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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation explains why and how urban Shanghainese are primarily 
commemorated in death as model socialist citizens despite the rise of individualism, the 
resurgence of religion, and current government opposition to socialist civil funerals since 
market reforms initiated in 1978. The study draws evidence from archival materials, 
interviews, and participant observation fieldwork between June 2010 and January 2012 
(including attendance at over 75 funerals). The Chinese Communist Party’s original 
funeral reforms, especially the promotion of socialist funerals, aimed at eliminating 
religious, affective, and relational ideas of self through the removal of “superstitious” 
elements, ritualized and externalized grief and mourning, and all horizontal ties among its 
citizens. The dead were thus envisioned as undifferentiated socialist subject-citizens 
directly tied to the party-state in socialist funerals.  
After the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the state began to 
discourage socialist funerals, while marketizing all state funeral parlors. Shanghai state 
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funeral parlors thus started to pursue “personalized” funerals commemorating the 
deceased as individuals. However, despite such moves, the socialist funeral has become 
the dominant form of commemoration. The dissertation argues that when death became a 
profit-making business, the government lost its moral capacity to dominate the subject 
formation of the dead. Shanghai people saw state parlors' effort to promote personalized 
funerals as simply another instance of profiteering. “Dying socialist” became a critique of 
the neoliberal regime, momentarily de-naturalizing the capitalist reality of Shanghai life.  
Meanwhile, the rise of semi-legal private funeral brokers mediating between the 
bereaved and state funeral parlors further pushed death into a moral vacuum.  
Simultaneously, these brokers also provided a new platform for the inclusion of 
traditional and religious funeral elements within socialist civil funerals. The thesis ends 
by considering two forms of socialist funerals—popular religious/Buddhist and Protestant 
versions—and their respective subject formation. The former seeks to add new frames 
alongside the socialist frame, while the latter seeks to supplant the socialist frame with an 
entirely different narrative. The first is pluralist and accommodative. The second is 
revolutionary, striving for a singular Protestant subjectivity to supplant the old socialist 
one. 
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Before it moved to its current location, the restaurant “Prosperity” was originally 
located directly across the street from the Longhua Cemetery of Revolutionary Martyrs 
(longhua lieshi lingyuan 龍華烈士陵園) in Shanghai.1 This cemetery is where the 
Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) veteran soldiers are buried and commemorated. Next 
to this martyrs’ cemetery is Longhua Temple (longhua si 龍華寺)—the largest and one 
of the four most famous ancient Buddhist temples in Shanghai.2 While the location of 
Prosperity generally attracted much foot traffic of people passing by due to the popularity 
of the Temple, for some reason all prior businesses to open on that particular spot had 
failed. After the owners of Prosperity took over the spot from previous shop owner, they 
decided to open a restaurant that targeted funeral banquets. Funeral banquets are known 
as “doufufan” (豆腐飯) in Shanghai. This is because one of the must-have dishes in such 
banquets is thick tofu soup. With roughly 10 million people living in Shanghai Proper,3 
there are only three city funeral parlors (binyiguan 殯儀館): Baoxin (寶興), Longhua (龍
華) and Yishan (益善) Funeral Parlors. All of them are administratively located under the 
Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau. Having a relationship with one of these three should 
ensure an easy, steady stream of business. Prosperity's decision to take up the funeral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Prosperity” is a pseudonym. For more regarding the anonymity of my research subjects, please 
see footnote 4 in this chapter.   
2 The other three are Yufo si (玉佛寺), Jing’an si (靜安寺), and Zhenru si (真如寺). 
3 As in 2014, the Shanghai Proper includes eight districts. They are Huangpu (黃浦), Xuhui (徐匯





banquet business was exactly in part because its location placed it next to Longhua 
Temple and only about a ten minute drive from Longhua Funeral Parlor. It was also in 
part because another funeral banquet restaurant had already been doing quite well nearby. 
They figured that Prosperity’s business should be able to quickly succeed. However, for 
whatever reason, once Prosperity opened up their business, like all the other businesses in 
that same place before them it simply wouldn't take off.  
 It is a common practice for restaurants in Shanghai to have a Laughing Buddha 
(xiaomianfo 笑面佛) or Wealth God (caishenye 財神爺) as their patron god. Prosperity, 
too, had a shrine for the Laughing Buddha in the beginning as well. However, since 
Prosperity’s business did not take off, the bosses switched to worshiping Guanyin (觀音), 
the Bodhisattva of Compassion instead. This Bodhisattva, too, unfortunately, failed to 
deliver the prosperity the owners had hoped for. Finally, running out of options, they 
decided to hire a fengshui master to take a look at the restaurant to see if there was 
anything that could be done to save it. The fengshui master came and almost immediately 
told the owners that Prosperity’s problem lay in having all of the spirits in the Longhua 
Cemetery of Revolutionary Martyrs just across the street. It also was not just about 
having general spirits to deal with; either Guanyin or the Laughing Buddha could have 
held those back. These spirits, however, were one and all Communist Party members and 
therefore must have been atheists. As such, regular gods or goddesses simply would not 
work. The communist spirits were not afraid of “superstitious” trickery. The only way to 
control these martyr-spirits was to have someone that they were actually afraid of. As a 




himself, the Chairman of their Party, to command them. Prosperity promptly replaced 
Guanyin with Chairman Mao in their shrine and their business boomed.  
 Prosperity's business was so good that they later had to move to another location 
with more space. In its current location, the Mao shrine is located prominently in the 
center of the front entryway. Most of its customers, however, come in through the back 
door because it connected directly to the nearby bus parking lot. Although the new 
location is far away from the martyrs’ cemetery, Prosperity not only kept Mao’s shrine in 
the restaurant, but expanded on the theme as well. When I visited Prosperity during my 
fieldwork, one of the long walls of the main dining area was decorated with the full text 
of one of Mao's most famous speeches, “Serve the People” (weirenminfuwu 為人民服務
). This speech was painted in beautiful black calligraphy on the white wall.  
 Serve the People is not only one of the most important texts that defines what 
being a model socialist means, but also is the first text under the CCP that asked Chinese 
people to have “memorial meetings” (zhuidaohui 追悼會). Contemporary memorial 
meetings in Shanghai are a kind of socialist civil funeral. While the Republican 
Nationalist government established memorial meetings earlier, the CCP modified them 
significantly under their rule. In these memorial meetings, everyone is memorialized as 
model socialist citizens through two highly stylized speeches: a “memorial speech” 
(daoci 悼詞), given by the deceased’s work unit, and a “thank you speech” (daxieci 答謝
詞), given by the chief mourner. I will analyze socialist memorial meetings in Chapter 7.  
 Since switching to the worship of Chairman Mao, Prosperity began to throw an 




practice in Chinese popular religion (minjian zongjiao 民間宗教). The main people who 
Prosperity’s boss invited to the banquet were funeral brokers (binzang zhongjie 殯葬中介
) instead of “state practitioners”—a term I use to describe people who work in state 
funeral parlors. Funeral brokers are private entrepreneurs who mediate between the 
bereaved and state practitioners. As I will discuss in Chapter 5, however, this relationship 
is complicated as the bereaved can also arrange their funerals directly through the state 
parlors. Funeral brokers must thus both cooperate with and compete against these same 
parlors. In fact, funeral brokers were only recently legalized in Shanghai, and Shanghai is 
one of only four jurisdictions in China to have done so. This annual banquet at Prosperity 
was meant to be a celebration of Prosperity’s host God, Chairman Mao, and also a thank 
you banquet for funeral brokers for introducing the bereaved to their restaurant for their 
funeral banquets.  
 The story of Prosperity's intriguing combination of communism and 
“superstition,” of atheist Mao as the only God able to control his atheist, martyred ghost 
followers, and of a capitalist banquet business combined with socialist civil funerals was 
heaven for me as an anthropologist. I once asked a funeral broker if he found that it made 
sense to have Chairman Mao in a funeral banquet restaurant. He told me that just as 
Chinese carpenters worship Lu Ban (魯班, 507-440 BCE) as their occupational patron 
god since he invented several carpenter crafts, it makes sense to have a funeral banquet 
restaurant that worships Mao because Mao invented the memorial meeting. While his 
statement about Mao “inventing” memorial meetings was not entirely correct, it did point 




meetings in the contemporary Chinese funeral industry and in contemporary urban death 
rituals.  
 I suggest in this dissertation that Prosperity's unique situation stems directly from 
contemporary Shanghai's particular conglomeration of changing political economic 
tensions in the funeral industry and agentive interactions between state parlors, private 
funeral brokers, and the bereaved. This dissertation, based on participant observation 
fieldwork and extensive interviews, explores this particular conglomeration, its related 
ethical sources and their respective processes of subject formation through changing 
funeral rituals. Finding such a conglomeration, complete with the ongoing critical role 
socialist memorial meetings play in it, is particularly intriguing because it was not at all 
what I had expected to find in contemporary urban Shanghai funerals.  
 Before I started my fieldwork, I had expected to find and follow two trends in 
death rituals in urban Shanghai: the emergence of personalized funerals and the revival of 
traditional Han Chinese funerals. The first expectation, for the emergence of personalized 
funerals, was based on a commonly observed phenomenon all over China—the rise of an 
individualized self as China moved away from high socialism and from a planned to a 
market economy (or what Deng Xiaoping called a “socialist market economy with 
Chinese characteristics”). Scholars have approached this process through a wide variety 
of theoretical angles. Some focus on individualization (Yan 2009), some focus on 
globalization and modernization (Link et al. 2002), and still others focus on privatizing 
processes (Hoffman 2006; Li and Ong 2008). Under these theoretical frameworks, 




2003), sexual cultures (Farrer 2002), televised love and homosexuality (Rofel 2007), 
talent centers (Hoffman 2006), and utilitarian individual networks (“guanxi”) (Kipnis 
1997; Yan 1996; Yang 1994). While these scholars differ as to whether this phenomenon 
should be interpreted as a triumph of individualism, globalization, and capitalism; as a 
loss of morality; or as a growing commensurability between neoliberal subjectivity and 
socialist-authoritarian states, there is a general consensus that a concept of an 
individualized, modern, or privatizing self has emerged in China.  
 Moreover, scholarly works in Euro-American arenas have long identified a close 
relationship between modernity, individualism, and an individualized self (Bellah et al. 
1985; Giddens 1991; Taylor 1989). This kind of individualized self is often expressed 
through the desire and pursuit of sincerity or authenticity or both (Anton 2001; Charles 
Lindholm 2008; Martin 1997; Seligman et al. 2008; Trilling 1972). Whether or not a 
person needs to be envisioned as some kind of autonomous and independent individual, 
the effort to be who they are and act accordingly is what matters here. It is the attempt to 
match the internal state of being and thinking to external behaviors that creates an 
“authentic” and “sincere” self. In this sense, I assumed that I would find increasing 
numbers of personalized funerals in urban Shanghai as more Chinese come to want a 
commemoration of their beloved as they were while they were alive. At the very least, I 
thought that I could find a strong desire for, if not actual moves toward, personalization 
and de-ritualization of funerals even if the number of personalized funerals were low. 
 My second expectation, which appears almost counter-intuitive to the first, was to 




among Han Chinese. Scholars have identified the formation of a standardized set of folk 
funeral elements at least since late imperial China even though they disagree as to 
whether correct thinking (orthodoxy) or correct performance (orthopraxy) was the major 
mechanism for standardization (Katz 2007; Rawski 1988; Sutton 2007; Szonyi 2007; 
Watson 1988a). One key characteristic of this standardized set of folk death ritual is 
ritualized wailing and weeping (Chau 2004; Johnson 1988; Oxfeld 2010; Stafford 2000; 
Standaert 2011; Watson 1982). In such a funeral, the bereaved construct the deceased as 
embedded in ancestor-descendent ties and as a continuing part of reciprocal relationships 
between the living and the dead. Through funerary rites and ancestor worship, the 
bereaved transform dead bodies into a symbol for the lineage’s fertility or as a segment of 
an eternal patriline at the end of life (Ahern 1973; Baker 1979; Brook 1989; Cohen 1976; 
Fei 1946; Freedman 1965; Fried 1953; Hsu 1971; Jordan 1972). In other words, 
traditional folk death ritual constructs religious and relational kinds of self.  
 As it turned out, however, and in spite of all of the literature to the contrary, both 
of these expectations (increasing prevalence of personalized and of folk funerals) were 
wrong. What I found in my fieldwork on urban Shanghai death ritual was that no matter 
whether the deceased was a humble retired worker, a petty capitalist, a university 
president, or a government official, they all were commemorated in memorial meetings. 
Every deceased person was lauded for their contributions to constructing the socialist 
Chinese state through verbal narrations of their employment history no matter how far the 
content of that work might appear to be from constructing socialism. The significance of 




attended over 75 full funerals and many more in part between June 2010 and January 
2011. All of them had memorial meetings as the core of their funerary rites. Personalized 
funerals and their associated individualized expression of grief and mourning only 
occurred when the death was an abnormal one (such as the death of a young child) or 
when the deceased was some kind of “cultural celebrity” (e.g., a film director). Traces of 
traditional Han Chinese funerals could indeed be observed, especially in Buddhist or 
popular religious versions of these memorial meetings, but these were really segregated, 
peripheral traces rather than main events. In other words, the kind of self articulated in 
contemporary Shanghai funerals is the following combination: 1) the absence of 
personalized selves and the repression of expressing emotions, 2) the central significance 
of socialist selves through memorial meetings, and 3) the marginality of religious and 
relational selves.   
 To give some idea of what memorial meetings look like, I am going to describe 
the first three funerals I attended after I started fieldwork. The very first one I attended 
was the funeral of a retired government official. This memorial meeting was held in the 
second largest memorial meeting hall of “Huangpu Funeral Parlor” with about three 
hundred mourners. This included the head of the Parlor as well as the head of the 
Shanghai Funeral and Interment Service Center (FIS) since the deceased was affiliated 
with the Civil Affairs Bureau, which supervises the funeral industry.4 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 I did participant observation in all three city funeral parlors and several suburban funeral parlors 
with one of them as my primary site. In other to keep specific places and people anonymous, 
when I refer to stories about particular persons or places I locate all of the different funeral 
parlors the stories take place within as “Huangpu Funeral Parlor” throughout my dissertation. In 




 At this funeral, the work unit representative’s speech narrated the deceased's life 
history. This included when and where the deceased was born and when, where, and how 
he had died as well as a chronological review of the deceased’s work history and the 
socialist ethics (such as selflessness and frugality) that the deceased had embodied. The 
son of the deceased then gave a thank you speech that sounded very much like the 
memorial speech. Although the socialist narratives seemed odd to my ears since it 
reminded me of the kind of speeches heard in Taiwan under martial law, it was not hard 
for me to understand having this kind of speech for a government official in China.  
 The second memorial meeting I attended, which was actually on the same day as 
my first, was for a sixty-year-old man. He was an ordinary retired worker. His funeral 
was in one of the smaller memorial meeting halls and there were about thirty attendees. 
The representative of the deceased’s work unit was a chubby woman in her forties or 
fifties. She used a plain, rather monotone voice to read the memorial speech without any 
emotion from a piece of paper. Then the daughter went up to give a thank you speech. 
She started thanking the leaders of her father’s work unit. And then she gave a thank you 
speech that also sounded identical to the memorial speech, just like the first memorial 
meeting I attended. Her voice was also flat and emotionless. Since I stood behind her (I 
was attending with a state practitioner), I saw that her speech was a pre-printed speech 
and that she had simply filled in the blanks on the paper. In the end of her thank you 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
when I describe public knowledge about funeral parlors, for example, that the two centrally 
located city funeral parlors in Shanghai are Longhua and Baoxin. As a result, my description of 
Hunagpu is inconsistent. For example, sometimes Hunagpu has cremators on site but sometimes 
Huangpu does not. This was because a new urban policy of the Shanghai government moved the 
cremators of the two city funeral parlors (Longhua and Baoxin) to the third one (Yishan). 




speech, she switched from talking to the audience about her father to talking directly to 
her father. I later found out that this is again a standard practice for thank you speeches. 
She said, “Father, how could you leave so suddenly?” At this moment, her voice 
suddenly started to break down a little bit. Though tears ran down her face, she again 
repressed them and finished up reading her thank you speech. I looked at my watch. It 
was 2:50 pm—only 10 minutes after we had started.  
 Several days later, I went to my third memorial meeting. The deceased was an old 
lady who died in her eighties. She was a housewife for her whole life. A representative 
from her Residential Committee (juweihui 居委會) gave a memorial speech. The 
Residential Committee is the lowest level grassroots Party organization in urban China 
that ties individuals directly to the state. Again, she was commemorated as a model 
socialist citizen in her memorial meeting in both the memorial speech and the thank you 
speech even though, like the deceased in the second memorial meeting, she was just an 
ordinary person. It was then that I started to see not only the format of the memorial 
meeting being repeated, but also the significance of socialism in commemorating a 
person regardless of her or his background. These findings surprised me even more once 
I realized that the CCP has been preventing people, especially government officials and 
Party members, from having socialist civil funerals since shortly after the end of the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Meanwhile, since the start of the economic reforms, 
Shanghai state funeral parlors have promoted personalized funerals. I tackle these issues 




 As a whole, this dissertation tackles how and why people die socialist in Shanghai 
after three decades of embracing market economy and how seemingly incompatible ideas 
of self co-exist such that the deceased is commemorated as a proper socialist citizen first 
and as a religious and/or relational subject second. In tackling this overarching question, I 
also explore the political economic structure of death ritual and the funeral industry that 
supports this particular conglomeration of dying socialist, religious, and relational. These 
structural and governing aspects are especially important for understanding the 
performance of these socialist civil rituals within a state monopolized, profit making 
institution (funeral parlors) in capitalist Shanghai where the socialist self is made the core 
of the self of the commemorated dead.5 
 
Death Ritual as a Site of Subject Formation 
 Anthropologists have long treated death ritual as something productive. For 
example, death ritual restores the normal flow of community life that was interrupted by 
death (cf. Durkheim 1965 [1912]); funerals help individuals to deal with psychological 
loss or fears associated with death (cf. Becker 1973; Malinowski 1948); funerals, as a rite 
of passage, transform the participants from one stage to the next (Turner 1969; Van 
Gennep 1960); and death ritual can be understood as a moral (social) obligation to attend 
to decaying biological bodies (Bloch and Perry 1982; Hertz 1960; Metcalf and 
Huntington 1979; 2000; Suzuki 2000). My research here explores one specific aspect of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Before I move on, I want to make it clear that when I describe Shanghai as capitalist, this does 
not mean that I see no difference between capitalism in liberal-democratic societies and in 
socialist-authoritarian societies. My intention here is rather to articulate the commonly accepted 




the societal obligation to attend (to) dead bodies. That is, how do the living create new 
identities for a dead person and what does this mean in its larger social context?  
 Recognizing the co-existence of the world of the living and that of the dead has 
meant that the identities of a subject continue to exist even after the biological end of life. 
Radcliffe-Brown (1930) calls this the “social personality” of the dead. In this sense, when 
a subject dies and becomes a dead body that is going to decay, it needs to acquire a new 
identification posthumously in socially and culturally recognizable ways. To put it in 
Hertz’s terms, death ritual is the society’s moral obligation to make decaying dead bodies 
culturally appropriate beings. In other words, decaying dead bodies force the living to re-
conceptualize their perceptions about the dead both in terms of who the dead were before 
and who the dead should be afterward. In China studies, ritual surrounding death have 
long been a key site to understand what being Chinese means considering the wide 
variety of religious ritual among various groups of people (and especially in relation to 
regional and class differences) (cf. Freedman 1974; Wolf 1974)  
 Yet, surprisingly, the productive nature of ritual in constructing the identities of 
the dead (and the living through the dead) has been largely absent in contemporary 
studies of subject formation. To simplify what is actually a very diverse set of research 
here, I think that there are generally two dominant approaches to the study of subject 
formation in anthropology. The first emphasizes how subjects are products of the 
interaction between (more or less) innate individual psyches (and their agentive action) 
and external political and economic structures (cf. Biehl, Good, and Kleinman 2007; 




subjectivity as emotional states of the subject, or to use Raymond Williams’ term, 
subjectivity consists of “structures of feelings” (Williams 1977). These works often 
present complicated and multi-layered accounts of the subjective experiences and 
feelings of subjects as subjects living in a world of “violence, political domination, and 
social suffering” (Biehl, Good, and Kleinman 2007). Luhrmann points out that such an 
emphasis stresses “the emotional experience of a political subject” (2006:346, italics are 
original). The second approach tends to stress how subjects become subjectified (parallel 
to the ways that an object becomes objectified) as external political and economic 
structures create subjects accordingly (cf. Ong and Collier 2005; Rabinow and Rose 
2006; Rudnyckyj 2010; Yan H. 2003). These authors tend to define subjectivity as 
“subjectification” (French: “subjectivation”) and their works often present cohesive and 
at times encompassing accounts of how external forces, governments especially, turn 
people into governable subjects. The first approach often seeks theoretical inspiration 
from psychoanalysis or other parts of psychological anthropology and the latter often 
finds their tools through Michel Foucault and his concepts of biopower and 
governmentality or other scholars of critical theory.  
 To some degree, the need to choose such an either-or epistemological position 
(whether as assumption to start with or as conclusion to end with) is at least partly due to 
methodological constraints. That is, scholars usually study subjectivity at the intersection 
between an individual subject and structure (whether or not this subject is individualized 
and individuated) through either a top-down (subjectification) or bottom up 




homogeneous. Although a psychosocial approach is more likely to leave space for 
ambiguity and plurality, it still may fall into this epistemological dilemma—the subject is 
either “empty or not” to begin with. This is not to mention that the shaping processes 
might be hierarchically top-down or bottom-up sometimes, and at other times various 
processes might simply exist in competition or juxtaposition.  
 Sherry Ortner discusses her own engagement with subjectivity with a critical 
balancing act: “By subjectivity I will mean the ensemble of modes of perception, affect, 
thought, desires, fear, and so forth that animate acting subjects. But I will always mean as 
well the cultural and social formations that shape, organize, and provoke those modes of 
affect, thought, and so on” (2005:31). Building on and exploring in detail the second part 
of Ortner’s definition—“the cultural and social formations that shape, organize, and 
provoke those modes of affect [and] thought”—this dissertation takes Biehl, Good, and 
Kleinman’s emphasis on political subjects in understanding subjectivity as its departing 
point. Specifically, I propose here a methodological shift of focus from examining 
individual experiences to beginning with a middle ground, ritual, by treating ritual as a 
productive “rhizome” (Deleuze and Guattari 1980). Robert Weller (2006) in Discovering 
Nature proposes a theoretical approach to studying the flow of power, ideas, and 
practices between the global and the local with examples from environmental movements 
in Taiwan and China. He suggests seeing these “nodes of power” as creative sites where 
different (yet particular) ideas and practices about environmentalism meet at confluences 
and are remixed. I suggest that by re-orienting our site of exploration to ritual as a node, 




externalized, conventional, and repetitive acts and where governing power and other 
normative forces interact with each other.  
 Consequently, by “subjectivity” here I mean the condition of being a subject as 
realized and expressed in a ritual node. In this particular rhizome, the living (re)creates 
new identities of and for the dead. It is in this sense that I propose to study subject 
formation through death ritual; funerals are where the living actualize their social 
obligation to attend to the dead. This can simultaneously shed light on the subject 
formation of the living. Specifically, through exploring the connection between ritual and 
subjectivity, I argue that it is through the rituals created and enacted in the frictional 
relationships between state funeral practitioners, private funeral brokers, and the bereaved 
that the public definition of the self of the deceased is made. While this does not replace a 
psychosocial understanding of subjectivity, this shift does provide a perspective to 
research plural processes of subject formation, their interaction, their potential for 
conflict, and the ambiguity of what being a subject means.  
 
Doing Fieldwork on Death in Urban China  
 Despite the increasing amount of work on the contemporary resurgence of 
religion in China, we have very little data on contemporary Chinese funerary practices in 
general and urban death rituals in particular. Many ethnographies of China may have a 
chapter or a section covering contemporary rural funerals in the post reform era (Chau 
2006; Liu 2000; Oxfeld 2010; Siu 1989), but even these short treatments tend to have 




funerals (Aveline-Dubach 2012; Bellocq 2012; Goossaert and Palmer 2011; Ikels 2004; 
Kawaguchi 2012; Whyte 1988).  
 To some degree, this lack of data is associated with social scientists’ imagination 
of what “Chineseness” means. Many simply considered urban death ritual not to be 
“really” Chinese and therefore not worth studying if we want to understand “Chinese 
Culture.” A professor in China once asked me why I even wanted to do fieldwork in 
urban Shanghai if I wanted to study Chinese funerals. He said, why didn't you go to a 
rural village? In fact, even my funeral professional informants thought the same thing. 
Many told me that if I wanted to study “(Han) Chinese Funerals,” I should go to the 
countryside. Some directly told me that there is no “Chinese Culture” in urban Shanghai 
funerals. Some even told me that if I wanted to study traditional (Han) “Chinese 
Funerals,” I really should go back to Taiwan to do my research.  
 However, if we accept that there is no need to assume some kind of essence for 
Chinese culture, then urban Han Chinese cultural and social practices are just as 
“Chinese” (or just as “Un-Chinese”) as their rural counterparts. The question of what is 
(are) the kind(s) of subject that is (are) formed in contemporary urban death ritual would 
then be just as important (if not more so due to population concentrations) in 
understanding what being Chinese means today. After all, the CCP has brought about 
dramatic and rapid changes in handling dead bodies and performing death rituals in urban 
China. Does this mean that we therefore see different kinds of subjects being constructed 




 Furthermore, this insufficiency in the ethnography of death is also at least partly a 
result of methodological constraints. Finding the dead (and, therefore, the bereaved) was 
one of the key difficulties that I also faced in conducting deliberate ethnographic research 
on funerals and death. For a specific focus on death, a traditional village or community 
study will not work because there is no guarantee of observing death and funerals within 
a small population at any particular time. This is why the vast majority of anthropological 
studies on death and funerals in China have been anthropologists who went there to study 
something else. Then, when a funeral did occur, they wrote about it as a part of their 
understanding of the larger networks and meanings of social life in that community. Were 
they to have been thought to be primarily studying death, few people would have wanted 
them around. Of course, some special groups of people or institutions such as hospices or 
nursing homes for the elderly might provide access with a higher probability of 
witnessing death, yet the anthropologist in such a case is likely to be seen herself as evil 
or immoral because she comes to wait for people to die (unless, that is, her goal is instead 
to study the process of dying). This is not even to mention the moral and ethical issues of 
the research itself here.  
 This is part of the reason that this study necessarily focuses more on the funeral 
professionals than the bereaved and why I chose funeral parlors as my main field site. 
While in this choice I lost some access to the complicated networks and meanings of the 
social life of the deceased and the bereaved, as Clifford Geertz (1973) illustrates in his 
famous analysis of the death of a Javanese boy, I gained access to a wide variety of 




normal and abnormal deaths and their respective funerals. This wide variety provides a 
spectrum for understanding death ritual in urban Shanghai that details but also goes 
beyond individual cases.  
 Most important of all, this focus on funeral professionals opens up the possibility 
of studying the political economy of death and the death industry as well as the subject 
formation process of this particular group of people who have long been seen as morally 
ambiguous in Chinese contexts. To be clear, paid funeral professionals have been crucial 
in folk death ritual in Chinese societies at least since late imperial times (Watson 1988 b). 
Yet, this focus on funeral professionals is even more crucial today since individual 
households and communities no longer handle death in contemporary urban China. The 
removal of death and dying from domestic spaces and personal experience and its 
placement in the hands of professional institutions (like hospices, hospitals, nursing 
homes, and funeral parlors) is not particularly unique to Shanghai. Urbanization and its 
consequent erasure of death from the social gaze have been observed in many other 
places as well (for the American case, see Laderman 2003; for the French case, see Aries 
1974).  
 As I mentioned briefly above, “funeral professionals” in Shanghai include “state 
practitioners” who work in funeral parlors and “funeral brokers” who are private 
entrepreneurs. While the Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau owns all three city funeral 
parlors, civil affairs bureaus at district levels own their respective suburban funeral 
parlors. Prior to 1998, the Funeral and Interment Administration (FIA), under the Civil 




management of the city funeral parlors has been passed on to the Shanghai Funeral and 
Interment Service Center (FIS).  
 Institutionally speaking, funeral parlors and FIS are both kinds of shiye danwei (
事業單位 )—a term that is usually translated as “public institution” or “service 
organization.” Shiye danwei, prior to the Opening Up, would have been categorized as 
semi-governmental non-profit organizations based on American categorizations (Pearson 
2007). However, since the Opening Up, administrating bureaus have asked all shiye 
danwei to become financially independent if not profit making. Funeral parlors are no 
exception to this. This was why, when I first arrived, I was given the impression that 
funeral parlors were a kind of state enterprise (guoying qiye 國營企業) instead. I will 
discuss funeral parlors and their marketization in Chapter 4.    
 Nevertheless, funeral parlors have remained a state monopoly since 
marketization. To use my informants’ words, this means that state practitioners do not 
need to “go out to find the dead” since funeral parlors are the only possible destination 
for dead bodies. In contrast, funeral brokers are “self-employed households or 
individuals” (getihu 個體戶 ) fully submerged in China’s market economy. They 
therefore have to go out to find the dead before they arrive at the funeral parlors. Funeral 
brokers have to persuade the bereaved to hire them as brokers even though these 
bereaved could just as easily go to a funeral parlor directly instead. I describe how funeral 
brokers went about finding dead bodies in Chapter 5. In an almost black comedy sense, 
funeral brokers’ primary task was not that different from mine as an anthropologist doing 




 State practitioners in funeral parlors and funeral brokers share a very complicated 
relationship. They have collaborator, competitor, and governor-governed relations all at 
the same time. I mentioned their difference here because I started my fieldwork primarily 
working with state practitioners in funeral parlors without knowing that they were also 
basically a part of the government beforehand. My first stage of participant observation in 
Huangpu did not go well from the very first day precisely due to my ignorance of 
hierarchy in state institutions and office politics. During this time, I mainly sat with state 
practitioners in the sales department. I sat through countless business meetings with state 
practitioners to observe how they talked to the bereaved, how they made funeral 
arrangements and what they thought about the industry, funeral parlors, and urban death 
ritual. This was also the same time I started to get to know funeral brokers. While I 
eventually figured out the power issues at play in Huangpu and built rapport with some 
state practitioners, I never did manage to navigate my way through the interpersonal 
politics of what was essentially a government bureau fraught with stratified and 
monetized tensions.6  Doing fieldwork in China is probably never easy, but doing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ever since I started my fieldwork in Huangpu, I had a nagging recollection of a famous political 
catch phrase in Taiwan—“a little white rabbit accidentally fell into a jungle.” In 2002, after Chen 
Shuibian (陳水扁) was elected President of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan for the first 
time, he invited Zong Caiyi (宗才怡), the then chief accountant of Poway, California to be the 
Minister of Economic Affairs of the ROC. Zong resigned after only 48 days in power as she 
could not handle the furious interpellation from legislators. She became the shortest lived minister 
in the history of the ROC in Taiwan. This record was broken in 2013 when the Minister of 
National Defense resigned after a mere six days in power. On her resigning statement, she 
described herself as “a little white rabbit accidentally fell into a jungle.” I do not have any 
particular opinion about this politician, but I did think that the statement gave people a chance to 
repeat their prejudices against female politicians. However, eight years later when I desperately 
tried to find my way in a Shanghai funeral parlor, this joke became my reality. No matter what 
kind of feminist pride I had, I felt that I was a trapped rabbit in bureaucratic politics where I had 




fieldwork in a state institution definitely made it worse.  
  I eventually shifted my base of fieldwork to primarily working with funeral 
brokers after seven months. This was the second stage. In the next twelve months, I 
worked with funeral brokers from four different companies. I spent most of my time with 
funeral brokers from Longevity Funeral Ritual Service Company. Among Longevity’s 
funeral brokers, I especially worked with Chen Ting (the owner of Longevity), Chen Yu 
(Chen Ting’s younger sister), and Tang An (Chen Yu’s husband). These funeral brokers 
were my key informants. Working with funeral brokers meant that in addition to sitting 
through business meetings conducted in their offices, I also followed them to where the 
bereaved live to observe business meetings. Also, I spent a lot of time attending memorial 
meetings in the parlors. I helped brokers at Longevity to set up memorial meetings and 
stood through memorial meetings with them. Some days I even attended three memorial 
meetings in a row. I also accompanied brokers to take the bereaved to various funeral 
banquet restaurants after memorial meetings since this was the end of their routine jobs. 
The bereaved usually did not invite funeral professionals to join in the banquets.  
 Accompanying funeral brokers in Longevity through their routine work was an 
important way for me to learn about both the Shanghai funeral industry and death ritual, 
but I also often found myself learning just as much (if not more) from having lunch with 
them in their office. While we ate our respective homemade lunch boxes, we exchanged 
personal stories, stories about particular customers, and gossiped about particular state 
practitioners in funeral parlors or other funeral brokers. 




interact with funeral practitioners since Shanghai people, by law, could only have their 
funerals in a parlor—they could not just host funerals on the street like people in rural 
China and other smaller Chinese cities do. Rather than distancing myself from the funeral 
parlors, as it turned out, this switch helped me to understand them from a very different 
perspective. I actually came to know more, as a whole, about funeral parlors, their 
internal and external politics, and their position within the wider Shanghai funeral 
industry after the switch than prior to it.  
 Another part of my participant observation fieldwork involved observing religious 
rituals at temples, at the deceased’s homes, as well as during burial and worship rituals in 
cemeteries. These religious rituals are either Buddhist or Daoist salvation ceremonies 
(most of them were Buddhist). I also conducted interviews with Buddhist monks, Daoist 
priests, and Protestant pastors. I discuss religious variations on the socialist civil funeral 
in Chapters 8 and 9 specifically.   
 In addition to these participant observation methods mentioned above, I also 
conducted ten life history interviews and numerous semi-structured interviews. Three of 
them were with senior state practitioners who joined funeral parlors prior to the Cultural 
Revolution. Among these three, two were in Shanghai and one was in Hunan Province. 
The rest were with state practitioners and funeral brokers. I also conducted semi-
structured interviews with scholars, government officials, and industry leaders who were 
related to funeral governance or the death industry. This included people from private 
commercial cemeteries (in Shanghai and Hunan), religious organizations (Shanghai), 




Provinces, and some funeral parlor directors and brokers from Hunan and Sichuan 
Provinces.  
 Finally, I did archival research at the library of the Chinese Funeral and Interment 
Profession in Shanghai and documented the exhibit contents of the Shanghai Funeral 
Museum. The writing of Chapters 2 and 3 as well as part of Chapter 4 was based on these 
primary sources collected in the archive. Most of these sources are internal governmental 
documents of the Funeral and Interment Administration prior to the Cultural Revolution. 
    
Chapter Summaries 
 My dissertation unpacks the specific co-existence of socialism, religion, and other 
folk ideas of death and dead bodies through this socialist civil funeral and its variations in 
urban Shanghai. Part I of the dissertation explores the political economy of death. Part I 
contains four chapters that respectively explore the history of funeral parlors prior to the 
Opening Up, funeral parlors since marketization, and the rise of private funeral brokers in 
Shanghai. I begin in Chapter 2 by laying out the “scope” of funerals, funeral governance, 
and the death industry under the CCP. Specifically, I argue that funeral governance under 
the first few years after the immediate take over was aimed at cleaning up dead bodies 
with an intention to prove the CCP’s capacity to govern (in contrast to the failures of the 
Japanese-backed and ROC governments). Chapter 3 argues that death became a project 
of state moral governance prior to the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1978 by 
analyzing how the Shanghai government nationalized the funeral industry and promoted 




and individualized socialist subject-citizens directly tied to the party-state.  
 In Chapter 4, I describe how the introduction of a market economy in general and 
China’s preparation for its entry into the WTO in particular commenced another rapid 
economic restructuring of state funeral parlors in Shanghai. State practitioners 
transformed their roles from officials responsible for constructing the bereaved as 
political subjects to entrepreneurs caring about profit and “customer satisfaction.” Over 
the course of these changes, death has fallen from its position as a moral project to an 
economic one capable of generating profit for the Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau. As a 
result, the government lost its legitimacy to dominate subject formation. 
 Moreover, in the middle of such rapid moral and economic transformations of 
death and the funeral industry, has seen the rise of semi-legal funeral brokers who are 
situated in a structurally fragile and middle location of the Shanghai death industry. In 
deploying their “edge ball politics” (meaning pushing the envelope) to gain a piece of the 
market, they brought about two unintended consequences: they further pushed death into 
a moral vacuum on the one hand and provided a platform for the partial resurgence of 
traditional funerals on the other. I describe this dual process of making death both amoral 
and moral in Chapter 5.    
 Part II tackles how death could be analyzed as a site of subject formation. It 
contains four chapters. Each chapter deals with a particular aspect of funerals and the 
kind of ideas of self that are associated with these. Specifically, I analyze personalized 
funerals and neoliberal subjectivity in Chapter 6, memorial meetings and socialist 




memorial meetings and religious as well as relational subjectivity in Chapter 8, and in 
Chapter 9, Protestant variations of memorial meeting and Protestant subjectivity.      
 Chapter 6 describes funeral parlors’ efforts to promote personalized funerals. As a 
reaction to the economic restructuring and the rise of funeral brokers detailed in Chapters 
4 and 5, contemporary state funeral parlors began to promote personalized funerals that 
commemorate the deceased as autonomous and unique individuals. As opposed to 
religious or folk alternatives to standard socialist memorial meetings, such funerals are 
secular, modern, and more profitable. Their promotional efforts, however, have largely 
failed. This is because the bereaved see personalized services as simply another attempt 
at profiteering, and profiteering through death has become a real public concern since 
2000.  
 In spite of the state funeral parlors’ promotion of personalized funerals, Shanghai 
people continue to die socialist through the performance of modernist bodily movements 
(such as bows rather than prostrations) and stylized socialist verbal utterances (memorial 
speeches) in memorial meetings. I describe the formation and popularization of memorial 
meetings in Chapter 7. While it was the government’s monopolization of dead bodies that 
allowed the original expansion of dying socialist, I argue that dying socialist, ironically, 
is now critique: the bereaved entering the socialist frame of the memorial meeting 
momentarily de-naturalizes the capitalist reality of Shanghai life. As the state itself 
promotes “market” governance and personalized commemoration, actual opposition to 
the state is less linked to capitalism or liberal democratic values. Instead, it is more 




 Chapters 8 and 9 then tackle the shape that alternatives to this memorial meeting 
ritual have taken and what this might mean for subject formation. While the majority of 
Shanghai people continue to die socialist today, they do not only die socialist. By 
performing religious rituals (chanting and giving offerings) and gift exchange (via funeral 
banquets) before and after (but not during) memorial meetings, the bereaved added 
Buddhist subjectivity, popular religious subjectivity, and guanxi subjectivity to the 
memorial meeting's dominant socialist subjectivity in a way similar to how prefaces and 
appendices might be added to a socialist book. In other words, what we see today is that 
Shanghai people seek conventionally shared plural subjectivities based, first, on socialism 
and, second, on religious moralities and reciprocal obligations that define what being a 
person means at the end of life. Chapter 8 analyzes these processes.  
 Chapter 9 discusses Protestant memorial meetings as one exception to this 
appendix-book format because rather than enabling plural subjectivities to co-exist 
alongside the socialist one, Protestants have attempted to create their own collectively 
shared singular subjectivity. They do so by creating a new frame to “encase” the 
meeting’s original socialist framing. This therefore has led to more conflict in Protestant 
memorial meetings than in those with modifications by other religious influences in 
Shanghai funeral parlors today.  
 Overall, in addition to contributing to China studies through my ethnography and 
history of a modern, urban funeral industry that few have written about, my dissertation 
sheds light on studies of ritual change, religious ethics, subjectivity and governance. With 




results disentangle the often taken for granted connections between subjectivity and 
governance as well as neoliberalism and neoliberal subjects. I identify both possible 
alternatives to late-socialist neoliberal subjectivity and the mechanisms that have 
produced these alternatives. Moreover, I not only identify how capitalist and non-
capitalist ethics are enacted in ritual and economy, but also illustrate under what 
conditions such ethical tensions articulate, when they may even be emphasized, and how 
these enable ritual change and alternate ways of defining people. My focus on ritual and 
its relation to governance and the political economic structures of the industry advances 
our understandings of critical contemporary issues by providing an in-depth account of 
how ritual change happens in the context of a developing country in a dense urban area, 










CHAPTER 2  MODERN GOVERNANCE ON DEATH7 
 
 On March 14, 1955, the Funeral and Interment Administration (FIA) submitted a 
document to the Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau —two years after the Civil Affairs 
Bureau took over the FIA from the Health Bureau. The FIA asked the Civil Affairs 
Bureau to approve one of the two propaganda samples in the document.  The FIA could 
then print out the chosen one as campaign material and disseminate it through the local 
Public Security Offices (police stations) and lilong (里弄, linong in Mandarin, meaning 
residential alleyway) associations to further reduce the number of exposed corpses on the 
streets. These two samples were:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This chapter, the next, and Chapter 4 are primarily based on archival materials I collected in the 
Library of the Chinese Funeral and Interment Profession (abbr. CFIPL hereafter) located in the 
Longhua Funeral Parlor in Shanghai in addition to secondary Chinese sources and my own 
fieldwork interviews. The CFIPL has a collection of original government documents mainly 
issued by the FIA between the 1930s and 1965. My informant told me that the CFIPL was more 
of a by-product when the Shanghai Funeral and Interment Service Center (FIS) established its 
Shanghai Funeral Museum (opened in 2008). These original documents were previously stored in 
bags in the basement of the FIA. When the FIS decided to establish the Shanghai Funeral 
Museum (also located in the Longhua Funeral Parlor), a group of people (some of whom were 
from funeral parlors and some from the Shanghai Funeral Culture Research Institute) took these 
documents out of the basement for the Museum. Other original documents in the CFIPL archives 
were personal belongings of the previous chairs of the FIA. In addition to these original 
documents, the CFIPL also has copied documents retained from the Shanghai Municipal 
Archives. These documents were collected as part of their effort to build the Museum. All of 
these documents were loosely stored in folders but had not been cataloged in the CFIPL. These 
archive materials were meant to serve only as references for the people building the Museum. As 
far as I know, the archival materials in the CFIPL archive are not yet known to English readers 
(and probably only known to a very few Chinese readers), I have translated some excerpts at 
length as they serve my ethnographic or theoretical purposes. In addition to these archival 
materials, CFIPL also has a collection of published books on death (primarily in Chinese), 




Don’t Casually Dump Dead Children’s Bodies 
After a person dies, his/her body will soon decompose. The process of 
decomposition is the best time for spreading germs around. The bodies of those 
who died from contagious diseases pose even higher risk. This is even more so in 
urban areas where the population is dense. Today, some citizens do not 
understand this danger [of dumping bodies] and the proper protocol [of corpse 
disposal] so they casually dump dead children’s bodies on the streets. It has 
become an extreme threat to our city, its environmental hygiene, and the 
appearance of the city. In order to correct such bad habits, we hope that all 
citizens would work together. When such an unfortunate event happens, please 
call any nearby [funeral] branch or us. We will send a car to pick up the body.  
 
March 14, 1955. Shanghai Funeral Service Station 
Propaganda Sample I 
 
Further Eliminating Body Dumps  
Body dumping is a bad habit leftover from previous counter-revolutionary 
governments. Since Liberation, the People’s Government cares about the 
suffering of the people so it tries its best to facilitate the handling of children’s 
bodies. As a result, body dumps have decreased. This has positive effects on 
urban hygiene and the appearance of the city. In order to further eliminate body 
dumps, we hope that all citizens work together to help us. If you encounter such 
issues, please call any of our branches or us.  
 
March 14, 1955. Shanghai Funeral Service Station 
Propaganda Sample II8 
 
 The document accompanying these samples states: “Our city still faces a serious 
issue in regards to the matter of exposed bodies. Taking January and February [1955] as 
an example, there were totally 5,177 exposed bodies in January. This is an average of 172 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Due to the limitations of the archive, I don’t know which propaganda sample, if any, the Civil 
Affairs Bureau actually approved in the end. Who wrote the campaign materials? Why did she or 
he or they write two versions with one focusing on hygiene and the other focusing on politics? 
Writing after the Three-Anti’s (anti-corruption, anti-waste, and anti-bureaucracy) and the Five-
Anti’s (anti-bribery, anti-tax evasion, anti-state property theft, anti-cheating on government 
contracts, and anti-stealing state economic information) movements that ended the short-lived 
liberty that Shanghai enjoyed during the immediate time after the CCP’s takeover (the end of 
“liberty” after the “liberation”?) as well as in the midst of one of the most intense points of the 
“socialist transformation” that eventually nationalized agricultural, handicraft, and capitalist 
industries in China (the so-called First Five Year Plan 1953-1956 ), perhaps the writers were 




bodies per day. Although the number of exposed bodies decreased in February, there 
were still 3,465 exposed bodies. That’s at least 115 bodies per day. Many citizens do not 
understand the proper handling procedures or the special institutions that collect bodies, 
so they casually toss children’s bodies on the streets. This has seriously influenced the 
hygiene and appearance of our city. In order to further eliminate body dumping, we need 
to increase our propaganda. We propose to print out one sample to disseminate.”9  
 These two excerpts reflect two very different concerns within the governance of 
death in China. The first propaganda sample focuses on hygiene, describing the danger of 
abandoning dead bodies on the streets largely in terms of disease and public health. The 
second, while mentioning health, focuses instead on the key words of the Communist 
Revolution, on Liberation and the ongoing need for a revolution in the habits of the 
people from those of the counter-revolutionary (or “feudalistic”) past to those of a People 
working together for the glory of Socialist China. These two documents also mark a 
critical moment in the history of funeral governance in Shanghai. Only a few years 
earlier, responsibility for funeral governance had been shifted from the responsibility of 
the Health Bureau to that of the Civil Affairs Bureau. As I discuss below, this marks the 
re-emergence of funeral governance as a key site for the creation of proper socialist 
subjects.  
 To understand this shift, however, it is important to first understand the historical 
scope of funerals in China, the circumstances under which a “modern” funeral industry 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Shanghai Funeral and Interment Administration 上海市殯葬管理處.1953. “Guanyu loushi 
chuli de xuanchuan ji cheshi shou fe biaozhun wenti baoqing heshi” 關於露屍處理的宣傳及車
屍收費標準問提報請核示 [Regarding the propaganda of handling exposed bodies and fees for 




emerged in Shanghai, and the significant reasons behind the CCP's early emphasis on 
health in terms of funeral governance. In this chapter, I first provide a brief overview of 
the birth of the Chinese death industry in general and of the Shanghai death industry in 
particular. These two are intertwined because Shanghai was the birthplace of the modern 
Chinese death industry. This background helps to explain what some of the modern 
funeral institutions were like in Shanghai before the Communist takeover in 1949. This is 
important because these institutions were the objects of funeral governance after the CCP 
consolidated its power (roughly around 1955)—something I discuss in detail in the next 
chapter. As a direct result of this funeral governance both funerals as rituals and the 
funeral industry itself were fundamentally changed.  
 The second part of this chapter describes what funeral governance entailed around 
the time of the regime change. I argue that before the CCP consolidated its power the 
object of funeral governance was dead bodies instead of funeral institutions. By 
displaying the Communist Party’s ability to remove dead bodies from public space—
something that the Republican government failed to do, the CCP established its 
legitimacy and ability to govern as sovereign through its governance of death and dead 
bodies.     
 
The Scope of “Funerals” in China 
 Chinese death ritual contains three interrelated sets of rituals: ceremonies of bin (
殯), zang (葬), and ji (祭). Bin, originally referred to keeping a coffin in a temporary 




is actually a much more commonly used word. Bin ceremonies (binli 殯禮), or sang 
ceremonies (sangli 喪禮), are rituals conducted during the period of time after death and 
prior to burial. This traditionally included preparing bodies for body burial, managing 
pollution, presenting offerings, mourning and hosting mourners, making arrangements for 
follow up rituals and so on. Zang meant to inter or to bury. Zang ceremonies (zangli 葬禮
) are rituals conducted at the gravesite. While both bin and zang ceremonies are 
prescribed, Rubie Watson (1988) argues that grave rites (zang ceremonies) are more 
flexible and therefore more open to political manipulation. 
 Chubin (出殯), the funeral procession, literally denotes the leaving of the place 
where the body was encoffined. It is the transition between bin and zang. If we see death 
ritual as a whole in terms of liminality, then chubin was a liminal moment within a larger 
liminal period. It is also the last appearance of the corpse in an area of the general public. 
As the dead bodies move through the streets and are surrounded by mourners they are 
encountered by whomever happens to be passing by, reminding those people of the 
presence and reality of death. Chubin were both the defining moment and the most 
spectacular part of funerals throughout imperial China, the Republic of China (the ROC, 
1911-1949, also known as the Republicans, Nationalists, or the KMT), and the period 
immediately after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC, also known 
as the Communists, or the CCP). The process of moving from bin to zang was meant to 
ensure a proper transition for the deceased in at least two senses: as a way of properly 
leaving the community of the living (this world) and entering the world of the dead (the 




spirits. Performing rituals correctly transformed dead bodies with their potential for 
powerful pollution into ancestors who, as a part of an eternal patriline might eventually 
grant material wealth, benevolent guardianship, and luck to the deceased's living 
descendants.  
 As a result of this transformation, the final part of Chinese death rituals is ji. Ji 
means to offer sacrifice. In the context of death ritual, ji particularly refers to ancestor 
worship. Ji assures the continuous renewal of the relationship between the living 
descendants and their deceased ancestors even long after biological death. Overall, death 
rituals were the temporal and spatial sites where the grieving family showed their filial 
piety, displayed their wealth and status, exchanged gifts in public, and repaired the 
disruption of normal community life caused by death.  
 In contemporary China, funeral governance is called “the administration of bin 
and zang” (binzang guanli). The death industry is called the binzangye (殯葬業), the 
industry for bin and zang. My own research here is primarily a story of bin ritual, bin 
governance, and the bin industry in contemporary China. For reading convenience, I call 
these three things funeral ritual, funeral governance, and the death (or funeral) industry 
respectively throughout the dissertation.   
 
The Birth of the Modern Death Industry 
 Shanghai is one of four independent municipalities in China today. The other 
three are Beijing, Tianjin, and Chongqing. In the Chinese administrative system, 




city of Washington or New York City being granted the same rights as the states of, say, 
Virginia and New York). Prior to the CCP’s takeover, Shanghai was the commercial and 
financial center of China. It emerged out of a sleepy, rather low-population area into this 
position as it became a treaty port in 1843 after the Treaty of Nanjing when the Qing 
Empire lost the First Opium War. International powers soon set up various settlements 
outside of the old City Wall. Eventually, the International Settlement was established in 
1845 and the French Concession in 1849.10 Within the old City Walls was the Chinese 
Administration Area. 11  These semi-colonizers and their associated international 
influences and businesses turned Shanghai from a small fishing village to a city of 
immigrants known as the “Pearl of the Far East.”  
 Meanwhile, these semi-colonizers also made Shanghai the birthplace of the 
modern Chinese death industry. Modern funeral institutions such as funeral homes 
(binyiguan 殯儀館, literally meaning bin ritual hall), modern commercial crematoria 
(huozanchang 火葬場), and commercial public cemeteries (gongmu) were all first 
established in Shanghai as those semi-colonizers needed to handle the deaths of their 
people. In the following sections, I provide descriptions of these modern funeral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The International Settlement was first ruled solely by the British with the French and 
Americans all joining later. Still later, the French decided to have their own concession. The 
British and Americans' then jointly-governed institution in the International Settlement was called 
the Municipal Council. 
11 This was ruled by the Qing government until 1911 when the regime changed over to the 
Republicans until 1949. The Republican rule was interrupted when the Sino-Japanese War broke 
out. The Japanese army occupied the Chinese Administration area from 1937 and then supported 
a puppet regime to rule this area. The International Settlement and French Concessions remained 
nominally unoccupied until 1941 when the Pacific War broke out. In 1943, the British and 
Americans reached an agreement with the Republicans and therefore ended their claims to rights 
over their concession. This move, however, was more symbolic than practical since the 




institutions’ entrance into China.  
 The British established the “Shandong Road Foreigner Cemetery”(Shandonglu 
waiguo gongmu 山東路外國公墓) in 1844. This was the first commercial public 
cemetery in Shanghai. It was for foreigners who died in China. The first commercial 
public cemetery for Chinese was not built until 1909.12 Prior to the establishment of 
Chinese public cemeteries, Chinese people who died in Shanghai and who could afford 
proper burial were transported back to their hometowns and then buried there. I will 
return to this point a bit later.  
 Traditional Chinese cemeteries are private or lineage based places.  Though 
lineage based cemeteries have more than one single nuclear family buried there (and 
though the extent of “actual” blood relationships between lineage members in the largest 
of these cemeteries could be quite small), they were corporate cemeteries (Cohen 1990). 
Thus, they were quite unlike commercial public cemeteries whose plots sold for a fee to 
almost anyone. Another kind of traditional “public” cemetery were “charity cemeteries” 
(yizhongdi 義塚地) in the sense that people who were buried there were, indeed, 
unrelated. People who died in Shanghai but could not afford the postmortem trip home 
were often buried by their relatives in charity cemeteries run by their native place 
association so that these poor souls would be at least buried on their hometown’s 
property. In Shanghai, one of the most famous cases of this was the charity cemetery of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In 1909, a businessman named Jing Runshan (經潤山) bought 20 acres of land for building a 
cemetery in Hongqiao, Xujiahui. This land was later confiscated for railroad construction. His 
wife, Wang Guozhen (汪國貞) later bought land in Zhanghong Road and started Xielu Garden 
Wanguo Public Mausoleum. This was the first for-profit cemetery for Chinese. See Shanghai 




siming gongsuo (四明公所), the Ningbo (寧波) Native-Place Association (Bryna 
Goodman 1995).13  
 Though charity cemeteries seem to be somewhat closer to the model of the new 
modern public cemetery, these were places that no one really chose to be buried in. They 
were where people without identification, with identification but without family, or with 
identifiable families but without financial means were buried. Historically, charity 
cemeteries (and lineage cemeteries as well), lacking proper care by the living, often 
became “cemeteries of no name” or luanzanggang (亂葬崗 ), literally meaning a 
chaotically buried cemetery. Without proper identification and without descendents’ 
worship, these “cemeteries of no name” became the main playgrounds of wandering and 
unattached ghosts, dangerous places altogether different from an ancestor’s final resting 
spot.   
 As for crematoria, in 1896 the Municipal Council of the International Settlement 
established Jing'an Temple Cemetery with a crematorium attached.14  This Council 
established the “Cemetery Department” under its Health Committee thirty years earlier in 
1866. The Cemetary Department was actually the first funeral governing institution in 
Shanghai. The crematorium in Jing'an Temple Cemetery was the first modern 
commercial crematorium in Shanghai.  
 To be clear, cremation was not foreign in a Chinese context. Historically, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Soon after the establishment of French Concession, the French wanted to take over Siming 
gongsuo’s charity cemetery and other lands for their use. This eventually turned into several 
blood fights between French and Shanghai people. 
14 It is located across the street from the famous Jing'an Temple so the cemetery is called the 




crematoria were a part of Buddhist temples that were known as huashenyao (化身窯). 
The increased popularity of Buddhism, at least since the Song dynasty, had made 
cremation more palatable (to a certain degree) in areas where Buddhism was influential 
(for more on this see Patricia Ebrey 1990). Yet, the dominant and morally proper way of 
interment among the majority of Han Chinese was still body burial. This was especially 
the case among intellectuals whose funerary practices followed Confucian teachings 
more closely. Unlike huashenyao, essentially just using a pile of wood to burn bodies, 
Jing'an Temple Cemetery’s crematorium had gas-generated cremators.  
 The first funeral homes did not show up until 1924 when an American company, 
the China Casket Company, set up an “International Funeral Home” in Shanghai. The 
Chinese called this Wanguo (萬國) Funeral Home. This funeral home was similar to 
funeral homes in America and it only served foreigners in the beginning. I will discus this 
particular funeral home in detail in the next chapter.  
 Saying Wanguo Funeral Home was the first funeral home in Shanghai does not 
mean that there were no specialized funeral shops before this. While the family members 
of the deceased generally handled funerals at home, specialized funeral providing shops 
indeed existed prior to the colonial powers’ incursion into Shanghai. These included both 
“guanqidian”(貫器店) and “hongbaigang” (紅白杠). The former provided rentals of 
ritual goods for both weddings and funerals, and the latter literally means “wedding and 
funeral (sedan chair or coffin) carrier.” While guanqidian operated as full time 
businesses, hongbaigang were more “amateur” in the sense that many people who 




and carry out funeral processions—the most public centered step of any funeral before 
the CCP tighten up its control over funeral governance. Nevertheless, these kinds of 
shops were not where bodies were handled and commemorated. While funeral 
professionals have been an important part of folk death ritual (J. Watson 1988), the 
emergence of funeral homes in Shanghai marked the beginning of the institutionalization 
of dead bodies and death ritual in China.  
 Before I move on, I want to make clear that I have chosen to call contemporary 
binyiguan funeral “parlors” rather than funeral “homes” on purpose. Through this 
distinction in language, I want to emphasize and convey the difference between funeral 
homes (under the Republican and early Communist era) and funeral parlors (after the 
Cultural Revolution) despite the Chinese name remaining the same for both. Funeral 
homes and funeral parlors were two very different kinds of historical product in 
Shanghai. For example, private companies or associations (such as native place 
associations) in Shanghai operated funeral homes until the mid 1950s when they were all 
nationalized. I will discuss this nationalization process in the next chapter. Even when 
nationalized, however, these funeral homes still practiced body burial as before. As the 
Cultural Revolution began, all Shanghai funeral homes were shut down. Funeral parlors, 
on the other hand, all belonged administratively to the Civil Affairs Bureau. Moreover, 
they really should be seen as synonymous with crematoria (huozanchang 火葬場), not 
funeral homes. In fact, most funeral parlors/crematoria in China were built in the 1960s 
and 1970s exactly to implement the state’s cremation policy. The Chinese government 




attempt to reduce people’s fear of cremation.15 I analyze funeral parlors and their 
historical emergence in much more detail in Chapter 4. For now, however, let me return 
to the eve of the Chinese Communist takeover.  
  
Governing Dead Bodies: Cleansing a City of Corpses    
 On the 15th of August 1945, the Japanese government officially announced its 
surrender. After more then eight years the Sino-Japanese War had finally reached its end. 
Japan had occupied the Chinese Administrative Area of Shanghai as early as 1937 when 
the Battle of Shanghai broke out. The heart of Shanghai (the French Concession and parts 
of the International Settlement), however, remained outside of Japanese occupation until 
1941. Wars, by definition, create a great loss of life. This is even worse in cities, like 
Shanghai, where food shortages, dense populations, and diseases were prominent in 
addition to the actual violence of guns, bullets, and soldiers. Countless people died and 
were left on the streets. Shanghai was a city of corpses and governing dead bodies was 
one of the most urgent tasks by the time of the immediate post-war period. 
 Wars were not the sole reason for Shanghai’s dead body problem, however. 
Dealing with dead bodies had always been a big problem there. As Christian Henriot 
describes, “Shanghai was like a gigantic funnel that swallowed up lives by the hundreds 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Another difference is that (contemporary) funeral parlors do not usually provide arterial 
embalming—the common American practice of embalming. In China, only internationally 
transported bodies need arterial embalming. Funeral parlors usually slow down decomposition by 
refrigerating dead bodies and also performing hypodermic embalming. Hypodermic embalming 
means injecting embalming fluid through the deceased's blood vessels. Foreigner operated funeral 





or thousands, even in times of peace” (2009: 409, emphasis added). Death and its 
afflicted bodies were so prevalent that it was a part of the “commonplace” of the day, 
going unremarked in conversation and newspapers. Henriot’s work on such “masterless 
bodies” or “bodies without masters” (wuzhu shiti 無主屍體) shows how the very 
visibility of bodies in every corner of Shanghai City thus rendered death invisible to the 
social gaze throughout the Republican era and the early Communist Period. Wars simply 
worsened these matters.  
 At this time, administratively speaking, there were three categories of “dead body 
problems” in Shanghai funeral governance: accumulated coffins (jijiu 積柩), above 
ground coffins (fucuo 浮厝), and exposed corpses (loushi 露屍). The first refers to 
coffins with bodies in them that had not yet been buried. Many of these were stored in 
coffin repositories (bingshe 丙舍 or jijiusuo 寄柩所) or funeral homes. As for above-
ground coffins, these were usually for people who couldn’t afford to pay for a place like a 
coffin repository in the first place. In such cases the bereaved would find a place, such as 
an abandoned house or simply a roadside, to lay the coffin down above ground until they 
saved up enough money to be able to send the deceased home. These coffins were usually 
made of cheap wood and poorly sealed. It did not take long before people passing by 
were able to smell the decomposition and see the blood mixed with body fluids that 
would spread on the ground around it. As time went by, many above-ground coffins 
simply were abandoned. Their bereaved may have failed to save up the money, met other 




more death, but also increased the very disruptions that made even more people abandon 
coffins. 
 Finally, the third problem, of exposed bodies, entailed corpses that had been 
dumped on the streets. Henriot says that the majority of these exposed bodies were 
infants and children under 10. Since children were “not considered potential ancestors 
and ha[d] committed an unfilial act by the mere fact of dying young” in China (Freedman 
1970:165), adults generally would not offer proper funerals to dead children, if they even 
held any funeral at all. The death of children was not the death of a full person, 
conceptually speaking. Henriot, however, points out that the fact that large numbers of 
dead children were found encoffined or wrapped in mats shows that such an explanation 
itself is insufficient if not misleading. The key is less about a refusal to offer proper 
funerals, and more about the reality of high mortality, especially infant mortality. This is 
more important for explaining the high number of dead infants and children even though 
it is often overlooked (2009:410). He explains that “[t]he high figure of children, many of 
them newborn or infants, is not surprising. They were the least prepared to survive in a 
context of poor housing, lack of food and adverse weather conditions” (2009: 416).  
 Pushan Shanzhuang (普善山莊) and Tongren Fuyuantang (同仁輔元堂) (Pushan 
and Fuyuantang respectively hereafter) were the main two charity organizations that 
devoted themselves to collecting and disposing of exposed bodies and abandoned coffins 
(with bodies in them) that had been left on the streets of Shanghai.16 They usually buried 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Pushan is also known as the Shanghai Public Benevolent Society. Rich Shanghai business 
people such as Wang junsheng (王駿生) Li Guqing (李谷卿) funded this charity organization. It 




adult dead bodies individually in charity cemeteries while cremating children’s bodies 
collectively. This difference in body disposal shows that the former is recognized as a 
subject even if their identification was unknown. The latter simply falls into a non-person 
and non-subject category. While their parents might give them coffins or at least a mat if 
they could afford it, their non-subject status made collective cremation a legitimate 
mortuary practice.   
 While the “normal” effects of war exacerbated the above three problems, other 
political decisions added additional pressures into the governance of dead bodies in 
Shanghai: eight or more years of war had drastically constrained the transportation of 
newly deceased bodies between Shanghai and other “home” places. The bereaved in 
Shanghai with the means to do so generally stored their beloved’s coffins (with their 
remains within them) in coffin repositories until they were ready to transport them back 
to their hometown. The Japanese puppet regime that ruled the Chinese Administrative 
Area set up barriers to prevent any kind of transportation in or out of its area.17 As a 
result, the body accumulation problem exploded. Soon after Japan officially announced 
its surrender on August 15, 1945, the FIA (at that time under the Shanghai Municipal 
Government’s Health Bureau) announced policies for cleaning up accumulated coffins 
and promoting cremation. The FIA estimated that there were over 100,000 accumulated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(with bodies in them) off of the streets. Fuyuantang was established in 1809. It started out 
focusing on collecting bodies and donating coffins, and later expanded into a multi-functional 
charity organization including clinics and a school. For more on these organizations, see Christian 
Henriot (2009) and Liang Yuansheng (2009). 
17 Wu Jianxi 健熙. N.d. Qingchu jijiu yu Shanghai saying binzang ye gaizao 清除積柩清除積
柩與上海私營殯葬業改造 [Cleaning up accumulated coffins and the transformation of the 




(occupied) coffins in Shanghai. These were deposited in native place associations, charity 
organizations, coffin depositories, funeral parlors, and lineage temples, and all were still 
awaiting their final journeys home.18  
 From 1946 to 1947, Republican China’s Shanghai Municipal Government 
promulgated a series of funeral related regulations.19 Yet, despite its intent and effort 
spent on perfecting the legislative issues of funeral governance, what the Republican 
Government most urgently needed to do was to solve the eight year backlog of 
accumulating coffins in depositories, above-ground coffins, and exposed bodies all of 
which were still piling up. On June 17, 1946 the Health Bureau released a communiqué 
intending to make the solution to the problem of accumulated coffins the Bureau’s 
primary task. It requested all funeral parlors, coffin depositories, and native place 
associations to transport all of these accumulated coffins out of Shanghai by the end of 
the year. Any remaining coffins would be treated as “masterless” coffins and therefore 
would be cremated collectively shortly afterwards.20  
 The Trade Association of Funeral Parlors, Coffin Repositories, and Coffin 
Transportation Offices soon challenged the Health Bureau's decree by submitting petition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau 上海市民政局. 2005. Shanghai Tongzhi 上海通志 [Shanghai 
general local history], Vol. 43, shehui shenghuo [Social life], Shanghai: Shanghai renmin 
chubanshe.  
19  They were the “Shanghai Cemetery and Crematoria Administration Regulation,” the 
“Shanghai Funeral Parlor Administration Regulation,” the “Shanghai Coffin Repository 
Administration Regulation,” the “Shanghai Coffin Transportation Administration Regulation,” 
and the “Shanghai Private Cemetery Administration Regulation.”  
20 Shanghai Funeral and Interment Administration 上海市殯葬管理處. 1946. “Chengming 
fengling banli chuqing jijiu kunnan qingxing ji bubian yilu huohua liyou yangqijian heshi zunshi” 
呈明奉另辦理出清積柩困難情形 不便一律火化理由仰祇鑒合適遵事 [The difficulties of 




letters to various state apparatuses, including the Shanghai City Council, and even calling 
a press conference to mobilize public opinion to postpone the policy's implementation.21 
Funeral business operators argued in these public negotiations that coffins stored in their 
facilities were not like those stored in charity organizations or coffins above ground. 
They were not masterless, even if their masters were temporarily unreachable. Not to 
mention that they were professionally kept coffins paid for by bereaved persons who 
wanted to safely store their beloved dead.22 If the owner suddenly showed up and ask for 
these coffins, funeral professionals would have nothing to give them. Another less 
vocalized reason was the huge loss of profits this could cause these funeral facilities. 
Coffin repositories charged like hotel rooms—the longer a coffin stayed, the more money 
was owed. If coffins could not be deposited for a long period of time and bodies had to be 
cremated immediately, then coffin repositories, coffin transportation offices, and funeral 
parlors would all lose a significant amount of income and might even go bankrupt 
entirely.  
 As a result, in the name of “protecting ancestors,” funeral professionals also 
argued against sudden implementation of cremation. I will discuss cremation, and 
especially how the CCP promoted cremation in the 1950s and 1960s in the next chapter. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Shanghai Funeral and Interment Administration 上海市殯葬管理處. 1946. “Chengming 
fengling banli chuqing jijiu kunnan qingxing ji bubian yilu huohua liyou yangqijian heshi zunshi” 
呈明奉另辦理出清積柩困難情形暨不便一律火化理由仰祇鑒合適遵事 [The difficulties of 
cleaning up accumulated coffins and the inconveniences of cremating all bodies], CFIPL archive. 
22 Shanghai Coffin Repositories and Transportation Association 上海市殯葬寄柩運葬商業同業
公會. 1947. “Wei huohua shiguan zhiai nanxing, ruo bi yu shishi yiti huohua, yi ying xian 
wancheng falv chengxu” 為火化屍棺窒礙難行，若必欲實施遺體火化，亦應先完成法律程序 
[Cremation is hard to implement. If this is a must, the legal procedure should be followed], 




During this negotiating process, the FIA first postponed their December deadline to the 
end of April 1947 and then again to the end of October. At the same time, however, it 
announced a plan of six steps to clean up accumulated coffins. On April 14, 1948, the 
Health Bureau issued a new communiqué. It said that based on data they had received 
from funeral parlors, coffin repositories, and guilds, there were a total of 2,225 coffins 
that were masterless and these would be cremated in a month, some time after May.23  
 A year later, on May 27, 1949, Shanghai was “liberated” by the Communist Party. 
The Health Bureau of the Shanghai People’s Government took over the FIA from the old 
Republican Health Bureau. In July of 1949, the (new) Health Bureau issued its own 
“Implementation Rules for the Fifth Step of Cleaning Up Accumulated Coffins” 
proclamation.24 The government officials, who were largely the same people from the old 
bureau,25 decided that the first four steps had been more or less accomplished under the 
Republican regime and that they could now move on to the fifth. This particular event 
reminds us that even a revolution does not always indicate a political and governing 
disjuncture at the ground level. The seeming complete rupture of political ideology and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Shanghai Health Bureau 上海市衛生局. 1948. “Shanghai weishengju gongbao” 上海衛生局
公報 [Shanghai Health Bureau communiqué], No. 37-26, CFIPL archive. 
24 Qingchu jijiu diwu buzou shishi banfa 清除積柩第五步驟實施辦法.  
25 When the PRC took over Shanghai, it allowed the last head of the FIA, Gao Buqing, to 
continue to be the head until November 8, 1950. He was then fired for corruption. Xuli became 
the next head of the FIA. See Shanghai Funeral and Interment Administration 上海市殯葬管理
處. N.d. Shanghai minzhengshi xiabian chugao 上海民政史下編初稿 [Draft of the history of the 
Shanghai civil governance II], p.4. CFIPL archive. I will call this manuscript “The Draft” 
hereafter. There was no Part I in the CFIPL archive. This hand written version eventually became 
“Chapter 17 binding guanli 殯葬管理 [Funeral and interment administration]” in Shanghai 
minzhengzhi 上海民政志 [History of the Shanghai civil governance] published in 2000. If we 
compared the Draft with the final published version, we can see a significant amount of details 





form of government did not mean the discontinuity of social reality and governance. 
Dead bodies were still on the streets and the same officials still ran the FIA even if the 
Mayor of Shanghai City had changed. Governing death was (and is) a rather continuous 
process even if official discourse from one side or another might link a particular policy 
to a particular period and only to that period.  
 Although this new rule stated that all accumulated coffins had to be transported 
out of Shanghai between July 12 and October 12 or the Bureau would cremate the 
remaining accumulated coffins collectively,26 in reality, and just as had happened under 
the previous regime, the implementation was not very successful.27 Many reasons were 
given and most of them were the same reasons for opposition under the Republican state 
such as the unwillingness of funeral professionals to lose potential income. The 
Communist state nevertheless intended to create a historical disjuncture since its 
legitimacy was to be built on claims to be a different government—a state that cares 
about people, capable of implementing polices, and ending social suffering.  In pursuit of 
this policy, it eventually did clean up those accumulated coffins, regardless of the protests 
of funeral professionals.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Shanghai Health Bureau 上海市衛生局. 1949. “Shi weishengsuo zhi binzang guanli suo wen: 
cha qingchu benshi jijiu yi an” 市衛生局致殯葬管理所文:清除本市機柩一案 [An order by the 
Health Bureau to the Funeral and Interment Administration: Regarding cleaning up accumulated 
coffins in the city], CFIPL archive. 
27 Shanghai Health Bureau 上海市衛生局 . 1950. “Shi weishengju cheng shifu wen...wei 
qingchu jijiu wenti shen duo” 市衛生局呈市府文…惟清除積柩牽涉問題甚多… [A report by 
the Health Bureau to Shanghai Government: …cleaning up accumulated coffins is a complicated 




     On May 23, 1950, the Bureau issued their “Supplementary Provisions to Clean 
Up Accumulated Coffins in Shanghai Municipal City” proclamation.28 These provisions 
further defined any coffins that stayed in the city for over six months as “accumulated 
coffins” and therefore rendered them legitimate objects of state clean up. With this, along 
with the implementation of other rules29 and the actual execution of policies, accumulated 
coffins were more or less removed by the end of 1952—a total of 83,629 accumulated 
coffins were handled. Starting from 1951, the FIA shifted its attention to cleaning up 
above-ground coffins. They handled over 10,000 above ground coffins around the 
Beipiao (北票) Pier of the Rihui (日暉) Harbor and around Tongji (同濟) University 
alone–the two places that had the highest concentration of above-ground coffins. The FIA 
hired about 400 funeral professionals and 300 temporary workers to work daily at the 
task. They opened up some of the caskets and picked out the remains, cremated some 
right there on the spot, and moved some to Dachang (大場) Cemetery to be buried. By 
the end of 1952, the FIA had eliminated a total of 209,708 above-ground coffins.30 
 As far as exposed bodies went, the FIA still worked with the two charity 
organizations, Pushan and Fuyuantang, just as in pre-liberation times (in the intervening 
period under the CCP, however, these had been merged into a single entity called the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Shanghai shi qingchu jijiu buchong banfa 上海市清除積柩補充辦法.  
29 “Shanghai Cleaning up Accumulated Coffins’ Price Deduction and Temporary Regulations,” 
“Shanghai Funeral Parlor Administration Regulation,” “Shanghai Coffin Depository (or 
Repository) Administration Regulation,” “Shanghai Coffin Transportation Administration 
Regulation,” “Shanghai Private Crematoria Administration Regulation,” and “Shanghai Private 
Cemetery Administration Regulation.”  
30 Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau 上海市民政局. 2005. Shanghai Tongzhi 上海通志 [Shanghai 





Shanghai Funeral Service Center). On October 23, 1953, the Shanghai Government 
announced new “Instructions about Handling Exposed Bodies.” This communiqué again 
declared that these exposed bodies would be cremated collectively unless someone 
claimed ownership. The bodies of children and infants would be cremated collectively in 
Xi Baoxin (西寶興) Crematorium. This place was the predecessor of Baoxin Funeral 
Parlor today. Between June 1949 and October 1954, the city cremated some 129,248 
exposed bodies and buried 34,382 exposed bodies.31 Officially speaking, the task of 
cleaning up accumulated coffins and exposed bodies ended in 1954.32 
 In 1953, the CCP decided that the new task of the FIA would be “Promoting 
Cremation, Transforming Customs” (tuixing huozang yifeng yisu 推行火葬移風易俗) 
because, just like their Republican counterparts, the CCP saw the roots of these dead 
body problems in the Chinese customary preference for body burial.  Consequently, the 
CCP restructured the administrative position of the FIA moving it from the Health 
Bureau to the Civil Affairs Bureau on March 9, 1953. The FIA has remained under the 
Civil Affairs Bureau ever since. This administrative change shows that the governance of 
death shifted from a matter of cleanliness to a matter of civility and from a short-term, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau 上海市民政局. 2005. Shanghai Tongzhi 上海通志 [Shanghai 
general local history], Vol. 43, shehui shenghuo [Social life], Shanghai: Shanghai renmin 
chubanshe. 
32 All told, by 1954 they had cleaned up some 456,967 dead bodies (note that these numbers do 
not include those bodies that were successfully sent home and buried). To give an idea for 
comparison, according to the 1950 US census, this number would have placed this City of the 
Abandoned Dead as the 20th largest city in the United States, around the same size as Seattle and 
Kansas City. As compared to American cities in 2012 (by US census estimates), it would have 
been the 38th largest and bigger than Atlanta, Georgia. Shanghai’s own population in 1950, 





massive clean up project to a long-term project aimed toward social and cultural 
transformation. As a result, the object of funeral governance has shifted from dead bodies 
to civil matters. However, even after funeral governance shifted to civil matters, the CCP 
did not go straight into reforming funeral customs. Instead, what they did first was to 
reform funeral institutions. I explore this point further in the next chapter. This 
administrative change also marked the turning point where the new regime saw itself as 
finally having its feet solidly rooted in China following their initial consolidation of 
power. While the CCP had cleaned up the city and demonstrated their difference from 
their Republican predecessors, this was not revolution. Only after passing the initial 
unstable period, was the CCP ready to carry out revolution in governing death and the 
death industry.     
 We can return now, briefly to the two propaganda samples with which I opened 
the chapter. Other than pointing out the seriousness of dead bodies abandoned in 
Shanghai even after the CCP demonstrated their superior ability to clean up the city (over 
the KMT), these two excerpts can be seen to reflect the political history of the FIA and of 
its mission. The first focuses on health concerns, the second on the political concern that 
these bodies without history were dangerous leftovers from the suffering of the un-
liberated past. While the priority of funeral governance changed as the FIA moved from 
the Health Bureau to the Civil Affair Bureau, these dual focuses remain crucial even 
today. This policy change did not mean that coffins and bodies had disappeared 
completely from the streets. The continuance of health concerns and abandoned bodies is 




after the government declared the beginning of their new campaign. Recall that the text 
attached to the two excerpts noted that there were still “5,177 exposed bodies” found on 
the streets within a single month (albeit one of the coldest months of the year).  
 As with “revolution,” on the ground, one era and the next tend not to be separated 
by clear and distinct lines, but rather bleed across those boundaries from one into the 
other. However porous the boundary may be, this shift did indeed mark a boundary 
whereby, going forward, funeral reform's primary focus was on creating socialist-citizen 
subjects. While cleaning up the mess left from the previous occupying regimes was 
important for consolidating the CCP’s power, it was time to start implementing their own 
ideas of social revolution to fundamentally solve these issues at their roots. Thus, while 
the problems of accumulating masterless bodies was not so quickly and neatly left 
behind, the dominant theme of the next part of this history revolved around these socially 
and culturally transformative intentions—how to make its death industry, funeral rituals, 
and deaths, both “modern” and “socialist.” In this sense, the CCP picked up on the 
modernizing project at the point that the Republican regime had failed to continue. As a 
result, this administrative change not only signifies the way the goal of funeral 
governance changed from regulating hygiene to civility, but also articulates the re-
emergence of the governance of dead bodies as an integral part of governing citizens—
the making of political subjects. 
 Even after funeral governance shifted to civil matters, however, the CCP did not 
go straight into reforming funeral customs. Instead, as I explore in the next chapter, what 
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CHAPTER 3 THE MAKING OF POLITICAL SUBJECTS AT THE END 
OF LIFE 
 
 After the initial takeover, implementing a socialist transformation became an 
overwhelming movement that swept, albeit unevenly, all over China. Regarding 
governing death in Shanghai, this transformation specifically involved three policies. The 
first was to nationalize all funeral institutions. The second was to promote cremation. The 
third was to transform the (believed) unproductive and wasteful nature of the death 
industry into literal productivity. This especially referred to the development of pig 
raising sideline businesses in Shanghai funeral homes and cemeteries. The degree that 
each of these policies were implemented varied: the first policy was implemented the 
most thoroughly; the second went up and down, but eventually was implemented fully in 
Shanghai when the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) began; the third was especially 
executed around the time of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961). In this chapter, I 
describe each of these new governing attempts in turn. My goal is to illustrate how the 
FIA initiated these structural changes and how such governing attempts impacted what 
being a “Shanghainese” or a Chinese person meant.  
 
I. Nationalizing Funeral Institution 
 After the FIA was transferred from the Health Bureau to the Civil Affairs Bureau 
in 1953, one of its first new tasks was to transfer the ownership of the property of funeral 
institutions to the state in order to nationalize the Shanghai death industry.  There were 




2) Chinese associations or Chinese capital, and 3) religious institutions. All three implied 
objects of identification that indicate the potentiality and multiplicity of thinking about 
what being a person meant in China in general but in Shanghai in particular. These 
different institutional affiliations mediated, crosscut, and even overshadowed the 
connections between individual subjects and the socialist state and therefore were prime 
targets to be redefined and “nationalized.”  In this section, I discuss how the FIA 
nationalized funeral homes owned by foreign capital, native place, Chinese capital, and a 
crematorium of Buddhist temple in turn. What I argue in these examples is that the FIA 
eliminated alternative sources of identity (alternative to the socialist state) through 
nationalizing the property of these non-socialist institutions. This was the CCP’s first step 
toward creating political subjects at the end of life in Shanghai.   
 
Nationalizing the External Others 
 For most Chinese who did not live through the Shanghai of the 1930's, Wanguo (
萬國) Funeral Home will not ring any bells. Yet, many will probably have heard about 
the funeral of Ruan Lingyu (阮玲玉), the then most famous Chinese silent movie star 
who committed suicide in 1935 at the age of 25. Wanguo handled her funeral, and her 
funeral procession “was three miles long, three women committed suicide during it and 
the New York Times ran a front page story, calling it 'the most spectacular funeral of the 
century'” (Cousins 2004). About a year later, one of the most important contemporary 
Chinese writers (one of the few claimed by both Communists and Republicans), Lu Xun (




 As mentioned in Chapter 2, Wanguo was the first funeral home in Shanghai. The 
story of Wanguo began when a funeral home in New York sent two people, the boss’s 
son and one employee named R.O. Scott, to Shanghai in 1924. They started the China 
Casket Company there and named their funeral home the “International Funeral Home” 
in English and “Wanguo,” meaning ten thousand countries, in Chinese. This company 
originally served only foreigners. When business didn’t turn out as well as they had 
hoped, they extended their service to Chinese. However, not many Chinese used their 
services, at least partly because the operation completely followed then current Euro-
American funeral styles.  
 In 1934, the company in New York decided to close the funeral home and R.O. 
Scott took this chance to buy it from his former employer. After buying Wanguo, he 
shifted his target customers from foreigners to rich Shanghai businessmen, celebrities, 
intellectuals, and artists. With this switch, he also allowed many Chinese ways of 
operating funerals to intermingle with Western styles in Wanguo. The movie star Ruan 
Lingyu’s funeral made Wanguo a household name in Shanghai overnight. As Wanguo’s 
business took off, many Chinese imitated it and many funeral homes, such as the China 
Funeral Home, the Centre Funeral Home, and the Shanghai Funeral Home among others 
suddenly began to spring up in Shanghai.33   
 During the war, the Japanese puppet regime that ruled the Chinese Administrative 
Area took over Wanguo and made it state-owned. When the war finished, however, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 In 1931, a Chinese businessman from Nanchang (南昌), Jiangxi (江西) Province named Tao 
Xingyu (陶醒予) established China Funeral Home (中國殯儀館). This was the first funeral home 




Republican state returned Wanguo to its owner, Scott. By 1949 when the CCP took over 
Shanghai, Scott decided to return to America. He asked a Chinese man named Dong 
Shoupeng (董壽朋) to continue to run the funeral home for him. On September 8, 1951, 
the Health Bureau submitted a request to take over Wanguo. This first request, however, 
did not receive approval. On May 29, 1953, when the Civil Affairs Bureau wrote to the 
Health Bureau to discuss their impending receipt of the administrative functions of the 
FIA they also brought back up the issue of taking over Wanguo from its private foreign 
owner. In this document, the Civil Affairs Bureau suggested that, considering the 
excellent quality of the funeral home’s equipment and the profit it generated, the Civil 
Affairs Bureau should continue to run Wanguo after the state take over.34 
 On December 7, 1953, the Shanghai Military Control Committee, the highest 
administrative authority at that time, ordered the Civil Affairs Bureau to take over 
Wanguo. 35 In this order, it said that the owner should turn all property belonging to this 
funeral home to the state without sabotaging, transferring, or hiding any of it. All workers 
were to be kept on to work as usual.36 Two days later, the vice chair of the Civil Affairs 
Bureau had a meeting with Dong Shoupeng to inform him of the take over. Later on that 
same day, the head of the Social Unit (FIA was underneath this unit within the Civil 
Affairs Bureau hierarchy), Fan Yuling (樊玉玲), and another five people accompanied 
Dong Shoupeng back to Wanguo. As soon as they entered Wanguo, they called a meeting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 The Draft, p.24, CFIPL archive.  
35 A temporary administration that was established when the Communist Party was in the 
process of “liberating” China. This committee exerted military control over the city it was in 
charge of. This form of governance disappeared as the Party gained full control of China. Military 
Control Committees emerged again during the Cultural Revolution.  




to tell all of the employees about the take over and to reassure them of their future job 
security in order to stabilize the workers’ worries about their uncertain future. From 
announcing the official order to the actual take over, it took the Civil Affairs Bureau only 
two days to nationalize Wanguo. In the same month, the bilingual sign outside Wanguo 
was changed to read (now only in Chinese) “Municipal No. 1 Funeral Home” (shili diyi 
binyiguan 市立第一殯儀館). The foreign private-capital funded funeral home had now 
officially become a Chinese public funeral home.37  
 One of my informants who worked in a funeral home in the early 1950s told me 
that Wanguo was responsible for introducing the American style of embalming to 
Shanghai and all of Shanghai's funeral homes’ embalming fluids were sourced either 
legitimately or illegitimately from Wanguo prior to its being taken over by the state. 
Before 1949, all but two of the employees in the Wanguo were foreigners. The vice 
manager was a Jewish man named Lonise Holte and two Russians, L.A. Kasikousky and 
Kosta Levchenko, worked in the cosmetic and embalming unit. Levchenko always 
worked independently when he embalmed a body. Before he left for Brazil in 1952, he 
taught Zhu Miaogen (朱妙根), Scott's private tailor, the technique of embalming. When 
the Civil Affairs Bureau nationalized Wanguo in 1953, it forced Zhu Miaogen to then 
teach embalming techniques to other fellow Chinese funeral professionals.38 
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parlors.” The key reason is because these funeral homes still practiced body burial. As mentioned 
in previous chapters, funeral parlors today are synonymous with crematoria.   
38 2003 Shanghai zangsu shihua wanguo binyiguan 上海葬俗史話—萬國殯儀館 [History of 
Wanguo Funeral Home]. Shanghai caifeng 上海采風 [Folklore collection]. Pp. 26-27, Vol. 4. 




Nationalizing Internal Differences 
 The traditional Chinese idea of a proper death was (and to a large degree still is) 
to be buried in one’s hometown like “falling leaves returning to their roots” (luoye guigen 
落葉歸根). In contrast to Euro-American conceptions of “urbanites,” imperial Chinese 
urban life was seen as temporary and most residents thought that they would return to be 
buried in their native places with their ancestors—the sojourning aspects of imperial 
Chinese cities described by Skinner (1977: 539; Golas 1977: 564). Pre-communist 
Shanghai was no exception. Bergere describes Shanghai in the early 20th century, “[t]he 
population was fragmented into communities that had virtually no communication with 
each other. Shanghai was a Tower of Babel where provincial dialects created as many 
barriers between the Chinese as national language did between the Europeans” (2009:84). 
Since native place was one of the most important sources of identity for individuals and 
given the need to return in death to one's ancestral home, coffin repositories were often 
facilities attached to native place associations or native place association based guilds 
(Sinn 2003).39 When they had enough coffins to fill up a boat, those coffins would be 
transported back to their hometown.40 For poor people, native place associations provided 
charity cemetery plots in Shanghai so that the poor could at least be partially returned to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 This type of organization was also very common in other urban areas and in centers for 
international migrations as well. One of the original high level organizations of Chinese residents 
in British colonial Hong Kong with any power was that of the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals that 
oversaw (as charity work) the receipt of coffins returning their residents home from lives working 
abroad (Sinn 2003).  
40 Coffin transportation companies (yunjiusuo 運柩所) were another related funeral institution in 




their hometown by being buried on their hometown associations’ property (Bergere 
2009:101).  
 Xijin (錫金) Funeral Home, like many other funeral homes prior to the socialist 
transformation, was associated with Xijin Association—a native place association. The 
association was first established in 1902 for people who came to Shanghai from Wuxi (無
錫) and Jinkui (金匱) cities. Just a few years before Wanguo Funeral Home took off, the 
Xijin Association’s coffin repository already contained several funeral halls and a funeral 
service department. These funeral halls and the service department were the predecessor 
of the Xijin Funeral Home. Over the first 40 years of Xijin’s operation, their service 
gradually expanded from providing for only people who came to Shanghai from the same 
area of origin to providing for-profit services to the general public. 
 In 1954, the Civil Affairs Bureau and the Shanghai branch of the People’s Relief 
Administration of China decided that all forms of native place associations, established 
with social funds, counted as public property and therefore needed to be “returned” to the 
state. In this sense, such a change was not a change from private to state ownership. 
Rather, those properties were seen as already “public” in the first place. They were 
“public” entities that were improperly held for the benefit of a small proportion of the 
public and should therefore be fully public. In July 1954, the Civil Affair Bureau formed 
a four-person team to take over Xijin.41 About four months later, the Bureau officially 
finalized its take over on November 13, 1954. Since there were not many funeral homes 
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in downtown Shanghai by then, the Bureau decided to make Xijin into a city funeral 
home. In March 1955, the Xijin Funeral Home was renamed the “Shanghai Municipal 
Xijin Funeral Home.”42 
 In addition to funeral homes like Xijin that were run by associations, there were 
also many funeral homes run by private Chinese individuals or companies at that time. 
While the socially funded associations related to funeral institutions and cemeteries were 
simply nationalized, these private and commercial funeral institutions became “public-
private joint management” (gongsi heying 公私合營) operations. According to the Civil 
Affairs Bureau’s 1956 plan, there were a total of nine funeral homes, three coffin 
repositories, and two crematoria that needed to be became public-private joint 
management enterprises.43 The first private and commercial funeral institution that went 
through this process was Anle (安樂) Funeral Home in January 1956.  
 After the success of Anle as a trial case, the “Private-Public Joint Management 
Committee” was formally established on April 14, 1956 in order to nationalize all private 
funeral institutions. The FIA then merged and nationalized all private and commercial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 The story of Yong Xi Tang (永錫堂) was very similar to the Xijin Funeral home. It started as 
a coffin repository for members of the Zheshao (浙紹) Association—founded in the early 18th 
century for people who came to Shanghai from Shaoxing, a city in Zhejiang province. This coffin 
depositary later also had a funeral service unit. In 1954, the People’s Relief Administration of 
China reorganized Yong Xi Tang and took over its property. In order to keep their jobs, the 
employees of Yong Xi Tang then worked together to establish a Yong Xi Funeral Home 
independent from the Zheshao association. In January 1956 when it was nationalized, it closed its 
doors and all its employees were transferred to work in Xijin or Xieqiao Funeral Homes. 
43 Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau 上海市民政局. 1956. “Shanghai shi minzheng gongzuo 





funeral institutions between 1956 and 1958.44 After this series of acts, by 1958, only five 
funeral homes remained in Shanghai. They were Wanguo, Anle, Xieqiao (斜橋), Xijin, 
and Guohua (國華) Funeral Homes. These five remained open until the Cultural 
Revolution.  
 In this public-private joint management model, the original owners gained 5% in 
dividends from the annual profits every year after nationalization. These dividends, 
however, were suspended in September 1966 at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. 
Although many owners stayed in their jobs early on, often working as day-to-day 
managers, the FIA assigned personnel were the ones who held the real power in running 
the business. After nationalization, employees were no longer employees of a private 
capitalist organization; they were employees of the FIA—a state bureau reporting directly 
to the party-state.   
 
Nationalizing Religious Funeral Institutions    
 While nationalization of private and commercial cemeteries, funeral homes, and 
coffin repositories went relatively smoothly, the nationalization of religiously affiliated 
funeral institutions caused more issues. The former were each nationalized within a 
couple of months, the latter took almost ten years. The crucial factor here was related to 
the fact that religious funeral institutions were caught between two bureaus. One was the 
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Civil Affairs Bureau that had by then been placed in charge of all funeral related 
business. The other was the Religious Affairs Bureau that was in charge of all religious 
institutions. Here I discuss the story of Haihui Temple (haihuisi 海會寺) in depth to give 
a sense of the complicated texture of the Chinese state at that time, even in terms of 
“nationalization.” 
 In 1949, the sutra chanting service business was not going well in the Haihui 
Temple. In order to gain some additional income, the head monk, Huikai (慧開) got some 
money from a few fellow Buddhists to start the Haihui Temple Crematorium and 
registered with the Business Administration Bureau as a company serving the general 
public. It officially started its business in January 1950.45 In addition to the seven monks 
assigned by Huikan to work there, Haihui Temple Crematorium hired around twenty 
other workers. Although Haihui Temple and the Crematorium were adjacent to each 
other, their finances, space (including land and houses), and personnel were separate. 
Their business, however, was still not very good as most Shanghai people rejected 
cremation so long as they could afford body burial. When the nationalization process 
started in 1956, the Shanghai Religious Affairs Bureau, in response to a Civil Affairs 
Bureau inquiry (i.e., cross-bureau pressure), said that the Haihui Temple Crematorium 
was a business in nature and therefore should be included in the nationalizing project.  
 As explained by the Religious Affairs Bureau the problems only grew from there: 
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Over the course of the nationalizing process, though, Comrade Zhu Jinfu, who 
was sent by the FIA to run the crematorium, seriously violated religious 
policies. He attempted to convert the Grand Hall [of the Haihui Temple itself] 
into a mourning hall. He also forced monks to stop being monks (huansu  
還俗). Some monks refused, yet they were told that the minority must obey the 
majority’s decision. In the end of July 1956, the head of the sales department, 
Gu Jinshen called a meeting with nine monks. Comrade Gu told them in the 
form of an administrative order that there would be no Buddhist ceremonies [in 
the crematorium] and all religious activities were to be terminated in the 
temple. Those monks who did not want to return to the lay life soon came to 
our bureau [the Religious Affairs Bureau], the Religious Affairs Department of 
the Luwan District Government, Shanghai Buddhist Association. Our bureau 
[the Religious Affairs Bureau] and the religious affairs departments soon 
contacted Comrade Mao, the Division head of the Civil Affairs Bureau, 
Comrade Shu, the head of the FIA, and the representative Comrade Gu. We 
told them that they should not touch the Grand Hall. After several attempts at 
negotiations, although the Grand Hall was intact, they locked it up and 
suspended its usage. The above series of examples of violations of [the 
government's] religious policies caused many Buddhists unhappiness and even 
such that they mistakenly thought that the state had nationalized the Haihui 
Temple.46 
 
 Here, the Religious Affairs Bureau stepped in to halt nationalizing actions taken 
by the Civil Affairs Bureau due to their conflict with the government's religious policies, 
the turf of the Religious Affairs Bureau. The two bureaus eventually sat down to 
negotiate and finally decided on a two-step plan. The first step was to make Haihui 
Temple Crematorium a privately run company as a sideline business of the temple. The 
temple itself would be subordinated to the Buddhist Association of China (which was 
itself subordinated to the Religious Affairs Bureau). The Civil Affairs Bureau would 
assist with the cremation business and the education of the workers in the crematorium. If 
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this failed, then the second step would be to separate the temple and the crematorium 
with the Buddhist Association supervising the former and the FIA taking over the later. 
However, the Religious Affairs Bureau later complained that the FIA not only did not do 
the right thought work (sixiang gongzuo 思想工作) to educate the workers in the 
crematorium, they even told those workers who wanted to be nationalized that there was 
nothing they could do and that their supervisor was the Buddhist Association, not the 
FIA. 
 From the Religious Affairs Bureau’s perspective, this was an attempt to work 
against the existing agreement by suggesting the problem lay in the workers' location 
within the Religious Affairs Bureau rather than the Civil Affairs Bureau. The tension 
between monks and crematorium workers worsened over the next few months due to a 
continuing degeneration in the business of the crematorium. So much so that the workers 
blamed those monks who refused to return to lay life as the reason that the crematorium 
was not nationalized and ultimately not doing well. As a result,  
 
“five families of the workers, led by Gu Jinshen, moved into the crematorium 
(despite the fact that they all had their own houses in Shanghai and some even 
originally lived in the countryside). After they moved in, they even hung women’s 
underwear in front of the Grand Hall [of the temple]. This disturbed and upset the 
monks very much.”47  
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Such a provocative act of forcing monks who had taken vows of abstinence to be exposed 
to women’s underwear upset the monks greatly. The monks then made a formal request 
to the Religious Affairs Bureau to solve the situation. When the Religious Affairs Bureau 
passed along the complaints to the Civil Affairs Bureau, the latter claimed that they did 
not own the property of the crematorium so they could not deal with the issue. The 
Religious Affairs Bureau finally relented and requested that the Shanghai CCP 
Committee approve the separation of the temple and the crematorium. 
 The decision at the top levels continued to go back and forth, presumably as other 
political issues and policies changed. The Shanghai CCP Committee approved the Civil 
Affairs’ Bureau’s request, submitted on 22 August 1960, to nationalize the Haihui 
Temple Crematorium and other religious cemeteries on December 3, 1960. However, it 
seems that on May 18, 1961, this issue went back to the negotiating table. On June 11, 
1961, the Shanghai CCP Committee approved a motion to suspend the Civil Affairs 
Bureau’s nationalization of religious funeral institutions. The issue was only finally 
solved at the end of 1965 on the eve of the Cultural Revolution. It was at this time that 
Haihui Temple’s crematorium along with Shanghai's other religious cemeteries were 
finally nationalized by the Civil Affairs Bureau for good.48  
 This vignette shows the complicated process that was necessary to eliminate 
religious sources of identity within funerals. The intra-bureau competition provided space 
for monks and crematorium workers to fight (via their respective vertical backers) for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau 上海市民政局. 2000. Shanghai minzhengzhi 上海民政志 
[History of the Shanghai civil governance], Ch. 17, binding guanli 殯葬管理 [Funeral and 




their own interests despite the fact that this occurred in the midst of a seemingly 
overwhelming project of nationalization. Nevertheless, this case shows how the CCP 
eventually successfully separated funerals from the religious realm. This separation is 
crucial in understanding the eventual establishment of socialist civil funerals and civil 
funeral institutions that were devoid of religion in Shanghai.  
 
Nationalizing the Objects of Identification  
 Through this examination of the way that various funeral institutions were 
nationalized, I argue that these nationalization projects were instances of the breaking of 
those non-Party ties and sources of identity that were prevalent in Shanghai. I specifically 
refer to three sources of identity that were available and important to many Shanghai 
residents of the time—foreign influences (the external others), associational life and other 
intermediary loyalty (the internal others), and religion. As a cultural contact zone, 
Wanguo not only transmitted Euro-American cultural influence and body techniques for 
handling dead bodies, but also represented the colonial invasion that made its existence 
possible in the first place. Wanguo thus represented an internal “external other” that 
simultaneously stood for both cosmopolitan foreignness as well as colonial humiliation in 
the context of Shanghai. Therefore, by eventually transferring this foreign cultural capital 
to the socialist state, the nationalization of Wanguo expelled foreign influences both as 
sources of cosmopolitan identity as well as eliminating reminders of colonial shame. This 
funeral home then changed its name from “ten thousand countries” (wanguo), one that 




serving foreigners in Shanghai), to the Municipal No. 1 Funeral Home, a name that 
emphasizes its administrative status in relation to the beginning of the Communist period 
and to the municipality (shili, meaning at the municipal level). The American boss, the 
Jewish manger, and the two Russian embalmers were erased as if they had never existed. 
The only part that reminded the living about the particular history of Wanguo was “No.1” 
of its new name. Yes, Wanguo was also the first pre-Communist modern funeral home in 
Shanghai.  
 While institutions of foreign capital represented the invasion of the external other, 
funeral institutions belonging to Chinese native place associations and institutions of 
Chinese capital represented a type of “internal other” that united and divided people into 
different groups. Regardless of this unity and diversity, these institutional ties stood 
clearly in between individuals and the state. They represented one of the most important 
ways of identifying what being a person meant in pre-Communist Shanghai and in the 
immediate time period after the regime change. Beyond the boundary of family, identity 
markers such as native place created community boundaries in urban Shanghai where 
practically everyone was an immigrant. These regionally divided public differences were 
eradicated as the FIA took over the funeral institutions of native place associations, 
disbanded them and redistributed their property and employees into state enterprises. As 
a result, while there was no need to erase the particular (cosmopolitan and colonial) 
history of Xijin as occurred at Wanguo, the funeral home’s new name also emphasizes its 
“belonging” to the municipality. Being a part of Xijin was fine as long people recognized 




course, so long as the funeral home did not treat people from “their” place differently 
than anyone else). 
 Finally, religious associations stood for transcendental and alternative sources of 
power that regulated relationships and between humans and the larger cosmological 
world. Such characteristics gave religious affiliations the potential to compete with the 
Party for group loyalty on the one hand as well as a clearly linking them to “feudalism” 
and “superstition” on the other. Yet, at the same time, the socialist constitution legally 
allowed “religion.” Even though the state’s definition of religion referred to institutional 
religions (subject to the party-state) instead of to diffused religions (C. K. Yang 1961), 
state recognition of religion nevertheless created ambiguity for religious funeral 
institutions. Were they funeral institutions and therefore to be governed by the Civil 
Affairs Bureau or were they religious institutions and therefore to be governed by the 
Religious Affairs Bureau? This uncertainty allowed inter-bureau politics to thrive and 
gave religious funeral institutions a much longer life span within this socialist 
transformation than any other funeral institution.      
 Although all of these acts might seem to focus purely on changes in ownership, 
the consequences went beyond shifts in economic wealth or power. Each says something 
about how the state went about erasing alternative possibilities for what being a 
Shanghainese or Chinese person might mean. With the removal of various funeral 
institutions that built upon differentiated group identities, individuals were left only with 
the choice of linking themselves and their dead more directly to the state without 




bereaved such that their sole connection and loyalty went straight to the state without any 
dilution or competition from different social loyalties or “contamination” through 
associational ties. These nationalizations were therefore a key part of the social and 
cultural engineering performed by the state to reduce horizontal ties among people in 
favor of vertical ties between the people (a single, undifferentiated public) and the party-
state. In other words, individuals were being atomized as they were “liberated.” The 
elimination and alienation of these other sources of identity established the foundation for 
creating a new sort of subject, a political subject citizen who is directly linked to the state. 
In the next section, I discuss the steps that followed as the state aimed at creating a 
collectively shared singular subjectivity at the end of life that is first and foremost based 
on socialism and socialist idea of person.  
 
II. Promoting Cremation in Shanghai 
 Cremation as a kind of body disposal among Han Chinese people existed long 
before the birth of the modern Chinese death industry. Although its exact origin is still up 
for debate, its increasing popularity was linked to the popularization of Buddhism in 
China (Xiang Mingsheng 1992). As a type of institutional funeral facility, “all recorded 
crematoria [in China] were run by Buddhist temples, although it was also possible for 
people to cremate their own dead by constructing a pyre on open ground” (Ebrey 1990: 
414). As a form of interment in imperial China, cremation was often an option for people 
who believed they would move on to a Buddhist Nirvana as well as for those who were 




 Imperial Confucian scholar-officials, however, objected and even sought to 
criminalize cremation because they maintained that cremation not only violates principles 
of filial piety, but also meant being animal-like—only beasts, or non-humans who were 
incapable of human sentiments were able to destroy their loved one’s bodies. Moreover, 
for a deceased parent to be a proper ancestor (and thus a proper postmortem personage), 
Confucian scholar-officials believed that the deceased's body had to remain whole in 
death. The rituals performed before and during body burial as well as afterward during 
the ancestor worship that is enabled by the proper funeral and burial rites were all thought 
to be critical filial obligations of all descendents. For certain areas such as Jiangnan (江南
) where Shanghai was located, the tension between folk tendencies to make cremation 
available and the imperial state’s stand on body burial was particularly fraught (Fang 
Xianliang 2006). 49 After Shanghai became a treaty port, cremation was again associated 
with devout Buddhists or Buddhist monks, foreigners, and extremely poor Chinese 
(Xiang 1992).   
 Under the socialist regime, the need to clean up dead bodies probably played a 
more important role than ideological reasons for kick-starting the actual on-the-ground 
promotion of cremation. In an official document addressed to the Shanghai Municipal 
Government, the Civil Affairs Bureau indicated that there were three usual ways of 
dealing with accumulated, above-ground, and exposed bodies (at that time): transporting 
the bodies out of Shanghai, burying them in nearby public cemeteries, or cremation. 
However, according to the Civil Affairs Bureau, the number of cemetery plots available 
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could only last one year and four months. Transportation out of Shanghai, too, was not 
convenient or cost effective. They explained that the lack of sufficient land in the urban 
environment of Shanghai obliged the FIA to seek alternatives. On December 2, 1951, the 
FIA posted an announcement in state newspapers to encourage the general public use Xi 
Baoxin Crematorium instead of looking for burial sites.  
 Furthermore, the Civil Affairs Bureau proposed to build more crematoria in 
Shanghai, especially since the government wanted to have more adults cremated, and 
established more public cemeteries to tide the city over until enough people accepted 
cremation. The Shanghai Municipal Government replied to say that the Civil Affairs 
Bureau was on the right track. However,  
 
“[The Civil Affairs Bureau] should not solely depend on administrative orders to 
force the masses to accept cremation, they should not decrease the price of 
cremation so much that it is impossible to maintain crematoria. They also should 
not blindly and exaggeratedly campaign for cremation so that the current 
cremation facilities cannot meet the demand. […] In approving all of the above, 
we should be well aware of the difficulty and the extended time needed to change 
the old customs. We should be reasonable, act accordingly and appropriately, we 
should not rush into things or force things with orders. We should not let private 
cemeteries freely charge people [whatever they like], yet we should also not allow 
public cemeteries to just go ahead and increase prices because this will cause the 
masses to feel upset and therefore lead us into a passive position (reacting rather 
than leading).”50  
 
The kind of governing philosophy revealed in this document shows that despite the fact 
that promoting cremation was to become the centerpiece of socialist funeral reforms, its 
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implementation was to be more cautious and pragmatic than passionate and 
revolutionary. This was in contrast to the nationalization of funeral institutions, which 
was done rapidly through administrative orders. Specifically, promoting cremation 
emphasized campaigning through persuasion, or “doing thought work” (gao sixiang 
gongzuo 搞思想工作) to use the vernacular term.   
 There were two waves of cremation campaigns in Shanghai. The first happened 
before the nationalization of funeral institutions (1956-1958) and the second happened 
right before the Cultural Revolution. In the following sections, I first provide a brief 
overview of cremations campaigns. Then I discuss the specific techniques used in 
persuading the bereaved to accept cremation in Shanghai.     
 
Cremation Campaigns  
 There were two waves to cremation campaigns in Shanghai. The first wave went 
on and off from 1954 to 1956 and the second peaked between 1963 and 1965. In the first 
campaign, the spirit of funeral governance was memorialized in the slogan, “Promoting 
Cremations, Maintaining Body Burials, and Encouraging Body Transportation” (tichang 
huozang, weichi tuzang, guli waiyun 提倡火葬、維持土葬、鼓勵外運).51 In practice, 
the FIA set up a crematorium in Longhua Cemetery and another two, Xinlu and Lianxi 
Crematoria, in rural Shanghai in 1954 to enhance the infrastructural aspects of promoting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




cremations.52 Meanwhile, the FIA also simplified the procedures for cremation in June 
1954, lowered the price of cremation by providing free funeral hall rental, free rentals of 
western-style coffins (used during the funeral but not to be cremated with bodies), and 
reducing the prices for body transportation, embalming fees, and so on.53 The FIA also 
increased the price of public cemetery plots so that, ideally, more people would choose 
cremation for economic reasons. From these policies, we can see that the FIA continued 
to maintain the three different ways of handling dead bodies—cremation, body burial in 
Shanghai, and transporting bodies out of Shanghai to be buried. Cremation was a priority 
but not the only way to inter dead bodies. 
 The first wave waned as the Anti-Rightist Movement kicked off in 1956.54 We 
can see the correlation between cremation campaign and adult cremation rate in Table 1 
above.55 From Table 3.1, we can see that the adult cremation rate was 11.94% in 1953. It 
went up to 19.38% in 1954 as the campaign started. It then dropped to 15.16% in 1955, 
but then increased again to 23.08% in 1956. However, the rate fell off to 15.09% in 1957 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Shanghai Funeral and Interment Administration 上海市殯葬管理處. 1960. “Shanghai binzang 
shiye de yixie qingkuang” 上海殯葬事業的一些情況 [The general condition of the Shanghai 
funeral and interment industry], CFIPL archive. 
53 Starting from June 23, 1954, the bereaved only needed a burial certificate (maizang zheng 埋葬
證) issued by a police station or issued by the Statistics Unit of Life and Death to proceed with 
cremation under the new policy. In the past, the court needed to send a coroner to the 
crematorium before a body was cremated. See 1953. “Guanyu binzang gongzuo jixiang yijian 
cheng shifu wen” 關於殯葬工作進行意見呈市府文 [Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau’s opinions 
on funeral governance], CFIPL archive. 
54 Shanghai Funeral and Interment Administration 上海市殯葬管理處. 1960. Shanghai Binzang 
shiye de yixie qingkuang 上海殯葬事業的一些情況 [The general condition of Shanghai funeral 
and interment industry], CFIPL archive. 
55 As discussed in Chapter 2, cremation was the primary form of interment for handling 
children’s dead bodies in Shanghai. It is therefore not a good indicator for understanding how 





Annual Comparison of Pre-Cultural Revolution Cremation and Body Burial Rates56 
 
 
PSB = Shanghai Municipal Public Security Bureau 
FIA = Funeral and Interment Administration, Shanghai Municipal Civil Affairs Bureau  
*PSB numbers cover those whose bodies were handled at home and used unregistered 
boats to transport bodies to places outside Shanghai. Yet, they exclude some newborn 
babies and non-Shanghai residents who did not have their household registration 
registered in Shanghai. The FIA numbers, in turn, do not have the former, yet cover the 
latter. This is why the two statistics are inconsistent.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Sources: (1) FIA. 1960. Linian siwang tongji qingkuang biao 歷年死亡統計情況表 [The 
statistical table of deaths]; (2) FIA. 1964. 1957nian zhi 1963nian huo tu zang shengjiangshu 
bijiaobiao 1957年至1963年火、土葬升降數比較表 [The increase and decrease of cremation 
between 1957 and 1963]; (3) Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau 上海市民政局. 2000. 1949-1997 
nian shanghaishi shiti huohua qingkuang tongjibiao 1949-1997 年上海市屍體火化情況統計表 
[Cremation rates in Shanghai between 1949 and 1997], in Shanghai minzhengzhi 上海民政志 
[History of the Shanghai civil governance], Ch. 17, binding guanli 殯葬管理 [Funeral and 
interment administration], Shanghai: Shanghai shehuikexueyuan chubanshe; (4) Shanghai 
Funeral and Interment Administration 上海市殯葬管理處. 1960. Shanghai Binzang shiye de 
yixie qingkuang 上海殯葬事業的一些情況 [The general condition of Shanghai funeral and 




and then saw little increase over the years as the FIA shifted its focus on nationalizing 
funeral institution (Xu and Xu 1999).  
 This drop in 1957 was ironic because it was in 1956 that Mao Zedong made his 
famous cremation proposal. Along with the other 151 functionaries in the Central Work 
Conference, Mao approved A Proposal that all Central Leaders be Cremated after 
Death. Mao made the following exhortation when he signed: 
 
To chant "Long life!" is to contradict natural laws. Everyone has to die sooner or 
later, whether they be killed by germs, crushed by a collapsing house, or blown to 
smithereens by an atom bomb. Anyway, one way or another everyone ends up 
dead. After people die they shouldn't be allowed to occupy any more space. They 
should be cremated. I'll take the lead. We should all be burnt after we die, turned 
into ashes and used for fertilizer.57 
 
The China Funeral Association’s website today describes 1956 as a watershed moment 
where “from then on, China began funeral reformation” due to the signing of this 
proposal.58 Yet, even if this was a watershed moment in Chinese history, it did not bring 
an increase in the cremation rate in Shanghai. Instead, there were intriguing temporal 
divisions in CCP governance where policies played out quite differently or at quite 
different pace on the ground. In retrospect, it is ironic that Mao’s cremation proposal is 
recorded on the official website of Mao’s Mausoleum in Tiananmen Square: the very 
place where his body remains unburied, uncremated, and taking up a good deal of space.  
 While there was not much going on in terms of promoting cremation between 
1956 and 1958 in Shanghai as the FIA occupied itself with nationalizing funeral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 http://www.tsquare.tv/tour/au.html. Accessed on 7 August 2012.  




institutions, another small cremation campaign started in 1959. This campaign was a 
minor part of a different campaign that focused on reforming funerary rites. I will discuss 
this specific ritual reform in more detail in Chapter 7.  
 In any case, an unpublished internal draft of the funeral history of the Shanghai 
Civil Affairs Bureau (the Draft hereafter) explains that by National Day (October 1) of 
1959, many citizens had complained of feeling tired of the cremation campaign. It says 
that some people in the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the CCP even criticized the 
FIA and, as a result, the “Comrades in the FIA had cold water thrown on them. 59 The 
citywide cremation campaign stopped.”60 This description, of course, did not make it into 
the final published version of the history of the Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau.61 
Nevertheless, it shows that even though promotion of cremation was a central 
government decision publicly supported by Mao himself and implemented by the 
Shanghai FIA, this support did not translate into inter-bureau consensus at the levels 
directly above the FIA.  
 In 1961, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the central government (the 
predecessor of the Ministry of Civil Affairs) requested all civil affairs bureaus at local 
levels to prepare for a nation-wide promotion of Funeral and Interment Reform. This new 
promotion had four specific requirements: 1) Promote cremation and establish 
crematorium starting from the large cities and then moving on to medium and smaller 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Please see footnotes 3 for the background of the Draft.  
60 The Draft, p.35-36, CFIPL archive. 
61 Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau 上海市民政局. 2000. Shanghai minzhengzhi 上海民政志 
[History of the Shanghai civil governance], Ch. 17, binding guanli 殯葬管理 [Funeral and 




cities, 2) Use barren mountains and deserted lands to build public cemeteries to reform 
body burial, 3) Break the old funerary customs and institute frugal funerals, 4) Use 
administrative unit division as the basic units to promote Funeral and Internment Reform 
in unity.62 In response to the Internal Affairs Bureau, the Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau 
reported on July 26, 1963 that “there are six crematoria with a total of 23 cremators 
(furnaces) in Shanghai city. We are about to build gas cremators and meeting halls in the 
Longhua Crematorium”.63  
 This notice then turned into the second wave of cremation campaigning. Starting 
in July 1963, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the central government in Beijing issued 
a nationwide document to investigate how the promotion of cremation had been carried 
out in each place and to ask for plans for the next year's building of new crematoria. This 
document reasserted (or reinstated) the central government’s determination to promote 
cremation. In 1964, to echo the call of the central government, the Shanghai FIA changed 
its policy slogan from “Actively Promote Cremation, Gradually Decrease Body Burials, 
and Reasonably Attend to Body Transportation”64 into “Actively Promote Cremation, 
Determinedly Minimize Body Burials, Holistically Reformulate Funeral Reform”65  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 The Ministry of Civil Affairs, People's Republic of China 中華人民共和國民政部 
1996. Binzang guanli 殯葬管理 [Funeral and interment administration]. Bejing: Zhongguo shehui 
chubanshe.  
63 Shanghai Funeral Museum p.97 
64 Actively Promote Cremation, Gradually Decrease Body Burials, and Reasonably Attend to 
Body Transportation (Jiji tichang huozang, zhubu jinsuo tuzang, shidang zhaogu waiyun 積極提
倡火葬, 逐步緊縮土葬, 適當照顧外運) 
65 Actively Promote Cremation, Determinedly Minimize Body Burials, Holistically Reformulate 
Funeral Reform (Jiji tuixing huozang, jianjue yasuo tuzang, quanmian gaige binzang gongzuo 積




 On March 10, 1964, the Shanghai Municipal Government approved the FIA’s 
proposal to renovate Longhua Crematorium and Xi Baoxin Crematorium as a part of its 
effort to further promote cremation.66 By the end of 1964, a citywide “Transforming 
Customs and Promoting Cremation Committee” was established. 67  This committee 
consisted of representatives from the Publicity Ministry of the Shanghai Municipal 
Committee of the CCP, the Public Security Bureau, the Personnel Bureau, the Labor 
Bureau, the Education Bureau, the Civil Affairs Bureau, and the All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions (Xu and Xu 1999). Several months later, in July 1965, the Internal Affairs 
Bureau of the central government announced its formal “Opinions about Funeral and 
Interment Reform.”68 This Opinion actualized the CCP’s effort to promote Funeral and 
Internment Reform in general, and cremation in particular, at a nationwide level.69 The 
campaign for cremation was again up and running at full steam.  
 Just prior to the start of the Cultural Revolution, government figures recorded 
13,930 bodies being cremated in urban Shanghai in 1965, occupying 50.46% of that 
year’s deaths. Among these, 1,285 households were persuaded to accept cremation by 
funeral practitioners—a three-fold increase from the previous year.70 Shanghai had (and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Shanghai Funeral Museum, p.97 
67 Yifeng yisu, tuixing huozang gongzuo wei yuanhui 移風易俗推行火葬工作委員會.  
68 Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau 上海市民政局.1953. Guanyu binzang gongzuo jixiang yijian” 
cheng shifu wen 關於殯葬工作進行意見呈市府文 [Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau’s opinions on 
funeral governance], CFIPL archive. 
69 A huge quantity of crematoria were built as the direct product of this statement. Specifically, 
16 crematoria were built in all 16 cities with populations of over 100 million. 23 of 31 cities with 
populations between 50 and 100 millions also have crematoria. 26 of 75 cities with populations 
between 20 and 50 million people also got crematoria. See 1996. Binzang guanli 殯葬管理 
[Funeral and interment administration]. Bejing: Zhongguo shehui chubanshe. 




still has) the highest cremation rate nationwide. In March 1966, the Internal Affairs 
Bureau even organized a national meeting in Nanhui (南匯) County of Shanghai City 
regarding the technical issues of building crematoria and installing new, cutting-edge gas 
cremators. This conference’s minutes were then distributed to the whole nation. 
According to the Draft, Internal Affairs’ ambition to promote national funeral reform was 
“the arrow just being shot from the bow.” Yet, the beginning of Cultural Revolution 
abruptly stopped the arrow from being released towards its target. I will return to the 
Cultural Revolution by the end of this chapter. For now, I will analyze how state 
practitioners on the ground actually went about “promoting” cremation. The actual 
technique of promoting cremation was important because I argue this technique aimed to 
detach individual mourners from their kin relations. 
 
Disembedding Self from Kin Relations 
 In the beginning, the methods of promoting cremation involved disseminating 
printed campaign materials throughout hospitals, police stations, alleys, neighborhood 
communities, charity organizations, and funeral parlors. After 1955, the FIA expanded its 
propaganda tools in a slideshow promoting cremation that was shown in all movie 
theaters in Shanghai for a whole month, setting up giant billboards in landmark areas 
such as the Bund and the People’s Avenue for a whole year, creating a “walkway” 




crematoria.71 In 1959, the FIA campaigned at the temple festivals of the Qibao Temple, 
Longhua Temple, and Jing'an Temple.72 During the second wave, the Transforming 
Customs and Promoting Cremation Committee not only campaigned in temple festivals 
as before, but also turned the month of the Sweep Tomb Festival (April) into a 
“Campaign for Cremation Month” in 1964. This time six more crematoria were built in 
rural Shanghai and each funeral home was to compete against the others to see which one 
had the highest cremation rate at the end of the month.73  
 While the above methods were important in promoting state sanctioned ideas 
about funeral and interment, this did not mean that people who actually needed to arrange 
funerals at that time would accept these ideas. Therefore, within funeral homes, state 
practitioners were tasked with persuading those bereaved who went to the funeral homes 
of the superiority of cremation. One informant told me that one of her first jobs after 
starting work on a case at a funeral home was to do “thought work” with the bereaved to 
promote cremation. Another informant told me that it was not an easy job to persuade the 
bereaved to accept cremation. He said that some bereaved became so upset that they 
threw shoes at him.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau 上海市民政局. 2000. Shanghai minzhengzhi 上海民政志 
[History of the Shanghai civil governance], Ch. 17, binding guanli 殯葬管理 [Funeral and 
interment administration], Shanghai: Shanghai shehuikexueyuan chubanshe.  
72 Shanghai Funeral and Interment Administration 上海市殯葬管理處. 1960. Shanghai Binzang 
shiye de yixie qingkuang 上海殯葬事業的一些情況 [The general condition of Shanghai funeral 
and interment industry], CFIPL archive. 
73 Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau 上海市民政局. 2000. Shanghai minzhengzhi 上海民政志 
[History of the Shanghai civil governance], Ch. 17, binding guanli 殯葬管理 [Funeral and 




 In addition to my own interviews with older practitioners, I also have some 
documents describing the actual process of persuading the bereaved to agree to cremate 
their beloved.74 They give us a unique partial look at how persuasion was actually carried 
out. What I want to get at from these descriptions is how state practitioners persuaded the 
bereaved. I argue that the key technique used here was to identify and isolate the chief 
mourners in their decision making so that the state formed a direct bond (mainly through 
state practitioners) with chief mourners that could transcend other relational and kinship 
relationships.  
 
I: As long as you are willing to stand up, the Party and the Masses all 
support you:75 
[…] The deceased lived with his wife and his parents. When they came to our 
funeral home to organize the funeral, over 20 people came (even though these 
people did not in general circumstances have social interaction). The deceased's 
wife was thinking about cremating her husband, yet she was not sure yet. This 
possibly open attitude, compared with the objections from the parents-in-law [of 
the deceased’s wife] and other relatives, stood in large contrast to the other 
people. The Comrades working in the memorial meeting halls were not 
discouraged. On the one hand, Comrade Zhu Xifu went to invite the Public 
Security Bureau to assist [in their persuasion work]. On the other, Comrade Qiu 
Genchu and other comrades went to talk to the deceased's wife several times 
respectively. They analyzed the intentions of those relatives for her. They 
encouraged her to stick to the truth and stand firmly on her position. They told 
her, “as long as you are willing to stand up, the Party and the masses all support 
you.” Then funeral practitioners went to talk to all those relatives together to 
explain the Party’s policy and tell them that they [the relatives] had no right to 
stop other people’s progress—they [the relatives] were politically criticized. 
Among these relatives, one woman was particularly bad. She kept talking to the 
wife telling her not to. So we had an individual meeting with [this woman] to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 One thing that needs pointing out is that these state practitioners wrote these documents as 
work reports to their superiors who then collected them for use in their own annual reports and 
other documents. 
75 Funeral Service Team 服務組. N.d. […missing p.1] “shi bu dong yuan de) jiazhong youqi qi ji 
sizhi fu yu mu...” 是不動員的）家中有其妻及死者父與母… […not mobilized) the household 




pressure her more so her bad influence would not work. As soon as we found one 
man among these relatives who seemed to change his mind a little bit, we took the 
chance to encourage him to help us by doing an inside job from within in order to 
turn things around into a good direction. After using this method many times we 
succeeded.  
 
II: Three Catches: Catch the organizer; Catch the major conflict; Catch the 
thought 
August 30. The deceased was Zhang Aidi. Female. 60 years old. Her husband Xu 
Jiji is a petty capitalist. Unemployed. He had planned to buy a coffin [meaning 
using body burial]. He originally intended to have her funeral at his house. 
However, his lilong [neighborhood community] did not allow this [as doing this 
has a very bad influence] so he came to us [a funeral home]. Xu Jiji insisted on 
transporting her body back home to be buried. His oldest son also insisted on this. 
After Comrade Kong [a funeral practitioner] learned more about the situation, he 
found out that the father favors his second son the most and therefore believes his 
[second son’s] words the most. When the second son came back from the army, 
Comrade Kong focused on persuading him [the second son] in order to persuade 
the father. Through memory contrasting methods (comparing how the second son 
treated his mother before and after he joined the army) and other persuasion, the 
father finally changed his attitude. He said, determinedly, “my good son, I will 
listen to you. I certainly will cremate your mother.” His other sons asked him to 
think seriously again. He said, “I certainly will do this. There is no way that I will 
change my mind.” Finally, [the bereaved family] had one request—to bury her 
ashes nicely [meaning to still have a nice plot in the cemetery]. We agreed and 
helped them return the coffin. They were also very grateful.  
 
III: Cooperate with the Lilong Closely 
April 1. The deceased Wei Gendi. Female. 31 years old. Her husband Chen 
Pingling. Their three kids and the mother-in-law of the husband [the deceased’s 
mother] who came from Wuxi live together. Since the work unit did “thought 
work” with the husband in advance, he had already agreed to accept cremation. 
The main obstacle was the mother-in-law. She said to him, “if you cremate my 
daughter, I will not take care of these three kids.” The husband was worried about 
this since he did not have parents to take care of his kids. Comrade Hua Xingshen 
actively persuaded the mother-in-law (because they all came from Wuxi so 
sharing a language made persuasion easier). Comrade Hua used himself as an 
example. He said, 'when my wife died, she was cremated. According to my 
understanding of what is happening over in Wuxi, there were many tombs that 
were dug up. If you buried your daughter’s body, I'm afraid that it won’t be too 
long before it too is dug up. Then you'll have to spend more money to deal with it 
all again. What trouble. I will not lie to you. If you agree to cremate your 




impression of him]. After various persuasions and the cooperation of the work 
unit, the mother-in-law finally cleared up her mind. The childcare issue was 
solved.  
 
 As these instances show, persuading the bereaved to accept cremation was 
accomplished by making the chief mourner, whether the spouse of the deceased or the 
children of the deceased, work directly with the state practitioners so the state could 
move them out of the influence of their extended family. For example, the wife in the 
first story, the outsider of a patrilineal family, yet “the partner” of the deceased within a 
nuclear family, was chosen to be the target for persuasion. The state practitioner working 
in the meeting hall stood on the wife's side in fighting against the patrilineal family of the 
deceased in general and the parents of the deceased in particular. When this did not work, 
then the state practitioner Comrade Zhu Xifu recruited people from Public Security 
Bureau to persuade the patrilineal family of the deceased. Meanwhile, Comrade Qiu 
Genchu continued to talk to the wife to affirm her position by “analyzing the intentions of 
those relatives.” Although the report did not say what these intentions were, one possible 
reason that Qiu Genchu said probably related to how the deceased’s patrilineal family 
made their decision based on their lineage interests instead of the wife’s interests. Thus, 
as the report says, “as long as you [the wife] are willing to stand up, the Party and the 
masses all support you [the wife].” Moreover, one particular woman who was asserting a 
“bad influence” from the state practitioners' perspective and who was a moral upholder of 
extended family values was singled out. State practitioners had a separate and individual 




We saw this strategy of picking out a target and using a divide and conquer 
technique in the second and third cases as well. In the second story, state practitioners 
persuaded the husband of the deceased by making the second son of the deceased 
persuade the father. This put the second son-father in alliance against the other sons. In 
the third story, the state practitioners made sure that the widower was strong enough to 
fight against his parents in law.  
 All three cases not only show the divide and conquer technique, but also 
purposeful acts of atomizing individuals in making funeral decisions. This was done by 
state practitioners forcing (at least partially) a particular chief mourner to work along 
with them and against their other family members at the same time. While families as a 
group historically have rights and obligations in deciding how funerary rites and body 
disposal should be performed, now it is the specific individuals, backed up by the state, 
who have the right and obligation to make such decisions. If nationalization of funeral 
institutions removed the associational ties (such as native place) or ties via religious 
belonging, campaigns promoting cremation aimed to remove individual ties to extended 
kin relations at the micro level. Although the general campaign might have an impact on 
people’s perception of cremation, cremation was more successfully promoted in the 
direct interaction between the bereaved and funeral practitioners working on the front 
lines of the funeral parlors . What made changes to cremation possible were these 
negotiations between the bereaved and the lowest “rank” of people within the hierarchy 





III. Turning Uselessness to Usefulness and Alienating the Dead 
 After the first wave of cremation campaign (1954-1956) and the nationalizing 
project (1956-1958), Shanghai funeral governance's own objectives fell victim to the 
bigger wave of the movements of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) that aimed to turn 
unproductive cemeteries and labor forces in the death industry toward productive 
enterprises with technological innovation. I have excerpted and translated the following 
quote from a six-page document written by an unknown person in the FIA. Although the 
exact writing date is unmarked, it was most likely written in the first half of 1960.76 The 
document title is Speech Notes from the Pig Raising Unit’s Meeting: 
 
Why is there such a high death rate for the pigs? Is it because the quality of the 
pigs was bad [in the first place] or is it because of the quality of our subjective 
management?77 I think it is because subjectively we did not work hard enough 
and this caused the pigs’ death, even though Qingpu pigs’ quality was indeed not 
good. From our work unit to other work units, we can all observe this. Now let’s 
examine this more specifically:  
 
1. Our cleaning job is not good enough. […] The pigs are like humans. If 
they live in a humid environment, they get sick. Pigs die from being sick.  
2. We did not find the right interval to feed the pigs so they got sick. Even 
when this happens to humans, such as we have a full meal this time but 
not enough the next meal, we too will have stomach problems in the long 
term.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Shanghai Funeral and Interment Administration 上海市殯葬管理處. 1960. Zhu eryuedi 
siyang baogao 豬二月底飼養報告 [Reporting on raising pigs in the end of February], CFIPL 
archive. Page one has the Table of Contents for this speech. According to the document, the first 
part of the talk was meant to summarize work done in 1959. The second part is to talk about the 
plan for 1960. The third part is a work evaluation based on work done in January and February of 
1960. 
77 Mao’s vision of socialist revolution was to overcome the barriers of “objective reality” 
through individual, and therefore “subjective,” efforts of the masses. The difference between 
“subjective” and “objective,” in Chinese socialist jargon, is more similar to the difference 
between “social structure” and “individual agency” than that between “subjective” and 




3. We were not attentive enough to our pigs in general. If we pay more 
attention to the pigs, we will know which pigs are getting sick and we can 
treat them the right away, then we might be able to keep them alive. 
However, many people in the work units did not notice the pigs were ill 
until they were dying. How can you treat pigs when you don’t even have 
enough time to diagnose them?  
4. We did not protect against epidemics or quarantine pigs well so contagion 
caused a lot of death.  
5. We failed to do a thorough examination of the pigs when we first bought 
them so new sick pigs lived with the old healthy ones. Contagion then 
brings death. 
6. We did not classify the pigs and raise them accordingly. When you put big 
and small pigs together, the food will not be distributed evenly. […]  
7. We have to admit that our bad management was the primary cause of their 
deaths. Subjectively speaking, it is because we did not work hard enough 
and lacked experience. The bad quality of the pigs was just one of the 
objective factors. From now on, we should use subjective factors to 
overcome objective factors. 
  
 Perhaps the first question this report raises is that of why it even exists. Why in 
the world would someone in a funeral governing institution need to write a report to 
explain why pigs died? How do pigs have anything to do with funerals? One of my 
informants who worked in a funeral home during the 1950s and 1960s described how, at 
that time, he was one of the younger ones in his work unit, so they always sent him to 
collect grass to feed the pigs—this involved two hours or more of walking with a push 
cart filled up with grass. I met him early on in my fieldwork. At that time my 
Shanghainese wasn’t very good and he did not really speak Mandarin. I had to ask him to 
repeat several times what he had just said in various ways to confirm that he was indeed 
talking about collecting pig feed as a part of his job at a funeral home. I certainly did not 
expect a funeral professional to need to know how to raise pigs. As I learned more about 




intimately related to funeral and interment governance in certain periods in Shanghai, but 
also that it represents one of the crucial ideas of funeral governance—the desire to 
transform something that, to the Party, was inherently unproductive into something 
productive in a literal sense. Governing death and funerals was an effort to reverse 
alchemize uselessness into usefulness.  
 The FIA started its experiments with growing agricultural products in cemeteries 
at least as early as 1954.78 On March 15, 1956 the Shanghai government decided to 
nationalize all cemeteries (rather than adopting public-private joint management as they 
had for some funeral parlors). Around the same time, the FIA submitted a proposal about 
how to distribute profits earned from agricultural products planted in these same 
cemeteries. This proposal describes 80 mu (13 acres) of land that was being used to grow 
cotton and 30 mu (5 acres) for soybeans among the graves. The FIA even planted 
potatoes and fava beans (broad beans) in various places to “make sure that no land [in 
cemeteries] was wasted.”79 In the next year, the FIA divided the management of all 24 
nationalized cemeteries into four big ones: Lianyi, Longhua, Ji'an, and Dachang 
Cemeteries. 80  This consolidation of ownership set up the foundation for funeral 
governance in the Great Leap Forward.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau 上海市民政局. 1956. “Guanyu ge gongmu yeyu nongye 
shengchan de baogao” 關於各公墓業餘農業生 的報告 [Regarding the amateur agricultural 
production in each public cemetery], CFIPL archive.  
79 Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau 上海市民政局. 2000. Shanghai minzhengzhi 上海民政志 
[History of the Shanghai civil governance], Ch. 17, binding guanli 殯葬管理 [Funeral and 
interment administration], Shanghai: Shanghai shehuikexueyuan chubanshe. 
80 Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau 上海市民政局. 2005. Shanghai Tongzhi 上海通志 [Shanghai 
general local history], Vol. 43, shehui shenghuo [Social life], Shanghai: Shanghai renmin 




 The Great Leap Forward began in January 1958 and terminated in January 1961. 
This was Mao’s first attempt to move away from a Soviet style centrally planned 
economic model to a mass-based, self-reliance, and self-energizing model of economic 
development (Conrad Schirokauer 1989). Simply speaking, Mao mobilized the masses to 
devote themselves to rapid industrialization and modernization. Peasants were organized 
into communes so they could change from farming small pieces of land individually to 
farming big swaths collectively to make agricultural production more efficient.81 The 
most famous part of the Great Leap Forward was probably the efforts to set up smelting 
furnaces in every corner of China. People put their cookware and farming tools into 
backyard furnaces to produce steel (often of questionable quality) for industrial usage. 
The Great Leap Forward consequently brought about massive deforestation and a 
disastrous famine nationwide between 1959 and 1961—the so-called “Three Years of 
Natural Disasters” as some of my informants (as well as current official discourse) called 
it.  
 As far as funeral governance goes, the Great Leap Forward embraced the idea of 
turning useless land for funeral and interment into useful arable land. This idea 
contradicted traditional ideas that saw cemeteries and funeral related spaces as dangerous 
and polluted, and therefore places from which one needed to keep one’s distance. In 
1958, the FIA asked its employees to grow fruits trees and commercial forests in their 
respective funeral institutions (including funeral parlors, crematoria, and cemeteries). In 
1959, the FIA initiated a pig-raising project as a key sideline enterprise for funeral 
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institutions.82 In 1960, the FIA focused more on revolutionizing the technology of funeral 
and interment and of pig raising. An internal document records some examples of such 
technological innovations including “the addition of an automatic cutting machine for pig 
feed, special canvas body bags, electronic embalming machines, pig feed mixtures” and 
so on. I am not sure what exactly these innovations are (or even if they were real beyond 
the documents they were listed in). Rather, the point here is more to give some idea of 
what the possible technological innovations in funeral institutions were at that time and 
how these were a jumbled mixture of human and pig related technologies.   
 When the dead were forced to share their last resting space with domestic 
animals, the two did not necessarily co-exist in peace. I have many reports, including the 
one quoted at the beginning of this section, pointing out recurrent problems with high 
death rates of pigs in the FIA’s properties. One internal report written in February 1960 
records a 19% death rate for pigs raised in Longhua Cemetery, 0.9% in Lianyi Cemetery, 
5% in Wan’an Cemetery, 12.8% in the Xijin Funeral Home, 20% in Anle Funeral Home, 
and 19.4% in Guohua Funeral Home.83 The FIA tried hard to catch up on their quotas 
since they only had 640 pigs and their goal was to have 1350 pigs by August 1960. These 
high death rates were serious business. Several of these reports, like the one quoted at 
length above, explore the causes of the pig's deaths through the by then classic Chinese 
Communist genre of self-criticism.  
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general local history], Vol. 43, shehui shenghuo [Social life], Shanghai: Shanghai renmin 
chubanshe. 
83 Shanghai Funeral and Interment Administration 上海市殯葬管理處. 1960. Zhu eryuedi 





 I suggest that the FIA workers used these self-criticism reports as allegories. For 
example, reason two describes how pigs are like humans, how both died from unstable 
food sources. While these workers may be novices at pig raising, they certainly knew a 
thing or two about human death. To wonder why so many pigs died is, in a way, also to 
figure out why so many fellow human beings were dying. During the latter years of the 
Great Leap Forward the fate of the pigs merged with the fate of human beings and these 
writers, while certainly trying to redouble their efforts, did not know what they could do 
to keep the pigs (and themselves) alive. Moreover, given the intermixing on the 
technological innovation list and the parallels between the pig’s fate and the simultaneous 
disasters of the Great Leap Forward, it is not too far fetched to argue that pigs were an 
analogy for humans in this case. Emily Martin (1981) also has suggested that pigs were a 
key analogy for humans within a different context in Chinese popular religion.   
 On March 12, 1961 (when the Great Leap Forward had just been terminated), the 
FIA submitted a letter to the Civil Affairs Bureau and carbon copied it to the Shanghai 
Poultry and Eggs Company (PEC). In this letter, the FIA requested the Bureau to force 
the PEC to clean up the cemetery lent to it so that it would be clean prior to the April 
Tomb Sweeping Festival. The FIA also proposed to terminate its lending out of this 
cemetery to the PEC. The letter says, “according to our [the FIA’s] most recent 
investigation, there were 157 tombs that had lost their burial mounds. Among these, five 
coffins were exposed on the ground. Another 690 burial mounds are now filled with 
small and large holes.” This was not even to mention that many tombstones had been 




cemeteries to raise chickens because when chickens scavenge, they dig at the burial 
mounds. Chickens scavenge the earth every day and every hour so there is no way to fix 
those holes in the burial mounds. There are just too many holes.”84 
 When a funeral practitioner’s job becomes raising pigs and when the sideline 
enterprises of funeral institutions are agricultural production and animal husbandry, it 
shows how the funeral industry has moved towards being a productive site in the most 
literal sense. This is not to say that other Chinese ideas or practices of funeral and 
interment have nothing to do with increasing the material welfare of the living or fertility 
as commonly observed in funerals cross-culturally (Hertz 1907; Bloch and Perry 1982). 
Quite the opposite, traditional Chinese funeral rituals such as choosing an auspicious 
cemetery plot based on fengshui, burying the deceased at a certain time and date, and 
burning ritual money and other goods to the deceased all aimed to make the dead happy 
in return for calling on the dead to protect and bless the living with material benefits. The 
difference under socialist rule was the deliberate removal of the mediation and 
supernatural role of the dead. The magical protection and blessings from the dead did not 
bring wealth. Instead, it was the work of the living, quite literally on the backs of the 
dead, but under the CCP’s supervision, that was to increase productivity and bring wealth 
for the whole society. 
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The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution   
 The exact starting time of the Cultural Revolution, or the “Ten Years of Disaster” 
as some people call it today, is not uniformly agreed upon.85 For the Shanghai death 
industry and funeral governance, however, it began with an exact date: August 22, 
1966.86 On that day, the Red Guards broke into the Shanghai coffin transportation station, 
located in a port. They opened up all the coffins, took out their human remains, and then 
burned them right then and there. This incident was not only the end of coffin 
transportation in Shanghai, but also the dramatic turning point between the predominance 
of body burial and cremation as the primary form of interment. After this incident, the 
Red Guards started to “break the Four Olds” (puosijiu 破四舊) in funeral homes.87 The 
“breaking” here was both physical and metaphorical—they hoped to change habits by 
literally destroying the objects that were associated with the Four Olds. The Red Guards 
went to cemeteries to destroy tombs, crypts, and gravestones and went to funeral homes 
to smash coffins and unceremoniously scatter their lifeless, soulless contents. The 
remaining five funeral homes—Wanguo, Xieqiao, Anle, Guohua, and Xijin—that 
survived nationalization were shut down in the next few months. 
 In early December, many peasants from Jiangsu and Zhejiang (the two nearby 
provinces) started a one month long raid on Shanghai cemeteries. They dug up tombs, 
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Press publish an article of his in November 1965.  
86 Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau 上海市民政局. 2000. Shanghai minzhengzhi 上海民政志 
[History of the Shanghai civil governance], Ch. 17, binding guanli 殯葬管理 [Funeral and 
interment administration], Shanghai: Shanghai shehuikexueyuan chubanshe. 





broke tombstones, opened up coffins, and abandoned the remains on the grounds.88 By 
the end of 1966, it was estimated that at least 400,000 tombs were destroyed.89 The CCP 
of the Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau submitted a document to the CCP of the Shanghai 
Municipal Committee on December 24, 1966. This report has a vivid description of these 
raids.90 It explains how:  
 
In recent months, wave after wave of Red Guards and little Revolutionary 
Vanguards, especially those revolutionists in rural communes, stood up and took 
revolutionary acts to crush tombstones and tear down tomb mounds. According to 
partial statistics, excepting only those tombs of veterans, all tombstones have been 
pushed down or destroyed so far (half of foreigners’ tombstones have also been 
crushed). Tombs in the Buddhist Cemetery and Zili Cemetery [a Christian 
cemetery] were all or largely destroyed. Hundreds of the tombs of bloodsuckers 
and parasites [“enemies of the masses”] were dug out and some foreigners' tombs 
as well. The rural masses who are close to Dachang, Jiangwan, and Lianyi 
Cemetery are preparing for an even more comprehensive set of revolutionary acts. 
Revolutionists in the [Shanghai] Funeral and Interment Administration [FIA] are 
acting up too. […]  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Digging up coffins and converting cemeteries happened before the Cultural Revolution in 
Shanghai, too. For example, the Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau submitted a report to its 
supervising institution and a carbon copy to the rural committee of Shanghai on October 24, 
1961. This report said that a lot of FIA’s charity cemeteries were converted to farmland by rural 
production brigades without the FIA’s approval as early as the mid-1950s. At the time of writing, 
a rural production brigade had just converted over 60 mu into farmland with only 6 mu remaining 
untouched. Moreover, “in the spring, peasants even dig out coffins to use them [their wood] to 
repair their houses, pigs houses, or sheep houses. What is even worse is that the peasants do not 
even bury those bodies again afterward so the bodies are left on the ground. Local residents are 
very upset.” See Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau 上海市民政局. 1961. “Guanyu chuanshaxian 
yanjiaqiao dengchu yizhongdi fenmu beijue qingkuang he chuli yijian de qingshi baogao” 關於川
沙縣嚴家橋等處義塚地墳墓被掘情況和處理意見的 請示報告 [A report on the damages to 
charity cemeteries in Yanjiaqiao in Chuansha County], CFIPL archive.    
89 Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau 上海市民政局. 2000. Shanghai minzhengzhi 上海民政志 
[History of the Shanghai civil governance], Ch. 17, binding guanli 殯葬管理 [Funeral and 
interment administration], Shanghai: Shanghai shehuikexueyuan chubanshe. 
90 Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau 上海市民政局. 1966. “Guanyu quxiao gongmu pinghui fenmu 





As we can see from this description, the first targets of destruction were tombs of 
foreigners, religious practitioners, and class enemies. Such destruction articulates the 
formation of singular and collectively shared selfhood. There was now only one official 
way to be a person in Shanghai and in China—a socialist citizen. The Cultural 
Revolution pushed this singular and collective idea of self to such an extreme that all 
other alternatives had to be destroyed, even if these alternative sources of identification 
were only secondary to the socialist identification. Many Shanghai people, however, were 
not happy with these revolutionary developments. The report thus continues:  
 
However, many tombs have owners [meaning that they belong to someone]. As 
for those owners, […] most of them have been persuaded and agree. But some 
people haven’t strengthened their thoughts. Recently, many family members [of 
the deceased] have individually or collectively filed complaints to the FIA, asking 
the party committee to immediately take active acts to make related units and 
rural communes act in organized ways, and to ask them to pick up the remains 
and cremate them etc. Thought work is a difficult task. In any case, we can’t wait 
a single second to solve the problem of cemeteries. Without immediate and active 
actions to handle this, it might cause internal conflict and quarrels among the 
masses therefore leading to unsolvable chaos.   
 
To solve this problem, the CCP of the Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau proposed to close 
off all cemeteries with a less devastating method. They suggested:  
 
As far as destroying all cemeteries, we suggest the Bureau of Urban Planning, 
Civil Affairs, and district and county governments [of Shanghai] work together to 
form a work team to carry out this task in an organized way. At the same time, we 
should inform the owners of the tombs in order to do “thought work” right. We 





 The above events were what finally accomplished universal cremation, one of the 
most important goals of the Funeral and Interment Reform, as all funeral homes and 
cemeteries were closed by the end of 1966. Shanghai already had the highest cremation 
rate in China prior to the Cultural Revolution. Later, the Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau 
handed all cemeteries over to the Revolutionary Committee of the Municipality of 
Shanghai, the highest governing authority of Shanghai during the Cultural Revolution, on 
July 1, 1967. 91 After shutting down all funeral homes and cemeteries that only left two 
crematoria, Longhua and Baoxin, to handle all of Shanghai's deaths. Cremation became 
the only possible way to inter dead bodies. These two crematoria were the predecessors 
of Longhua and Baoxin Funeral Parlors today.  
 Shanghai quickly became a pioneer of Funeral and Interment Reform that 
exemplified the ultimate goal of funeral governance even without having an institution to 
govern. The Cultural Revolution terminated the institutional life of both the Shanghai 
Civil Affairs Bureau and the FIA—the very institutions that had been promoting the 
Funeral and Interment Reform.92 At the national level, the Central Committee of the CCP 
abolished the Ministry of Internal Affairs on December 11, 1968.93 Funeral governance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 The Revolutionary Committee of the Municipality of Shanghai was the highest Party and 
government authority between February 23, 1967 and December 1979. Its predecessor was the 
“Shanghai People’s Commune” (Shanghai renmin gongshe 上海人民公社) which only lasted 
from February 5 to February 23, 1967. 
92 The notorious January Storm for Seizing Power started in Shanghai in 1967. This movement 
was the Maoists’ attempt to allow the Red Guards to take over all of the old communist party 
organizations—such a take over was in fact the spirit of the Cultural Revolution. This “storm” 
was initiated in Shanghai and affected Shanghai's government from the top all the way down. It 
then spread from Shanghai to other parts of China. Thus, the Revolutionary Committee 
established a branch in the FIA by the end of 1967. This takeover paralyzed the operations of the 
FIA. 




work was therefore transferred to the Ministry of Finance in 1972. If there ever was one, 
this is one lesson that history has taught us about irony—the lifelong personal and 
institutional career goal of funeral governing officials was achieved through the 
destruction of the very institutions that carried out funeral governance.   
 
Conclusion: The Making of Political Subjects  
 Over the last two chapters, I have delineated a process of highly politicized 
subject formation through an examination of how funeral governance in Shanghai was 
carried out based on the mundane work of public servants. The need to clean a city of 
corpses was a prelude for governing death and constructing citizenship in modern 
Shanghai. While the Health Bureau and its concerns for hygiene solved the immediate 
problem of body dumping, it could not change roots of the issue of dead bodies without 
putting into effect a more fundamental transformation that changed how people handle 
death. As a result, as the FIA was transferred from the Health Bureau to the Civil Affairs 
Bureau, governing death transformed from a matter of hygiene to one of civility. Under 
civil governance, and echoing back to the larger socialist project, funeral governance then 
turned to the nationalization of funeral institutions. This was the state’s attempt to create 
a particular kind of subject by eliminating certain alternative sources of being 
Shanghainese and Chinese through their control and ownership of funeral institutions. 
Specifically targeted were sources related to external others such as foreign influences, 
internal others such as native place associations and other forms of associational ties, and 




 Moreover, the state’s efforts to diminish possible alternate sources of self were 
further accomplished by cremation campaigns. A key to this was the CCP’s attempt to 
destroy the foundation of both Confucian and popular religious ideas of person because 
these assumed that properly performed funerary rites and body burials transformed the 
deceased into ancestors. In the course of persuading the chief mourners to accept 
cremation, funeral practitioners worked on alienating specific individuals from their 
larger social networks (and those networks’ “bad influence”). Promoting cremation 
therefore became a way to remove individuals from their ties to family members, both 
living and dead, and to eliminate their influence as a part of who they were. In other 
words, the CCP attempted to politicize subject formation by eliminating previously 
strong intersubjective (such as links to ancestors and fellow family members) and 
associational ties (such as native place associations or private companies) within the 
world of the living and between the living and the dead through various means of civil 
governance. 
 Finally, if my discussions of the nationalization of funeral institutions and the 
alienation of the dead from the living in previous sections explains the CCP’s work to 
politicize subject formation by eradicating institutional ties and intersubjective ties 
leaving only direct links between the individuals and the party/state, my discussion of the 
radical socialist period explains how the CCP attempted to manufacture a new kind of 
political subject. That is, the Great Leap Forward era attempted to enact changes to 
funeral homes and cemeteries to transform them from places of ritual and grief to sites of 




socialist citizenship would be realized and reaffirmed. Finally, it is crucial to point out 
that these mid-level formal institutions and practitioners such as funeral homes and their 
frontline practitioners, as well as the FIA, played key roles in altering subject formation 
processes historically as they defined both the policy and practice of funerals. All these 
different aspects of funeral governance during this period set the material foundations 
that made “dying socialist in capitalist Shanghai” possible in the first place—something I 





CHAPTER 4 FROM DEATH AS A MORAL PROJECT TO DEATH FOR 
PROFITEERING  
 
The dead cannot afford to die. The living cannot afford to live.  
死人死不起，住房住不起 
- A popular saying in contemporary China 
 
 
 On September 9, 1976, Chairman Mao died. Two years later, Deng Xiaoping won 
the post-Mao struggle for state and Party power. In 1978, the Third Plenary Session of 
the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party announced the 
“Reform and Opening Up” (gaige kaifang 改革開放) and China entered a new era of 
what Deng Xiaoping called “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (zhongguo tese 
shehui zhuyi 中國特色社會主義), or what other people know as a socialist market 
economy. These economic reforms would radically transform China over the next three 
decades.  
 This chapter describes changes in Shanghai funeral governance against the 
backdrop of this much wider set of economic reforms. I tackle how state practitioners 
working in Shanghai funeral parlors changed their roles from being government officials 
solely responsible for making political subjects to service providers who also need to care 
about their personal bonuses, parlors’ profits, and customer satisfaction. I then explore 





Governing Funerals: Civil Governance and Market Governance   
 As I have documented, prior to Cultural Revolution the key funeral governing 
institution in Shanghai was the Funeral and Interment Administration (FIA) . The 
institutional life (and death) of the FIA, is itself an indication of the uncertain destiny of 
funeral governance because of funerals' ties to the “four olds” targeted by the Cultural 
Revolution. The FIA was abolished in the beginning of Cultural Revolution. It then was 
first re-instituted as a subunit of the Business Department of the Civil Affairs Bureau in 
1976. In 1978, a new FIA was finally (re)established with 20 personnel. This was the 
same year that China officially entered its market economy experiment. However, the 
newly resurrected FIA's mandate was again revoked after a year of life in 1979. This time 
the FIA became a part of the Third Unit of the Social Welfare Department of the Civil 
Affairs Bureau—a two level fall into obscurity, institutionally speaking.94 The FIA 
finally regained its independent institutional life for good in April 1981.  
 After resurrecting funeral governing institutions and as China moved further 
toward a market economy, government officials needed to decide whether Funeral 
Reform would be a continuing goal of funeral governance in the new era or if this had 
simply been a product of extreme leftism and therefore should be suspended. The 
Ministry of Civil Affairs held its “First National Work Conference on Funeral and 
Interment” in December 1981. At this conference, central government officials affirmed 
that funeral reform was not a product of radical leftists and that funeral reform had been 
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[History of the Shanghai civil governance], Ch. 17, binding guanli 殯葬管理 [Funeral and 




(and therefore could/should continue to be) a long-term effort of the CCP. They affirmed 
that the direction of funeral governance was to continue to promote cremation, modify 
body burial, eradicate old funerary customs, and promote frugal funerals.  
 Furthermore, on October 22, 1983, the Ministry of Civil Affairs proposed to the 
General Office of the CCP that communist party members should be exemplars for 
choosing cremation and frugal funerals as well as prohibited from conducting 
“superstition.” The General Offices of the CCP later promulgated this proposal to all 
CCP institutions as the “No. 75 Document.”95 Part II of this document says,  
 
CCP members should simplify their funerals. Except for the leaders in the Party 
and the state as well as those who are influential domestically and internationally, 
CCP members should not have funeral organizing committees, farewell 
ceremonies for their bodies, and memorial meetings. For special situations where 
having memorial meetings are necessary, we should control the size of them. 
They should not have more than 200 to 300 people. The decoration of memorial 
meeting halls should be as simple and frugal as possible. 
 
 Two months after the first national work conference, in February 1982, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Chinese Communist Party of the Ministry of Civil Affairs 民政部黨組.  
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產黨員應簡辦喪事、帶頭實行火葬的報告 [A report regarding the Communist Party members 
needing to simplify funerals and adopt cremation]. The first related document was issued in 1980. 
The title is: Regarding Avoiding Propaganda for Individuals (zhonggong zhongyang guanyu 
jianchi shaoxuanchuan geren de jigewenti de zhishi 中共中央關於堅持少宣傳個人的幾個問題
的指示). In Section 5, the notice suggests that high levels cadres should cancel ceremonies to bid 
farewell to the body, downsize the scale of memorial meetings, give less flower wreaths, reduce 
the number of participants, shorten memorial speeches, avoid praise and so on. Again, in 1991, 
the Central Committee of the CCP issued an announcement titled Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu 
dang he guojia gaojiganbu shishihou sangshi gaige de tongzhi 中共中央關於黨和國家高級幹部
逝世後喪事改革的通知 [Regarding the funeral reform for the high level cadres in the Party and 
the state]. Section 2 requests that high-ranking Party members and officials not have either 





Ministry of Civil Affairs promulgated a document asking all local FIAs to improve the 
problem of decreasing cremation rates and of the resurgence of old funeral customs—a 
nation-wide phenomenon as the Cultural Revolution waned. 96  Consequently, the 
Shanghai FIA held the First Shanghai Work Conference on Funeral and Internment in 
April 1982. It proposed that Shanghai funeral governance was meant “to break the old 
funeral customs, to handle funerals in an economic way, and to promote new social 
behaviors” to echo the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ calling.97  
 The Shanghai FIA was “lucky,” as compared with other FIAs, because cremation 
was already a well-established practice in Shanghai. The Shanghai FIA’s primary task 
was therefore to fight against funeral related customs, especially in relation to religious 
and folk death ritual revival. On July 12, 1982, the Shanghai FIA made an announcement 
to reaffirm to the public that there should not be “superstitious activities” in crematoria. 
In October 1982, crematoria in both urban and rural Shanghai conducted a (new) 
“Changing Customs” (yifeng yisu 移風易俗) campaign (Zhu 2010). On October 5, 1982, 
the Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau promulgated its “Provisional Measures on the 
Management of Crematoria of Shanghai.”98 This was one of the first funeral policies in 
post-Cultural Revolution Shanghai. This series of policies and actions (re)affirmed that 
civil governance would continue to be an important orientation of funeral governance in 
the post-Cultural Revolution Shanghai.  
 However, the orientation of civil governance would not be the only orientation of 
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baogao” 進一步加強殯葬改革的報告 [Regarding the report on further reform], CFIPL archive.   
97 Shanghai Funeral Museum, Pp. 98, 111. 




funeral governance in this new era. Under the spirit of Economic Reform and Opening 
Up, a new competing orientation for funeral governance has also emerged—the 
orientation of market governance. At the end of 1983, the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
organized another work conference in Weifang (濰坊) City, Shandong Province (Fan 
1989). There were two goals in this conference. The first task was to make sure all local 
FIAs understood the spirit of the No. 75 Document that reasserted a civil governance 
orientation toward funerals.99 The second task of this conference was to make local FIAs 
exchange their experiences with experiments in various “contract responsibility systems” 
(jingying chengbao zerenzhi 經營承包責任制) in funeral and interment management. 
This second goal was meant to allow local officials to experiment with ways of 
operationalizing market governance in governing funerals.  
 At that time, no one really knew how marketization should work in China in 
general and in the death industry in particular. This was why Deng Xiaoping said that 
developing China's market economy was a matter of “crossing the river by feeling your 
way from rock to rock” (mozhe shitou guohe 摸著石頭過河). This conference was 
essentially a place where funeral professionals from various places went to share their 
experiences of “initial ways of feeling for rocks.” This Weifang Conference decided that 
all Chinese crematoria would adopt the contract responsibility system and local FIAs 
went home with basic guidelines for how to operationalize the contract responsibility 
system.   
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 Later on the next year, in September 1984, the Shanghai FIA held a “Second 
Shanghai Work Conference on Funeral and Interment.” This conference officially 
approved the implementation of the contract responsibility system in all Shanghai 
crematoria (including both city and district crematoria). As a part of embracing the spirit 
of economic reform, on October 6, 1984, the Shanghai FIA announced the renaming of 
Longhua and Baoxin Crematoria as Longhua and Baoxin “Funeral Parlors” to show the 
public these governing institutions’ sensibility and capacity for a humanist touch. 
Officials believed that such renaming might mitigate people’s fear of crematoria and 
cremation.100 Since then, funeral governance changed from being about governing the 
“cremation industry” (huozang shiye 火葬事業) to being about governing the “funeral 
and interment industry” (binzang shiye 殯葬事業).  
 Finally, on November 5, 1984, the Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau approved the 
renaming of FIA from the “Funeral and Interment Administration” to the “Funeral and 
Interment Business Administration” (FIBA). This one additional word, business, stands 
for the Shanghai government’s effort to define funeral governance not only as civil 
administration but also as business administration. From this moment on, funeral 
governance was officially shifted from being only a matter of civil governance to having 
a dual orientation toward both civil and market governance.  
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Operationalizing Market Governance 
 It is important to emphasize the particularity of Shanghai when analyzing how 
Shanghai funeral governance incorporated business administration because of one critical 
factor: the unique, city-wide high acceptance rate of cremation. This meant that Shanghai 
crematoria (and thus the “parlors” they became) were financially in much better shape to 
begin with. As mentioned, the national decision to make all crematoria adopt a contract 
responsibility system was determined in the end of 1983. Two years prior to making this 
decision, in 1981, 85% of crematoria in China operated at a loss.101 In 1984, there were a 
total of 1,205 crematoria in China.102 Among them, only 280 of them (23%) were making 
any profit. The total amount of profit these made was RMB 9,430,000 (USD 3,367,857). 
The other 925 crematoria (77%) lost a total of RMB 26,740,000 (USD 9,550,000).103 
This means the losses of the unprofitable ones were 2.8 times bigger than the profits of 
the profitable ones.104 Shanghai crematoria were among those lucky 23% that operated in 
the black due to the high acceptance of cremation. In 1983, Longhua and Baoxin 
Crematoria together made RMB 1,300,000 (USD 498,084) for the Shanghai Civil Affairs 
Bureau.105 Of the 15 other crematoria at county levels in Shanghai, five were making 
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Ministry Fan Baojun’s Report on Funeral and Interment Reform].  
102 They cremated a total of 1,280,000 bodies that year. 
103 This exchange rate is based on 1:2.8 (USD to RMB) in 1984. This rate is based on the World 
Bank's annual middle exchange rate for US dollar to Chinese Yuan. The chart was accessed at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_renminbi_exchange_rates 
104 The Ministry of Civil Affairs, People's Republic of China 中華人民共和國民政部. 1996 
Binzang guanli 殯葬管理 [Funeral and interment administration]. Bejing: Zhongguo shehui 
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some profit and the remaining ten at least made their costs and income balance.106  
 At the time, the FIBA identified one of the fundamental flaws of funeral parlors 
and their funeral practitioners as “eating from the public pot” (chidaguofan 吃大鍋飯).  
At an institutional level, this meant that funeral parlors received state funds no matter 
whether or not they were operated efficiently. At an individual level, this meant that 
individual workers received more or less the same amount of salary regardless of their 
job performance. It is worth pointing out that the exact same discussion was going on in 
all state-owned enterprises at this time. In funeral parlors, job performance was tied to 
administrative goals of producing a certain kind of citizen (through percentage of cases 
accepting particular funeral reforms) rather than in terms of “sales.” Therefore, even 
given the financial leeway, how could the people on the ground operationalize market 
governance in crematoria when the entire staff had long been trained instead to privilege 
the implementation (without much regard for cost) of administrative orders (either 
through coercion or persuasion) instead of calculating cost and benefits?  In the following 
sections describing how Longhua Funeral Parlor implemented contract responsibility 
based on archival materials, I show that the state used a new monetary reward system to 
transform state practitioners from civil servants to market servants through the cultivation 
of self-responsible, self-motivated, and self-regulated chief directors and employees.  
 As mentioned, Longhua became one of only two funeral institutions in urban 
Shanghai that provided funeral services when all of the former funeral homes and 
cemeteries were closed in the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Longhua 
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Crematorium actually started as a set of primitive style of cremators within Longhua 
Cemetery in 1952. These cremators were built to cremate dead children, infants, and the 
homeless—the kind of crematable dead bodies described in Chapter 2. In 1954, the FIA 
approved the official establishment of the Longhua Crematorium.107 Four years later, 
with the decrease in infant mortality rates by 1958 and the growing government interest 
in promoting cremation, the FIA renovated this Longhua Crematorium and opened it up 
for public use.  
 At that time, Longhua Crematorium had only two coal run cremators, three body 
transportation cars, and one meeting hall of less than 20 square meters.108 In 1965, the 
FIA raised RMB 530,000 (USD 215,447) to rebuild the crematorium during the second 
wave of cremation promotion.109 On May 1, 1966, Longhua Crematorium gained its 
independence from Longhua Cemetery and became its own financial unit just in time for 
the Cultural Revolution. 
 After Longhua Crematorium became its own financial unit, the Shanghai 
government gave it RMB 315,000 (USD 128,048) annually to support its regular 
functions.110 Since all cemeteries and funeral homes were closed at the end of 1966, 
Longhua became profitable starting in 1969. In 1975, a year before the Cultural 
Revolution ended, Longhua already was making an annual profit of RMB 161,780 (USD 
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interment administration], Shanghai: Shanghai shehuikexueyuan chubanshe. 
108 Shanghai Funeral and Interment Administration 上海市殯葬管理處. 1978. Qingkuang jianjie 
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87,448).111 By 1977, profits were up to RMB 227,080 (USD 122,745).112 In other words, 
funeral governance had gone from a drain on resources to a not insignificant source of 
funding for the Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau's other projects and institutions even 
before the Opening Up.113  
 Taking a look at specific income sources, the highest profit-generating item at 
Longhua was its meeting hall rentals (See Table 4.1). The rest of the profitable items 
included cremation fees, its cremains depositary, sales of funerary merchandise, and body 
transportation. Just to give a basis for understanding the meaning of these prices at that 
time, I can give some numbers regarding funeral practitioners’ income. In 1978, Longhua 
spent a total of about RMB 120,000 (USD 48,780) for personnel.114 This included 162 
employees.115 Their average salary was RMB 62.69 (USD 25) per month.116 This means 
that to rent a medium sized meeting hall cost 2/3 of the monthly salary of a state 
practitioner working in a crematorium with average salary.117 It is worth pointing out that 
at that time, funeral parlors’ employees did not have a lower salary than others who 
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costs were RMB 751,490 (USD 406,210). In 1976, its profit rose to RMB 197,150 on RMB 
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worked at comparable levels in other institutions under the Civil Affairs Bureaus.   
 
 Table 4.1: Longhua Crematorium Profit Distribution in 1978118  
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cremators and an RMB 4 per body gas fee. The profit generated through the body transportation 





 As a part of implementing the contract responsibility system in funeral parlors, 
Longhua adopted a Chief Directors Contract Responsibility Based System (guanzhang 
chengbaozhi 館長承包制) in 1985.121 This operation asked the chief directors of funeral 
parlors take individual responsibility for that parlor’s costs and benefits in the form of 
their own salaries. This meant that the chief director’s salary was first determined by 
whether the parlor met the pre-set annual quota. If he met the goal, he then would receive 
his salary plus a bonus depending on how much he surpasses his quota by. This monetary 
reward was supposed to give parlor leaders an incentive to innovate and execute the 
business plan of the parlor.  This Chief Directors Contract Responsibility System 
eventually evolved into an Annual Salary System (nianxinzhi 年薪制). When I did my 
fieldwork in 2011, my informants told me that chief directors of major funeral institutions 
(including city funeral parlors and cemeteries) were all in this annual salary system. An 
annual salary system is a common employment type among chief directors and other 
higher up managers in large state enterprises or international companies in China. The 
annual salary system ties salary to the effectiveness of management and as a result, as 
long as they meet quotas, managers are rewarded disproportionally higher salaries than 
ordinary employees. This was in large contrast to the previous salary system which 
basically followed a fixed scale that did not make a dramatic distinction between leaders 
and employees. 
 However, creating responsible and motivated leaders was not enough to transform 
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funeral governance from civil governance to market governance since it was the people 
on the ground who carried out the parlor's day-to-day business. There were a total of 183 
employees in Longhua Funeral Parlor in 1985.122 The Shanghai government needed to 
introduce a new operating system so that all of their employees would work in self-
motivational and self-responsible ways.  
 After negotiating with the Shanghai Financial Bureau, Shanghai Civil Affairs 
Bureau changed funeral parlors’ universal bonus distribution to one that rewarded 
individuals and groups of funeral practitioners based on a commission system. It also 
removed the maximum limit on bonuses. Specifically, this was accomplished by having 
FIBA assign a different basic quota to different funeral parlors and then a different ratio 
for calculating commissions above the quota since, for example, urban city parlors and 
rural district parlors were dealing with different kinds of customers and different 
cremation rates. Taking 1985 as an example, as long as state practitioners met their basic 
quota, they got a bonus. This bonus was equal to three months of the last year's salary.123 
While this part of the calculation was all based on the preset basic quota, profit from sales 
that exceeded the basic quota were calculated differently. Specifically, for extra profit 
produced less than RMB 150,000 (USD 51,020), 40% of this would go to employees’ 
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commissions. 124  For extra profit exceeding RMB 150,000, 30% would go to 
employees.125 Within a year of adopting the contract responsibility system (by 1986), 
these employees as a group totally were making RMB 760,000 (USD 220,289) in profits 
annually.126 
 Related to and enabling this new emphasis on sales was another organizational 
change within funeral parlors. Prior to marketization, Longhua had three departments: the 
Political Work Department (the predecessor of Human Resources Departments in all state 
institutions), the Business Department, and the General Affairs Department.127 The 
Business Department here included funeral services providing units such as the cremation 
unit, the meeting hall unit, body transportation and so on. Each department was headed 
by a chief and vice chief (guzhang 股長) and each sub-unit had its own head and vice 
head as well. As Longhua moved into the contract responsibility system, however, one of 
the first things it did was to restructure this internal administrative arrangement. The new 
organizational composition contained four departments: Political Work, Business, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 In 1985, the exchange rate was 1:1.94 (USD to RMB). Among this 40%, 30% was for 
commissions and 10% went to employees’ welfare funds. The other 60% went to the FIBA. 
125 Among the 30%, 20% was for commissions and 10% for welfare funds. And the remaining 
70% went to the FIBA. See Shanghai Funeral and Interment Administration 上海市殯葬管理處. 
1984. Zhenfenjingshen, maikaigaigebufa 振奮精神邁開改革步伐 [Stepping forward to the 
reform], Pp.17-18, CFIPL archive.  
126 In 1986, the exchange rate was 1:3.45 (USD to RMB). See Shanghai longhua binyiguan 
qingkuang jianjie 上海龍華殯儀館情況簡介 [Introduction to Longhua Funeral Parlor], Pp. 3. 
127 There were a total of ten sub-units under these Departments including the Business, Body 
Transportation, Body Cosmetics, Cremator, Meeting Hall, Cremains Depositary, Maintenance, 
Gardening, Security and Miscellaneous Affairs, and Cafeteria (for employees) units. See See 




General Affairs, and Merchandise Management.128 The first three departments still had a 
chief and a vice chief respectively. The most significant change here was the addition of 
the newly established Merchandise Management Department.129  Instead of having a 
chief and a vice chief, it had a Manager (經理) and a Vice Manager. It was in charge of 
selling cremains caskets, mourning dress (shouyi 壽衣, literally meaning longevity 
garments), wreaths (both rentals and sales), food and drink, small decorative items and 
other miscellaneous funerary goods.130  
 In other words, the most important spirit of the contract responsibility system was 
to provide personal financial incentives to both leaders and workers so they would work 
for themselves instead of “serving the people.” The more a person works, the more he or 
she earns, and (theoretically) the better a life she or he could have. Moreover, leaders 
were rewarded based on the same kind of mechanism except that the potential bonus 
available was designed to be disproportionally higher due to the believed existence of 
higher “risk” at the managerial level. People’s income became the result of hard work as 
individuals instead of a result of being a socialist citizen-subject with both the right and 
obligation to work who received more or less equal payment despite administrative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128  The Business Department contained 6 sub-units: the Sales, Body Transportation, Body 
cosmetics, Cremator, Meeting hall, and Cremains Depository units. 60% of employees were in 
this department. See Shanghai longhua binyiguan qingkuang jianjie 上海龍華殯儀館情況簡介 
[Introduction to Longhua Funeral Parlor], Pp. 2. 
129 It had three sub-units: the business administration, funeral merchandise services, and wreath 
units. 
130 Shanghai longhua binyiguan qingkuang jianjie 上海龍華殯儀館情況簡介 [Introduction to 




ranking differences and differences in efficiency.131 
 This process was what David Harvey (2005) describes as “neoliberalism with 
Chinese characteristics” (though it is equally important to point out that the Shanghai 
government has no interest at all in opening up the funeral market to free competition. I 
will return to this point later). Harvey sees this trend in China as paralleling the changes 
that have happened in advanced capitalist societies (especially in UK and US), a 
phenomenon he calls the rise of global neoliberalism. Moreover, from the details of how 
the contract responsibility system works, we can see that at the individual level, pursuing 
additional money is framed as pursuing self-responsibility and vice versa. The Shanghai 
Civil Affairs Bureau and the FIBA were clearly trying to make leaders and state 
practitioners into a new kind of subject (“new” here just means different from the 
socialist governing subject) who would be self-regulated, self-responsible, and self-
calculating. Foucault (1982) calls this way of governing subjects a neoliberal technology 
of self where power works internally through individual bodies rather than needing to be 
exerted from the outside.  
 However, with the following ethnographic vignettes, I argue that such a 
governing attempt at making neoliberal subjects has been only partially successful among 
state practitioners. Specifically, I argue that while this way of governing encouraged 
individuals to become individualized self-managed subjects on the one hand, it also made 
individuals into working class subjects with some degree of class-consciousness who 
could even take class action against the interests of the parlor and/or state on the other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 See Zhenfenjingshen, maikaigaigebufa 振奮精神邁開改革步伐 [Stepping forward to the 




hand.     
 
Envisioning Self as a Working Class Subject 
 Ma Haiming was a senior state practitioner at Huangpu Funeral Parlor. I asked 
him what the parlor looked like when he first started to work there in the 1970s. Instead 
of giving me an answer about the past, though, he told me about the present:  
Ma: “Funeral parlors have changed so much since I started in the late 1970s. 
Today, many leaders in funeral parlors are “tuochan” (脫產). Not just leaders, but 
also other people such as accountants and cashiers. All they do is sit in their 
offices and have meetings. They do not produce (shengchan 生產), but they get a 
salary. A lot of salary. In fact, more salary than we who produce...”  
 
I: “Tuochan? What is that?” I interrupted Haiming before he kept going. “How do 
you write those two characters?” I wasn’t sure if I didn't understand due to his 
strong Shanghainese accent or something else, but I couldn't figure out what he 
meant.  
 
Ma: “Oh, of course, you don’t know this. You're from Taiwan. I think tuochan is 
a Communist Party thing. Tuo is the tuo for tuoyifu (脫衣服, meaning taking off 
clothes) and chan is the chan from shengchan (production). If someone touchan it 
means that they have left production.” 
 
 I had never heard of tuochan being used in this way before. In Taiwan, tuochan 
describes the act of selling property in order to avoid liability (more along the lines of 
“shedding property”). Though the word still uses the same “chan” (產) character as in 
“production” (shengchan 生產), in this meaning, the chan takes its meaning more from 
caichan (財產) or property. From an online (mainland) Chinese-English dictionary, on 
the other hand, tuochan means “to be released from production or from one’s regular 




work.”132 Another (mainland) Chinese-English dictionary lists three meanings: 1) to 
transfer (production to other duties), 2) to take leave (for study or another job), 3) to 
dispose of property, 4) to transfer assets (to avoid liability).133  
 In practice, in China, tuochan is actually an employment category that describes a 
person who has stopped receiving salary from his or her work unit because she or he does 
not work there at that moment even though he or she still remains on the books as tied to 
that work unit.134 Tuochan usually is a temporary stage and is often associated with going 
back to school.135 It is necessary because urban workers were all supposed to have a work 
unit responsible for them (not just for work related things, but also for housing rights and 
numerous other permissions). Several Chinese scholars told me that when they stopped 
their jobs to pursue their doctoral degrees, their employment records showed that they 
were then “tuochan.” In other words, students in China are not engaged in production.   
 However, when Ma talked to me, he told me that leaders and accountants were 
tuochan. To better understand Ma’s “misuse” of this term, we can examine the usage of 
tuochan in rural China. Yarong Jiang and David Ashley's 2013 work illustrates the life of 
a cadre in rural China. This cadre told them how his promotion to the Party Secretary 
position of a commune did not release him from field labor. “In those days, cadres were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132See http://cidian.xpcha.com/98568ebdu4u.html (last accessed July 8, 2014) 
133See https://chinese.yabla.com/chinese-english-pinyin-dictionary.php?define=tuochan 	  
(last accessed July 8, 2014) 
134 A laid off worker might still have her or his work unit affiliation. In today’s China, some work 
units allow employees to “buy off” (maiduan 買斷) their work unit ties in exchange for a lump 
sum of money. The work unit is then no longer responsible for that worker. 
135 For example, I met an exchange scholar from China in Boston. She belongs to an academic 
institution as her work unit, but she currently is a full time PhD student at a different academic 
institution. Her first institution is still her official work unit, but she does not receive salary from 




'not-relieved-from-production' (bu tuochan)” even as they took on administrative duties 
(2013:57). In this quote, this rural cadres clearly associated production with field labor 
rather than administrative work (and his promotion to Party Secretary did not allow him 
leave production).  
 I suggest that Ma’s perception of how leaders and accountants came to be tuochan 
is a reflection of Chinese cultural concepts of class distinction that associated physical 
labor with the working class. In my earlier work on the relationship between substance 
use, class, and gender among Taiwanese men (Liu 2008), I discuss a concept of class 
based on a distinction between people who “work with their minds” (laoxi 勞心) and 
those who “work with physical force” (laoli 勞力). For Ma, to “marketize” meant the 
creation of class distinctions within funeral parlors. In this process, since parlor leaders 
and other white collar workers now only work with minds instead of with physical force, 
they can be said to not only have gotten raises, but also to have gotten to tuochan, even 
while the rest of the parlor's employees had to stay in production.  
 Let me give a brief description of Ma’s life in the crematoria to shed some light 
on what he, as a state practitioner, perceived counted as production. Ma graduated from 
junior high school in 1977 in Shanghai. This was the same year all the sent-down youths 
from all over China desperately tried to return to the cities they came from.136 Shanghai 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Sent-down youths were a group of urban youths who were either forced or volunteered to 
leave their home cities and be relocated in rural areas during the “Up to the Mountains and Down 
to the Countryside” (shangshan xiaxiang 上山下鄉) movement. The movement of urban youth to 
the countryside started as early as the 1950s. In 1962, this movement became nationally 
organized. Once in rural areas, due to the country's household registration system and perceived 
overcrowding in the cities, it became nearly impossible for these youths to go home. This massive 




was home for many of these youths, which made job assignments particularly difficult for 
anyone in Shanghai at that time.137 After two years of waiting at home, Ma finally got his 
job assignment. He was told that he had two choices—he could either work on a farm or 
in a crematorium. Ma had long been living in urban Shanghai. His family members had 
always had an urban household registration and had therefore never done any farm work 
before. Ma felt that farming was too “bitter” so he therefore chose to work in the 
crematorium. 
 When Ma first started work, he was assigned to work in the cremator unit 
(luzijian 爐子間). At the time, there were five cremators in his crematoria and his unit 
had a total of six employees. Back then, cremators relied on coal for their fuel. When 
they worked, they worked in pairs. They therefore could only keep three cremators 
working on normal days. Ma’s job was to keep adding coal to maintain the fire. Ma said 
that it took about a week for someone to learn when to add coal and how much was 
needed. Working in the cremator unit was very hard, hot work.  Not so much because of 
the psychological aspect, though Ma said he was well-aware that he was burning dead 
bodies and even more aware of how other people might think of him. Rather, it was hard 
because it took a lot of physical strength to shovel the coals up high enough to put bodies 
in the cremator.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and the reopening of college entrance exams in 1977, these sent-down youths made a series of 
petitions and other actions calling for permission to go home, including going on strike briefly. 
For example, sent-down youths in Yunnan organized a strike at the end of 1978. 
137 At this point, nearly all jobs in China were assigned by the state, there was no way to “apply” 
for just any job. While theoretically this meant that everyone was assigned a position, sometimes 
positions did not open up for quite some time and, in the meantime, you would be 




 This was not even mentioning the equally unbearable heat and smoke. Winter was 
the “death” season in Shanghai, especially around the Winter Solstice due to its humid 
coldness (in fact, this is one reason that many Shanghai people believe that Winter 
Solstice is when ghosts come out to wander around amongst the living). On these kinds 
of days, the cremator unit needed to have four or even five cremators running full-time 
without any boost in employees.138  Ma was sweaty in Shanghai winters where the 
temperature often hovered just around freezing. Meanwhile, the smoke always left him 
with a layer of dust coating his skin. Ma recalled that he did not have a single piece of 
clothing that was white between 1979 and 1988 while he worked in the cremator unit.   
 Aunt Wang, another senior state practitioner, told me that she remembered how 
the chief director of her crematorium himself went into the cremator unit to test things 
out in the 1960s. Whereas today all directors wear white shirts and ties while sitting in 
their air-conditioned offices and have “meetings.” In fact, this feeling was very strong 
among workers, especially the older generation who had been through funeral parlors’ 
transition from a purely administrative government bureau to also being an office for 
business administration. Whenever I asked senior or retired state practitioners about 
funeral parlors in the past, they told me how funeral parlors had changed so much up to 
the present and how they felt that people today were treated unjustly. Even though they 
all agreed that their own economic situation was better today, the most obvious change, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Ma's work choice affected his marriage prospects. He did not get married until 1988 when he 
was 28. For men in Shanghai at the time, this counted as very late. His problem finding a spouse 
was caused directly by the fact that he worked in a crematorium. In the end, Ma’s wife came from 
rural Shanghai. Her parents were quite open minded, and decided that Ma’s stable job and regular 
salary was much better then a livelihood that depended solely on Heaven’s will (meaning be a 




they told me, was that some people now earned a lot more money than others without 
much legitimate basis.  
 Ma’s description of how leaders no longer participate in production and Aunt 
Wang’s description of how managers in funeral parlors only have meetings instead of 
doing actual funeral-related work were more than idiosyncratic sentiments. For the 
majority of state practitioners, working in crematoria/funeral parlors was to be immersed 
in the physical labor of dealing with decaying corpses. For Ma and his generation of state 
practitioners, merchandise sales and business administration were not a part of 
“production” within funeral parlors. Dressing dead bodies, shoveling coal, and cleaning 
up meeting halls were production. Or, to use this within a Chinese concept of class, 
working with hands was production while working with minds is not. In this sense, by 
describing some people in funeral parlors as no longer in production, what these state 
practitioners were articulating was the emergence of class distinction formed through the 
economic reforms.  
 To be clear, I am not saying that hierarchy was somehow new. Quite the opposite, 
hierarchy had always existed in funeral parlors. However, before the Opening Up, 
hierarchy was built on political domination since funeral parlors were part of the 
government. The relationship between leaders and other civil servants was defined 
administratively through their positions in the bureaucracy. Moreover, this politically 
dominating relationship was tempered by a general sense of “economic” equality since all 
workers received relatively equal pay and leaders were not exempt from physical labor 




time). However, when funeral governance changed from civil governance to market 
governance, income inequality grew.  
 When individuals came to be rewarded for being self-motivating and self-
managing, these leaders lost their legitimacy because workers did not see leaders’ 
privileges in pay scale as the result of their individual successes in market competition in 
the first place. Another senior state practitioner, Master Kao put this point to me in a 
rather direct and succinct way. He told me that when the then chief director of Huangpu 
called a meeting to announce that he was going to take a “personal risk” and implement 
the contract responsibility system back then, Kao felt strongly that he was lying. Kao 
said, there was no “risk” there because Shanghai funeral parlors are a state monopoly and 
everyone dies eventually. This meant that Huangpu would always have business and, 
given the high cremation rates, it always would make money no matter how poorly the 
leader performed in Shanghai. What kind of “risk,” exactly, was he taking? Kao half 
jokingly said to me, “I would love to take that ‘personal risk’ as well if I had a chance.” 
 This general suspicion about rewarding certain individuals for imaginary risk not 
only existed between state practitioners and leaders, but also between senior and junior 
state practitioners, between junior state practitioners and leaders, and between 
practitioners working in the sales unit and the other state practitioners. Another of my 
younger informants, Lin Wu, said,   
 
The older generation often accuses the younger generation of state practitioners of 
being profiteers because there are now so many extra service items we charge for. 
I think that we need to understand profiteering from various perspectives though. 
First off, the average cost of having a funeral in our parlor is RMB 7,500 (USD 




gain nothing from this "profiteering." All of the prices are determined by leaders 
in the parlor and these profits do not trickle down to us. The parlor's increased 
profit does not correlate with our income level. What's "worse" is that when 
funeral parlors are making more money, the customers also are demanding higher 
quality service. In other words, the more money the funeral parlors make, the 
more and better work we have to offer despite us not earning any extra. In this 
sense, don't Shanghai cosmeticians make less money than those outside Shanghai 
such as in Anhui or Xi'an? We both may earn about RMB 4,000-5,000 per month. 
However, considering the number of bodies that we have to handle every month 




 Furthermore, Lin Wu also saw the formation of class distinction between leaders 
and practitioners in the sales unit on the one hand and the rest of the state practitioners on 
the other. He said,  
 
From the funeral parlors' perspective, it's a monopolized business. If you asked 
me to point out where competition exists, it only exists among the 16 or 17 
funeral parlors [and they are not in real competition in the sense that they are 
generally far away from each other geographically speaking].139 Among these, 
only three are city funeral parlors and suburban parlors simply cannot compete 
against the three city ones. Every year, Longhua, Baoxin and Yishan City Funeral 
Parlor announce their annual statistics, things like how many bodies they handled. 
These numbers are strange sometimes. For example, a funeral parlor might have 
handled fewer bodies compared with its previous year but yet the net profit still 
increased. Why? Because many service items are monopolized. People have no 
choice. They have to buy these services from the parlors.  
 
From another perspective, monopoly might not be a bad thing. But, it is important 
to recognize that these profits are not the result of some individual's self-initiated 
hard work and achievement. Individuals did not fight to get sales done. Business 
comes to your door directly. Profits here thus have nothing to do with certain 
individuals striving to offer more or better services. This is why I think that 
salespeople [in the sales unit] should not have such high commissions. Their 
“sales” result from their “sitting and facing the south” (chao nanzuo 朝南坐 in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Mandarin, shao noeshu in Shanghainese).140 In the past, an emperor sat on the 
south side to wait for his people to come to see him. In modern times, this means 
that our salespeople merely sit in their office and wait for the bereaved to come to 
them directly. This is very different from what people do in your Taiwan, for 
example. Taiwanese funeral professionals need to go out to find dead bodies 
themselves. If this was the case for us, giving salespeople high commissions 
makes sense. However, what they do is simply wait for dead bodies to come to 
them. Their "sales" are simply side expenses occurring around dead bodies. This 
is not "sales" (yeji 業績). Market competition in the funeral industry should be 
about competing for dead bodies.  
 
Lin Wu did not see such income disparities between cosmeticians and salespeople as the 
result of one having worked harder. His explanation of why income disparities among 
state practitioners were not justifiable was purely based on the logic of the market. That 
is, he thought that there was no real competition (meaning free competition) so people 
should not be rewarded for individualized market behavior.  In this sense, what we see is 
a mixture of self-conceptualization that is both individual and market-based as well as 
collective and class-based. Even though the state attempted to inculcate self-motivated 
and self-responsible individual state practitioners under their market governance 
structures, state practitioners became self-enterprising subjects while, at the same time, 
also becoming working class subjects with a degree of class-consciousness.  
 Moreover, these market-class subjects with both market sensibility and class-
consciousness sometimes took class action for group interests when the conditions were 
right. One of the best examples was the protest organized by Lin Wu and his fellows in 
the cosmetics unit at Hunagpu. Lin Wu told me, “the cosmetics unit used to direct the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 In Shanghainese, this term is a derogatory term that describes powerful people or institutions 
who just sit where they are like an emperor. They wait for other people to come to them to beg 




funeral parlor as a whole and its role was replaced by the sales unit after the reforms. 
What's worse was that there was a sudden increase in income gap between cosmeticians 
and salespeople.” In other words, the body cosmeticians, who did all the dirty work, 
earned less than salespeople who only needed to sit in the office to persuade the bereaved 
to buy more. This was in addition to the fact that salespeople didn’t even need to go out 
to find the bereaved since funeral parlors are a state monopoly.  
 In the late 2000s, some people in the cosmetics unit of Huangpu posted a "big 
character poster" (dazibao 大字報) outside their cafeteria. These types of posters were a 
common genre of pro-Communist protest, self-criticism, and propaganda during the 
Cultural Revolution. This poster explained why cosmeticians deserved better pay. They 
made it clear that their requests were not targeting any "brother units" in the parlor 
(meaning the sales department), but that they were simply fighting for their legal rights. 
Finally, they stated that if Huangpu did not respond, they “would not exclude the 
possibility of having further and more radical actions.” Every cosmetician but two signed 
the poster.  
 The negotiation process that followed the posters’ appearance lasted less than a 
week. During the process, the cosmeticians at some point threatened to release the 
content of the poster online and to perform a "work slow down" (daigong 怠工) for half a 
day. As they were the ones that dealt with all of the bodies and since most funerals had a 
three-day turnaround from death to memorial meeting, even a half-day slow down would 
have had immediate repercussions. Lin Wu said that he was even offered a deal if he 




the end, the poster did not go online, there was no strike, and Lin Wu did not accept the 
bribe. Huangpu and its superiors finally caved in and announced a new pay scale. Lin Wu 
said,  
 
All of the contractual laborers in the cosmetics unit got raises from receiving 
RMB 2,000-3,000 (USD 325-488) to 4,000-5,000 (USD 650-813).141 In addition 
to a raise, those of us who were hired as Non-profit Public Sector staff regained 
an extra bonus and additional commissions for handling abnormal deaths, 
embalming, and some other things. We used to get these extra payments for these 
services, but the then chief director canceled them because they said these were 
"grey income" (灰色收入 ). This cancellation took away almost half of a 
cosmetician's original salary.  
 
 From this incident, we can see how some state practitioners took class interest 
based action with classic socialist protest methods such as “big character posters” and 
strikes to counter neoliberal governing technologies such as transparency and 
individualized self-management. For example, Lin Wu and his fellow cosmeticians 
demanded to re-institute certain subsidies that were considered “grey income”—“an extra 
bonus and additional commission for handling abnormal deaths, embalming and some 
other things.” From the parlor’s perspective, these were “grey” because of the difficulty 
of having an exact way to determine what counted as an “abnormal” condition of a body. 
This violated the principle of transparency. Without such transparency, it would be hard 
to calculate the exact bonus that a worker deserved. Moreover, instead of accepting the 
emphasis on individualized and self-motivated ideas about being a person (you should 
work for yourself and the more you work the more you get), Lin Wu and his fellows 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




sought for a raise for all body cosmeticians. This despite the fact that there were still 
differences among them since half of them were hired as Non-profit Public Sector staff 
and the other half as Contract Staff who already received only half of the benefits to start 
with. Such an act not only undermines individualized differences, but also individualized 
self-motivation.  
 However, it would be wrong to say that these cosmeticians only acted out of a 
socialist ethos. Let’s not forget that the very foundation for Lin Wu to justify his protest 
was that because there was no real market competition in funeral parlors business (since 
parlors are a state monopoly) it is unfair to make every state practitioner work for a 
personal bonus. The “revenue” generated in the sales unit of funeral parlors should not be 
seen as the result of individual sales people's hard work. In this sense, Lin Wu “bought 
into” the neoliberal logic of open and free competition as well as the logic of individuals 
regulating and motivating themselves in this market game more than most of the sales 
people did.  
 My point here is not to determine whether Lin Wu acted more based on neoliberal 
or socialist ethics. Rather, I am pointing out the complexity of being a subject and the 
multiple sources that are called upon in the envisioning self. In this sense, even though 
the Chinese state was indeed implementing a set of practices (providing monetary 
incentives so the state could have new types of employee-subjects who are self-
motivated), this process has only been partially realized. In the case of funeral parlors, 
what we see was a simultaneous process of class formation and class-consciousness. 




though the justification for class action was based on a belief that individuals should 
compete and be rewarded in a free market based on actual labor.  
 
From Death as a Moral Project to Death for Profiteering 
 My questioning the validity of their creation of neoliberal subjectivities does not 
mean that funeral institutions failed to become profit making businesses. Quite the 
opposite, Shanghai funeral parlors and cemeteries had been doing very well. In fact, the 
Chinese death industry might have been doing “too well.” In early 2004, the journalist 
Wei Yahua (魏雅華) published an article in Gongming (共鳴) Magazine titled The Top 
10 Industries with Exorbitant Profits (baoli 暴利) in China in 2003 that immediately 
caught the nation's attention. The word “bao” implies that these profits were at least, very 
unreasonable if not outright immoral. It also implies that the people who profited from 
such an industry did so through unjust means. The year 2003 version (published in 2004) 
was actually Wei's second year to write such an article and while the funeral and 
interment industry escaped the 2002 version (published in 2003), this time it came in all 
the way at No. 3.142 In his description, Wei writes: 
 
  No. 3 Funeral and Interment: Cemeteries are More Expensive than Apartments 
The profit of the funeral and interment industry was even higher than that of the 
real estate industry [Real Estate topped both the 2002 and 2003 lists]. A cremains 
casket that only costs RMB 20 or 30 (USD 2.41-3.62) to purchase can sell for as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142  The 2002 list included (in order starting with the worst): real estate, publishing, 
pharmaceutical, highway construction, automobile, media, mobile phone, study abroad, airline, 
and middle school education industries. The 2003 list comprised (in order as above): real estate, 
elementary and middle school education, funeral and interment, publishing, automobile, glasses, 




much as RMB 300 or 400 (USD 36.2-48) once it is placed on the shelf of a 
funeral parlor. A cremains casket that costs less than RMB 100 (USD 12) could 
be sold for over RMB 1,000 (USD 120) or 2,000 (USD 240). A cemetery plot that 
is less than 2 square meters with a gravestone that may be simple or may be 
elaborate costs RMB 5,000 to 6,000 (USD 605-725) for the cheaper spots and 
RMB 10,000 to 20,000 (USD 1,209-2,418) for the more expensive places. 
Cemetery plots are more expensive than apartments. According to an 
investigation, the officially approved price for cremation was RMB 92 (USD 11). 
However, what people actually spent was between RMB 6,000 and 7,000 (USD 
725-864) or more. [Finally,] the Bureau of Civil Affairs still holds power over 
administrative approvals for companies hoping to enter the funeral and interment 
industry.143  
 
 The funeral and interment industry has remained one of the most profitable 
industries in China despite the publication of this list. Every year, especially around the 
Tomb Sweeping Festival (in April), Chinese media outlets routinely publish new articles 
about profiteering in the death industry. A Chinese professor I met made a comment to 
me after he heard that I was doing research in Shanghai funeral parlors. He said, 
“Everyone in China hates funeral parlors. This is one of the worst instances of exorbitant 
profits.” A Shanghai person I met who has nothing to do with the death industry once 
said to me that the problem is that people in the death industry “make money from the 
pockets of dead people” (zhuan sirenqian 賺死人錢). It is not just members of the 
general public make such criticism against the death industry, but so too do other state 
officials. For example, the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference and a deputy to the National People's Congress joined the 
national trend of criticizing the funeral and interment industry.144 This in spite of the fact 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 http://www.southcn.com/estate/jiaodian/200401090120.htm (last accessed July 8, 2014) 
144 http://news.xinhuanet.com/house/2004-12/30/content_2394161.htm  




that the top beneficiary of the trend toward increased profits was the government’s civil 
affairs system itself. 
 It is not hard to understand public criticism of profiteering in the death industry. 
Profiteering has been the de facto framework that defines the public’s understanding of 
the death industry in America at least since Jessica Mitford (another journalist) published 
her provocative New York Times best seller, American Way of Death in 1983. While 
scholars have later complicated this assessment of the American funeral industry (cf. 
Gary Laderman 2003), profiteering has remained at the center of popular imaginations of 
the death industry. In America, profiteering from death is considered immoral partly 
because people believe that they are being taken advantage of at their most vulnerable 
moment (Jessica Mitford 1983).  
 In China, profit-making itself has always led an uncomfortable (but generally 
pervasive) existence within Confucian (and later CCP reform) ideology. However, 
profiteering from death was even more problematic. I argue that public suspicion over 
profiteering from death is an articulation of questioning the legitimacy of market 
governance of death. This is because, historically, the common people’s ability to provide 
for the dead has been an indicator of the rulers' Mandate of Heaven. In imperial China, 
the Mandate of Heaven was the primary source of (divine) political legitimacy (Hsu, 
Cho-yun 1965:24). Dingxin Zhao (2009) called it performance legitimation. This 
traditional concept of legitimacy emphasized the state’s performance in providing 
provisions for its people. One of the most fundamental of these was provision for the 




occurred during [those] age[s] of social and political upheaval when the old aristocracy 
would often be replaced by upstart commoners,” this was a clear indication that the 
current regime must have lost the Mandate of Heaven. This could both cause and justify 
uprisings calling for the end of a regime (Poo, Mu-Chou, p.28).  
 To be clear, I am not saying that market governance or immoral profits from 
funerals have led to the loss of political legitimacy for the CCP regime. Moreover, by no 
means was the funeral and interment industry the only industry believed to be making 
immoral profits. Based on Wei Yahua’s listing everything from real estate sales to study 
abroad agencies and baby formula producing companies were seen as making immoral 
profit. These ill-gotten gains do not necessarily lead to a questioning the government’s 
political legitimacy. What I am saying is that market governance of death, the particular 
combination of death and profit in governance, has led to questions arising over the 
political legitimacy of the government to govern death. 
 Death here plays a tricky role in thinking about profit in Sinophone (or 
Sinocultural) areas. For example, Robert Weller (personal communication) explained that 
it is immoral for physicians to go to temples to pray for prosperity in rural Taiwan. This 
is so even though physicians are a highly respected occupation in Taiwan and it is 
perfectly legitimate, appropriate, and indeed expected for ordinary people (such as 
grocery store owners or accountants) to pray for prosperity. The problem is that  
 physicians’ prosperity is related directly to the pain, suffering, and perhaps deaths of his 
or her patients. For example, people often post Spring Festival Couplets (chunlian 春聯) 




year. The discussion surrounding a set of well-circulated pictures of a Chinese hospital’s 
couplets shows how people were uncomfortable about hospitals hoping to achieve 
prosperity.145 These pictures circulated so widely and easily because people found this 
type of behavior to be immoral for hospitals.   
 With regard to market governance of death, what was unique about public 
concerns over profiteering from death in China was that the object of such criticism is the 
government itself, since it is the Civil Affairs Bureau that monopolizes the industry. As 
mentioned, in 1984, the Shanghai Funeral and Interment Administration (FIA) became 
Funeral and Interment Business Administration (FIBA) and officially integrated business 
administration into its civil governance. However, as the range and the scale of services 
and products extended, the contradictions in FIBA’s dual role as both the governing 
administration and business administration increased. As an informant told me, “you 
could not be a referee and at the same time also be a player” (qiuyuan jian caipan 球員兼
裁判). He said that this was not only unfair, but also created a situation where he felt it 
was impossible to be good at both.  
 Another informant said that if you do too much governing administration 
(xingzheng guanli 行政管理), you lose at business administration (qiye guanli 企業管理
). This was particularly the case for funeral governance since the goal of governing was 
to promote funeral reform that honored a commitment to frugal funerals while the goal of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145  “Ridiculous Spring Festival Couplets On the Hospital’s Door” (yiyuan chunlian cheng 
“shengyixinglong” beizhi leiren 醫院春聯稱 “生意興隆”被指雷人), Xiaoxiang News (瀟湘晨報
). http://news.sohu.com/20110215/n279339057.shtml. For pictures of this hospital, see 




market governance was to bring in revenue through a reliance on expanding and 
elaborating funerals. While theoretically speaking generating profits and funeral reform 
need not be incompatible, the reality is that most of the funerary merchandise revived 
since the Opening Up were exactly the same items that Funeral Reform had targeted 
(such as cemeteries, coffins, and other markers of status).  
 The Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau was well aware of the contradictions 
associated with the growth of the death industry. By the end of 1996, there were a total of 
15 funeral parlors in greater Shanghai (three were at the city level and the rest were at 
district or county levels). There were a total of 46 cemeteries or columbaria, 710 
companies that sold funerary merchandise (not including unregistered ones), and 81 sales 
centers for cemeteries.146 The Civil Affairs Bureau eventually ordered the formation of a 
separate organization directly under itself to take over the business administration 
functions of FIBA. This new organization was the Shanghai Funeral and Interment 
Service Center (FIS). The formation of FIS was meant to transfer the business 
administration of the FIBA to FIS. Hierarchically speaking, FIS is parallel to FIBA—
both directly reported to the Civil Affairs Bureau. Institutionally speaking, while FIS is a 
public non-profit unit (shiye danwei 事業單位) like funeral parlors, the FIBA remains a 
government bureau (xingzheng danwei 行政單位).  
 FIS was approved in February 1998 and officially began operations in August of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Among the 46 cemeteries or columbarium, 26 were cemeteries that only provided cremains 
burial, 14 provided cremains deposit only, and 8 provided both. A total of 48,107 bodies of 
cremains had been buried and 24,895 bodies as cremains were placed in columbarium. See 
Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau. 1996. Shanghai minzhenggongzuo fazhanbaogaoshu 上海民政工




the same year. However, this separation merely shifted the issue up a level to the Civil 
Affairs Bureau. The fundamental contradiction now primarily belongs to the Shanghai 
Civil Affairs Bureau instead of FIBA. This shift did not actually solve the original 
contradiction at the FIBA level either. This is because the first generation of the 
leadership of FIS consisted of exactly the same people who worked in the FIBA. The 
Civil Affairs Bureau allowed the then chief director of the FIBA (and some other people) 
to “retire” from their government posts and to “dive into the ocean” (xiahai 下海, 
meaning going into business) to become the chief directors of the quasi-private FIS.147 
The interchanging of personnel between the two branches of the Civil Affairs Bureau has 
continued today. As a result, the establishment of a separated business managing 
institution (FIS) did not escape the “one crew, but two signs” (yitao renma liangkuai 
paizi 一套人馬兩塊牌子) trend that has characterized the so-called “privatization” of 
Chinese state institutions across a whole range of sectors.   
 Today, FIS functions like a mother company (even though it is technically a 
“public non-profit” unit) for the three city funeral parlors, several funerary merchandise 
companies, and many cemeteries. For a breakdown of these relationships, please see the 
organizational chart for the Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau’s funeral governance 
reproduced below. As it shows, FIS owns a variety of kinds of organizations including 
everything from other public non-profits (such as funeral parlors) to wholly owned 
subsidiary companies, share-holding companies, and participating stock companies.  
 As FIS and FIBA became parallel units (and therefore the Civil Affairs Bureau’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




orders now go directly down to FIS) and all funeral parlors are administratively run 
through FIS, the FIBA as an institution lost much of its power. One of the few powers 
that the FIBA has retained today is the power to renew the licenses of funeral parlors. 
However, even this is more formality than real threat. While this kind of hierarchical 
relationship with few horizontal interaction between government bureaus and 
organizations (except upwards and back down through common parent bureaus) is one of 
the defining characteristics of Chinese government, we must also keep in mind the 
movement of personnel between FIS, funeral parlors, and FIBA. Finally, the fundamental 
problem of governing funerals remains constant. That is, the FIS is charged with both 
executing the ongoing funeral reform and with the often contradictory task of making a 
profit. Today, this ambiguity is less of an issue than in the past because profit has won 
out (not because the fundamental problem was resolved). 
 Since criticism against the government’s inability to ensure that people are 
properly cared for after death has always been a sign of the Chinese government's loss of 
legitimacy and since funeral institutions such as funeral parlors were nevertheless state 
institutions (even though they are managed by FIS instead of FIBA now), the public 
sentiment that “the dead can not afford to die” (the quote I began this chapter with) 
therefore should not be seen as a commonplace complaint, without greater significance. 
Rather it is a question that has the potential to make people wonder whether or not the 
socialist state that is profiteering from death still holds the Mandate of Heaven (or, at 





Chart 4.2: Structure of Shanghai Funeral Governance and Death Industry 
 
 
 My argument on how market governance of death has potentially led to the 
possible public questioning of political legitimacy is not far fetched at all if we consider 
how the state reacts to public accusations of profiteering from death. After the increase in 
public concern over the funeral industry profiteering from death, there have been 
considerable internal debates among funeral governance leaders over whether the death 
industry should be further marketized or instead maintained “for the public good” 





The full marketization of Shanghai funeral parlors was really the result of trying 
to get ready for China’s entrance into the WTO. People were worried that foreign 
capital would massively flood the Shanghai funeral and interment industry 
therefore destroying state enterprises [even though funeral parlors were public 
non-profit units rather than state enterprises at that time, institutionally speaking]. 
This was why they decided to fully marketize the three parlors and five 
cemeteries we had at that time. The idea was that we monopolize the market like a 
trust so foreign companies would not be able to compete. However, after ten years 
of entering the WTO, we realized that we were wrong. This is because it turned 
out that the approval department [the Civil Affairs Bureaus] would in no way 
approve foreign capital to enter the market. This is particularly true in Shanghai. 
The worry about the WTO bringing open competition totally did not come true. 
Meanwhile, the general public is more and more unhappy with the skyrocketing 
prices. Therefore, FIS now is adjusting its strategy. They think the right goal is to 
increase “public satisfaction” (公眾滿意度). 
 
 At the national level, the reconsideration of the nature of the death industry has 
brought death into a new stage that emphasizes “putting humans at the core” (yiren 
weiben 以人為本) or “human-centered funeral and interment” (renben binzang 人本殯葬
).148 The concept of “putting humans at the core” was actually a part of Hu Jintao’s 
governing philosophy built around the creation of a “Socialist Harmonious Society” (和
諧社會) through a “Scientific Outlook on Development” (科學發展觀). Based on this 
ideology, the market economy as it exists in China today is said to lack “honesty and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Increased public concern over profiteering in death in the current day has forced the FIS to 
respond with a campaign advocating for a “Sunny” (yangguang 陽光), “Convenient” (bianmin 便
民), “Green” (luse 綠色) and “Civilized”(wenming 文明) funeral and interment industry. 
“Sunny” means that all products and services will be sold at marked prices based on free choice. 
“Convenient” means that funeral parlors (through funeral practitioners) will operate for and at the 
convenience of the people rather for themselves. The third term, “Green” means that parlors will 
follow the spirit of Funeral and Interment Reform to reduce energy waste and the production of 
pollution. The last, “Civilized” means parlors will provide civilized funeral practices (instead of 
“feudal” or “superstitious” ones) by demanding that funeral practitioners provide their services 
civilly and politely (Zhu 2010: 98-101). These sorts of campaign propaganda soon flooded the 




trust” (chengxin 誠信) due to the rapid speed of development. A Scientific Outlook on 
Development was the means by which China, under the Hu and Wen leadership, would 
eventually be made into a Socialist Harmonious Society where the economy could 
continue to grow, but all conflicts of interest among different social groups would 
dissolve away. For the death industry, to develop “human-centered funeral and 
interment” was defined to mean increasing  “public satisfaction.”  
 Shanghai funeral parlors (and FIS) decided that public satisfaction could be 
officially measured through three indexes: the general impression of funeral parlors, the 
impression of their services, and their honesty and trust (chengxin 誠信). For example, in 
order to enhance the general impression of funeral parlors and their services, funeral 
parlors also created a new service called “Accompaniment Service” (peitong fuwu 陪同
服務). Purchasing this service would ensure that the bereaved were accompanied by the 
same practitioner the whole way through their funeral organizing and hosting process 
whether they were arranging funerals in sales unit or carrying out the funeral in the 
memorial meeting halls. This way, if there was any unpleasantness or doubts that came 
up during the process, the funeral practitioners could solve or clarify things right away.  
 Moreover, Shanghai funeral parlors asked funeral practitioners to make the 
bereaved fill out customer satisfaction questionnaires in order to know their general 
impression of funeral parlors’ service. However, while the intention at the top may have 
been to find out how the public actually felt, lower level managers asked funeral 
practitioners to make sure that they made the mourners write the questionnaires as self 




particular funeral practitioner, the practitioner could use the questionnaire that the 
bereaved had already filled out to refute the complaint. As for building honesty and trust, 
funeral parlors asked state practitioners to take classes on how to build honesty and trust 
in the death industry. In fact, they even had an open book test after every class.  
 What were the outcomes associated with this turn to a “human-centered” funeral 
and interment? First, there was a slight decrease in cremation rates at the national level. 
The Green Book of Funerals: Report on Funeral Development of China (2013-2014) 
showed that a “second return of old customs” (meaning a slight decrease in the national 
cremation rate) around 2006 was related to the launching of human-centered concerns 
with customer satisfaction.149 The Green Book said that this was a result of “funeral 
government officials [who] misunderstood the true meaning of human-centered funeral 
and interment.” Since cremation rates were not an issue in Shanghai, the influence of 
such a “return” was expressed rather more through a slight decrease in profits as funeral 
parlors reviewed their pricing policy item by item.  
 It is important to point out, however, that even with this slight decease in profit, 
Huangpu Funeral Parlor made enough in profit that the portion they passed along to the 
Civil Affairs Bureau in 2010 was in the region of RMB 80 to 100 million (USD $13 to 
$16 million). Someone high up in Shanghai's funeral institutions once told me that 
Shanghai funeral parlors were still only making “minor profit” (weili 微利). Maybe it is 
my lack of business experience or my working class upbringing, but I am not quite sure 
how over USD 10 million in profits can be conceptualized as “minor” when funeral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 The national cremation rate dropped from 53% in 2005 to 48% in 2006. This latter rate has 




parlors are supposed to be “non-profit” units.  
 The central government’s concern over this loss of legitimacy pushed Hu's 
administration to declare the Chinese death industry an industry for the “public good” in 
2011. While the market governance seems to have lost its voice at the front stage of 
funeral policy, it is a complete misunderstanding to think that business has lost its role in 
governing the death industry. If we look into the details, we find that this “public good” 
characterization is only limited to four aspects of funeral and interment: dead body 
transportation, dead body refrigeration, cremation, and cremains storage. Notice that all 
of these are directly related to dead bodies and all are thus a part of the funeral parlor’s 
state monopoly. These were originally to be operated with state subsidies since handling 
bodies through cremation was the goal of civil governance in governing death. But ritual 
and products associated with spirits and the afterlife were not associated with the 
immediate materiality of death and therefore the state was not responsible for regulating 
profiteering in the sale of these products and services. The corollary, of course, is that the 
state in the guise of FIS and the Parlors could therefore still profit from these other 
products and services. 
  
Conclusion 
 This chapter started with the resurrection of funeral governance after the Cultural 
Revolution ended. It ended with a loss of legitimacy for the civil institutions that are 
meant to carry out that political process of subject making. The emergence of a 




make profit means that funeral governance now has two contradictory goals: one is a 
focus on civil governance and the other is on market governance. The former policy 
orientation extended from the pre-Cultural Revolution era and the latter was formed 
against the backdrop of Opening Up.  
 These two governing orientations aimed to formulate different kinds of subjects. 
As analyzed in the previous chapters, when funeral governance operated as and in terms 
of civil governance, it aimed to create political subjects whose sole identity was based on 
socialism. The ultimate goal of funeral governance as civil governance was to produce a 
singular defined and collectively shared socialist subjectivity among all Chinese people. 
 Market governance, however, aims to create “market subjects” who are self-
motivated and self-regulated and who act “rationally” (in the sense of calculating costs 
and benefits). This market governance in governing funerals actually has two aspects. 
The first was to transform state practitioners from government officials to service 
providers who are supposed to be self–disciplined and, later, attendant to customer 
satisfaction since they work for their own personal interests. Yet, I argue that such market 
selves have only partially solidified. What some state practitioners did in this process was 
to simultaneously also formulate class-based ideas of self through the rhetoric of 
describing who is in production and who is not by recognizing how market governance 
has created a whole set of class distinctions. Moreover, based on such a class-based 
conceptualization of self, practitioners have, at times, taken class action under specific 
conditions. In this sense, they became “socialist” workers just as the state tried to turn 




   This second issue is related to making the bereaved themselves become 
consumers (rather than citizens) who have to make choices among a set of service items 
when making their funeral arrangement. This aspect will be explored through an in-depth 
look at business sales meetings for funerals and at the (so far, failed) push by the 
government to get the bereaved to choose to arrange “personalized” funerals. I will return 
to the second aspect of creating market subjects in governing funerals in Chapter 6 when 
I discuss funeral parlors’ attempt to promote personalized funeral. 
 Nevertheless, despite the semi-successful creation of market subjects under 
market governance in death, this by no means indicates that funeral institutions failed to 
generate profit within the market economy. On the contrary, funeral institutions in China 
since the Opening Up have acquired an image of profiteering. I argue that such public 
concern over profiteering is also a public questioning of the political legitimacy of the 
socialist state in governing death. As a result, the contradiction between governing 
administration and business administration here is not because “the market” is the 
opposite of “the state” (if we momentarily essentialize both “market” and “state”). Quite 
the opposite, it is because “the state” wants to be both “the governing body” and “the 
market” simultaneously.  
 Most important of all, in the process of making death fall from moral governing 
project (creating political subjects) to profiteering (creating service providers and 
customers), the state’s domination over subject formation at the end of life was eroded. 
The questioning of political legitimacy I describe here was one major factor for the 




rise of funeral brokers who worked as mediators between the state (funeral parlors) and 
the public (the bereaved) as funeral governance moved from a civil matter to a market 
matter with civil goals. While funeral governing institutions (the Civil Affairs Bureau and 
the FIBA particular) did not at all intend to cultivate a group of self-motivated and self-
managed individuals outside of state funeral institutions, their move toward market 
governance nevertheless created possibility for these brokers to exist. I will show that 
while from the state’s perspective these funeral brokers are not entirely moral, their 
actions in response to pressure from a variety of state and public actors has served to 






CHAPTER 5 THE FRAGILE MIDDLE: FUNERAL BROKERS AS AN 
AGENTIVE NODE  
 
 Chen Yu was a married woman close to thirty when I met her. She grew up in 
rural Jiangsu Province and eventually settled in Shanghai. She started working in various 
factories in Suzhou after she turned 16 like most of the other young women she grew up 
with in rural Jiangsu. Several years later she came to Shanghai to escape her unhappy 
marriage to a man from her village. When I met her in Shanghai, she was a “funeral 
broker” working not in a state funeral parlor, but in a private funeral agency. Shanghai 
funeral brokers are more like American wedding planners than American funeral 
directors. They need to work with funeral parlors since, legally, funerals may only be 
held in funeral parlors. Shanghai funeral brokers are mediators who do all the necessary 
arrangements for the bereaved but, unlike American funeral directors, funeral brokers do 
not have (and can not have) their own funeral facilities.  
 Chen Yu’s job was to deal with office and administrative affairs in one of these 
funeral agencies. I came to particularly admire Chen Yu's ability to do office 
organizational jobs once I realized that she only had three years of elementary school 
education. Her parents needed her help with farm work and household chores so she had 
to quit school quite early. While working in factories in Suzhou, her colleagues had led 
her into the world of romance novels and it turned out that she loved romance so much 
that she eventually taught herself how to read. She was still reading romance novels when 
I met her. Whenever I visited her office, I noticed that her computer screen always 




 Chen Yu’s current husband, Tang An, also worked for the same company. His job 
was to hold business meetings with the bereaved to help them make their funeral 
arrangements. In this kind of meeting, he sold products and services to the bereaved. In 
fact, he has really always been in sales as he sold life insurance before becoming a 
funeral broker. Tang An is a local Shanghai person with a high school degree. His 
marriage with Chen Yu was his second one as well. Tang An’s first wife was a rural 
migrant like Chen Yu, but his first marriage did not end well. Chen Yu felt that Tang 
An’s family did not like her or trust her. This mistrust seemed to be over and above the 
general discrimination against and suspicion toward rural migrants that was prevalent 
among Shanghai people. Tang An was an outspoken and humorous guy. When he spent 
time at the office between sales, he liked to research the stocks trading on the Shanghai 
stock market. His favorite conversation topic with me was politics, especially anything 
concerning Taiwan (although he was probably often quite disappointed with my 
explanations).   
 The funeral agency where Chen Yu and Tang An worked belonged to Chen Yu’s 
sister, Chen Ting, and her husband, Du Tu. Growing up as the second child of the family, 
Chen Ting carried more responsibility than other second born might have because her 
elder sister was mentally handicapped. Chen Ting was very vague about how many years 
of formal education she had had. I would guess that it was less then what Chen Yu had 
(so, less than three years). But Chen Ting definitely could read and certainly knew 
enough math to run her company. In fact, I would never have guessed that Chen Ting 




accidentally stumbled into this topic in the first place.  
 Chen Ting always struck me as a smart, independent, and beautiful woman who 
knew her business very well. Underneath her entrepreneurial and sophisticated mask, she 
had a soft, warm, and sometimes vulnerable heart. Her intelligence and perseverance led 
her into a whole new world of prosperity that was beyond anything her farming parents 
could have ever imagined. But overall she was not happy, partly because her marriage 
was crumbling. Occasionally, after she had a serious fight with Du Tu, she would stand in 
front of a window and let her tears fall quietly in the office when other people were out 
doing their jobs. One of the few moments that I saw happiness on her face (rather than a 
friendly face that she put on for her customers) was when she held her eight-month-old 
baby girl. Du Tu was not involved in the daily business of the company. Yet, this did not 
mean that he was hesitant about enjoying its profits. He came to the office mainly when 
he needed to collect money earned by the hard working team that Chen Ting had put 
together. He rarely went home to spend time with Chen Ting and their baby girl. Instead, 
he spent most of his nights out drinking, gambling, carousing with other funeral broker 
friends at Prosperity, the restaurant that I described in Chapter 1.  
 Chen Ting, Chen Yu, and Tang An were the closet friends I had when I was in 
Shanghai. Their hospitality and friendship helped me tremendously both emotionally and 
intellectually. My friends were ordinary people who had struggled to achieve their 
moderate success in the post economic reform era in Shanghai.  To do so they had to 
constantly negotiate their way through political pressures that both vilified and regulated 




(although this certainly is a factor if we consider the larger scheme of things). Instead, as 
I will show throughout this chapter, they were more a consequence of their peculiar 
structural position as brokers in the fragile middle of the funeral industry and of their 
feeling of being fragile. Most importantly, I argue that this fragile middle position and the 
actions brokers like them have taken within it is productive. Funeral brokers have been 
forcing funeral parlors and the death industry to change. While government officials and 
the bereaved might not perceive funeral brokers as entirely moral (for a variety of 
different reasons), funeral brokers have effectively created a platform for bringing 
religious ideas of person and practices to the socialist civil funeral and the Shanghai death 
industry.  
 
Fragility and Self-Enterprise     
 Chen Ting was the first of her family who moved to Shanghai. About a decade 
ago, she left her home village, her parents, her mentally challenged older sister, her 
younger sister Chen Yu, and two younger brothers in the rural part of Northern Jiangsu, 
also known as Subei  (蘇北), to find work to help her family. She started out as a waitress 
in a noodle shop after she arrived in Shanghai. That was the only job she could find as a 
young and unskilled woman with little education who did not even speak Shanghainese. 
When working there, she became familiar with a frequent customer who was a local 
Shanghai man. This man owned a photography and videography shop to which a funeral 
parlor outsourced part of its business. This old man liked the young, joyful, diligent 




him. This was how Chen Ting entered the Shanghai funeral industry.  
 The old man taught Chen Ting how to operate a camera and how to film funerals. 
Chen Ting learned photography and videography very quickly. She also learned some 
easy video editing on computers. More than just knowing the technical knowledge, Chen 
Ting very quickly found a talent for following, maintaining, and even creating the rhythm 
of the funeral. The friendly relationship between the old man and Chen Ting, however, 
changed after Chen Ting fell in love with the man’s son. It turned out that being a diligent 
and good worker and being a proper daughter-in-law was not the same thing. The man 
liked Chen Ting enough to offer her a job and to train her to be a good funeral camera 
person, but refused to accept her as a daughter-in-law because her rural background made 
her an “unsuitable” spouse for his precious only son.  
 Rural immigrants in urban China are categorized as members of a “floating 
population” (Zhang Li 2001) without “roots” in the city and without access to many of 
the rights and privileges of legal urban residents. Urban residents all over China have 
tended to discriminate against them. The fact that Chen Ting came from Subei probably 
further worsened the marriage deal since Shanghai people have a long history of 
discriminating against Subei people in particular—one often overlooked but prominent 
social inequality based on native-place in (especially) urban China. Emily Honig (1989), 
for instance, has described long held prejudices against Subei people in Shanghai since 
the 19th century. The association of Subei people with the backward, untrustworthy 
underclass has remained strong (and perhaps grow stronger) today as contemporary 




positions as unskilled labors and less educated, slum residents.  
 None of the Chen sisters lived in slums when I knew them (they both owned 
modern apartments in downtown Shanghai). However, Chen Ting indeed lived in a 
shantytown (penghuqu 棚戶區) for a while. Her Shanghai father-in-law did not like this 
marriage so he followed the common Shanghai practice of providing a place for the 
newly weds to live only “tacitly.” This meant that despite the fact that he owned several 
pieces of property in Shanghai, the living space he provided to the young couple was 
located in a shantytown. Most shantytowns in Shanghai are located downtown and all are 
waiting their turn to be demolished. Owners in the shantytowns each expect to get a new 
apartment as compensation when the demolitions finally comes and talk often revolves 
around potential compensation amounts and the price of real estate elsewhere. As a 
Shanghai saying goes, “The Shanghai poor count on demolition to turn the tables 
(Shanghai qiongren kao chaiqian fanshen 上海窮人靠拆遷翻身).150 Owners who can 
afford to live somewhere else often rented their space in shantytowns to rural migrants.  
 I never went to Chen Ting’s shantytown housing as it had already been 
demolished when I met her. However, I did visit several other shantytowns when I 
accompanied funeral brokers to have business meetings at the bereaved’s places during 
my fieldwork. Shantytown housing generally did not have flush toilets or gas pipes for 
heating or cooking. Moreover, shantytown residents only had limited access to running 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 The Chinese phrase fanshen here was a term invented and popularized by the CCP. This 
phrase literally means to turn the body or to turn over. The metaphorical meaning here is that 
socialist revolution could fundamentally change the fate of the people and bring them into a 
utopian world. Its use in this common phrase in terms of real estate speculation and demolishment 
settlements for downtown capitalist housing investment or business development as one of the 




water. I was told that the living conditions in the shantytowns were often worse than life 
in the countryside even though most urban Shanghai people imagine rural life to be the 
worst.  
 Chen Ting knew that her father-in-law put them in a shantytown in order to break 
up the marriage. But she did not have much choice. It was in such an environment that 
Chen Ting lived through her first childbirth. The battle between “bread” (money) and 
“roses” (love) did not fall in Chen Ting’s favor. Chen Ting's (first) husband was used to 
having a relatively prosperous life and could not handle this change. He failed to be the 
breadwinner for their small family after they were forced to relocate to the shantytown. 
When Chen Ting's baby boy was four months old, she decided to send him back to the 
countryside to her natal home so she could go to work herself. After all, one of them had 
to make money. Once the baby was sent to the countryside and she began to work outside 
the “house,” Chen Ting and her husband lived separate lives. The long-term separation 
was eventually formalized as a divorce only when they wanted to remarry. 
 For a while, Chen Ting worked as a waitress in a coffee shop owned by a 
Taiwanese man. From her Taiwanese boss, she learned how to do a service job well: you 
had to learn to talk to your customers in a soft and feminine voice, to interact with them 
as if they were your boss. This kind of “emotion management” in the service industry 
(Hochschild 1983) was something rather foreign to people who grew up in the 
countryside (or under high socialism). The business of the coffee shop, however, was not 
very good, at least in part because the Taiwanese boss was an incompetent manager. For 




about the shop’s balance sheet. Chen Ting wanted to rescue the coffee shop because she 
felt that the shop’s problem was managerial. She volunteered to be the manager. She told 
her boss that if he promoted her to be the manager and gave her authority to run the 
business, she promised to generate a profit for him. The boss agreed and Chen Ting did 
not disappoint him. It was during this time that Chen Ting learned the managerial skills 
she needed to run her own business including negotiating prices with suppliers, managing 
cash flows, building supplier and customer networks, and so on.   
 One day she got a phone call from a friend she knew back from when she was 
working in funeral photography and videography. This friend offered Chen Ting a job 
opportunity to work as a full time contracted funeral photographer and videographer at 
Huangpu Funeral Parlor. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, many Shanghai people liked 
to hire photographers and videographers in funerals. Chen Yu who later learned funeral 
photography and videography from her sister told me that filming and photographing 
funerals was new at that time. Many Shanghai people thought that it was modern to have 
such things in funerals and this was why there was a high demand in these services.151 
 Chen Ting accepted this job offer and began to work in Huangpu. This spatial 
proximity was how Chen Ting met her current husband, Du Tu who was a state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 This preference had changed by the time I did my fieldwork. Chen Yu said that more and more 
people realized that they would never watch the videos or look at the pictures again because a 
funeral is one of the last things that Shanghai people want to remember (not just because it is a 
sad memory of the death of a loved one, but also because funerals and death were causes of 
pollution and best to be avoided, even on film). However, they also could not throw the funeral 
pictures and films away since this seemed like it would be disrespectful and unfilial to the 
deceased. These films and pictures therefore became immovable objects that took up space and 
could neither be watched nor thrown away due to moral reasons. As a result, the best solution was 
not to have funeral pictures and films in the first place. When I did my fieldwork, one of the main 
reasons people would still hire videographers was to document the funeral to ensure a co-paying, 




practitioner at Huangpu. She built here a solid network of connections with people at 
Huangpu through herself and her husband. These networks turned out to be extremely 
important afterward. For various reasons, after Chen Ting and Du Tu got married, Chen 
Ting left her parlor job. During the time when she was “between jobs,” she started to help 
her friends, their acquaintances, and friends’ friends’ acquaintances to arrange funerals 
since she knew the funeral process very well and she had all the connections needed in 
making the arrangements. This act of “helping” eventually turned into a real business. 
Chen Ting and Du Tu decided to set up the “Longevity Ritual Service Company” where 
the majority of my funeral broker friends such as Chen Yu, Tang An, and Lin Wan 
worked.   
 From Chen Ting’s life trajectory of becoming a funeral broker, I want to 
particularly pull out two characteristics. The first was her entrepreneurial skill. We can 
see this from her talent for learning funeral recording, specific tactics of emotion 
management in doing service jobs, and practical skills in running a small business 
through managing the coffee shop. In this process, she cultivated both a customer-
oriented practicality and business sense. However, as I will elaborate later, even though 
this kind of practicality and sensibility is a quality needed to do service jobs, this also 
makes people think of such petty capitalists as “unprincipled and calculating.” Secondly, 
her social marginality in terms of being a young, rural, and female immigrant living in 
Shanghai had a Janus-face. On the one hand, it indicated a clear structural limitation. On 
the other, it also references her prior success and future possibility of crossing such 




legal and moral status in Shanghai. At the same time, since she was not bound to the local 
moral and legal world as much as a Shanghai person might be, it would also be relatively 
easier for her to break the existing social norms. These two characteristics therefore 
worked in tandem with each other.  
 What led her to fully embrace her entrepreneurial skills and able to work with (or 
to work out) her marginality (whether to overcome her marginality or to use it) was living 
in a shantytown with a newborn baby and an unproductive and unsupportive husband. In 
that fragile moment of life, she decided to send the baby back home and go out to find a 
job herself. Her desire to escape was such that she “dared” to voluntarily take over the 
managerial job of the coffee shop. It was at that moment that we start seeing her 
transformed from a timid, obedient, and filial young woman to a self-disciplined 
entrepreneur. This was not to say that she lacked entrepreneur characteristics before. 
Quite the opposite, she certainly had the spark in her videographer risk-taking. But her 
transformation into a self-disciplined entrepreneur was a contextualized “decision.” Of 
course, saying that this is a decision is not to deny the fact that she was more or less 
forced into it. What I aim to articulate here is the importance of this affective aspect—in 
this case, of being fragile—in constructing a kind of identity that is self-regulated and 
self-motivated.  
 
Ambiguity in Being a Self-Managed Entrepreneur  
 Funeral brokers like Chen Ting are everywhere in China today. By the time I did 




Longhua Funeral Parlors respectively were operated through funeral brokers.152 Most 
people I spoke to, including both state practitioners and funeral brokers, believed that this 
number will continue to increase. The popularity of funeral brokers was even higher in 
places such as Beijing, Hunan, and Sichuan (among the places I have heard things about).  
 I mentioned that Chen Ting’s company name is Longevity Ritual Service 
Company. The title, “ritual service company,” was actually a little bit strange from the 
perspective of the general Shanghai public. In China, the generic label for funeral brokers 
or their companies is binzang zhongjie (殯葬中介, literally meaning funeral agents) or 
binzang daili (殯葬代理, literally meaning funeral representative). Sometimes people 
refer to funeral brokers as binzang yitiaolong (殯葬一條龍, which literally means 
“funeral dragon”) because they were known for providing a comprehensive “dragon”-
style service (yitiaolong fuwu一條龍服務) that covered everything from the time of 
death to cremains burial. However, Chen Ting considered yitiaolong to be a derogatory 
term.153 She told me that she preferred the Taiwanese term—“ritual service company” 
(liyi fuwu gongsi 禮儀服務公司) because it sounds better.  
 Although she was unable to articulate why this sounded better to her, I guess that 
she thought that the emphasis should be on ritual and service instead of the utilitarian and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 These numbers were based on personal communications with state practitioners, including 
both people on the ground and at a managerial level. Baoxin is located on the North side of 
Shanghai Proper while Longhua is on the South side. Since the neighborhood areas around 
Baoxin are more working class and those around Longhua are more middle or upper middle class, 
there are class differences between the two parlors’ customers. 
153 This was probably because state media occasionally used the term “black dragons” (heiliong 
黑龍), a take-off on “black-hearted products” like melamine-laced baby milk powder that often 




efficient aspect of business operations. This distinction is important because it expresses 
a large tension built into being a funeral broker in urban China. In Shanghai, funeral 
brokers emerged in the early 1990s. I asked many funeral brokers and state practitioners 
about the origin of these brokers. Among the answers I received, I would separate them 
into at least four versions. The first version says that there always existed a set of “good 
hearted people” (haoxinren 好心人) who liked to help their friends and relatives out in 
organizing funerals (or other rituals). They did not do this for a fee, but did usually 
receive a red envelope (with money in it) from the bereaved as a way of showing 
gratitude. In this sense, the kind of relationship between the bereaved and these “good 
hearted people” was based on gift exchange wherein both sides enter into social debt 
similar to how other social relations work in China. They were more like “friends.”  
 The second version traces funeral brokers to the fact that, historically, well-off 
families often hired a “grand manager” (dazongguan 大總管) to organize funerals. These 
managers were known for their skills at organizing events and they usually provided their 
services for a fee. In this sense, the kind of relationship between the bereaved and these 
grand managers was more based on commodity exchange where one side provides labor 
and expertise and the other side gives money in return no matter whether or not the grand 
managers and the bereaved were “friends” in the first place.  
 The third version traced the origins of funeral brokers to retired state practitioners 
or the close friends and relatives of state practitioners. These people often helped their 
acquaintances to organize funerals since they had knowledge of and better access to 




Finally, the fourth version was that funeral brokers emerged when funeral parlors asked 
state practitioners to go out to get more business at the very beginning of the market 
reforms. This was a part of parlors’ effort to marketize and to bring in more profit. This 
consequently made more and more people realize the potential of and some methods of 
being a private broker in the funeral industry.  
 The last two versions have some interesting parallels. While both trace the origin 
of funeral brokers to state practitioners and (or) their friends and relatives, the former (the 
third version) emphasizes the helping characteristics and the latter stresses the 
entrepreneurial characteristics. It is probably not coincidental in that the difference 
between the third and fourth versions echoes the difference between the first and second. 
Specifically, both sets show a contrast between nice, altruistic people (the good-hearted 
people) and self-interested entrepreneurs (the grand managers). This was despite the fact 
that they were offering exactly the same services.  
 DJ Hatfield has observed the same kind of contradiction in thinking about opera 
troupes (actors and musicians) and matchmakers in Taiwan.154 He suggested that the 
same actions (whether we are talking about funeral brokers, opera troupes, or 
matchmakers) might implicate different truths because of “how the truth of relationships 
is produced in the interaction” (Hatfield, email communication, March 25 2014). When 
the truth of these relationships is produced as friendships such as those between the 
amateurs and their friends, then the actions fall into a moral realm. On the contrary, when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 He said that professional actors and musicians of opera troupes and matchmakers were (and 
still are) often considered “mean” (jian 奸) people in Taiwan. Meanwhile, amateur troupes (zidi 
tuan 子弟團) and “friends” who do the very same matching making or performing were 




the truth of the relationship is produced through professionalization and professional 
interactions with paid grand managers, the interactions could more easily be seen as 
immoral or amoral.  
 As a result, the origin stories of funeral brokers really reveal two ways of 
conceptualizing the self of funeral brokers: one envisions them as a kind of relational 
person clearly (and necessarily) embedded in reciprocal social networks. The other sees 
them as self-motivated and individualistic entrepreneurs engaged in transactional 
relationships with their customers. The former enters friendship through gift exchange 
(red envelopes) and the latter enters customer relationships through commodity exchange 
(service fees).  Both were also culturally available ways of thinking about funeral brokers 
(among various groups of people) before the introduction of the market economy. 
 While funeral brokers as individual persons are caught between these two ethical 
modes, funeral brokers as a specific occupational category in the contemporary death 
industry are also caught between two different ideas of conceptualizing “edge balls.”  As 
mentioned briefly in Chapter one, a common representation of funeral brokers by the 
state is that they act as though hitting edge balls (pushing the envelope). The first time I 
heard the term “edge ball” was the year before I started my actual fieldwork. During my 
preparatory fieldwork in 2009, I interviewed Wang Fuzi (王夫子), the chair of the 
Funeral Department at Changsha Civil Affairs School in Hunan Province. When I asked 
him about a story on funeral brokers I had seen in the news, he started his explanation by 
telling me that funeral brokers are hitting edge balls in the death industry. I had never 




characters the expression used in the first place.   
 He explained to me that despite their ubiquitous existence all over China, funeral 
brokers are not legal in many parts of China. They are illegal because they do not (and 
cannot) fulfill the proper state registration requirements. Without such registration they 
therefore, technically, cannot provide funeral services. The Central Government's law 
requires any funeral related businesses to register with both the local level Administration 
for Industry and Commerce and the local level Civil Affairs Bureau. Recall, however, 
funeral brokers are partial business competitors with funeral parlors and local civil affairs 
bureaus themselves own funeral parlors. The more funeral brokers there are or the more 
they are allowed to do, the lower the profit funeral parlors earn (and therefore the smaller 
the cut the local civil affairs bureau will get).155 As a direct result of this competition 
then, most province (and municipality) civil affairs bureaus will not register funeral 
brokers. Funeral brokers thus illegally provide funeral services even though they tend to 
be registered with the Industry and Commerce Bureau as all other non-funeral-related 
businesses also must be (of course, as in other industries in China, some choose not to 
register at all). Their operations themselves are thus already skirting the edge of legality 
just to exist at all.  
 Originally a sports term, an edge ball is a ball that is played to touch at the very 
edge of the sideline of a table in table tennis. Table tennis is a very popular sport in China 
(it even played an important role in building diplomatic relations between the United 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Since funeral governance is primarily regulated at the provincial (or municipal) level, the 
central government only provides general guidelines on policy. It is the local government that 




States and the PRC in the 1970s). The Contemporary Chinese Dictionary explains that 
people use “hitting edge balls” figuratively to mean “conduct that is on the borderline of 
legality, but not yet illegal” (Xiandai Hanyu Cidian 2005). The New Age Chinese-English 
Dictionary (Xinshidai Hanying Dacidian) (2001) explains this in English as “something 
almost, but not quite, illegal; circumventing the law or regulation by doing something 
quasi-legal.” These two definitions are consistent with Wang Fuzi’s explanation of 
funeral brokers playing edge balls.    
 Li Anxing (2008), however, criticizes these English translations as problematic 
because edge ball conduct in sports could be completely legal. Also, to “circumvent” 
implies a derogatory sense, but edge ball plays can sometimes be socially positive. As a 
result, Li proposes to translate “playing edge ball” as “playing by the rules even if one 
bends (distends or stretches) the rules to a breaking point; to push the envelope; to play 
by rules that are open to interpretation” (2008:155).  
 In order to understand this rhetorical contradiction of hitting edge balls, it is 
important to point out how hitting edge balls became a metaphor in the first place. The 
origin story of the edge ball metaphor often traces back to Qin Benli (欽本立). Qin was 
the founder and the editor-in-chief of the World Economic Herald (shijie jingji daobao 
世界經濟導報),156 a newspaper that was directly involved in the 1989 June Fourth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 This weekly newspaper was founded in 1980 and was known for advocating reform policies 
right from the beginning. The short-lived Herald was eventually shut down by Jiang Zemin (江澤
民), the then Party-Secretary of Shanghai City and the later Secretary-General of the CCP, after it 
published the contents of a symposium that commemorated Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦) (Jernow 
1994). The death of Hu Yaobang, a reform-minded party leader, and students’ demands to 




Student Movement where the CCP killed many students protesting in Tiananmen Square 
in Beijing. Qin used the hitting edge ball expression to illustrate his idea of running an 
ideal newspaper. In an interview with a New York Times reporter, Qin said, “If you hit the 
ball and miss the end of the table, you lose. If you hit near the end of the table, it’s too 
easy. So you want to aim to just nick the end of the table. That’s our policy” (Kristof 
1989). To hit an edge ball in the media meant to “push our coverage to the limits of the 
tolerance of the government while reducing the political risks for the paper to the lowest 
level” (Pei 1998:175). Qin’s ultimate goal was to expand the “table” itself by constantly 
attacking the boundary (Shen 1991).  
 This righteous, morally grounded, and politically loaded concept with clearly 
stated rebellious intentions for press freedom has now, some thirty years later, become a 
popular phrase used by both the general public and government officials to instead 
describe behaviors that are or “should be” either illegal or legal, but are also somehow 
immoral. For example, after the Chinese government increased interest rates for 
mortgages on second (and more) apartments to regulate the real estate market, many 
couples filed for divorce so they could buy a second apartment with the lower “first 
apartment” rate.157 This kind of “fake” divorce is a type of edge ball play.  
 In fact, hitting edge balls is observed in all kinds of economic activities in China. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Movement (also named the Tiananmen Square Massacre).  Also see Mi Zhou (2010), The Rise 
and Demise of the World Economic Herald, 1980-1989, MA Thesis, Arizona State University. 
157 For examples, please see: Malik Singleton, “China's Largest Cities Stop 'Fake Divorce' Home 
Buyers And Sellers From Exploiting Law To Avoid Taxes On Second Homes,” in International 
Business Times, April 02, 2013. Fung, Esther. "In China, It’s ‘Til Death – or Taxes – Do Us 
Part," in China Realtime, March 6 2013, or Wu Guoxiu, “Housing Rules Drive Up Fake 




The 2012 Chinese Industry Corporate Sustainability and Social Responsibility Report 
describes one of the biggest issues in Chinese economic activities as the popularity of 
hitting edge balls (Yu Na 2012). For example, the food industry is often considered a 
notorious player of edge balls (Li Xiangqun 2009). Instances ranging from exaggerated or 
false advertisements to “recycling” cooking oils, artificially coloring steamed buns, and 
adding ractopamine to meat (to make it appear leaner) are all commonly denounced as 
hitting edge balls. The most famous and probably most deadly example was the famous 
melamine adulterated baby formula incident.158 While melamine in milk was not illegal, 
it was clearly an adulteration that was meant to increase profitability in a price 
competitive industry by registering as missing protein in nutritional content tests. Hitting 
edge balls today, in part due to its usage by the government and official news 
publications, tends to be a derogatory term that describes loophole conduct, not Qin's 
righteous boundary-pushing and rebellion. This is also why the two dictionary definitions 
described above emphasize the illegality and immoral aspects as integral to hitting edge 
balls.     
 If we move beyond the negative indications of the term, we can then see a very 
different kind of understanding of hitting edge balls—something that is closer to Qin 
Benli’s idea of running his news paper or Li Anxing’s translation of the term. For 
example, a Kong lineage temple in Northern China was rebuilt with two halls and two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 This milk scandal started with one of the leading Chinese milk companies, the Sanlu Group. 
At least sixteen babies were diagnosed with kidney stones after drinking Sanlu’s products. It 
turned out that Sanlu had been adding melamine to its milk so as to increase its “protein” content. 
There were at least six deaths associated with this incident. What was worse was that the 
subsequent investigation showed that many other Chinese milk companies had been doing the 




sets of ritual performances so that it could claim to have moved from being a potentially 
suspicious site of ancestor worship to a site of public “cultural education” (see Jun Jing 
1996). Making a popular religious temple, the Dragon Temple, out to instead be a Daoist 
temple so that it is “legible” to the eyes of the state (who sees popular religion not as a 
religion, but as dangerous “superstition”) or associating it with an international NGO to 
legitimate its existence not only a site of religion, but also as a site for nature 
conservation both can also be described as clever edge ball plays (Adam Chau 2006).  
 In the death industry, funeral brokers are hitting edge balls in at least two senses. 
One is related to their institutional status and the other is related to their business 
practices. For the former, as mentioned, funeral brokers often illegally provided their 
services since they lacked proper registration. Shanghai was the first independent 
municipality (province), and one of only four so far, to have granted legal status to 
funeral brokers and their companies. Shanghai funeral brokers are now registered with 
the Shanghai Administration for Industry and Commerce (上海市工商行政管理局) and 
the Shanghai Funeral and Interment Trade Association (instead of the Civil Affairs 
Bureau or its Funeral and Interment Administration).  This trade association has been 
providing annual training conferences since 2006.  If funeral brokers registered as part of 
a funeral agency (i.e., no freelancing) and attend the conferences, then they received 
work permits (shanggangzheng 上崗証).  Full attendance was effectively the criteria for 
individual funeral brokers to gain work permits. In other words, the barrier for becoming 
a legal funeral broker is now rather low. This policy was more or less aimed at legalizing 




 While this legalization seems to suggest that Shanghai funeral brokers no longer 
need to hit edge ball plays anymore, institutionally speaking at least, the reality is a little 
bit messier. As a kind of quasi-institution, funeral brokers and their companies are private 
small businesses, sometimes also known as getihu (個體戶)—self-employed households 
or individuals under China’s market economy. Getihu emerged generally at the beginning 
market reforms. Many Shanghai people today, however, use the term in a negative sense 
(at least slightly). This is probably because they associate getihu with petty capitalists 
with rural backgrounds in contrast to working in much more prestigious large state or 
foreign companies that dominate Shanghai's commercial landscape. 
 The size of funeral broker companies in Shanghai varies significantly. Based on 
the four broker companies that I had most contact with, they respectively had one, three, 
around 10 (Longevity), and around 70 brokers. While funeral brokers in the first three 
companies were actual employees of their respective companies, the last company, the 
one with 70 brokers, was more of a shell company. A funeral banquet restaurant 
established this company. This shell company allowed individual funeral brokers to be 
“nominally affiliated” (guakao 掛靠) with the company because affiliation with a 
registered company was a part of the criteria for retaining work permits in Shanghai.159 In 
this company, these nominally affiliated funeral brokers did not need to do any profit-
sharing. The restaurant was willing to go to all the trouble, work, and cost of establishing 
and maintaining a company because these brokers would then persuade their customers to 
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host their funeral banquets in that restaurant. One thing worth noting is that “nominal 
affiliation” is by no means an exclusive tactic used in the funeral industry. Rather, it is a 
commonly observed phenomenon in China for all social organizations from 
environmental NGOs to religious organizations as a way to deal with registration issues 
(cf. Kin-man Chan 2005; Kipnis et al. 2009; Yiyi Lu 2008; Jude Howell 2004; Jonathan 
Schwartz and Shawn Shieh 2009; Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan 1999).  
 In terms of the practices of funeral brokers, their hitting of edge balls is often 
related to how they acquire business. Before I started fieldwork, I had hypothesized that a 
funeral business's success would be dependent on ritual expertise and on their cultivation 
of a form of “commoditized compassion” that would bond the bereaved and funeral 
professionals. I soon realized, however, that neither of these were all that important, and 
certainly not crucial factors, in terms of acquiring customers (the bereaved) in Shanghai. 
For funeral parlors, there was no need for either because they did not need to find 
business at all. Only funeral parlors could handle dead bodies and only the state, meaning 
the Civil Affairs Bureau, could own funeral parlors. As described in the last chapter, due 
to the city's high cremation rate, Shanghai funeral parlors simply “sit and face the 
south”—they just need to wait for business come to them.   
 On the contrary, funeral brokers have to go out to find the dead before they arrive 
at the funeral parlors. They have to persuade the bereaved to hire them as brokers even 
though these bereaved could just as easily go to a funeral parlor directly instead. Every 
funeral broker I knew told me that their business was essentially built upon “information 




broker could not make her or his living from operating funerals.  
 In Shanghai, there were at least three kinds of information sources. The first is 
from a network of paid informants. Paid informants, in turn, came in several different 
forms. The first are “watchers” (dinggong 盯工). Being a watcher means hanging out in a 
hospital to see who has just died and then passing this information on to one of the 
funeral brokers who hired you. Someone I knew actually started his career as a watcher. 
He then quickly learned the necessary skills of arranging funerals himself and eventually 
became a funeral broker working on his own. Maybe because this is how he started his 
own career, he still relied on hiring watchers to gain information when I met him.  
The second kind of paid informants were ambulance-drivers or people who worked for 
120 (the Chinese equivalent of 911). Several brokers told me that the number of 
emergency line personnel who have joined teams of paid informants has increased since 
the Shanghai government outscored its 120 service.  
 The third kind of paid informants were guards at hospitals’ morgues. In fact, 
working with guards at morgues was actually how Tang An started his career as a funeral 
broker. Tang An’s father was a sent-down youth. He spent many years in rural Yunnan 
Province. Many years later, after he retired there and with some difficulty, he was able to 
move his household registration back to Shanghai. However, since living expenses were 
so high in Shanghai and his retirement income was based on supplementing a rural life, 
he wanted to continue to work. The only job that he could manage to find was to be a 
security guard in a hospital’s morgue since this was exactly the kind of job that anyone 




morgue, a funeral broker approached him and offered to pay him if he would tell the 
broker when new bodies arrived. Tang An’s father soon realized the profitability of being 
a funeral broker. He asked the person who hired him to hire (and to train) Tang An to be 
a funeral broker (Tang An was selling life insurance at that time).160 This person agreed 
and this was how Tang An entered the business. As he started out, Tang An then relied 
on his father who worked at a morgue to be his information source.  
 During my fieldwork, funeral brokers generally paid their informants about RMB 
500 (USD 82) for each case sent to them, regardless of whether or not the broker closed 
the deal. My broker friends told me that before the 2010 World Expo, when the Shanghai 
funeral brokers’ market was highly unregulated, it was not uncommon to hear that an 
informant reported the same information to more than one broker since the former 
receives the money even if the latter could not close the deal. As a result, occasionally, 
two or more funeral brokers would end up fighting outside hospitals or outside the 
deceased’s home over for the right to represent the bereaved - generally without the 
bereaved knowing about the conflict.  
 Even though these paid informants were equally responsible for such fistfights, 
the Chinese state used this kind of incident as evidence proving how all funeral brokers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 In fact, the need to find information sources has even changed how hospitals run their morgues 
in Shanghai today. Morgues used to be one of the main money-losing units in hospitals in 
Shanghai. Hospitals had to pay for the equipment and personnel (you needed at least two people). 
Today, however, most hospitals in Shanghai contract out their morgues to individuals or 
companies. Hospitals now not only do not need to pay for the equipment or personnel, they even 
get a lump sum of money (in “management fees” 管理費) every year in return. This outsourcing 
now actually brings profit into the hospitals rather than simply cutting down on costs. People who 
contracted morgues were often themselves funeral brokers or had business cooperation 




(as opposed to state practitioners) lacked morality or were even associated with 
gangsters. This type of situation had decreased significantly by the time I did my 
fieldwork as the industry moved away from a more frontier mode of doing business. This 
was because the 2010 World Expo gave the Shanghai Government an excuse (and 
enough capital) to “clean up” funeral brokers’ business operations. A broker friend of 
mine told me that her brother was arrested about a year before the 2010 World Expo 
without any trial or sentence. She said that the Shanghai government arrested her brother 
because officials thought of him as a “bad element” due to his previous record of knife 
fights with other funeral brokers over business competition. She said, by arresting some 
famous figures in the industry, the Shanghai government could “threaten the monkey by 
killing the chickens” (shaji jinghou 殺雞警猴, meaning punishing someone as a warming 
to others). My friend told me that about 10 months after the 2010 World Expo finished 
(meaning he was in a jail for almost two years without any trial), her brother was 
released. I think that the fact that her brother was in and out of jail without any trial made 
her point that the Shanghai government just want to “threaten the monkey” by locking up 
her brother even more convincing.  
 Another way of gaining information access was to control one of the portals for 
death related information. The owner of Fortunate Funeral Company told me that he 
gained his information access through an official contractual relationship with a 
telephone company. The Shanghai branch of a Chinese telecom company has a special 
information providing hotline. Customers can call to ask for any kind of information. 




will be provided in each case. As such, companies must generally pay in order to be 
selected, much like one of Google search’s sponsored links. Fortunate paid to be one of 
the first three funeral broker companies to be mentioned if someone calls the hotline to 
ask information about arranging a funeral (a lower, second-tier payment would have 
gotten them mention only if the caller, having heard the first three, asked to hear 
additional names). Since there were only three companies to be mentioned, not everyone 
who could pay and was willing to pay could receive this spot. The owner of Fortunate 
Funeral Company told me that “of course” he had a special under the table deal with the 
person who was in charge of the decision. He replied to my inquiry in a way as if I had 
just asked one of the stupidest questions he had ever heard. Of course he was right. 
Fortunate was a successful firm employing two full time brokers (in addition to its boss) 
with real office space. Such success required clever manipulation. 
 Special organizations and facilities that are death or dying related or where people 
have knowledge about death are another kind of death portal. For example, I have heard 
that some funeral brokers cultivated relationships with staff in nursing homes for the 
elderly.  The boss of the Fortunate Funeral Agency cultivated good relationships with the 
“neighborhood community committees” (juweihui 居委會) nearby since it was not 
uncommon for residents to ask representatives of their committee questions regarding 
funeral arrangements after a loved one died. Neighborhood community committees are a 
grassroots governance association that links individuals to the Party-state through 
residence (parallel to work unit's links through work).  




through neighborhood community committees. As mentioned, FIS was established so that 
the Funeral and Interment Business Administration could transfer its operation of 
business administration out of the government bureau in 1998. FIS is like a mother 
company of all three city funeral parlors. I used to think FIS’ funeral agencies and funeral 
parlors would work together. They did, but they work together more in the way that 
funeral parlors and funeral brokers work together instead of the way that funeral parlors 
work with each other even though they all belong to FIS. State practitioners thought 
about and treated funeral brokers of FIS’ funeral agencies like other funeral brokers 
instead of like fellow state practitioners (just in different units). Tang An told me that FIS 
formed its own funeral agencies to compete with other funeral brokers. However, after 
FIS’ funeral agencies were formed, funeral parlors realized that while FIS’ funeral 
brokers might indeed compete with other funeral brokers, they were also competing with 
funeral parlors just like all of the other funeral brokers. Moreover, profits from FIS’ 
funeral agencies did not need to go to the Civil Affairs Bureau. This is because while 
funeral parlors are a kind of “public non-profit unit” and therefore a huge portion of its 
revenues must be passed on up to the Civil Affairs Bureau; funeral agencies are private 
companies (albeit owned in the same bureaucratic chain) so their profits stay within FIS. 
Leaders in FIS thus have strong incentives to keep and support FIS’ funeral agencies.  
 Longevity represented a third kind of model in establishing information access. 
Their operational method was less controversial. They primarily depended on 
interpersonal networks. Early on in my fieldwork at Longevity, I often asked each broker 




the same: a friend (or a friend’s friend) introduced this customer. In fact, they were quite 
proud that their primary information sources were “friends.” They considered themselves 
to be morally superior to those ambulance chaser kinds of funeral brokers who relied on 
paid informants to report random deaths.  
 Lin Wan at Longevity told me that Longevity’s model (interpersonal networks) is 
a more “decent” (zhengpai 正派 ) kind in our first conversation. Meanwhile, the 
ambulance chasers’ model is “walking through the side door” (走偏門 zoupianmen, 
meaning dishonest or indecent). I later found that this distinction was not just a matter of 
Longevity’s brokers “bragging” about the moral superiority of their business model. Most 
funeral brokers and state practitioners saw acquiring business through interpersonal 
networks as a much more virtuous form than that of the ambulance chaser. Such 
distinctions are consistent with the two ethical modes of conceptualizing funeral brokers I 
discussed earlier. Even though all funeral brokers are professionals (in this sense, grand 
managers engaged in commodity exchange), if they and the bereaved were related 
through interpersonal networks, this makes funeral brokers closer to being those good-
hearted people (the amateurs) than grand managers. This was why funeral brokers at 
Longevity often told the bereaved at the end of their business that they would not charge 
a “service fee” (RMB 200, USD 32) since their common friends had introduced them.  
 Sometimes, under specific circumstances, the bereaved did not know that they 
were actually hiring funeral brokers. They thought that they were just “lucky” that their 
friends’ friend (the broker) was such a nice person who just wanted to help. I would say 




even if they were “friends’ friends”). I did encounter one radical case wherein it seemed 
that the bereaved did not know that she was working with a broker the whole time (at 
least she pretended she did not know). After Chen Ting and I took this group to 
Prosperity Restaurant after the memorial meeting, the chief mourner gave Chen Ting a 
red packet to thank her for arranging the funeral. When we walked out of the door, Chen 
Ting told me that she was surprised that this chief mourner somehow was so naive that 
she did not know that Chen Ting was a broker.   
 Nevertheless, the major reason that Longevity could primarily depend on 
interpersonal networks was because of Chen Ting’s connection to Huangpu Funeral 
Parlor. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, Chen Ting used to work as a 
contract videographer and photographer for Huangpu’s outsourcing of its visual services. 
Du Tu was an actual state practitioner working at Huangpu. State practitioners at 
Huangpu, therefore, continued to be Longevity’s primary information sources. When 
relatives and friends of state practitioners (or their friends’ friends or further) needed to 
arrange funerals, they approached these state practitioners for guidance. From the state 
practitioners’ perspective, if they bring these people to the parlor where they themselves 
worked, they gained nothing. Not to mention that many products sold in parlors (although 
not all of them) were more expensive than comparable options sold via brokers. As one 
state practitioner told me, “you should not introduce people you know to a bad deal.”  
 On the other hand, if state practitioners bring people to Longevity, they receive 
money for each case they introduce. Unlike watchers or ambulance drivers who receive 




of each transaction. Of course, higher-up managers at Huangpu did not like its employees 
to have this kind of relationship with funeral brokers. Yet, as long as the people who did 
this were not those who worked in the parlor's sales department, managers usually could 
not do anything about it.  
 It is important to point out that this rule of giving a cut of profits extended not just 
to state practitioners, but to everyone who referred a case to Longevity. In one case I saw, 
a family member of the bereaved had previously done business with Longevity in the 
past. Later on, when her friend needed to arrange a funeral, she introduced Longevity to 
her friend. This person then got 50% of the profit from her friend’s case. I don’t know if 
she gave this money to her friend afterwards (or whether she even knew that she would 
get a cut beforehand). Yet, from Longevity's perspective, it was their obligation to share 
the profit with her.  
 Moreover, this was a common practice among funeral brokers beyond Longevity 
as well. Not only brokers at Longevity, but also brokers at all the other funeral agencies, 
shared profits with their introducers. Tang An told me that the amount of money that 
went to introducers has varied over time. Earlier, when the funeral broker business was 
less competitive, funeral brokers in general paid less to introducers. By the time I did my 
fieldwork, however, business was very competitive. Tang An said that 50% was not high 
because, due to his boss’s (Chen Ting’s) close ties to state practitioners, their information 
sources were very steady. He said that brokers in other funeral agencies paid 60-80% of 
the profits to the introducers because “this was how desperate those brokers were” in 




the dead.  
 Each funeral broker company divided its profits between introducers and brokers 
differently. Tang An told me that for each case he operated that involved an introducer 
(which was most of his cases), after the introducer received a 50% cut, Chen Ting and Du 
Tu split the other half. Chen Ting then split her 25% of the original total half and half 
with Tang An. I once asked Tang An why Du Tu qualified for such a high ratio since he 
practically did nothing, not even coming to the office except to pick up his check. Tang 
An said that state practitioners at Huangpu brought their business to Chen Ting because 
she was the wife of their colleague, Du Tu. This meant that, from his perspective, Du Tu 
had made an equal contribution to the company. In other words, the value of networks is 
worth so much that based on the division of profit it alone is worth just as much (if not 
more) than the actual labor that goes into arranging the funerals themselves. Here we see 
the literal meaning of Bourdieu’s “social capital” in individual networks at work.    
 I do not know whether most of the bereaved knew that their friends 
(“introducers”) received a cut from their business. While the money receivers, in theory, 
could decide to keep the money or give it (back) to the bereaved, funeral brokers had no 
choice but to give this money to the introducers so as to make sure that they would be 
willing to introduce business to them again in the future. While this procedure seems, at 
times, to run the thin borderline between commission and kickback, it is wrong to think 
that only the death industry operates like this. Receiving a cut for business transactions is 
a much broader social phenomenon. My informants told me, for instance, that when you 




hotel, you should assume that the driver received a cut from the hotel. Or, when you 
bring your friend to buy a car from someone whom you just bought a car from, you 
should expect to receive a cut from the car salesman. The line between kickback and 
commission was so blurred (both in China in general and in the Shanghai funeral industry 
in particular) that I'm not sure if it even makes sense to make such a distinction. 
 Within the death industry, one of the “worst” cases of “taking a cut” that I 
encountered (“worst” in the sense of touching my funeral broker informants’ (as well as 
my own) idiosyncratic moral line) was when I heard a bereaved asking to receive a cut of 
her own father’s funeral. One night, Chen Ting decided to invite her employees and me 
to a nice restaurant. During our dinner, Chen Ting left our table several times to talk on 
the phone. She said that a woman was arranging the business of her father's funeral and 
was quite a difficult customer. Chen Ting said that this bereaved was the only child of the 
deceased. Moreover, her father’s work unit was a state institute—meaning that the 
daughter would already receive a hefty lump sum of money to cover her father’s funeral. 
However, despite all of these factors that might indicate the daughter should be more 
likely to spend money for her father's final farewell, in reality, this daughter engaged in a 
very harsh drawn out negotiation and renegotiation of nearly every price.  
 On the way back from the dinner, we were all sitting in Chen Ting’s car, when 
this bereaved called again. Chen Ting was a new driver; she was not comfortable with 
driving one handed. So she asked us all to be quiet and let the phone call go through the 
car’s speaker system.  




call with some people in my father’s work unit. They want to purchase 10 flower baskets 
from you.”  
 “This is great,” Chen Ting said. “I will call the flower shop as soon as we hang up 
the phone. What else can I do for you now?”  
 “I introduced my father’s work unit to buy flower baskets from you. What are you 
going to do?” The bereaved boldly interjected.  
 At this moment, I was kind of in shock. I exchanged eye contact with Chen Yu. It 
was so strange to hear that, at first, I wasn’t sure if I actually had heard what I thought I 
had heard.  
 “I don’t understand what you mean by this,” Chen Ting replied. “Could you 
please be more specific?”  
 “Mmm… I persuaded my father’s work unit to buy flower baskets from you. 
Don’t you think that you should show some gratitude?”  
 “Gratitude? I don’t understand what you mean. I gave you the cheapest price for 
these flower baskets. The reason I suggested you buy flower baskets from me was 
because the meeting hall looks better when all the flower baskets are the same. Plus, I can 
arrange the baskets [bought through me] in advance so that when the guests arrive all the 
baskets will already be lined up. If you think that I offered you a bad deal, you are 
welcome to buy flower baskets from someone else. I will still put these baskets together 
for you. If you think that this is not enough or my service is just not good enough, I am 
really sorry I made you feel this way. You are, of course, welcome to walk away from 





 My intention in telling this story was not to say that this case was in any way 
representative. It was extremely rare to have a grieving family member ask for a cut and 
Chen Ting (and the other three brokers in the car), much as I, felt strongly that this case 
had “crossed the line.” However, despite its shocking effect, I do want to point how being 
a “self-entrepreneur” in different kind of structural relationship would fundamentally 
change as the nature of the relationship changed. This example is troublesome because 
the daughter was trying to be “rational” in a relationship (father and daughter) that was 
not supposed to be so calculating and monetary. Recall for a moment the two ethical 
modes of funeral brokers I discussed earlier. While I was talking about funeral brokers 
there, the idea that the exact same act would be understood differently based on the 
nature of the relationship involved is key to understanding why my funeral broker 
informants found this daughter’s behavior abhorrent. The daughter is related to her father 
through a kin relationship. However, her asking for a cut is an enactment of an 
entrepreneurial self. While it is rational to ask for a cut in the context of China, when the 
relationship involved was one of a daughter to her father, this became problematic.   
 
Governing the Middle 
 I went to “The 2011 First and Recurrent Training for Legal Representatives of 
Funeral Agencies and Funeral Agents in Shanghai City.”161 The Chair of FIS told a story 
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in his opening presentation:  
 
A man accidentally lost his two legs while working in a factory in Jiangsu 
Province. When his colleagues sent him to the hospital, they brought his legs as 
well thinking the doctor might be able to reconnect them. Unfortunately, this man 
did not make it. He passed away in the surgery room. A funeral broker was in the 
hospital and he saw what happened. When he found out that this man had died, 
the broker went to talk to a hospital employee who was in charge of medical 
waste. He offered a couple hundred RMB to the hospital worker in exchange for 
the man’s two legs. Meanwhile, the family members of the man who lost his legs 
were devastated when they realized that the doctor could not save him. After they 
cried for a while and began to accept the reality of his passing, they decided that 
they should at least cremate the two legs together with his body so this man could 
still be whole in the other world. Thus, the bereaved asked the doctor to give the 
deceased’s legs back to them. The doctor then told them to talk to the people who 
are in charge of medical waste. Since this guy had already sold the legs to 
someone else, he told the bereaved that, for some reason the legs were missing. 
He couldn’t find them. The bereaved were very upset and had a quarrel with their 
doctors. Just as the situation seemed to be escalating out of control, the broker 
approached the bereaved through the chaos. He said to them, if you give me RMB 
20,000, I can find this man’s legs for you.  
 
Before the chair of FIS told this story, he reviewed the current conditions of the Shanghai 
funeral industry including some statistical reports. He also commented on the market 
conditions of the funeral industry in Shanghai and other parts of China. He ended his talk 
with the stolen legs. As I had attended the conference along with brokers from Longevity, 
I asked Tang An after this what he thought of the session:  
 
This story was more about an immoral man who tried to blackmail a bereaved 
family who only just happened to be a funeral broker. The story is not really about 
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funeral broker malpractice even though he meant it as such. If that man had told 
the bereaved something to the effect of “if you hire me to arrange your funeral, I 
can guarantee you I will find your loved one’s legs,” then it would have been a 
case of funeral broker malpractice.  
 
 While I actually agree with Tang An on this, it is important to mention that this is 
the kind of representation of the truth produced by the state discourse. This is also the 
kind of representation we see in the Chinese media around the Tomb Sweeping Festival 
and the Winter Solstice—the primary annual times for cremains burial in Shanghai. This 
despite the fact that increasing numbers of bereaved are now hiring funeral brokers 
instead of going straight to funeral parlors to arrange things themselves directly with state 
practitioners.  
 In order to regulate this ambiguous middle, one of the first steps that funeral 
governing institutions in Shanghai did was to legalize the very existence of funeral 
brokers. The key institution involved was the Shanghai Funeral and Interment Trade 
Association. This trade association is a typical kind of government run NGO.162 At the 
time of my fieldwork, the chair of the trade association was also the chief executive of 
FIS, the same person who told the stolen leg story. Before the Civil Affairs Bureau 
appointed this man to be the chief executive of FIS, he was the Party Secretary of the 
center. Furthermore, the Vice Chair (the Secretary-General) of the funeral and interment 
trade association was the former chief executive of a city funeral parlor. Finally, this 
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Jonathan 1996. “ "Bridges": Private Business, the Chinese Government and the Rise of New 




trade association’s office was located inside the offices of the Shanghai Funeral and 
Interment Business Administration. These physical and personnel overlaps show that the 
trade association, FIS, and the Civil Affair Bureau still work together very closely even if 
they sought to appear to be different institutions. This therefore gave funeral parlors a 
position as a sort of governing institution in relation to funeral brokers even if they were 
technically parallel competitors, legally speaking.  
 I interviewed the Secretary-General of the trade association about why they 
decided to legalize funeral brokers in Shanghai in the first place. He said, the existence of 
funeral brokers and their increased popularity shows “the demand of consumers.” And, 
“because Shanghai is more modern and progressive, funeral governing institutions are 
willing to recognize consumers’ needs.” From funeral brokers’ perspective, however, 
they interpreted this legal recognition as resulting from the fact that Shanghai is the 
leading city in China—this means that the Shanghai government is the most politically 
powerful government. Unlike their counterparts in other municipal cities and provinces 
who are weak, the Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau is better at squeezing, repressing, and 
regulating funeral brokers. For funeral brokers, no legal status also meant no regulation. 
Legalization was the Civil Affairs Bureau's way of helping funeral parlors to compete 
with funeral brokers. In other words, legalization to them was a means to reassert the 
state monopoly of the death industry rather than a means to facilitate market competition.  
 I suggest seeing this legalization as a way to clarify and rationalize the ambiguous 
nature of the middle characteristics of funeral brokers. Recall here again for a moment 




professional and service fee relationships, on the other—and how these two modes 
project a relational self and an entrepreneur self for funeral brokers respectively. By 
legalizing funeral brokers, Shanghai funeral governing institutions declared that funeral 
brokers can no longer be both good-hearted people and grand manager at the same time. 
Instead, funeral brokers are now designated as only grand managers, that is, as 
professionals who provide service for fees. The implication of legalization was therefore 
to move funeral brokers out of the realm of relational persons who are “friends” with 
their clients and who enter into (profitable) gift exchange relations with the bereaved. 
After legalization, funeral brokers are (and could only be) individual entrepreneurs who 
are professional and who enter into commodity exchange with the bereaved. In this sense, 
the ethical ambiguity of kindly versus calculating broker is now turned into only a 
potential to be more or less calculating and money hungry as the brokers are legalized 
and portrayed via the state’s representation. Of course, in practice, funeral brokers still 
evoke this friendship model in operating business, especially if they, like Longevity’s 
brokers, depend on “personal” networks to be their information sources.   
 The trade association started an “honest and trusted file” (chengxin dang’an 誠信
檔案) for each funeral broker in the middle of my fieldwork. This is a good example to 
show how the government's new regulatory power rationalized and disambiguated 
funeral brokers’ practices. When I first started my fieldwork, all funeral brokers had to 
bring their work permits with them to arrange any services in funeral parlors. Without the 
papers (regardless of the frequency of their often daily visits) the parlors would refuse 




license with the brokers’ pictures. In addition to pictures, these paper work permits also 
showed the brokers' names and their companies’ name. 
 After several months, in January 2011, the trade association came up with a new 
method. They changed the paper work permit into a plastic IC card that could also be 
used to build up and store this “honest and trusted file.” This plastic has an IC memory 
chip for storing data. If something went wrong in a particular funeral, then state 
practitioners could add notes to the IC card of the organizing broker. The more negatives 
marks a broker received, the less “honest and trusted” quality the broker was taken to 
have. Funeral parlors then could refuse to serve brokers with a bad “honest and trusted” 
rating or could simply tell the bereaved directly that the broker they had hired had a bad 
record. During my fieldwork, all funeral brokers switched to this IC card. However, by 
the time I left at the end of 2011, I had not yet heard of any broker being refused in 
funeral parlors. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that this whole set of information 
was also collected and stored in the funeral parlors’ own computers. This example 
illustrates how funeral parlors, as partial cooperators-competitors of funeral brokers, also 
functioned as a quasi-governing institution with fairly significant power over brokers, 
even if that power is only a potential threat, as is the case with the IC cards.  
 Under the name of transparency, the Shanghai “state” (meaning the combination 
of funeral parlors, the Civil Affairs Bureau, and the government-run “NGO”) monitored 
and regulated its partial business competitors. Since legalized brokers are, by definition, 
no longer a relational person embedded in social networks who might inspire trust or 




individual basis without any context based on evaluations of them made by their 
competitors.  
 Another such move toward “transparency” was the governing institutions' attempt 
to institute a “Shanghai Standard Funeral Brokers’ Service Contract  (shanghaishi 
binzang daili fuwu hetong 上海市殯葬代理服務合同)” citywide. The vice chair of the 
trade association told me that signing a contract was a way to protect both the brokers and 
the bereaved. For brokers, they could know for sure that the bereaved would pay them. 
For the bereaved, they would gain a legal basis for making sure that brokers followed 
their business agreement. I did not give much thought to it all at the time he told me. I 
only began to realize the implications of such a standard contract when one day Chen Yu 
told me that her sister went to a meeting as the legal representative for Longevity the day 
before. Although the name of the meeting suggested it was to “inquire” into the opinions 
of the funeral brokers' legal representatives on the new standard contract, in actuality, the 
association used the meeting instead to “inform” those representatives of the new policy 
on standard contracts. Unlike the vice chair who saw this as a “natural” move toward 
professionalization, funeral brokers saw this as yet another attempt to assert governing 
control. Beyond mere control, it threatened to significantly diminish the influence of 
funeral brokers in Shanghai.   
 Chen Yu told me that the standard contract was to be written in triplicate. One 
copy was to be given to the bereaved, one to the broker, and the other to the funeral 
parlor. The most controversial part of the policy is this last part. As she pointed out, it 




business competitors. Every broker I talked to thought that giving a copy of their contract 
to the parlor would kill most funeral brokers’ companies. It would be just a matter of time 
because once the parlor has this third copy they can control the broker in so many ways. 
Tang An said, “For example, if the parlor thinks you earn too much (i.e., you 'steal' too 
much of the parlor’s own business) or you disobey their rules, they could bring a copy of 
all of your business transactions to the tax bureau.” Many funeral brokers pay very little 
tax if any at all. Or, he went on to explain, the parlor could make the tax bureau check 
your suppliers’ taxes. Most suppliers of funeral brokers manufactured their products in 
“small workshops” (xiaozuofang 小作坊) run by mom & pop petty capitalists and they, 
too, rarely pay taxes. Once this happened, these small suppliers would either be pushed 
out of the market, increase their prices, or at least never be willing to deal with you again. 
By controlling the suppliers, funeral parlors could control the brokers. Once the number 
of funeral brokers decreased, there would be less business competitors and it would all be 
that much easier to regulate the remaining ones (and for the parlors to increase their own 
profits, of course!). As Tang An said, the parlors are “using the name of the market to 
exert political sovereignty” (yi shichangzhiming xing zhengzhizhishi 以市場之名行政治
之事).  
 In fact, brokers' concern over the standard contract became a full-blown drama in 
the middle of the 2011 training conference for funeral brokers I began to describe above. 
On that day, one of the morning sections was a class given by a government official from 
the Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision. She presented 




(effective January 1, 2011). She talked about the content of this policy with specific 
emphasis on why people needed standard contracts. The standard contract, she told us, 
was a way to civilize (wenming 文明) business conduct and to raise the quality (suzhi 素
質) of the industry. With her PowerPoint slideshow projected on the screen, for a while I 
thought I was in a lecture at a University's law department. The speaker definitely made 
no effort to accommodate her audience, most of whom did not have college degrees (and 
many of whom had never graduated from or even gone to high school). In some ways, the 
fact that the trade association made “us” (funeral brokers) all sit there to listen to 
something that most of us didn’t care about (perhaps precisely because it was delivered in 
a language that was difficult to understand) was a form of their exertion of power. 
Forcing people to attend the meeting in and of itself, along with this demeaning format, 
implied and reinforced their power and image of superiority.    
 After the class finished, we went to have lunch. Unlike the silence of the two 
lectures, everyone at the table (some were from Longevity, but there were many others as 
well) heatedly criticized the standard contract, asserting that this was the state’s next 
attempt to “kill” funeral brokers. When the afternoon lecture started, the atmosphere was 
suddenly quiet and lifeless again though. It was as if everyone had just had their 
Thanksgiving turkey meal and fallen deeply into a turkey coma. The speaker was another 
government official. He was from the Contract Supervision Division (hetong jiandu 
guanlichu 合同監督管理處) in the Shanghai Administration for Industry and Commerce. 
He started his talk with a legal presentation of what a contract is. For example, he said, a 




details the rights and responsibilities, duties and obligations, of each party to the other 
and so on. In order to further illustrate what a contract was, he used a cell phone as an 
example to explore under what conditions his saying that he gave his cell phone to you 
would constitute a contract.  
 Although I think his explanation was quite clear, I could see how this display of 
legal “expertise” was so totally detached from the brokers’ concerns. Sitting down there 
as one of the nine hundred or so people in the audience, I thought this lecture would pass 
just like the morning one—brokers just sitting and sleeping to make the time pass by 
faster. However, about twenty minutes into the presentation and seemingly reacting to no 
statement in particular, a man stood up and yelled,  
 “We don’t give a fuck about your cell phone or my cell phone! Our concern is this 
Shanghai Standard Funeral Brokers’ Service Contract!  
 “Why do you guys have to do this to us?” He went on. “Why can’t you leave us a 
means of making a living? People say that rural migrants working in cities are pitiful, but 
at least they can go back to their hometown if they lose their jobs. Where can we go 
[many brokers there were Shanghai people]? I guess we can only go to funeral parlors 
[meaning all they could do was die, with the added irony that even dead funeral brokers 
had to go through the Parlors].”  
 Before he finished his statement, another woman stood up to yell at the speaker 
and at the vice chair of the trade association who was sitting next to the speaker. These 
two people, especially the first man, practically hijacked the conference for at least five 




speaker and the vice chair of the trade association on the stage in order to force them to 
talk about this contract. Although this little drama was eventually resolved, it did force 
the speaker to give up on his original talk. The presenter started to talk about the content 
of the actual contract and why it is “good” to have a standard contract for funeral brokers’ 
“self interest.” Even though the audience sat through the talk in the end, their puzzles and 
worries were not in any way resolved since none of their concerns had anything to do 
with the content of the legal document per se. After all, their worries were about how 
these legal documents might be used, their forced distribution to a competitor, and about 
the fact that their being a legal form would create a variety of outcomes that would 
quickly spiral beyond the brokers’ control. All of these things went well beyond any 
“legal” understanding of why a contract might be “good.”163 
  
The Fragile Middle as Productive  
 Funeral brokers and funeral parlors are business competitors on “folk custom 
items” and are business collaborators on “civil affairs items” since the former is open to 
market competition and the latter is a state monopoly. Although what counts as a “civil 
affairs item” as opposed to a “folk custom item” seems rather arbitrary, the categorization 
makes sense when seen in relation to distance from the dead bodies themselves. That is, 
all services and products that are directly related to dead bodies are civil affairs items. 
From body transportation (hearse and driver), body handling (embalming, make up, body 
dressing, and so on) to body display (from cremation coffins to memorial meeting halls), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




funeral parlors monopolize all of these. Any other product such as cremains caskets, 
flower baskets, banquet services, and religious goods belong to the folk custom category. 
Funeral brokers at Longevity followed such a distinction when conducting their own 
business meetings with the bereaved. They preferred to start by going through the civil 
affairs items first. Then they could concentrate on the folk custom items by giving 
relatively more in-depth elaborations on why the bereaved might want each folk custom 
item.  
 This distinction between civil affairs and folk custom items and the restrictions 
that follow from it has several consequences. First, it suggests that funeral parlors were 
partially responsible for the fact that the bereaved tended to spend more money when 
hiring funeral brokers. While I do not have a way to gather average spending statistics to 
evaluate whether the bereaved actually spent more money if they hired funeral brokers, 
this “fact” was frequently told to me by people in funeral governing institutions 
(including funeral parlors). Assuming for the moment that this statement is true, however, 
this result was to some degree caused by the funeral parlors themselves. For example, 
Huangpu had several “welfare packages” and other package deals. However, Huangpu 
did not allow funeral brokers to book any of these deals for their clients. These packaged 
deals could only be purchased if the bereaved went to Huangpu to arrange their funeral 
without hiring brokers.  
 Moreover, for each individual item on sale, Huangpu often prohibited the funeral 
brokers from selling the cheap-end civil affairs items to their clients. For example, when 




costing RMB 1,380 or more because Huangpu wouldn’t allow the funeral brokers to book 
cremation caskets costing less than this. From Huangpu’s perspective, when funeral 
brokers came in to the parlor to have their business meetings with state practitioners on 
behalf of the bereaved, this meant that the parlor had already lost the possibility of selling 
folk custom items. Huangpu’s way of making up for this loss was to force brokers to only 
sell the more expensive civil affairs items (even though this was done by sacrificing the 
economic interests of the bereaved).  
 Funeral brokers thought that funeral parlors were competing with them unfairly. 
Chen Yu said that  
 
After people started to say that funeral parlors were profiteers, they [the parlors] 
decreased their prices on folk custom items. Funeral parlors’ cheapest, low-end 
cremains caskets are now so cheap that they are losing money on them. However, 
funeral parlors then increased their prices for civil affairs items! In other words, 
the funeral parlors lowered their prices for products that were open to market 
competition and increased their prices for the products they monopolized. And 
then they [funeral parlors] blamed the profiteering on us, that the creation of 
excessive profit was our [funeral brokers] fault even though the portion of that 
[profiteering] money that we are making is based on competition while the 
portion they are making is based on their monopoly. 
 
 Second, since funeral brokers only gained profit from the folk custom items (they 
did not add any mark-up to civil affairs items), they had to come up with new elaborate 
ways of selling them. At a larger, cumulative scale, this necessity eventually worked to 
transmit religious knowledge about funerals within Shanghai society. For example, both 
Huangpu and Longevity sold coarse yellow paper (huangzhi 黃紙) in squares. Shanghai 




same squares are also used to rub the coffin before it is ceremoniously nailed shut. 
Finally, the same paper is also used as spiritual money to burn to the deceased once you 
roll it up like an egg roll. I helped various Shanghai friends to make spiritual money out 
of such yellow papers for a whole range of different occasions. For example, we made 
them once for a Buddhist salvation ceremony that was held in a temple and again for 
ancestor worship on the Winter Solstice.  
 When state practitioners introduced this folk custom item to the bereaved, the 
former simply asked ask the latter if they wanted some. Of course, when brokers had 
business meetings with state practitioners on behalf of the bereaved, the state 
practitioners would not bother to try to sell this yellow paper, or any other folk custom 
items, to the brokers. After all, brokers’ prices for buying their folk custom items from 
their own suppliers tended to be lower. When it was a broker selling this to the bereaved, 
on the other hand, they often offered an explanation (shuofa 說法) of the meaning and 
use of the squares. For example, Lin Wu at Longevity said to the bereaved,  
 
Do you want to buy some coarse yellow paper? I don’t know if you know that 
many people like to use yellow paper to rub the coffin. There are several 
explanations for having these. A more traditional, more superstition, explanation 
says that by rubbing the cremation coffin with it this act symbolically turns the 
casket into a golden casket. Also, people usually put a thick layer of yellow paper 
underneath the body. This yellow bottom layer added to the top layer of xibo (a 
different kind of spiritual money made of sliver tin foil paper) on the body 
symbolizes “wearing gold with sliver” (chuanjin daiyin 穿金戴銀). Of course, 
this is a matter of personal belief. If you don’t believe these superstitions, there is 
another explanation that I have heard of. It was more of a scientific explanation. 





 During the process of offering these explanations, Lin Wu would observe the 
bereaved’s decision in order to decide whether he should elaborate one explanation more 
than the other. As far as Lin Wu was concerned, why the bereaved bought these yellow 
coarse papers was not important at all, so long as they bought them. Yet, it is in exactly 
this kind of business meeting that funeral brokers transmitted (and in some cases 
completely created) religious interpretations and practices to the bereaved who might or 
might not know about them (of course, they could not know about wholly invented 
practices…but over time these too could become “traditional”).   
 Third, funeral brokers not only facilitated the transmission of religious knowledge 
(especially knowledge related to popular religion), but they also helped to create urban 
Shanghai's religious revival by expanding the range of folk custom items on offer. Since 
they could make no money on civil affairs items and since they were being undercut by 
the parlors in other areas, edge ball plays aimed at introducing new items that could also 
expand the entire range of offerings as a clear path to “widen the table.” For example, 
funeral brokers popularized a standard set of ritual goods, now known among funeral 
professional as the Three Minor Things. They are a comb, a fan, and a handkerchief sold 
together in one package (I explain the symbolic meaning of these in Chapter 8). This is 
now a standard item for sale by both funeral brokers and state practitioners.  
 State practitioners recognized the “invented” nature of many current funerary 
goods and their association with funeral brokers. A state practitioner told me, “Funeral 
brokers are ‘messy and chaotic’ (luanqi bazao 亂七八糟). They casually invent stuff and 




efficacy than not (ningke xinqiyou 寧可信其有).’ A lot of stuff we [Parlors] have now is 
all ‘the result of [funeral brokers] messing around (luangao de jieguo 亂搞的結果).’” 
Many practitioners made similar comments to me when I mentioned that there seemed to 
be more religious rituals around in Shanghai today. Some of them tried to warn me that 
these were not “real” religion. Rather, they were mere invented superstitions. 
 Whether the current religious ritual practices were newly invented or not, 
however, is not the point. The point I want to emphasize here is that people in the 
industry attributed the rise of popular religious rituals in funerals to funeral brokers. In 
fact, outside Baoxin funeral parlor, there is a famous “Funeral Avenue” (binzang yitiaojie 
殯葬一條街) where many small shops sell all kinds of funeral goods. All of these shops 
were either owned by funeral brokers or at least worked with funeral brokers. The 
concentration of these shops was a good indication of why more than 80% of funerals in 
Baoxin operated through funeral brokers (even Longhua had some 60% of funerals 
operated by brokers). When I did interviews with a scholar who was active in funeral 
governance (he was involved in drafting funeral policy in Shanghai), he told me that this 
Funeral Avenue was one of the centers of “superstition.”  
 This scholar told me about Funeral Avenue for a very different purpose. He was 
trying to tell me that the state should be very careful when attacking superstition. He 
thought that it was important to separate “superstition” (mixin 迷信) from “custom” 
(fengsu xiguan 風俗習慣). I asked him how one could make such a separation. He told 
me that a lot of products sold on this street such as “spiritual cash,” paper-made TVs, 




were not. When I tried to probe how he made such a categorization, he told me that this is 
because xibo is traditional. Meanwhile, spiritual cash and other things are “invented” 
since they look like modern money. While these sorts of debates over what counted as 
religion and what superstition were key to policy debates at the level of governance, at 
the level of practice, the fact that funeral brokers offered items that gained in popularity 
pushed the parlors to also begin to offer them. As they began to also be offered by the 
Parlors, a state institution, the practices were, to some extent legitimized – thus quite 
overturning the parlor’s original state-mandated mission to demystify death.  
  As a result, the degree to which these religious explanations and practices were 
invented or fake is not important. What’s important here was that funeral brokers were 
actively promoting and circulating both popular religious practices and multiple 
interpretations or improvisations of them in their operation of both funerals and business 
meetings as a direct result of the parlor's ongoing monopoly of civil affairs items. The 
rise of funeral brokers and their success in introducing new folk custom items articulated 
the increasing desires of the bereaved to include popular religion in their previously 
secular socialist funerals (I discuss this in much more detail in Chapters 7 and 8). While 
state practitioners in particular thought this was a negative development, almost all 
funeral professionals recognized the role brokers had played in this expansion of religious 
items in Shanghai funerals. It is in this sense that I argue funeral brokers’ structural 
position in the fragile middle is productive. It not only pushed funeral parlors to change, 
but also opened up a space for the possible return (or reinvention and even creation) of 




socialist civil funerals (memorial meetings).  
 
The Fragile Middle as An Agentive Node 
Q: Why has the Chinese table tennis team always been so amazing?  
A: Because every Chinese citizen is an expert at playing edge balls. 
A popular joke in China 
 
 In this chapter, I used an ethnography of funeral brokers as a way to move beyond 
the prominent simplistic and dichotomous understandings often put out about the funeral 
industry divided between good and bad, vulnerable bereaved and profiteering funeral 
professionals, legal state practitioners and semi-legal but immoral funeral brokers. In 
many ways, the practices in the death industry are not that different from those in other 
industries in China. Once we move beyond conceptualizing funeral professionals in terms 
of pollution—the classic conceptual framework for analyzing funeral brokers in China (J. 
Watson 1988), nothing is inherently immoral in the operation of a death business. Despite 
scholars, media reports, and government officials (both national and local) describing 
funeral brokers as those who constantly and immorally play edge balls, they were by no 
means the sole players. Hitting edge balls is as much a part of the state practitioners' or 
the bereaved's game as it is a part of funeral brokers’ game.  
 As a result, on the one hand, hitting edge balls is now a rhetorical tool used by the 
center of power to delineate and define what is happening on the margins of its power, 
casting it in a negative light. At the same time, it is also a term used by people on the 
margins to describe how they themselves have strategically expanded or redefined what 




position of the speakers in particular contexts. Moreover, although in certain specific 
contexts hitting an edge ball could be the sort of “heroic righteous resistance,” like Qin’s 
newspaper model, which anthropologists would have very little difficulty embracing, this 
is only rarely the case. Heroism as a form of resistance or a way to create social change 
has very rarely worked in China; heroes are too easily put down. Rather, hitting an edge 
ball not only is not always “righteous,” but at times can be downright ugly and nasty, or 
in some extreme cases, lethal. Edge ball plays could be entirely legal, but immoral; 
illegal, but moral; or maybe, legal or not, but simply ambiguously amoral.  
 In this sense, hitting edge balls is neither clearly resistance nor “corruption.” 
Rather, it is more a tango dance that requires both the state and the public (assuming we 
can somehow separate the two in the first place) to coordinate. A step forward on the 
public side means that the state is willing to not push back and vice versa. When the state 
decides not to push back, this does not necessarily mean the triumph of the public. It 
simply means that the state decided not to govern that particular thing at this particular 
moment – but could do so later. I argue that this collaborative and cumulative effort by 
funeral brokers at hitting edge balls has effectively carved out an institutional space for 
their business within the Shanghai funeral industry despite the industry still remaining (to 
a large degree) a state monopoly. These changes might entail a push toward justice or 
freedom based on liberal democratic values, but they might just as easily also be amoral 
or even immoral pushes no matter if the ball itself actually crosses the bounds of legality 
or not. Expanding the boundaries of state limitations in some cases means increasing 




public” (or what “public good” means) is never an unambiguous or non-contradictory 
concept. I suggest here that it is this ambiguous difficulty inherent in cheering for edge 
ball politics that has produced significant change by carving out a space for and providing 
a platform for new practices within the funeral industry.  
 Finally, funeral brokers’ position in the fragile middle, as marginalized people 
(whether due to their frequent immigrant status or general class position) and as 
sandwiched between the bereaved and state practitioners, has established them as an 
agentive node where changes are created out of the struggle for survival. From this 
position, and largely forced by this position, they have effected changes related to both 
the political economy of death and subject formation. Change here comes precisely from 
a node without power. For the former, the rise of funeral brokers has made state funeral 
parlors react accordingly, adding their own broker company as well as adding new folk 
custom items and relaxing opposition to the performance of popular religious practices in 
what are still considered state spaces (all this even as funeral parlors themselves are also 
changing due to marketization). For the latter, funeral brokers were actively bringing 
religious constructions of subjectivities of dead bodies back to Shanghai funeral ritual. 
This effect was real even though it was largely unintentional. Most brokers were simply 
trying to make more money and to have a better life at a time when they were otherwise 
getting left behind by a rapidly increasing gap between those with and without better 
incomes, education, and social connections with the state in urban Shanghai. It was the 
government that first transformed funerals from a project of moral governance to an 




funeral brokers were exploiting the bereaved (and this was true to some degree), the 
fragile middle ground that brokers occupied only by means of their practices was also the 
very location where religious subjectivity reentered the Shanghai funeral industry. The 
manipulations and struggles of those brokers occupying the fragile middle helps to 
explain how religious change actually came about in urban Chinese funerals. This 
theoretical shift from why to how, enables us to see some of the ways that religious 
revival in funerals has actually been a (sometimes small) part of a much broader set of 
changes. This is not, then, just about the revival of religious practices, but about change 
more generally as well. This shift can help us to understand how changes that might not 
be directly related to religion and ritual have, in fact, been crucial for opening up space 
for exactly such religious and ritual revivals. It was the cumulative immoral and amoral 









CHAPTER 6 NEOLIBERAL SUBJECTIVITY? CONTEMPORARY 
FUNERAL GOVERNANCE AND FAILED PERSONALIZED 
COMMENORATION 
  
 Zhou Enlai (周恩來), the first Premier of the PRC, once said that Chinese people 
need two revolutions to change traditional (“feudalist”) Chinese funeral and interment 
customs. The goal of the first revolution is “not keeping corpses” (bubaocun yiti 不保存
遺體) and the second is “not keeping cremains” (bubaocun guhui  不保存骨灰). Zhou 
was probably the best exemplar for the CCP of both revolutions. When Zhou died in 
1976, his body was cremated (“not keeping corpses”) and then scattered into the water 
(“not keeping cremains”).164 This was in contrast to what had happened to Mao’s body, 
which was embalmed and is still displayed in the Mausoleum in Tiananmen Square in 
Beijing. This even though Mao initiated and signed the most famous statement in the 
history of funeral governance under the CCP, “A Proposal for Cremation” (huohua 
changyishu 火化倡議書), in 1956.  
 In Shanghai, if we take 1954 as the starting point and 1982 as the finishing line 
for the first revolution, it took Shanghai less than thirty years to accomplish the first 
revolution. 165 From the perspective of funeral governance, Shanghai now is officially 
striving to complete the second revolution by persuading all Shanghai citizens to give up 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 My funeral professional friends told me that Zhou chose cremation and scattering his cremains 
because he was worried about what Chairman Mao might do to his body or cremains. Some even 
told me that Zhou’s family secretly kept the last bit of cremains and stored them at the Zhou Enlai 
Memorial Hall in Huai’an (懷安), Jiangsu. Huai’an was Zhou’s hometown. 
165 Shanghai FIA begun to promote cremation in 1954. From 1954 t0 1956, it was the first wave 
of Funeral and Interment Reform in Shanghai. See more on Chapter 3. 1982 was when Duhang 




keeping cremains. In reality, though, funerary officials have been enthusiastically 
facilitating the dramatic blooming of columbarium and cremains cemeteries since the 
early 1980s—both are places for people to keep cremains.  
 For government officials involved in funeral governance, “not keeping cremains” 
entails at least two distinct policy orientations in practice. The first is to develop 
alternative methods of cremains disposal. This means that instead of burying or storing 
cremains in cemeteries or columbaria, Shanghai people are encouraged to embrace sea 
burials (haizang 海葬), tree burials (shuzang 樹葬), grassland burials (caopingzang 草坪
葬) and so on. These alternative methods return cremains, unboxed, to the natural 
environment without leaving a trace of the identity and the ownership of the cremains. 
The ideology is that human flesh and bones will  become an unidentifiable part of the 
eco-system that sustains all life.166  
  The second policy orientation in thinking about “not keeping cremains” is to find 
a way that “preserves a culture of life” (baocun shengming wenhua 保存生命文化). The 
idea behind “preserving a culture of life” is that the cremains have no meaning in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Along these lines, I once attended a funeral related conference in Shanghai where one of the 
speakers introduced the latest and the most “environmental friendly” body disposal method 
developed in Germany—“water burial” (shuizang 水葬)—as a future potential alternative for 
China. The original German term for this is a Resomator. Resomator is the name of an airport 
baggage screener like device that can transform dead bodies into a white powder and a coffee 
colored liquid that are ready to “flush down the drain into sewerage system” (Chris Ayres 2010). 
The point of this presentation in the funeral conference in Shanghai was to show that human 
world is supposed to be for the living, not for the dead. The dead should leave the living world 
without a trace (or with as little as possible). While the presenter who shared this latest 
technology was well aware that such method violates Chinese sensibilities about death and dead 
bodies and therefore the impossibility of implementing water burial in Shanghai, his presentation 
nevertheless shows the kind of inspiration that higher up funeral officials and professionals have 




themselves—what is important is to preserve the meaning of the life that the cremains 
once embodied. In practice, “preserving a culture of life” involves developing techniques 
of representing the deceased in “authentic” ways such that the deceased’s life culture is 
“preserved” as if we were taking a picture of the deceased. One method to achieve this 
goal was to promote “personalized rituals” (gexinghua yishi 個性化儀式). Whenever I 
interviewed people in the funeral industry, so long as we were talking about rites of 
commemoration, they all told me that personalized funerals are (and should be) the way 
of the future. They said that the biggest problem with contemporary Shanghai funerals is 
that they are too “programmed” (chengshihua 程式化 ). There are no “personal 
characteristics” (gerentese 個人特色) in them. Interviewee after interviewee within the 
state affiliated funeral institutions stated that modern funerals should reflect individual 
difference. For them, modernity indicated a linear development from “programmed” 
ritual to personalized ones. This pursuit of personalized funerals is then not only because 
this happens to fit the goal of the second funeral revolution (“not keeping cremains”), but 
also because this is the believed “destiny” of modernization in funeral operations.167  
 This chapter starts by describing and analyzing the kinds of imaginings that go 
into personalized funerals and how this format works in principle. In contrast with this 
vision (or State's desire), I then discuss what kinds of subjectivity are actually being 
created in the mundane interactions between the state (vis-a-vis state practitioners) and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 In Chapter 4, I mentioned renben binzang (human-centered funeral and interment) when I 
discuss Hu Jintao’s proposal to promote a Socialist Harmonious Society as a way to deal with 
market development issues in contemporary China. “Preserving a culture of life” was also one 




the public (the bereaved) in funeral parlors. I conclude this chapter with a discussion of 
the modality of governance and subject formation in post economic reform Shanghai.   
 
Constructing a Neoliberal Self in a Personalized Funeral  
 In June 2011, I attended a national conference called the “Modern Funeral Ritual 
Demonstration and Learning Conference” (xiandai binzang liyi guanmo jiaoliuhui 現代
殯葬禮儀觀摩交流會) in Changsha, Hunan Province. During the conference, funeral 
professionals from all over China went to learn what a “modern funeral” might look like. 
I estimate that there were several hundred representatives from funeral parlors and 
cemeteries there. Conference speakers included people from Japan (representing a flower 
altar design company), Taiwan (representing a large funeral service company), Sichuan 
Province (representing a private funeral agency run by Taiwanese), and Shanghai 
(representing a famous private cemetery). These speakers either presented or actually 
demonstrated their respective versions (and visions) of modern funerals. In one of the 
sessions, students from the Funeral Department of the Changsha Civil Affairs College, 
the premier college for funeral professionals, also performed “modern etiquette” showing 
the proper way to shake hands, bow, walk, greet the bereaved and parade in military style 
goose-step. 
 Having two out of the five presenting institutions coming from (or associated 
with) Taiwan was not accidental (this number may have been closer to 3 since the private 
Shanghai cemetery mentioned above was actually started by Taiwanese as well). Taiwan 




in general and for rites of commemoration in particular. This was so much the fact that 
many of my informants did not understand why I would study Shanghai funerals if my 
interests were about ritual. The speaker from Taiwan gave a thirty-minute presentation in 
which she shared her experiences of designing personalized funerals in Taiwan. She 
presented three cases. Although all three were personalized, I have transcribed only the 
last one in detail here: 
 
We should imagine the personalized funeral as a graduation ceremony for the 
deceased. This graduation is the deceased’s last show. Therefore, she/he should be 
the main character (zhujiao 主角), the protagonist, of his life graduation. The 
bereaved are the actors and actresses who perform this show. Funeral 
professionals are the directors, script writers, and the people who move the stage 
settings during the show. We are not the stars. So make the bereaved do the front 
stage things, such as hosting, as much as possible. Step back and make the 
spotlight shine on the deceased and performers. Funeral professionals should 
remain behind the scenes even if you are the ones directing the show. […] 
 
A true personalized funeral places the deceased as the center of attention and 
story telling. A personal funeral also shows the entirety of the deceased’s life 
whether we are talking about those happy and glorious moments or frustrating and 
sad moments. A personalized funeral is the representation of the deceased's life on 
a stage […] 
 
[Not included in this excerpt: the first and second cases were about a housewife’s 
funeral and an ordinary businessman’s funeral respectively.] 
 
Now I am going to talk about the third personalized funeral I designed. This one 
was also my favorite. However, it is worth noting that although all three cases I 
share today are personalized, this last one only works when the deceased’s life is 
full of stories. The main character of my third case, Wang Zhaofan (王昭藩), was 
an architect and a professor. He also owned an architectural company. He was a 
part of the team that designed the World Trade Center. In addition to his 
architectural profession, he also liked painting, calligraphy, and drawing among 
other things. He even liked cooking—often baking cakes for his granddaughters. 
 




hoped his funeral could represent his talents, artistic characteristics, and humor. 
He wanted his funeral to show who he was. He also did not want people to cry for 
him in his funeral. He wanted people to party and to have fun. Wang hoped that 
all his friends who came to accompany his last journey could know each other just 
as they all knew Wang himself. According to these wishes, I designed a 
personalized funeral that suited him. 
 
First, we rented an old warehouse for his funeral. We divided this warehouse into 
several sections. In the entrance where people can sign in and give gifts, we had a 
staff member take a Polaroid picture of every guest. We set up a “Connecting 
Plaza” (lianyi guangchang 聯誼廣場) in the middle of the warehouse. Light food 
and drinks were provided in this section. Wang felt that people today are too busy 
to connect with each other. He hoped that his funeral could be a place where 
people connect and reconnect and where people could pause for a moment in an 
otherwise ridiculously busy life. Whether Wang's friends wanted to visit him or 
simply visit each other, they were all welcome. 
 
On the other side of Connecting Plaza, we set up a “Time Axis” (shijianzhou 時
間軸) printed on a 20-meter long paper on a wall. This Time Axis was a detailed 
time lime of Wang’s life journey from birth to death. Guests then fixed the 
Polaroid pictures we took of them earlier to the Time Axis to mark the 
intersection of the guests’ life and Wang’s own life.  For example, if you were 
Wang’s student in 1978, then you put the Polaroid you got at the entrance at the 
1978 mark. By the end of the day, Wang’s children could see that there were so 
many people who had accompanied their father throughout his life. This Time 
Axis provided an exemplar to Wang’s children for being a proper person. This 
was also a transcript that testified to Wang’s life achievements. 
 
Behind the Connecting Plaza and Time Axis was a space called the “fanjian” (藩
間). [Fan was the third character of Wang’s name and jian means room.] In the 
fanjian, we displayed eight different tables that Wang used while he was alive. 
They included: a blueprint drawing table, a computer table, a poker table, a 
calligraphy table, a painting table, and so on. We even had the work table that he 
used in the kitchen where he baked cakes for his granddaughters. Of course, the 
most important one, the mahjong table was there too. Wang had always been very 
proud of his mahjong skills—his most glorious moments were on mahjong table! 
Everything on these tables was stuff he actually had used while alive. The guests 
could see Wang’s preferences and tastes through these things. 
 
Then there was an exhibition area on the left. We not only exhibited Wang’s 
architectural works, blueprints, paintings, and calligraphy, but also notes and 
drawings he had made for his family, especially his granddaughters. People who 





Also, notice the logo and it’s design. We came up with this logo “knickknacks 
under rulers and compass” (juguixia de wanyier 矩規下的玩意兒). Rulers and 
compasses are tools used in making blueprints in architecture. Each of the 7 
characters in this logo was actually Wang’s own [calligraphic] work. We found 
and copied an example of each character from his own work and then put them 
together. […]. 
 
Then we have a farewell room. We set up a wooden table in the middle of the 
room. On that table, there was a wine cup on the right and a teacup on the left. 
Guests went in to say good-bye to Wang by having a last cup of tea or wine 
together. Where is Prof. Wang? He was in the large screen! We made a power 
point slideshow of his life. We made sure that we selected at least one picture of 
him for every five to ten years throughout his life. We put a lot of chairs and sofas 
in front of the screen so that people could enjoy watching this slideshow [while 
drinking]. 
 
We also set up a table where female guests could give Wang a yellow rose [that 
we supplied] if they felt that they wanted to give flowers to him. Roses were 
Wang’s favorite flower. But he did not like red or pink ones because he thought 
that they were too feminine. He liked yellow roses. You could also give 
something else too. Wang’s grand daughters made an origami bird from copies of 
the notes that their grandfather had left to them. 
 
This funeral was a whole-day event. We started at 10 am. I MC’d a small 
memorial service for Wang at 3pm. Wang wanted people say good bye to him in 
ways that reflected his interactions with friends. He wanted everyone to feel 
relaxed, free, and to be friends with each other. If you noticed [from my power 
point], you did not see many of our staff in this funeral. In fact, among the three 
personalized funerals I introduced today, this one used the least amount of staff 
and had a very good margin for profit. […] 
 
 This Taiwanese speaker’s presentation of personalized funerals shows a particular 
way of constructing the subjectivity of dead bodies. First of all, every (dead) body was 
first and foremost conceptualized as a unique and stand alone subject. This uniqueness 
gives the dead a natural right to be the main character of his/her “life graduation” 
(funeral). This distinctiveness is unable to be reproduced or substituted for—so while the 




main characters (nor could the funeral practitioners take center stage). Consequently, this 
gives the (dead) subject a clear boundary that distinguishes self from other. No one can 
be the replica of another person no matter what kinds of biological connections they 
might share. This bounded sense of self assumes the dead to be an individualized person 
whose existence is prior to and independent from the social relationships around him or 
her. In other words, this kind of self is not a socially embedded person to begin with, but 
an individual person who meets and interacts with other people along his or her way. 
Finally, the dead is envisioned as an agent who is the locomotive of his/her life journey. 
Agency and free will are conceptualized as inherent and innate characteristics of such a 
person. As a result, the mere existence of an individual being is enough to be the basis for 
a personalized commemoration, whether the deceased was a housewife, a small business 
owner, or an architect. Personalized funerals are based upon (and operate through) these 
particular ways of constructing the subjectivity of the dead. 
 Specifically, Wang’s funeral visualized this idea of a unique, bounded, and 
coherent self in his “Time Axis.” Every guest marked the point in time that their 
respective timelines intersected with Wang’s. The assumption was that Wang’s timeline 
had its own beginning and (now) end and that it is different from yours and mine. While 
different timelines might cross each other, everyone is essentially a loner with their own 
distinct destiny. In this construction, whether or not the abstract “Universe” has its own 
timeline (that is supposed to be total and inclusive), Wang’s personal timeline put him at 
the center of his own “universe.”  This idiosyncratic version was what mattered. As a 




come and go but the impersonal Universe remains, the Time Axis emphasizes the 
creation and disappearance of many individual universes. The Time Axis is about an 
individual journey and the intersections of many individual journeys. Once they passed 
the intersection, they were already moving on in their own respective ways. The Time 
Axis is an ego-centered view of self, time, and existential meaning. 
 Moreover, Wang’s funeral constructed Wang as a bounded self by emphasizing 
the totality of his life. By working on representing various aspects of Wang’s life from 
the professional, such as his architectural works, to the personal, such as his artwork and 
cooking, and from his serious achievements, such as being a part of the building the 
World Trade Center, to his silly achievements, such as his mahjong skills, all these 
difference could be merged into one single unity. This was possible because there was 
assumed to be a core underneath the diversity. 
 Furthermore, this funeral constructs the subjectivity of Wang through space. This 
was probably because Wang was an architect. This spatially structured self was 
materialized through tables in the design of the fanjian. Each represented a segment of 
Wang’s “true” self. From tables he used to work on to the table he used to entertain, 
together these tables were coherent because Wang’s “true” self was moving from one 
space to the other and therefore unified the differences. As a result, not just time, but also 
space, was conceptualized through an ego-centered view. 
 However, this unique and bounded self who is on his own journey to somewhere 
did not mean that Wang was constructed as an isolated atomic subject. Quite the 




relationships. The Taiwanese speaker described the Time Axis as an exemplar for 
Wang’s children because it showed that there were so many people whose life journeys 
intersected with that of their father. She did not describe Wang’s architectural works and 
artistic works as his life achievement. Whether or not the Taiwanese speaker was 
conscious of it, she described his accumulated social capital as the life achievement of the 
deceased. It was this achievement that she associated with a pre-existing cultural concept 
of being a proper person. In Sinophone Studies, scholars have long identified the link 
between being a proper person and her or his ability to maintain interpersonal and 
reciprocal relationships. These relationships are created and maintained through gift 
exchange (which is seen as proper etiquette). As a result, it was not surprising to also see 
food and drink being provided and given in the Connection Plaza—banquets were one of 
the most common ways to engage in gift exchange.  
 Moreover, Wang’s ability to be a proper (Han) person did not mean that other 
people around him had the same capacity. Quite the opposite, he worried that modern 
people were “too busy to connect.” After all, life in Taipei is “ridiculously busy.” The 
Connection Plaza thus served to solve this tendency by providing a node to facilitate 
interactions between individuals who might be too independent and therefore fall into 
anomie today. Since every participant’s own timeline at some point connected to Wang’s 
timeline, Wang’s funeral allowed individuals to further expand such connections so that 
two previously unconnected timelines could intersect. 
 Beyond constructing the subjectivity of Wang, the second important theme that 




authenticity. Right in the beginning of the presentation, the Taiwanese speaker pointed 
out that personalized funerals aim to faithfully represent the true totality of the deceased, 
whether it is about glory or sorrow. We can see the attempts to authentically represent 
Wang in the Exhibition Area and the fanjian. They needed to display eight different 
tables in the fanjian and both architectural works and other artistic and non-artistic works 
so they could cover both his professional and private life. If they had just displayed 
Wang’s achievements as an architect and artist but failed to show his “old naughty boy” 
side, this would be hypocritical and therefore morally wrong. Idealized representations of 
Wang (such as the attempt to disguise his naughty side) would be more embarrassing 
than showing the naughty side of him. Just as Wang was perceived as not ashamed of 
telling other people that he was naughty and good at mahjong, his funeral should not be 
ashamed to show these aspects as well. In this personalized funeral, authenticity was one 
of the highest moralities, if not the only morality, in constructing subjectivity. This 
pursuit of authenticity was further articulated through the Taiwanese speaker’s emphasis 
that all the items on the tables displayed in the fanjian were the actual possessions of 
Wang, in their original condition. They were not replicas nor the results of picking and 
choosing. This obsession with faithful representation shows a strong moral idea of 
valuing authenticity.  
 The third theme that emerged in this presentation of personalized funerals was the 
desire to reject social convention. People should do things because they want to, not 
because they have to. As a result, if a guest went to Wang’s funeral to see his old friends 




worse. People should not go to a funeral because they were obligated to go. Therefore, if 
you are happy because you see some old friends, then you should not feel obligated to cry 
even if you are at a funeral. We could see this rejection of rules and formality also from 
the description of ways of saying goodbye to the deceased. The guests were welcome to 
come and go as they wanted. When they were at the funeral, they could stay in the 
Connection Plaza and socialize with other guests. They could have a last cup of tea or 
wine with Wang. They could offer yellow flowers. They could enjoy reading through 
Wang’s Time Axis. They could watch the PowerPoint slideshow of Wang’s life. What 
mattered was the spirit and the heart instead of the formality and the gesture. There was 
no need for ritualized acts. Based on this presentation, everyone in Wang’s funeral, 
including Wang himself, was constructed as autonomous individuals who have free will 
and should act as such instead of being constrained by formality.  
 Finally, let’s not forget the role of the funeral professionals and their motivation 
for promoting personalized funerals. First, since funeral professionals’ timeline did not 
have much intersection (other than arranging the death rites themselves) with the dead, 
they should make themselves invisible as much as possible. This works because while 
ritualized funerals relied heavily on experts to perform the ritual or to guide the bereaved 
in their performance, personalized funerals do not need ritual experts to tell them what to 
do at each step, since acts and feelings should be spontaneous, original, and authentic. 
The experts simply set the stage and allow spontaneity to flow.  Once we give up 
ritualized performance, then it makes perfect sense to have funeral professionals stay 




that there is no role for funeral professionals. On the contrary, they are there to be 
“directors.” Most important of all, as the Taiwanese speaker told funeral professionals 
attending her presentation to note, she “used the least amount of the staff” for this funeral 
and that it had “a very good margin for profits.” In sum, the imagination of a particular 
kind of self who is autonomous, bounded, and independent; the modality of a ritual that is 
meant to authentically represent this particular kind of self; and the capitalist effort to 
provide a funeral service that is highly profitable, are all deeply intertwined in the 
promotion of and desire for personalized funerals.   
 Capitalist logic at least partly explained why Shanghai funeral professionals were 
so eager to provide service items related to personalizing funerals. For example, Huangpu 
Funeral Parlor started a new service item called “A Little Movie of Life” (rensheng 
xiaodianying 人生小電影) several years ago. For this service item, the bereaved could 
choose up to twenty pictures of the deceased that were supposed to provide a narrative of 
the life of the deceased. Huangpu would put these pictures together into a PowerPoint 
slideshow and play this during the memorial meeting. My friends told me that this 
technique was already commonly used in weddings in Shanghai.  Huangpu also created 
another new service item, a “personalized meeting hall” (gexinhua liting 個性化禮廳). 
This service allowed the bereaved to decorate the meeting hall in a way that would match 
the unique personality of the deceased. One example that Huangpu continually advertised 
was a music professor’s funeral. In his funeral, the meeting hall was decorated with 
flowers arranged in the shape of musical notes. This kind of decoration of the meeting 




the bereaved. One of the most ambitious attempts at personalization was probably the 
idea of “Flower Basket Literature” (hualan wenxue 花籃文學) or “cultured flower 
baskets” (wenhua hualan 文化花籃). The intention here was to create a new literature 
genre specifically for couplets on flower baskets. Instead of using generic content for 
couplets, people could use individualized content with various literary genres (such as 
poems or short essays) to commemorate the deceased. This way they could not only 
memorialize the deceased as an individual, but also cultivate a personalized memorial for 
the deceased's funeral. 
 Despite these efforts, personalized funerals and their related service items have, 
so far, not succeeded in Shanghai funeral parlors. I remember the first “Little Movie of 
Life” that I watched at Huangpu. This slideshow was just a collection of family 
gatherings and travel pictures of the deceased. Probably due to the fact that the deceased 
spent a large part of her life during the periods of high socialism, there were not many 
pictures from her early life. All the pictures obviously concentrated on the post-reform 
era. There was no effort to represent a coherent narrative of the totality of the deceased’s 
life. Moreover, I later found out that the bereaved only used this service item because it 
was free. This family happened to choose a special memorial meeting hall based on its 
size and scheduled availability. This meeting hall is “special” because, unlike other 
meeting halls that have flower decorations arranged in a rectangular shape surrounding 
the dead body, this meeting hall had flowers in a heart shape. The price of this hall is 
slightly higher than the other halls, but it comes with a free deal for the Little Movie of 




the funeral. When I went to other memorial meetings in the same meeting hall later, I 
noticed that many families did not have this PowerPoint slideshow. This means that, for 
whatever reason, some people even gave up a free service item that accompanied their 
meeting hall choice.  
 Shanghai funeral parlors’ efforts to promote personalized funerals were also 
evident in their recruitment efforts. A young woman I knew at Huangpu who has a 
college degree was hired specifically to assist a senior funeral practitioner to design 
personalized funerals. However, when I met her, she worked at the reception desk 
because personalized funerals just hadn't been a success. As a result, there was not much 
she could do on a daily basis. The senior funeral practitioner who was in charge of 
personalized funerals did most of his work arranging “special funerals.” I asked him what 
“special” funerals meant. It turned out that most of his work involved arranging 
government officials' or other important people’s funerals. His job was to make sure that 
he handled the politics of the memorial meetings correctly. He had to figure out the 
correct hierarchical relationships between units and individuals (a task made all the more 
complex and ambiguous when referring to parallel units, ranks, and high level people 
retiring from one to another. I will explore some of these issues further in Chapter 8). 
This was the kind of “personalization” he did. At least from his perspective, every funeral 
is “personalized” because each person occupied a specific hierarchical position. This 
specific position then links them to a set of hierarchical relationships surrounding the 
deceased.  Everyone’s funeral is “personalized” because everyone is situated in a 




preference and individual authenticity were unimportant, if not outright irrelevant, in his 
imagination and the operation of “personalized” funerals. If we compared what 
personalized funerals were in actual practice in Huangpu Funeral Parlor with the 
Taiwanese case, we can see how radically different they are. The former constructed the 
“individuality” of the deceased in terms of hierarchical rank and the latter did so in terms 
of personal autonomy and uniqueness of life experiences.  
 Of course, Wang’s personalized funeral was an exceptional case in many ways. 
The Taiwanese speaker described renting a warehouse for Wang’s funeral. I did some 
research myself after her speech for other reports of this particular funeral. The 
“warehouse” was not just any warehouse. It was actually a public space specifically 
reserved for artistic activities in Taipei. As she said in the beginning, the deceased 
himself was an unusual character to begin with so this model does not necessary work for 
everyone. Even though Wang’s funeral was rather on one extreme end, even if we 
imagined personalized funerals as a spectrum of tendencies this type of practice still did 
not work in contemporary Shanghai for several reasons.  
 First, there are technical limitations springing from cultural presumptions. Wang’s 
funeral happened several months after he passed away. In Shanghai, even though the law 
gives people 14 days to have their funerals, people like to and want to have memorial 
meetings on the third day after death. Personalized funerals, however, do not come nearly 
so quickly. They take time to think, to gather materials, to design, and to set up. 
Moreover, Shanghai people like to have open caskets for their memorial meetings. The 




did not matter.168 What mattered was the “life culture” he left behind which was 
represented in the funeral, not the material remains. This preference for open casket 
funerals means that Shanghai people can only have funerals in funeral parlors because 
you cannot move dead bodies outside the parlors.  
 Shanghai people’s preference for open casket funerals was at least in part related 
to their association of non-open casket funerals with abnormal death. If you go to a 
memorial meeting in Shanghai and it is not an open casket one, this often indicates that 
something horrible had gone wrong with this particular death. For example, such funerals 
are associated with accidental deaths (from car accidents and suicide) and are therefore 
“abnormal deaths” (any kind of dying young is an abnormal death) carrying greater 
danger of pollution. Furthermore, if the deceased had a serious contagious disease (such 
as SARS), the state requires their immediate cremation before any funeral could be held. 
At a more indirect level, displaying only cremains in a memorial meeting was also 
associated with politically problematic deaths under high socialism. At that time, counter-
revolutionaries were often cremated without the bereaved knowing about it. If the 
deceased could later be qualified for rehabilitation, their work unit would organize 
memorial meetings with cremains. For those who were rehabilitated, but whose relatives 
were unable to trace where the cremains were, memorial meetings would be held with 
just a picture of the deceased (or, lacking even that, some other things that were close to 
the deceased's body such as the deceased's clothing). I will discuss the relationship 
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parts of his cremains on a hill in Wang’s ancestral hometown nearby and then brought the rest of 




between memorial meetings and rehabilitation in detail in Chapter 7. For now, what 
matters is that both situations sent a message to the funeral participants that there was 
something wrong with a person’s death because the funeral is not open casket.  
 The third reason that made Wang’s funeral impossible in Shanghai was related to 
the kind of labor needed in organizing personalized funerals. Shanghai funeral parlors are 
operated more in line with Taylorism. Each funeral practitioner was in charge of a small 
part of handling the dead bodies that passed through the parlor each day. People in the 
same unit were doing more or less the same jobs. Although they were expert in their own 
units, generally speaking, anyone in the same unit could be easily replaced with another. 
The Taiwanese speaker, however, worked more like an event planner who needed to do 
everything and do all of it creatively. Shanghai funeral parlors have been recruiting 
college graduates in order to “upgrade” their labor quality. However, these graduates 
were still assigned jobs more based on a Taylorist style probably due to the massive 
amount of bodies that they have to handle each day. In Huangpu Funeral Parlor, for 
example, this meant a daily deluge of 60-80 bodies in the summer and 100-120 bodies in 
the winter. The mass production characteristics and highly industrialized operation made 
individualization very hard to achieve.  
 During my time in Huangpu, there were only two big personalized funerals that I 
heard about (none of the 75 funerals I attended was personalized). One of the deceased 
was a famous radio host. This funeral had many guests from the entertainment business. 
The other was an ordinary young woman who died in the 1115 Fire Incident. This fire 




eventually causing some government officials to resign. What is relevant here is that 
personalized funerals that address individuality are limited to artists or certain particular 
kinds of people and abnormal deaths (meaning dying young). So, despite the efforts of 
government officials, funeral business experts and scholars, and funeral professionals 
higher up in the parlors to promote personalized funerals that construct the deceased as 
unique, autonomous, bounded, independent, and coherent selves, their efforts have 
largely failed. Consequently, if personalized funerals and their associated kind of self are 
not what has been produced inside Shanghai funeral parlors, then what kinds of self of 
the deceased are created in the mundane interactions between funeral practitioners on the 
ground and the public as bereaved?  
 
Arranging Funerals: Business Meetings in Funeral Parlors 
 The Ding family just lost their father last night.169 Ding Wen and Ding Jia are the 
brother and sister children of the deceased and are both in their forties. They are both 
married, have their own respective nuclear families, and live separately from their 
parents. After the father died in a hospital, Ding Wen and Ding Jia accompanied their 
mother back to her apartment to sort out what they should do next. Shanghai people had 
less than three days to arrange the funeral, a daunting task for the many people who have 
not done it before. Ding Jia made some phone calls to her friends and searched the web to 
find out what they should do next. She found a 962840 phone number to contact a funeral 
parlor—a newly established “white event hotline” (baishirenxian 白事熱線) that gives 
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callers direct access to any of the three Shanghai city funeral parlors 24 hours a day. This 
hotline was initiated in August 2010, two months after I started my fieldwork. FIS used 
to have 6464-4444 as their main telephone line. This older phone number played with 
Chinese people’s common association of the number four with death due to the similarity 
between the two words' pronunciation.170 
 It was late at night. A funeral practitioner, Li Shan, answered the hotline that 
night. He told Ding Jia that the Parlor would send a hearse to pick up her father's body 
from the hospital: “What type of hearse do you want to be used to take your father from 
the hospital to the Parlor? Do you want a RMB 240, RMB 600, or RMB 1,000 (USD 39, 
97, 161) kind? The first one is a minivan, the second one is a Buick, and the third one is a 
Cadillac.” Ding Jia paused for a second as if she was thinking. Li Shan then continued, “I 
think we don't need to have a really nice car for this trip. A minivan will do just fine. If 
you want to let your father enjoy a nice last ride, you can rent a nicer hearse for his 
departure from Huangpu Parlor to the crematorium (rather than from the hospital to the 
Huangpu).” Ding Jia then decided to go with a minivan. 
 Li Shan continued, “it is late night already. Our salespeople are off work now. If 
you want us to provide House Service (shangmen fuwu 上門服務), you will have to wait 
until tomorrow morning. You can also come to Huangpu yourself. It all depends on you. 
Our newly initiated Door-Service is free of charge. Salespeople can conduct their 
business meeting with you at your place to make the arrangements for your father’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 This phone number now is reserved for the FIS’s own “private” funeral agency. FIS 
established its own “funeral agency” in order to compete against private funeral brokers. For 




memorial meeting. However, the disadvantage is that you will not be able to see our 
funerary products in person then. Our salespeople only carry computers and catalogs with 
them so you can see the products’ pictures.” Ding Jia talked to Ding Wen for a while and 
then decided that they would go to Huangpu Funeral Parlor in person the next day. 
 The next morning, Ding Wen, Ding Jia and their respective spouses got in a cab 
together to go to Huangpu. After they told the driver what their destination was, they 
closed their eyes to take a break. When they opened them again the taxi driver had 
stopped on the side of a road next to a park. The Dings looked out the window puzzled by 
the location. “Huangpu is just across the street,” the driver told them. “Since you are my 
first business, I don’t want to get too close to it to start my day.”171 
 After the Dings got out of the cab, they saw a large drivable entrance on the other 
side of the eight-lane road. A large security guard’s booth is located on the left side of the 
entrance and a grand looking granite stone engraved with the name of Huangpu Funeral 
Parlor is on the right. After walking in, the Dings saw a grey and white, modernist style 
building roughly six or so floors tall on the right. There were also some other buildings 
on the left and some further down. Between the buildings are well paved and maintained 
driving and pedestrian ways surrounded by nicely trimmed trees, flowers, and 
shrubberies. This was actually the first time that the Dings had been to a funeral parlor. 
They were a little bit surprised to see how nice looking this place of death was. The 
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generally held stereotype of a crematorium (huozangchang 火葬場)—as all funeral 
parlors used to be called—is a dark, scary, ugly, and cold place. 
 The Dings turned right into the first large building following a security guard’s 
direction. Another guard in a blue uniform standing outside the automatic glass doors 
waved his hand to the sensor to open the door for the Dings when he saw them 
approaching. When they walked through the automatic doors, they found themselves in a 
large bright space with vaulted ceilings six stories up. This grand lobby has a very open 
feel to it, interrupted only by two rows of four large marble columns setting off a central 
area from the sides of the room (See Picture 6.1). They could see from the first floor 
directly up to the sixth. The marble looking tile floor of the lobby is so clean that it 
shines. This despite the fact that it takes a lot of effort to stop the filthy dust that fills up 
Shanghai's streets and skies from building up. On the other end of the lobby (opposite the 
entrance) is a large reception counter. Behind this counter is a roughly four floor tall 
painting that that shows a person’s life cycle from birth through marriage, children, and 
death. At the 5 o'clock position the Dings see a baby. Then the baby becomes older and 
older and moves from being single to become parents and grandparents following a 
clockwise direction around the painting. The painting is full of color and forms a rather 
dramatic contrast to the bright, but gray and white stone color of the rest of the lobby. 
Four small offices flank each side of the lobby on the first floor. These offices look like 
the private consulting rooms that are commonly seen in banks in America. A digital LED 





Picture 6.1: The Grand Lobby of Longhua Funeral Parlor 
 
 
 There are four people standing behind the reception counter. They all look to be 
in their twenties. All of them wear uniforms that resemble flight attendants’. The female 




find that all funeral practitioners wear these uniforms.172 The Dings approached one of 
the receptionists and told him that they wanted to arrange a funeral for their father. Ding 
Jia told him that she had called last night to arrange to pick up her father from the 
hospital. The receptionist checked his computer and found the record. He told Ding Jia 
that her father is in the Parlor already. The receptionist then took a number from an 
automatic number machine on the counter, and handed it to her. He told the Dings that 
they could sit on one of the benches in the lobby to wait. When it is their turn, the digital 
number display screen on the wall behind the counter will show which office number for 
them to go to. The screen outside each office will also show the customer’s number and 
there will be a voice announcement as well. 
 During their wait, the Dings talked to each other occasionally, but most of time 
they just remained silent. After 20 minutes or so, a female mechanical voice announced, 
“Number 56, Number 56, please go to Office Room 3.” The Dings walked straight to 
Room 3. “Please sit down,” Xiao Lin said, standing up as they walked in. Xiao Lin is in 
her mid-thirties. When she talks, she uses a lot of words such as “please” or “thank 
you”—a relatively rare habit among Chinese living in (mainland) China. Xiao Lin gave 
each of the Dings a cup of water as they sat. She told me that she believed offering water 
immediately would relax the bereaved, so that instead of worrying about how the funeral 
practitioners might be ripping them off, they are more likely to take any advice from the 
funeral practitioners no matter whether that advice adds to the funeral’s cost. 
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 Xiao Lin’s office is equipped with a large desk, a desktop computer, and a couple 
of filing cabinets just like all the other office rooms in the lobby. A sign, roughly a half of 
a letter sized piece of paper, is displayed on her desk that describes the standard process 
of arranging funerals. It says, 
 
1. Fill out an application form for funerary (bin) rites 
2. Present the death certificate 
3. Make a reservation for body transportation 
4. Book a memorial meeting hall 
5. Order funerary service items 
6. Hand in the deceased’s clothes for the memorial meeting at the Clothing Collection 
Station 
7. Pay the bill 
  
This sign is mainly for decoration. Most bereaved don't seem to notice it and the Dings 
were not exceptional. Xiao Lin gave the Dings an application first. Ding Wen told Ding 
Jia to fill out this form since she has better handwriting. The form requests basic 
information such as the deceased’s name, sex, where he died, and the chief mourner’s 
contact phone number and address. After Ding Jia returned the form to Xiao Lin, the 
latter started to key in the data into her computer. Xiao Lin’s computer showed more 
information categories than are present on the application form such as “confidentiality 
level” (baomidengji 保密等級) and minzu (ethnicity) category. Salespeople usually leave 
these categories blank on their computers as well. Whenever Xiao Lin found a few 
illegible characters on the application form, she would stop typing to verify with the 
Dings. Things as simple as data typing needed to be done very meticulously in funeral 




or were unable to reach the bereaved because they had the wrong contact information. 
During this process, Xiao Lin also asked to see the death certificate of the deceased. 
 Xiao Lin asked the Dings when they wanted to have their father's memorial 
meeting. “We want to have it the day after tomorrow,” the Dings said. Xiao Lin then 
asked how many guests they expected and Ding Wen suggested around 70 or 80. Ding Jia 
added that there might be fewer. Xiao Lin then reassured them that the exact number 
didn't matter. Once you have more than 50 people, you have to book a medium-sized 
meeting hall. Xiao Lin then tried to see which medium-sized halls were still open. She 
asked the Dings if they wanted to have the meeting in the morning or the afternoon. Ding 
Jia said the afternoon would be better, especially close to dinner time, but, that morning 
would work too if there were any time slots that end around lunch time. Xiao Lin 
checked the availability of all the medium sized halls on her computer and told the Dings 
that all the morning time slots were booked. All the 3:05-4:05pm time slots were booked 
as well. They had to book an earlier time. Ding Jia and Ding Wen exchanged a glance. 
They were not too happy with this. 
 “The Parlor has an overtime time slot between 4:25 and 5:25 pm,” Xiao Lin 
offered. “But you need to add RMB 100 (USD 16) more for renting that hall. Also, you 
are only allowed to book the overtime time slot if you purchase your funeral banquet 
from Huangpu’s own restaurant.” “How much does the banquet cost?” Ding Wen asked. 
Xiao Lin took out a menu from her folder and explained the prices there. In the Parlor’s 
restaurant, each table accommodates ten people. Per table costs include options from 




different meal packages. The Dings decided to book a RMB 1,180 (USD 190) per table 
banquet for 5 tables. Xiao Lin told the Dings that they would prepare two extra tables for 
them just in case they needed them on the day.173 
 Once the Dings confirmed their intention to purchase a funeral banquet from the 
Parlor, Xiao Lin started to look at her computer to see which medium halls had the 
overtime time slot available. The Dings had several choices. They could choose a 
Chinese, Western, or Modern style meeting hall. Ding Jia asked about the differences and 
Xiao Lin showed them several pictures of each hall. At this point, Xiao Lin realized that 
this business meeting would take a while. The Dings were more meticulous than many of 
her customers. Xiao Lin saw plenty of Shanghai people book their memorial meeting hall 
without bothering to ask what the hall looked like. In the end, the Dings chose the 
Evergreen Hall. Xiao Lin explained that the basic charge of that room was RMB 1,600 
(USD 258). The fake green plant decorations and the flower decorations that surround the 
plastic cover where the deceased would be displayed cost RMB 300 (USD 48) and RMB 
200 (USD 32) respectively. “Do we have to use both of these sets of decorations?” Ding 
Jia asked. “I am sorry, but I'm afraid that they all come together when you rent a meeting 
hall.” (In the end of my fieldwork, FIS cancelled these extra charges and just increased 
the basic charge to cover the difference. People in FIS told me that when you charge for 
these things separately, but tell the bereaved that they have to buy them in a package deal, 
the bereaved felt this was profiteering. However, if you just tell them one single price that 
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includes the same things for the same overall cost, they are less likely to feel that they are 
being forced to buy many things.) 
  Xiao Lin paused briefly before beginning again. “Now that we have a meeting 
hall reserved, we can talk about the details of the memorial meeting. How do you want to 
address your father on the horizontal banner. This banner will be hung in the center of the 
meeting hall towards the front during the memorial meeting. The deceased is usually 
addressed either in kinship terms or as comrade. So, it would be either “Father” (fuqin 
daren 父親大人) or “comrade” (tongzhi 同志) in this case. 
 “Which is more common?” Ding Jia asked. 
 “Will you invite your father’s work unit to attend the memorial meeting?” 
 The Dings replied, almost in unison, “Yes, of course!” 
 Xiao Lin said that memorial meetings without the presence of work unit 
representatives at all usually used kinship terms. However, for those meetings that have 
work unit representatives attending, both forms of address are common. Xiao Lin 
emphasized that it all depends on what you want. The Dings talked amongst themselves 
for a while and decided to address their father as comrade because not only would their 
father’s last work unit send someone to attend the memorial meeting, but Ding Wen’s 
own work unit was also sending someone to attend his father’s funeral. 
 “So the horizontal banner will read 'Deeply Mourning Comrade Ding Daozhong ' 
(chentongdaonian dingdazhong tongzhi 沈痛悼念丁大中同志) unless you want to write 
your own version.” 





 Xiao Lin then asked the Dings which couplets they would choose for their father's 
vertical banners. They could choose from the list provided by Huangpu or write their 
own. Either way, the Parlor’s calligrapher will hand write whatever they wanted. 
 Ding Wen looked at Ding Jia and said, “I don’t think we need to write our own 
couplets.” Ding Jia agreed, “there's no need to write our own.” Xiao Lin then passed a 
piece of paper that listed the following several couplets to the Dings:174 
 
1. Kindly father your kindness is as heavy as a mountain. 
We sons and daughters are tearful to show grief and remembrance. 
(cifu enqing rushanzhong ernu huilei jiaisi 慈父恩情如山重，兒女揮淚寄哀思) 
2. Cry for my kind father who spared no effort to devote his whole life. 
Mourn a decent person whose merits of simplicity and purity will last eternally 
(kucifu xinlaoyisheng jugongjincui daohaoren shanliangchunpu gongdeyongcun  
哭慈父辛勞一生鞠躬盡瘁，悼好人善良純樸功德永存) 
3. My kind mother whose affection in raising us is as deep as the ocean. 
Us sons and daughters are tearful to show our grief and remembrance. 
(cimu yangyu qingsihai ernu huilei jiaisi 慈母養育情似海，兒女揮淚寄哀思) 
4. She labored all her life. Her affection in raising us is as deep as the ocean. 
She is tender, kind, and frugal. The bond between my kindly mother and us is strong. 
(xinlaoyisheng yangyuenzhong wenhoujiejian cimuqingshen  辛勞一生養育恩重，
溫厚節儉慈母情深) 
5. Being peaceful, being kind, being sincere to people. 
Being industrious, being frugal, being hard working for the whole of life. 
(yiheyiai zhenchengdairen keqinkejian xinlaoyisheng  
亦和亦藹真誠待人，克勤克儉辛勞一生) 
6. Being kind, being respectable. So much Affection in raising us. 
Being diligent, being busy. Working so hard for the whole of life. 
(cixiangkejing yangyuenzhong qinkenmanglu xinlaoyisheng  慈祥可敬養育恩重，
勤懇忙碌辛勞一生) 
7. Dying so young that we haven’t had enough household warmth. 
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example, Baoxin Funeral Parlor provides a list of 58 couplets to choose from. Bao Shan District 




A one day farewell becomes painful grief for eternity. 
(yingnianzaoshi tianlunweijin yichaoyongbie tongsizhangyuan  
英年早逝天倫未盡，一朝永別痛思長遠) 
8. An exemplar of teachers that shines on future generations. 
Devoted to education and contributing merit to eternity. 
(weirenshibiao guangzhaohoushi xianshenjiaoyu gongzaiqianqiu  為人師表光照後
世，獻身教育功在千秋) 
9. Being eighty-something with a smile up in the heavens. 
Your longevity is like a mountain that blesses your descendants. 
(baxungaoling hanxiaoxianjing shoubinanshan fuzhaozisun 八旬高齡含笑仙境，壽
比南山福照子孫) 
10. A life long with hardships keeps the spirits true. 
A life long of simplicity keeps moral standards high. 
(yishixinlao benseyongbao yishengchunpu pindechonggao   
一世辛勞本色永葆，一生純樸品德崇高) 
11. Pure and clean-handed throughout life. 
Diligent and industrious throughout life. 
(qingqingbaibai weirenzhongsheng qinqinkenken xinlaoyisheng  
清清白白為人終生，勤勤懇懇辛勞一生) 
12. Open, candid and righteous throughout life. 
Being diligent and law abiding keeps clean hands uncorrupted. 
(guangmingleiluo yishengzhengqi keqinfenggong liangxiuqingfeng  
光明磊落一生正氣，克勤奉功兩袖清風) 
13. Believe in Jesus to gain eternal life. 
Enter Heaven to enjoy eternal prosperity. 
(xinyesudeyongsheng jintiantangxiangyongfu  
信耶穌得永生，進天堂想永福) 
 
 Xiao Lin explained, “Numbers 1-6 and 9-11 would all work for your father. No. 7 
is for people who die around 50 or younger. No. 8 is for any deceased people who were 
educators. No. 12 is usually for people who work in the government. Finally, No. 13 is 
for Christians. You can substitute mother for father in No. 3 and No. 4. You can also 
substitute eighties for nineties for No. 9.” The Dings stared at the list and could not 
decide which one to choose. They asked Xiao Lin if she had any suggestions. Xiao Lin 




Lin said “I don’t know your father so it is really hard for me to give a suggestion. They 
are all very common. It really all depends on the kind of person your father was. You 
choose one that represents your father best.” Ding Wen commented that No. 9 seemed 
better. He asked Xiao Lin if that one was popular. Xiao Lin said that it was also very 
common, especially for more traditional families. Ding Jia was still staring at the list. 
Xiao Lin sensed that the Dings might not be able to make a decision immediately. She 
suggested the Dings take the list home and discuss it with their mother. “Your mother 
knows your father the best. Maybe she can help up make the decision. You can always 
confirm the couplets later by phone.” The Dings decided to follow her advice. 
 “Now we can talk about coffins and other funerary merchandise.” Xiao Lin 
suggested moving to the display room so they could see the samples in person. All of 
them stood up and walked across the lobby to the display room that was located in a set 
of rooms in the back half of the building behind the reception desk. Xiao Lin led them to 
the coffin display area first. 
 “These coffins are 'cremation coffins' (huohuaguan 火化棺). This means that the 
coffins will be cremated along with the deceased. Since they are for cremation, they are 
made of paper or bamboo. These coffins are more “environmentally friendly” (huanbao 
環保).” 
 The Dings were quite surprised. Can't we get one that is made of wood?” Ding 
Wen asked. 




instead of cremation. Only Muslims,175 Macanese, Hong Kong residents, Taiwanese, or 
foreigners who have been legally authorized to have body burial here or whose body will 
be transported internationally may buy wood coffins.” 
 The Dings continued to look around at the coffins. Ding Wen asked about the 
difference between ten or so coffins displayed there. Xiao Lin said that if you want to be 
able to nail the coffin to ritually seal it (fengguanding 封棺釘), you have to buy a coffin 
that costs RMB 980 (USD 159) or more. The Dings looked at the coffins not suitable for 
the nailing ritual and decided that they wanted the more expensive sort. Ding Jia asked 
what the more common coffins purchased for this category were. Xiao Lin pointed at the 
coffins that fell in the price range between RMB 1,000 (USD 161) to over RMB 2,000 
(USD 322). Xiao Lin suggested to the Dings that if they want to enable their (deceased) 
father to “live” better, they might actually spend their money buying a more expensive 
cremains casket instead. They do not need to spend very much money on coffins that will 
just be burned. A little bit over RMB 1,000 (USD 161) will do just fine. Ding Jia then 
asked her brother if he liked the RMB 1,320 (USD 213) one and they settled on that one. 
 Xiao Lin jotted down 1,320 in her notes and then led the Dings to the cremains 
casket section. She said that they had a very wide range of prices from two hundred to 
several thousand yuan. Xiao Lin pointed out a few that cost around RMB 300, 1,000, and 
2,000 (USD 48, 161, 322) respectively. 
 “What price do the majority of people arrange for? Ding Jia asked. 
 “People usually spend about a thousand or two thousand something.” 
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 Each cremains casket has a tag that explains the kind of wood it's made of and its 
price. The kinds of wood include sandalwood, rosewood, blackwood and so on. They are 
all decorated differently. Some have evergreen tree carvings, Buddhist texts, or red-
crowned cranes (xianhe 仙鶴, a bird that symbolizes prosperity and longevity). Some 
look like mini coffins, but some resemble the architecture of traditional Chinese palaces. 
Some are wood inlaid with jade flowers or other patterns. In the end, the Dings chose one 
costing RMB 2,288 (USD 369) because they liked the symbol of the red-crowned crane. 
 Xiao Lin then led the Dings over to the other part of the display room where all 
sorts of funeral outfits for the deceased were displayed. She asked the Dings to first 
decide whether they wanted Chinese or western style outfits. The latter is a black suit. 
The former is a set of garments that contain “five tops and three bottoms” (wuling sanyao 
五領三腰). The “five tops” include four shirts and one cloak while the three bottoms 
refer to three different types of pants. The idea behind the “five tops and three bottoms” 
is to make sure that the deceased has enough different types of clothes to help him go 
through seasonal changes. The Dings, almost without hesitation, chose the Chinese style 
even though this did not at all resemble the kinds of clothes people wear in their daily 
lives. Xiao Lin explained, depending on the materials (cotton or silk), funeral outfits can 
cost anywhere from several hundred to several thousand RMB. There are also different 
colors and patterns in each material such as red (and several shades of red for that 
matter), yellow, pink, white, purple, blue, and brown. 
 Ding Wen was interested in a red outfit, but Xiao Lin said, “People usually buy 




(xisang 喜喪). Your father might be a little bit too young for the red color. But, of course, 
this is all just custom (fengsu xiguan 風俗習慣). You don’t have to follow.” Meanwhile, 
a staff member brought several bedding sets out for them to consider as well. Xiao Lin 
explained that there are Chinese and Western styles of bedding. The main difference is 
the pillow. The Chinese style pillow looks like an ingot and comes with another ingot-
like pillow for the deceased's feet as well. The Western style only has one pillow for the 
head. Both sets have a blanket. As for the color and pattern, they are similar to the 
shrouds. While waiting for the Dings to make up their minds, Xiao Lin brought out a set 
of one handkerchief, one fan, and one wooden comb (in one package), several pairs of 
shoes and some pairs of socks (that could match the funeral outfits) for the Dings to 
consider. Xiao Lin said that the handkerchief and fan are to make sure that their father 
has something to hold in his hands and that the wooden comb is for them to comb their 
father's hair one last time at the funeral. 
 Ding Jia asked Xiao Lin if they have to buy these things from Huangpu. Xiao Lin 
said, “No, you can buy these things outside. You just need to bring the clothing and 
bedding set to us the day before the memorial meetings so funeral practitioners will have 
enough time to dress up the deceased and make his bed for him.” Ding Jia thought that it 
might be a good idea to go somewhere outside the Parlor due to a general impression that 
state stores have higher prices. However, Ding Wen felt that it was a little bit too much 
trouble to go out to a different place to buy the things. In the end they bought what they 
needed at the Parlor to save time and trouble. Before they headed back to the consulting 




if they were interested to see any samples. The Dings said yes, so they all walked to the 
flower shop located in a different building, where most of the memorial meeting halls 
were. Xiao Lin introduced some basic flower baskets and told the Dings their respective 
prices. She told them that they did not have to make this decision right then if they were 
not ready. Ding Jia asked if it is OK to purchase flower baskets outside. Xiao Lin said, of 
course. It is just that if you buy the flower baskets from us, we can arrange them in the 
hall in advance to save you time. The Dings decided to hold off on the flower basket 
decision. 
 All of them walked back to Xiao Lin’s office. Xiao Lin entered onto her computer 
the data about the kinds of merchandise that the Dings had chosen so far. She then 
explained the procedure of a memorial meeting from the beginning to the end. By the end 
of her explanation, Xiao Lin asked the Dings what kind of car they wanted to use to send 
the deceased from Huangpu to the crematorium. She explained the price differences 
much like Li Shan did the night before when they arranged a minivan to pick their father 
from the hospital to the Parlor. Xiao Lin said, that a minivan is more “economical” 
(shihui 實惠), unless they want something nicer. Ding Wen said that this would be his 
father’s last ride so he wanted to give him something better. In the end the Dings decided 
to book a Buick. 
 “Huangpu Funeral Parlor’s rule is to only allow one passenger to go in the hearse 
with the deceased to the crematorium. However, this person is responsible for finding 
their own way back, and there is no subway stop at the crematorium.” 




 “Most people don't go to the crematorium because it is too hard to bear to see 
their beloved burned.” 
 The Dings agreed with Xiao Lin’s point and decided to not to go. Xiao Lin 
explained that, in this case, all they would need to do is to go to pick up the cremains on 
the third day after the memorial meeting. 
 Finally, Xiao Lin explained, “There are two different ways of sending out the 
deceased from a meeting hall to the hearse parked in their parking lot. This is what 
people used to call the funeral procession. One is to have coffin carriers, a group of six 
men in black suits, to pick up the coffin and put it in the hearse. The other is to have 
special coffin carriers who wear white marine-like uniforms to carry the coffin on top of 
their shoulder (this higher position is more prestigious) while doing a goose-stepped 
march. The first costs RMB 300 (USD 48) and the second costs RMB 900 (USD 145). 
This latter service item is known as a “ritualized funeral procession” (liyi chubin 禮儀出
殯). Either way can be combined with a marching band playing music for an additional 
RMB 200 (USD32).  If you want to have the band stay throughout the memorial meeting, 
it will cost RMB 400 (USD 64).” Ding Wen said that as this funeral procession would be 
their father’s last journey, having special coffin carriers would give him more face 
(mianzi 面子). Ding Jia added, that hiring a band, in that case, might also be good so as to 
make the entire event more “hot and noisy” (renao 熱鬧). In the end, the Dings bought 
the “ritualized funeral procession” plus the band service. 
 Xiao Lin then printed out a receipt for their total cost of RMB 13,648 (USD 




Lin took out a customer satisfaction questionnaire and asked the Dings to fill it out. Since 
this questionnaire was written in front of Xiao Lin, not surprisingly, Ding Jia’s answers 
were all positive. After writing up the questionnaire, Xiao Lin led the Dings to the 
Parlor's cash register in person to pay their bills first and then to the reception desk to 
pick up a cremation license. Before the Dings left, Xiao Lin reminded them again what 
documents and receipts they needed to bring with them on the day of the memorial 
meeting as well as other pending items. Xiao Lin told the Dings to have a safe trip home 
and walked back to her office. The entire business meeting from The Parlor’s entrance to 
exit took about an hour. 
 
Subjectivities based on Social Convention  
 Let me start my analysis by pointing out a few absences. That is, even though 
people who are higher up in the funeral industry (whether government officials, scholars, 
or business leaders) want to promote personalized funerals that construct the deceased as 
autonomous and unique subjects like those revealed in the Taiwanese architect’s funeral 
presented at the modern funeral ritual conference, the kind of subjectivity of dead bodies 
constructed in the mundane interaction between state funeral practitioners and the 
bereaved is anything but individualized. One of the best places to see this is the 
discussion over the vertical couplets between funeral practitioners and the bereaved. 
Recall that when Xiao Lin said that she can’t help the Dings because she did not know 
their father, she was clearly indicating a connection between who the deceased was and 




funeral is personalized as a whole. Yet, throughout the entirety of any business meeting, 
this is the most obvious place, if not the only place, where we can see that funeral 
practitioners identify for the bereaved a chance to show individuality in the generally 
generic memorial meetings. During my fieldwork, what surprised me was the lack of 
interest on the bereaved's side in doing so. Not all salespeople mentioned to the bereaved 
that they could personalize couplets because many practitioners already knew that the 
bereaved would not be interested in doing so. Whenever practitioners did mention this, 
the most common response from the bereaved was that “it is not necessary” (bubiyao 不
必要) or “there is no need” (buxuyao 不需要). Like the Dings the question most of the 
bereaved asked was not what would fit their particular deceased relative, but rather what 
“most people did” or what was “most popular.” This lack of interest in personalizing the 
couplets’ content is even more ironic considering my fieldnotes actually recorded more 
bereaved inquiring about the couplets’ font style than about the appropriateness of the 
words. 
 I attended countless business meetings and, as far as I could recall, there was only 
one time that “the bereaved's representative” wanted to write their own couplets before 
Xiao Lin mentioned the possibility (this happened to be her case as well). I call this 
person “the bereaved's representative” because he actually represented the deceased’s 
work unit instead of being a family member. This funeral was rather a special case. It was 
organized by the deceased’s work unit because the deceased died on duty. She was a 
schoolteacher in her forties. While she was representing her school on a visit to Taiwan 




finally passing away. Her son, who was only a teenager, went to Taiwan (along with 
people from the work unit) to take care of his mother and eventually brought her 
cremains back to Shanghai. There were hundreds of mourners in her memorial meeting 
and many of them were students from her school. One female student cried so hard that 
she almost fainted. People had to drag her out and put her in the resting room behind the 
meeting hall. At her funeral, the vertical couplets used to commemorate her were:  
 
Right Couplet: 
The red cloud suddenly disappeared, but we could not stop thinking about you. 
This is because you are the eternal exemplar of the educational world. (彤霞忽消
思難停堪稱桃園師範千秋 tongxiahuxiao sinanting kancheng taoyuan shifan 
qianqiu) 
 
Left Couplet:  
The red candle (dawn) is suddenly blown out, but the light is still on.  This is 
because of your heartfelt loyalty to education. 
 (絳燭匆罷光不滅只因杏壇丹心一片  jiangzhu congba guangbumie zhiyin 
xingtan danxin yipian) 
 
The color red and dawn were not a random choice of words. The deceased’s name 
literally meant “red dawn”. This funeral was not personalized as a whole probably 
because it was organized by her work unit, but people commemorated her in personalized 
vertical couplets. My description is meant to point out the uniqueness of this death and 
how this explains the existence of the personalized couplets. This unfortunate death has 
all three common ingredients that established a higher likelihood of having a personalized 
funeral in Shanghai—she died young, died in an accident, and was an 




couplets was rare. 
 Why the lack of interest in personalizing the poetic narratives of the deceased? A 
case I witnessed might answer this question. One day I went with a (private) funeral 
broker from Longevity to have a business meeting at the apartment of an old man who 
had died at home. His body was still in the apartment when we arrived. This was because 
his oldest daughter was a very devout Buddhist, she insisted on having “zhunian” (助念), 
meaning “assisted recitation of the Buddha’s name,” for 24 hours before moving her 
father to a funeral parlor.  
 My broker friend conducted the business meeting with the deceased’s other 
daughters and sons in the hallway while the eldest daughter (with her friends) recited the 
Buddha's name next to the deceased in the bedroom. Just as the business meeting group 
talked about couplets, the eldest daughter passed by. Her friend had just bought some live 
fish for her so she could have a fangsheng (放生, meaning “free the captive animals”) 
ritual and she needed to pick them up. Many Buddhists believe that performing 
fangsheng on behalf of the deceased could create merit (gongde 功德) for the deceased 
and therefore smooth his/her transition to the other world and perhaps even enhance 
her/his chances for a better eventual reincarnation. The son and other daughters had 
different opinions about the couplets so when the eldest sister passed us again the second 
time on her way back to the bedroom (with a bucket full of fish in her hands), they asked 
her opinion. The eldest daughter glanced at the couplet lists while listening to her 
brother’s explanation of their discussion over the couplets so far. The eldest daughter 




formalities (xingshi 形式). They don’t mean anything.”  
 Considering the fact that she was in the middle of Buddhist rituals that are no less 
formal than couplets, this comment only makes sense if we can reason through how she 
sees rituals. For her, her Buddhist rituals of reciting the Buddha’s name or freeing an 
animal caught or raised for the purpose are meaningful because (according to her beliefs) 
these rituals have efficacy to actually help her father in the afterlife. This makes her 
Buddhist ritual not mere formality. However, choosing a couplet that represents her 
father, even if one represents him more truthfully than another, is meaningless because it 
does nothing for him. Couplets therefore become mere formality for her. 
 So, despite the fact that funeral practitioners often introduce couplets as 
something that would represent who the deceased was in life, the majority of Shanghai 
people made decisions on couplets during business meetings without too much thinking. 
And the vast majority of people chose couplets from the set lists the parlors provided, 
apparently encouraged by the knowledge that these couplets are ‘popular.’ These show 
that the bereaved did not consider vertical couplets representing the deceased as an 
individualized subject except in the most generalized way – by age, gender, religion. The 
denotative meanings of couplets are not important. Instead of searching for individualized 
ways of representing the deceased, Shanghai people preferred poetic narratives of the 
deceased based on conventional understandings of generically proper persons as provided 
on the lists.  
 Taking the list I translated as an example, No. 1, 3 and 4 are about the relationship 




embedded in family relationships instead of assuming an individual existed prior to the 
occurrence of social relationships. Moreover, the specific parent to children relationship 
is described in terms of debts. This feeling of indebtedness is the foundation of Chinese 
notions of filial piety. No. 2, 5, 6, 10, 11, and 12 emphasize the moral character of the 
deceased. Specifically, all stress a life long of enduring hardship. While being frugal, 
devoted, diligent and so on were by no means new moral values in China, they were the 
kind of ethics that the Chinese Communist Party has praised. The difference among them 
is that the first three couplets (No. 2, 5, and 6) are still more or less conceptualized in 
terms of parent-children relationships, while the last three (No. 10-12) have transcended 
family relationships. This means that no matter what the relationship between the 
deceased and the people who choose (or read) their couplet, these moral categorizations 
would make sense because they represent absolute values that are beyond relational 
difference. In other words, if we imagine Confucian morality and socialist morality being 
at the two ends of one spectrum that describes the embodied morality of the deceased, 
then No. 1, 3, and 4 are on the Confucian end, No. 2, 5, and 6 are in the middle, and No. 
10-12 are on the socialist end. In fact, Xiao Lin once told me that “the Old 
Revolutionists” (laogeming 老革命) like to use No. 10-12. This comment shows that she 
clearly saw strong socialism in No. 10-12. 
 No. 7 is specific for people who die young. Of course, what age counts as 
“young” is rather subjective. I remember one business meeting where the bereaved said 
that she wanted to choose No.7 for her mother. The salespeople told her that her mother 




is usually for people who die in their fifties or even younger. Dying in her sixties usually 
does not count as ‘dying young.’” This lady then decided to choose No. 3 to stress her 
“debt” to her mother by raising her. From this conversation, we can see that she clearly 
felt that her mother died young. Choosing No. 7 would represent her sincere feeling of 
loss. However, instead of choosing a couplet that represented her sincere feelings about 
her mother’s death, she chose to follow the practitioner's suggestion and follow 
convention. 
 No. 9 and No. 13 are the only two that are obviously religious in nature. The 
former refers to popular religion while the latter is about Christianity. For the former, 
there are two important concepts at play. The first is the idea of a happy death (xisang 喜
喪). In Chinese popular religion, when someone dies at an old age, this is a good thing 
because the deceased has proven his longevity. In Shanghai, funeral professionals 
generally defined this as above 80 years of age. Of course, the idea behind this is that 
even though death is unavoidable, the deceased has shown his/her luck (or good fate) by 
living for a long time. The second related concept is that this longevity can be 
transformed into prosperity for the living and contribute to the living’s own potential for 
longevity. This is why the second half of the No. 9 couplet is “your longevity is like a 
mountain that blesses your descendants.”  
 If the deceased is qualified for this couplet, funeral professionals often asked the 
bereaved if the they wanted to buy “longevity bowls”—a rice bowl that has the Chinese 
character, longevity (shou 壽) printed in red color. The bereaved then will give away this 




something else sweet) to every guest who attends the funeral. People believe that by 
using this bowl to eat their rice they might gain a piece of the long-lived deceased's 
blessing and longevity. In fact, a related concept is that a person can “steal longevity” 
(toushou 偷壽) by begging (tao 討) or even stealing. One day when I was in Huangpu, a 
funeral professional came to me and happily showed me a goody bag (with a longevity 
bowl inside) that he had just gotten by begging. I asked him what was so special about 
this funeral. Funeral professionals see longevity bowls all the time and the bereaved often 
gave them these bowls to express their gratitude. I did not understand why he even 
bothered to beg for one. He said that the deceased was a nun who had died in her one 
hundredth year. He said that she was one of only a very few “real” nuns (meaning that 
she had kept her vow of chastity) and she had lived for so long. This meant that her 
longevity has even more magical power than an ordinary kind of longevity. He also told 
me that he even saw random people trying to steal longevity bowls there. 
 However, despite the importance of this concept, I noticed that funeral brokers in 
Longevity recommended No. 9 to the bereaved much more often than Xiao Lin did. I 
once asked Xiao Lin why she did not recommend No. 9 as her personal recommendation 
whenever she conducted business meetings. She told me that it was because she thought 
that No. 9 was “too direct” (taibai 太白), she likes things that are more indirect (hanxu 含
蓄). I asked her to elaborate, but she told me that she could not. My guess is that she 
meant that even if people all hope to gain prosperity from the deceased, it is seemed too 
vulgar to just say it out loud. Nevertheless, the comparison between (private) funeral 




observation of mine: that the former are much more willing to embrace popular religion 
than the latter. 
 Finally, No. 13 is obviously for Christians since it mentions Jesus. While not all 
Christians chose No. 13 (a majority of them did), it would make no sense to non-
Christians to choose this. This logic also applies to No. 8. This one is specifically for 
educators. While not all educators were commemorated with this couplet, it makes no 
sense to memorialize someone who is not in education with No. 8. 
 Despite there being only two couplets related to religious ideas of person, 
religious ideas of self are dominant in the business meeting as a whole. Right from the 
beginning, when Li Shan and the Dings discussed the hearse, Li Shan suggested the 
cheaper one for the first ride because he thought “if you [the Dings] want to let your 
father enjoy a nice last ride, you can rent a nicer hearse for his departure from Huangpu 
to the crematorium.” The idea of treating the dead as if they were still living is one of the 
most important principles in handling death traditionally. In fact, the whole discussion of 
choosing cremains caskets, funeral outfits, funeral processions, and hearse rides were all 
based on an ongoing dialogic imagination of the deceased as one who could still live, 
behave, and feel just like the living could in the other world. Therefore, cremains caskets 
were where the deceased would reside, funerary outfits were clothes for him in the next 
world where there also are seasonal changes (so the Dings provided “five tops and three 
bottom” for their father), a ride in a Buick and a “hot and noisy” ritualized funeral 
processions all would give their father “face” as he left this world (as well as giving face 




making the deceased happy. 
 Moreover, despite this being a socialist, state owned parlor, we can even see 
hierarchical differentiations constructed in the business meetings as they arranged 
funerals for the dead. Hierarchy in traditional funerals is understood as relational 
difference, but this is often articulated through numerical difference. For example, in 
imperial times, if the deceased was an ordinary person, he could have four, eight, twelve 
or sixteen people to carry his coffin depending on how much his descendents could 
afford. Sixteen carriers, also called “dragon head carriers” (longtougang 龍頭杠), was the 
highest treatment that an ordinary deceased (meaning someone without official title) 
could enjoy. People with official titles could have 32, 48, or 64 carriers depending on his 
ranks. Only the emperor could have 128 carriers (Shanghai Funeral Museum, n.d.: 23). 
This is what I mean by hierarchy being expressed through numerical difference.  
 Recall now Li Shen’s introduction of the hearse options to the Dings. Li Shen 
asked the Dings if they wanted the RMB 240, 600, or 1,000 (USD 39, 97, 161) kind. The 
same thing happened with Xiao Lin’s introduction to cremains casket. She asked if they 
want the several hundred or several thousand kind. In fact, all funeral professionals I 
worked with (whether they were state funeral practitioners or private funeral brokers) 
framed their introduction of products in terms of prices first. The content difference only 
came in as a secondary explanation. In some cases, the bereaved made decisions even 
before they found out how one product was different from the other. It was not 
uncommon for the bereaved to decide that they wanted to hire a RMB 1,000 (USD 161) 




a Cadillac and the other was a minivan. Or they might have decided they wanted to buy a 
RMB 2,000 (USD 322) something cremains casket (after they were told that most people 
chose to buy cremains caskets around this price) before looking at them. This lack of 
interest in content, or we could say the concentrated interest in hierarchies articulated 
through numerical difference disregarding the content, always amazed me. I saw many 
people making decisions about which meeting hall to use without even asking to see the 
difference between the Chinese, Western, or Modern styles of meeting halls. This 
tendency means that content does not matter so much as the message about face, social 
status, and hierarchy. Just like people’s preference for conventional couplets, 
individualizing content was not very important.  
 In addition to this convention-based subjectivity described above, the secondary 
subjectivity articulated in business meetings is that of socialist citizens as subjects. 
However, this socialist aspect is very subtle in business meetings, especially as compared 
with its overwhelming presence in memorial meetings themselves (I will discuss 
memorial meetings in detail along with their construction of socialist subjectivity of dead 
bodies in Chapter 7). One reason for this was that memorial meetings have standardized 
procedures that would be explained before the service so there was no need to discuss 
them during the business meeting. Furthermore, socialist memorial meetings were not 
associated with any specific products so there was nothing really to negotiate between the 
bereaved and funeral parlor sales representative. The socialist meeting's lack of service 
items to sell helps explain why frontline parlor sales employees working on partial 




associated paraphernalia into the socialist funeral as a whole. However, all these 
profitable religious products are related to rituals that take place either before or after, but 
not during the memorial meetings. I will discuss these in more detail in Chapter 8.  
 Nevertheless, within the process of arranging funerals (meaning during business 
meetings), the first and most obvious part that constructs the deceased as a socialist 
subject is the discussion of the horizontal couplet. Recall that Xiao Lin asked the Dings 
how they wanted to address their father. Did they want to address him as Father or 
Comrade? In my fieldwork, I estimate that half of the people I saw chose kinship terms 
and half chose comrade when choosing a horizontal couplet even though it was almost 
always the family members organizing the funerals (unless the deceased died on duty). 
Why would people want to address their family members as comrades when they were 
the organizers of the funerals? I am 100 percent sure that those people who chose 
“Comrade” did not actually call their parents Comrade. Shanghai people today even 
rarely call each other “Comrade” when they are speaking to complete strangers (this 
would be one of the most likely situations to call someone a comrade). Nevertheless, this 
clearly shows that Shanghai people die as socialist first and foremost even though they do 
not live socialist lives. I will explore the implications and characteristics of “dying 
socialist” at greater length in chapter 7.  
 The next place where we can see the idea of the socialist citizen at work is in the 
discussion over cremation coffins. When Xiao Lin introduced the “cremation coffins,” 
she explained that cremation coffins are made of paper or bamboo. When the Dings 




Macau, Taiwanese, and foreign people who are allowed to have body burial are allowed 
to use wood coffins. This categorization marks ideas of citizenship and minzu (state 
ethnicity) categories and shows how these identity categories relate to the materiality of 
the coffins and therefore to the applicability of the law forcing cremation.  
 The last place that reminds us the deceased were, after all, under the state’s watch 
was on the funeral practitioners’ computer (something that, therefore, only the 
practitioners and the anthropologist could see). There were two demographic categories 
that were on computer system but not on the form the bereaved filled out: the “minzu” 
category and “degree of confidentiality.” Although the current form that the bereaved had 
to fill out did not contain these two categories, their presence in funeral parlors’ computer 
system reminds us that the deceased was nevertheless (also) conceptualized in terms of 
state authorized ethnic categories and political implications. “Degree of confidentiality” 
was related to political reliability. As I mentioned earlier, during high socialism counter-
revolutionaries often died and then were cremated without their family members even 
knowing about it. Their deaths were often state secrets. Today, a similar situation might 
involve the cremation of executed inmates or, on the other end of the spectrum, the 
funeral of a political elite that required additional attention. Filling in this category would 
trigger a different set of assumptions and actions by the state practitioners. Death and 
knowing about death was never a personal or private matter.  
 To sum up, despite people higher up in the funeral industry wanting to have more 
profitable personalized funerals that would commemorate the deceased as unique and 




and the bereaved in business meetings, customers consistently chose convention. In the 
sales focused business meeting, the deceased was primarily conceptualized within a 
popular religious framework and according to conventional categories of age, sex, and so 
on, and then, secondarily, as socialist citizen subjects (this sequence will be reversed in 
the actual performance of the memorial meeting itself). Individualized subjects were 
completely absent in such business meetings.  
 
Conclusion  
 I asked several salespeople in Huangpu why funeral parlors wanted to promote 
personalized funerals and why these attempts had failed. Almost every salesperson told 
me that funeral parlors wanted to promote personalized funerals because they are modern 
and they could potentially make the parlors more money. These attempts failed because 
the bereaved think that personalized funerals are just one more (of many) things that 
funeral parlors try to sell them. Since the bereaved, by default, suspected and believed 
that funeral practitioners would overcharge, the latter had to try their best to gain the 
former’s trust during business meetings. One of the most important ways to do so was to 
avoid giving suggestions that might make the bereaved think that you are just trying to 
sell them things. As a result, most salespeople would not even mention the possibility of 
a personalized funeral to the bereaved when making funeral arrangements. This was 
because as soon as they mentioned something like this, the bereaved would start to worry 
about being tricked into buying too much. Salespeople told me that if the bereaved really 




suggestion. If a salesperson was stupid enough to ask the bereaved if they wanted a 
personalized funeral, then this person was on her way to ruining her deal. 
 Rather, the trick to selling more was to start off selling less. From my description 
of the Ding's business meeting, we can see that both Li Shan and Xiao Lin had to be very 
tactful in talking to the Dings when arranging their funeral. For Xiao Lin (and all the 
salespeople working in funeral parlors), the only way to make a sale go smoothly was to 
make the bereaved believe that the salesperson was on their side. One of the easiest ways 
to do so, in this era of associating death with profiteering, was to suggest only necessary 
funeral goods and services. Successful salespeople played down or recommended lower 
priced options for the early service items (like the hearse from the hospital to the parlor) 
as a way of gaining trust: “Clearly, this practitioner is not simply trying to sell me the 
most expensive option.” This would allow them to make more money by selling big 
ticket things like the cremains caskets or the procession/band options that were 
introduced at the end of the sales pitch.  
 What salespeople cared about most (and needed to accomplish) was to meet, and 
then exceed by as much as possible, their monthly quotas so they could get higher 
bonuses. As a result, no matter how people higher up envisioned the future of funeral 
governance, practitioners on the ground had very little incentive to offer services or items 
that they were not sure that they could sell or did not know how to sell. Recalling my 
discussion on class formation within funeral parlors since marketization in Chapter 4, one 
of the most important methods of marketizing state funeral parlors was to transform 




into service providers who were responsible for making a profit both for themselves and, 
therefore, for funeral parlors (market governance). When the hierarchy within funeral 
parlors was transformed from one based on political domination to one based on 
employers/managers and workers, funeral practitioners on the ground came to see their 
primary task as doing business rather than governing. One consequence of changes in the 
regimes of governance was funeral practitioners’ unwillingness to carry out changes 
when they could not see how they could make any personal profit from such changes. In 
fact, trying to sell customers more personalized funeral services could lead to mistrust 
and loss rather than gain. As a result, even if personalized funerals might bring long-term 
profits (both in terms of earned income and the costs of governing) for the state, funeral 
practitioners have little or even negative incentive to push them.  
 Since “the state” (in this case, the “state funeral parlors”) has never been a 
homogeneous unit, we should not assume that what might benefit “the state” as an 
institution would also benefit the state as a group of actual people who are assigned to 
different jobs. What creates profit on the funeral parlor’s balance sheet does not 
necessarily also create profits on individual funeral practitioner’s balance sheets. “The 
state” has always been composed of actual people who are hierarchically related. These 
people who work for the government have different priorities based on different regimes 
of governance (which regulate their relationships with the public) as well as on the 
foundation of hierarchy (which regulates the relationships among people who work for 
the government).  




between modes of governance and subjectivity are important here because they shed light 
on critiques of neoliberal governance and its subject formation. Wendy Brown (2003) 
discusses the neoliberal economy as (partially) sourced to Thatcher-Reagan economic 
policies that dealt with their respective financial crises by rejecting Keynesian ideas of 
welfare states. She further points out how neoliberalism has often come to be associated 
with third world countries through institutions such as the IMF which push for a 
boundaryless global free market. Donald Nonini (2008) working in China has already 
pointed out the problem of examining post-economic reform China through the lens of 
“neoliberal restructuring.” Even if there are parallel developments between what is 
happening in China and what is happening in Western Europe and America, the Chinese 
state has never been “neoliberal” in the sense of promoting a free market move away 
from state regulation. I agree with Nonini in this regard. In the case of the Shanghai 
funeral industry, the Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau was obviously thoroughly rooted in 
state monopoly and state regulation.  
 Rather, I use “neoliberal governance” here in a very and specific limited sense. I 
define it as a method of governing subjects that emphasizes raising the efficiency and 
profitability of the government. Scholars such as Nikolas Rose (1996) point out that this 
new modality of governance focuses on cultivating individuals who are free and 
responsible. Neoliberalism as a form of governmentality here is about creating a certain 
kind of subject who is autonomous and self-regulating so that the state can govern its 
subjects more efficiently and profitably. Foucault calls this the rise of a new technology 




method of governance relies on power operating within individuals, what Foucault calls 
biopower.  
 The problem with this line of thought, however, is that “the state” is not a 
homogeneous entity. As I have shown in this case, what might appear to be efficient and 
profitable for the institution does not mean that it is also be efficient and profitable for 
people who are actually doing the governance. This is not even mentioning that 
empirically Shanghai people preferred their own customary values and rejected the 
individualized idea of self at the end of life. This point is consistent with my earlier 
argument that in spite of Shanghai government attempts to transform state practitioners 
into neoliberal subjects, such attempts have only been partially realized. In fact, these 
attempts sometimes have unexpected consequences that can run in directions counter to 
the intent.   
 I started this chapter by exploring what a personalized funeral might look like. I 
showed how such a ritual constructs the dead as autonomous and individualized subjects. 
I also discussed how this is indeed the officially desired direction of funeral governance 
in Shanghai. However, despite efforts of the Shanghai state funeral parlors, personalized 
funerals (and their construction of individualized subjects) have never been popular on 
the ground. The kind of subjectivity created in the interaction between state (via funeral 
practitioners) and the public (via the bereaved) was any thing but individual. From 
business meetings in particular, we can see that state funeral practitioners and the 
bereaved construct the subjectivity of dead bodies based on social convention, especially 




on the ground, there is nothing efficient or profitable in cultivating the bereaved as free 
and responsible citizen subjects. On the contrary, for them, it is more efficient and 
profitable if funeral practitioners could work with the bereaved to construct the dead as a 
Confucian or religious subject. Such discrepancies between funeral practitioners and their 
superiors in their notions of what is efficient and profitable occurs exactly because of the 
introduction of market principles.  
 As a result, while there is a clear trend that has changed the relationship between 
Shanghai funeral parlors and Shanghai citizens from one of rulers-and-subjects to one of 
companies-and-customers since marketization, such changes in the governing 
relationship did not produce autonomous and individualized subjects. In governing 
Shanghai funeral parlors, we see neoliberal governance fail to bring about neoliberal 
subjectivity because what makes funeral parlors neoliberal (again, here just meaning 
operating a government based on efficiency and profitability) has simultaneously 
diversified the meaning of efficiency and profitability. As death became an economic 
project, funeral parlors lost their ability to dominate subject formation. Salespeople’s 
primary goal is to earn their commission, which means catering to the beliefs and desires 
of their customers.  Thus, the goal of Funeral and Interment Reform to “preserve a 
culture of life” through the development of personalized funerals only existed on the 
books and in the minds of government officials higher up. This left a lot of space for the 
bereaved to incorporate traditional and invented religious rituals and paraphernalia 
(something “the state” had long opposed) and high socialist ethics (something the state no 




CHAPTER 7 DYING SOCIALIST: MEMORIAL MEETINGS AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIALIST SUBJECTIVITY  
 
From now on, when anyone in our ranks who has done some useful work 
dies, be he soldier or cook, we should have a funeral ceremony and a 
memorial meeting in his honor. This should become the rule. And it should 
be introduced among the people as well. When someone dies in a village, 
let a memorial meeting be held. In this way we express our mourning for 
the dead and unite all the people.  
 
Serve the People, Mao Zedong 
September 8, 1944 
 
 On September 5, 1944, a man died at the age of 29 in Yan’an, Shaanxi Province 
—the sacred refuge and site of the rebirth of the Chinese Communist Party. This young 
veteran was Zhang Si'de (張思德)—an ordinary peasant-soldier who had joined up in 
1932.176 The official narrative describes Zhang as a dedicated communist who was 
injured for the revolution at least three times prior to his actual death. What took his last 
breath, however, was not revolution, but an accident. Zhang was working in an earthen 
shelter called a yaodong (窯洞), or cave dwelling, commonly seen in the Yan’an area, 
when a charcoal-producing kiln collapsed on him. Such a seemingly humble death did 
not go without notice. Not when the CCP was dependent on peasants’ support and when 
they were in the middle of their proselytizing expansion after their near extinction during 
the Long March.177 The Central Committee of the CCP organized a commemoration with 
about 1,000 mourners for this young man on September 8, 1944. On this occasion, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Zhang was Mao Zedong’s personal guard during the year of 1943. Perhaps not coincidentally, 
1943 was also the year that Mao's rise to power within the post-long march Party was formalized. 
He was raised to the chairmanship of the Central Committee of the CCP in March of 1943. 




then Chair of the Politburo of the CCP, Mao Zedong, gave a memorial speech. This 
speech, known as Serve the People (wei renmin fuwu 為人民服務), later became one of 
the most famous speeches in the history of the CCP.  
 Recall for a moment, Prosperity, the restaurant I described in my Introductory 
chapter. There I told the story of how Chairmen Mao became the patron god of this 
funeral banquet restaurant. During my fieldwork, I saw the text of the Serve the People 
speech at least once a week when I accompanied funeral brokers taking the bereaved to 
Prosperity after memorial meetings because the whole speech was printed in calligraphy 
on the wall decorating the main hall of the restaurant. The very first time when I walked 
into Prosperity, I read the speech to try to figure out what it was that occupied such a 
conspicuous position. I did not see the title of the speech; I only saw the content on the 
wall. Soon after I began, Chen Ting saw me reading it. She told me that this was Mao's 
Serve the People speech. I had never actually read the content of this speech before, but 
knowing the slogan I knew roughly what it was about. What I did not know was why 
anyone would have the entire article printed out in a funeral restaurant. So I asked Chen 
Ting like any other anthropologist would do.  
 Her eyes opened wide and she replied, don’t you know that Serve the People is a 
“memorial speech” (daoci 悼詞) written by Chairman Mao? I explained, embarrassingly, 
“I knew Mao wrote this and that it’s a key text for socialist ethics, but I did not know that 
it was a memorial speech.” Chen Ting then told me this speech was also the first 
statement that asked Chinese people to have “memorial meetings” (zhuidaohui 追悼會) 




her to complain that his table did not have watermelon seeds for snacking even though all 
the other tables had them. So we stopped our conversation. When we finally went back to 
Longevity’s office, she could not wait to tell Lin Wan, the first person she saw in her 
office that I, someone on the road to getting a PhD, did not know that Serve the People 
was a memorial speech. Lin Wan was kind enough to save my face by reminding her that 
I am Taiwanese. He told Chen Ting that since the KMT did not want their people to 
know about Mao’s writings, I wouldn't know this. He then turned to me and explained 
that Serve the People is to modern Chinese funerals as the bible is to Christianity. “It is 
the sacred text for the contemporary Chinese funeral industry,” Lin Wan said.  
 In this chapter, I first describe what memorial meetings are today and then how 
they have come about under the CCP. As a particular form of modernist ritual and way of 
commemoration, I specifically tackle how certain narratives and bodily performances of 
memorial meetings evolved over the course of the funeral governing process in Shanghai. 
The historical contours of the formation and popularization of memorial meetings in 
Shanghai endowed memorial meetings with a sense of “formalism, traditionalism, 
invariance, rule-governance, sacral symbolism and performance”—what Catherine Bell 
terms “characteristics of ritual-like activities” (1997:138). I end this chapter with a 
discussion on the relationship between ritual and subjectivity as well as how ritually 
constructed subjectivity relates to lived experiences outside of ritual.  
 
Contemporary Memorial Meetings   





Step 1: The Master of Ceremonies (MC) verbally announces the beginning of the 
memorial meeting. 
Step 2: All commemorate the deceased in silence while playing the funeral dirge 
(aiyue 哀樂). 
Step 3: The work unit representative gives a “memorial speech” (daoci 悼詞). 
Step 4: The representative of the bereaved gives a “thank you speech” (daxieci 答
謝詞). 
Step 5: All collectively bow to the deceased three times.  
Step 6: “Farewell Ceremony” (gaobie yishi 告別儀式). 
 
 This procedure was posted on the wall in memorial meeting halls and displayed 
on the desks of the salespeople at Shanghai funeral parlors. It was also printed on the 
pamphlets published by the Shanghai Funeral and Interment Service Center (FIS). In fact, 
this text was found throughout the PRC. If you buy a Chinese language “how to” book 
that teaches people how to organize modern funerals in China, you would see this same 
procedure there as well (eg. see Lu Xiaohong 路曉紅 and Zheng Xiangdong 鄭向東 
2011). This is the standard procedure for memorial meetings in China.  
 Furthermore, this procedure did not just exist in writing. Over the course of my 
fieldwork in 2010 and 2011, I saw over 75 complete memorial meetings and numerous 
others in part. Whether the deceased were civil servants, university professors, small 
business owners, housewives, CEOs, or factory workers, when they died in Shanghai, 
their families held memorial meetings for them. All memorial meetings I observed in 
Shanghai followed this procedure whether or not they also contained popular religious, 
Buddhist, Protestant, or Catholic rituals in addition. I will discuss some of these religious 




this chapter, I focus on explaining the core, socialist parts of the memorial meeting. I do 
so by describing one particular memorial meeting, one organized for Wang Dashan. 
 Before I proceed, however, I would like to say a few words about this particular 
memorial meeting. Wang Dashan’s funeral was one of Longevity’s cases. Tang An 
conducted the business meeting with the Wang family, but Chen Ting was the MC of the 
memorial meeting. Tang An usually did not do the MC part simply because this was the 
division of labor in Longevity. Also, since Chen Ting was the MC, she added her own 
“extra touch” that is absent in memorial meetings directed by other funeral brokers and 
state practitioners. I will specify Chen Ting’s “extra touches” when they appear in my 
description. Nevertheless, while every funeral MC has her or his own idiosyncratic 
variations, these remain quite small and all follow basic steps of the standard procedure. 
Of course, to a certain extent, such differences are to be expected; no funeral MC could 
repeat the exact same ritual just as, as Heraclitus has told us, you can never step into the 
same river twice. Margaret Thompson Drewal (1992) has shown that ritual is 
characterized by simultaneity, multifocality, contingency and indeterminacy once we see 
ritual actors as knowledge agents. At the same time, however, this does not change the 
fact that a good portion of the river, as we understand it, has indeed remained despite or 
in fact because of its water’s flow. Finally, unlike the story of the Taiwanese architect’s 
funeral described in the last chapter which was meant to be an extreme case along a 
spectrum of possible personalized funerals, Wang Dashan’s memorial meeting is very 




different from the rest of the 74 memorial meetings I observed. I could have selected any 
other for description and analysis. 
Wang Dashan’s Memorial Meeting 
 Wang Dashan had a daughter and a son, Wang Meifang and Wang Shaoquan. 
Both were married and had two children respectively.178 On the day of Wang Dashan’s 
memorial meeting, Chen Ting, Chen Yu, and I arrived in the meeting hall before the 
Wangs, as we usually did. The state practitioner who was assigned to be in charge of the 
particular meeting hall for Wang Dashan’s funeral was Lu Yang. Lu Yang was a young 
man in his early twenties like the majority of the state practitioners who worked in the 
meeting hall section.179 I was helping Chen Yu arrange flower baskets while Chen Ting 
went through the logistical details with Lu Yang. About twenty minutes before the 
scheduled starting time, Shaoquan walked into the meeting hall holding his father’s 
portrait photograph (yixiang 遺像) in his arms. All of the other family members walked 
in behind him. Shaoquan was the first in line because his father, Wang Dashan, had now 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 These grandchildren were all school age children. I did not see Wang Dashan’s wife and these 
grandchildren when Meifang, Shaoquan and their spouses had their business meeting at 
Longevity. This is common in Shanghai—it is the children’s responsibility to organize funerals 
instead of the surviving spouses’ responsibility. In general, the deceased’s spouse (assuming he or 
she was still alive) was often absent from business meetings during my fieldwork. Grandchildren 
were occasionally absent even from the memorial meetings themselves if they were younger than 
school age. Tang An told me that some Shanghai people think that funeral parlors are full of evil 
spirits and therefore that children are vulnerable there, especially if they were very young. Chen 
Yu, however, saw this as another example that showed how Shanghai people were in general 
more indifferent to their elders. 
179 The relatively young age in the meeting hall section was a result of a deliberate policy. 
Leaders at Huangpu thought that people who work in the meeting halls were the “face” (menmian 
門面, literally, the front door) of the parlor. They believed that young people were better at 
service work so it would be better to let young people be the face of the parlor. Many funeral 
professionals told me that the older generations of state practitioners were not as good at treating 
the bereaved as customers. Finally, it is also possible that their youth and freshness is desired 




been materialized in the meeting hall via the portrait photograph that was right in front of 
Shaoquan. The deceased had to arrive first to his funeral.  
 As soon as Chen Ting saw the Wangs getting close to the hall, she went out and 
waited in the entrance and told Shaoquan, “Let’s first invite your father in.” Chen Ting 
accompanied Shaoquan on his walk all the way to the other end of the meeting hall and 
directed him to hang the picture on the wall. After the picture was properly hung, Chen 
Ting told Shaoquan to bow three times to his father. This was one of her unique touches.  
I have never seen other state practitioners ask the bereaved to bow to the deceased after 
hanging the picture. Then Chen Ting took Shaoquan to see Lu Yang to verify and sign 
the necessary documents. One of these documents was a customer satisfaction 
questionnaires regarding the bereaved’s opinions about Lu Yang’s service. Shaoquan 
checked “satisfied” (the highest choice possible) on every question as was the case with 
the majority of the bereaved.  
 Unlike the customer satisfaction questionnaires in the sales department which 
were filled out at the end of business meetings (see Chapter 6), questionnaires regarding 
services in memorial meetings hall were filled out before memorial meetings started. 
Throughout my fieldwork, only once or twice did the bereaved question why they had to 
sign the customer satisfaction survey before receiving the service. When they did 
question the survey’s timing, the bereaved insisted on adding “before the memorial 
meeting starts” on the survey form to stress that the degree of his satisfaction was based 
only on service provided before the meeting began. In this regard, in the normal instance 




denotative meaning. We will see this lack of interests in denotative meaning throughout 
the whole memorial meeting.180  
 Once Wang Shaoquan finished signing all the documents, Chen Ting, Wang 
Shaoquan and Lu Yang then talked through the procedure of the memorial meeting again 
briefly (Tang An already went through this once in more detail during their business 
meeting). When this was finished, Lu Yang led Wang Meifang, Wang Shaoquan, 
(myself) and Chen Ting to the body preparation room located in the back of the meeting 
hall to verify the identity of the body. Meanwhile, the other funeral participants had 
arrived and were socializing with each other in the meeting hall.   
 When it was about time to start the meeting, Chen Ting walked to the podium and 
talked on the microphone to announce that the meeting was about to start. She urged 
people to line up in rows.181 Chen Ting asked Wang Dashan’s wife to stand in the middle 
of the first row and her two children, Meifang and Shaoquan and their spouses to stand 
next to her, one couple on each side. Then Meifang’s two children and Shaoquan’s two 
children stood in the second row right behind their parents. The general rules of standing 
in memorial meetings are to have the family members of the deceased to stand in the first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 In Chapter 4, I discussed how these “meaningless” questionnaires were used more like a 
protective weapon among state practitioners for deal with customer complains.   
181 Chen Ting, rather than Lu Yang, was the MC because as long as a memorial meeting is 
operated through a funeral broker, the funeral broker must also be the MC. This was a kind of 
power game played between funeral brokers and state practitioners who worked in the meeting 
halls. The latter thought that since their parlors earned less money from brokers operating 
funerals that they did not have any obligation to be the MC. They were “entitled” to do less. Of 
course, this general consensus could be changed if a funeral broker and a state practitioner had a 
good relationship. For example, Chen Ting occasionally asked state practitioners to be the MC 
when she was operating big cases (meaning memorial meetings that involved over a hundred 
people). If the state practitioner agreed, this would give Chen Ting more flexibility to take care of 
important errands during the meeting. Chen Ting could do this occasionally because of her close 




few rows and other distant relatives and friends to stand in the rows behind them. Chen 
Ting liked to articulate generational difference if the deceased had more than one child 
and grandchild. This was why she had the grandchildren stand in the second row. Of 
course, when there were fewer direct descendants, Chen Ting would ask them all to stand 
in the first row and made sure that on each side of the deceased’s spouse was a nuclear 
family member of the deceased’s children respectively. In any case, then, Chen Ting 
asked the work unit representative to stand on the very leftmost spot (from the deceased’s 
perspective) in the first row. The left was the “superior position”  (shangshou 上首) in 
Shanghai memorial meetings.182 
 Chen Ting told the rest of the participants to stand behind the bereaved family in 
order based on their being relatively close or more distant relatives and then being 
relatively close friends and colleagues. The rest of the participants then simply found a 
spot for themselves anywhere towards the back so long as they stood in a row. When 
everyone was lined up, Chen Ting announced, “We are now going to start the memorial 
meeting. We are here today at Huangpu Funeral Parlor to deeply commemorate Mr. 
Wang Dashan. First, allow me to represent the bereaved family members of Wang 
Dashan to thank you for your participation.” After she said this, she stepped out from 
behind the podium and bowed to the participants once. Doing their own bow in this 
manner was something that funeral brokers were more likely to do. Then Chen Ting 
walked back to the podium and said, “Our dear and kind Wang Dashan has left us. He 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 It is worth pointing out that for funerals that were not Longevity’s cases, funeral professionals 
occasionally did not assign a specific spot to the work unit representatives. In this case, work unit 




has gone to the Western Heaven to bless his children from afar. Now I announce that we 
are officially beginning the memorial meeting of Mr. Wang Dashan. Let’s commemorate 
Wang Dashan in silence. Please play the dirge.”  
 Lu Yang then pressed the play key on the CD player to play the dirge. During this 
time, everyone looked down at the floor and remained silent, including the funeral 
professionals and me. About thirty seconds into the dirge, Lu Yang stopped the music. 
When the music was done, people lifted up their heads and looked again to the front. 
Chen Ting continued, “We now invite the work unit representative to give a memorial 
speech.” Meanwhile, after playing the dirge, Lu Yang slipped out of the meeting hall 
without attracting any attention since Chen Ting, rather than he, was the MC.  
 The work unit representative then walked to the front and center of the meeting 
hall. He first bowed to the deceased three times and then turned around to face the 
participants and bowed once. Chen Ting had reminded him about this three and one rule 
before the meeting started. Then the work unit representative picked up a piece of paper 
from his pocket and started to read the speech with a flat, emotionless tone. Just like 
many other memorial speeches I had seen given, I suspected that he did not even bother 
to rehearse his speech. In my transcription of his speech that follows here, in order to 
highlight what would have been clear to local participants, I have italicized those turns of 
phrase that have particular meanings drawn from classic socialist narratives, slogans, 
history, or practice. Note that these italicized words were spoken in the same monotone 





Dear Comrade (tongzhi 同志) Guests:  
We are here today with extreme feelings of grief to deeply commemorate the 
retired employee Comrade Wang Dashan. Comrade Wang Dashan, due to the 
failure of medical treatment of a heart attack, passed away at 10:38 pm, on 
December 12, 2011 in the Fifth People’s Hospital. He lived for 71 years.     
 
Comrade Wang Dashan was born on August 8, 1941 in Shaoxing, Zhejiang 
Province in an ordinary Peasant family (nongmin jiating 農民家庭). He was born 
into the Old Society (jiushehui 舊社會). He suffered and was greatly oppressed. 
When New China (xinzhongguo 新中國) was born, he was liberated (jiefang 解放
) like thousands of other fellow Chinese. Comrade Wang Dashan joined the 
revolution (canjia geming gongzuo 參加革命工作) in June 1959 when he began 
to work for the Shanghai Textile Company. From June 1959 to May 1972, he 
worked in the Maintenance Department. From June 1972 to May 1990, he worked 
in the Warehouse Department. From June 1991, he worked in the Mail Room 
until he retired in May 1996. Throughout his work in revolution, he passionately 
loved the Homeland, Socialism, and the Communist Party.183 He made great 
contributions to the Chinese socialist textile industry! 
 
Comrade Wang Dashan was diligent and hard working. No matter what posts he 
worked, he was always concentrating on working. He loved his job and was good 
at it. He was dedicated to his job with his full heart. Comrade Wang Dashan was 
an honest and frank man. He was humble and cautious as well as friendly and 
kindly. He was frugal and simple and had endured hardships and bitterness. He 
was very strict in educating his children so all his children are law abiding and 
studious people.  
 
The death of Comrade Wang Dashan made us lose a good comrade. Although he 
has passed away, his spirit of selfless dedication to work, his bitter, hard, and 
diligent, as well as frugal life style, his decent, honest, and frank morality are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 Passionately loved the Homeland, Socialism, and Communist Party is actually from a short-
lived propaganda campaign slogan: The Three Loves. The Three Loves are the Love of the 
Motherland, the Love of Socialism, and the Love of the Chinese Communist Party. The 
associated campaign aimed to fight against “spiritual pollution” after initial moves toward 
economic reform (Myers, James 1985:989). After Deng Xiaoping promoted “First get rich, then 
build socialism,” more and more people, especially intellectuals and urban youths became 
dissatisfied with the limits on freedom and growing corruption. Deng launched this campaign to 
control these critiques by describing them as spiritual pollution. However, conservative leftists 
soon embraced this campaign as a way to question Deng’s direction in marketization as a whole. 
As a result, Deng decided to let the campaign die down as soon as possible in order to ensure the 
continuity of his reforms. Thomas Gold (1984) explains the rise and demise of the campaign as 





examples for us all. Although human beings cannot return to life once they have 
died, we can transform our grief into a powerful force. Having this model, we can 
comfort the spirit of Comrade Wang Dashan by having even more passion to 
devote ourselves to the work of socialism.    
 
Comrade Wang Dashan, please rest in peace!  
 
 After he finished reading this, the work unit representative turned around and 
bowed to the deceased three times and then turned around again to bow to the 
participants once. This replicated his actions prior to the speech. When he walked back to 
his position, Chen Ting announced, “Now let’s invite the bereaved to give a thank you 
speech.” Shaoquan then walked to the same spot where the work unit representative had 
stood earlier to give his speech. Before he started his speech, Shaoquan also bowed to his 
father three times and then bowed to the participants once. Shaoquan used the template 
that Tang An had given him after their business meeting as the basis of his thank you 
speech.184 With this template, the bereaved only needed to fill in the blank in the 
underlined places.  Here I translate Shaoquan’s thank you speech with the underlining 
marks to show what the template looks like (as with the italicization, the underlined 
phrases were not spoken any differently than the rest of the speech). I will return to the 
template aspects of this thank you speech (as well as to the socialist aspects of the 
memorial speech) later in this chapter. 
 
Dear Relatives and Friends, Seniors, Leaders, and Guests:  
First, I am representing my whole family to express our sincere gratitude to all of 
you who came to join our Father’s memorial meeting. Today, with our painful 
sorrow, we are here to deeply commemorate our Father. Our Father had a heart 
attack. Even with the emergency treatment provided by the Fifth People’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Hospital, he continued to deteriorate so much so that no medical treatment could 
save him. On December 12, 2011, he passed away. He lived for 71 years.  
 
On August 8, 1941, our Father was born into a Peasant Family. Since he was 
young, he was filial to his parents and took care of his siblings. After our Father 
married our Mother and started his own family, he educated us to be people who 
are responsible and compassionate.  
 
Father had endured a life long of hardship. He worked very hard and was frugal 
and simple. He loved his job and was very responsible. He was kind to his 
neighbors. He was the exemplar for us all as his children. During the time when 
Father was sick, many relatives and friends as well as leaders came to visit him. 
After Father passed away, all these relatives and friends as well as leaders came to 
show their condolences even though they were so busy, especially leaders from 
our Father’s work unit, the Shanghai Textile Company. They valued our Father 
and gave him a high evaluation. Here, I am representing my family. I want to 
thank you all to express my sincere gratitude.  
 
Father, you have left us. No matter how hard we cry, we could never wake you up 
again. Yet, your voice, face, laugh, and appearance will stay in our heart forever.  
 
Father, please go away peacefully. Our family will exist in harmony. We will take 
care of our aged Mother to make sure that she can enjoy her old age. We will 
educate our children to make sure that they will become useful people to our 
society as our way to repay the debt of you raising us.  
 
Please rest in peace, Father. Please rest in peace.  
 
 Although Shaoquan started his speech like the work representative with a flat and 
emotionless tone, by the end of his speech, his voice started to break down. After 
Shaoquan finished reading the thank you speech, he turned around to face the deceased. 
He bowed three times and then tuned around again to face the participants and bowed 
once. Then he walked back to his spot in the first row. Chen Ting then announced, “Now 
it is time for us all to bow to the deceased three times.” After saying this, she then turned 
around facing the deceased and started her three bows. All of the participants followed 




 When all of us finished our three bows to the deceased in unison, Chen Ting said, 
“We are now going to have our farewell ceremony to say goodbye to Mr. Wang Dashan.” 
After making the announcement, Chen Ting stepped to the side. She used her hand to 
gesture and verbally told Shaoquan to bring his mother and his nuclear family forward 
(Chen Ting had also already instructed them about this beforehand). They then stood on 
the left side of the coffin facing it in a diagonal line and Chen Ting stood next to them. 
After everyone was situated, Chen Ting verbally said “First bow. Second bow. Third 
bow.” to direct Shaoquan’s group to bow as she spoke the words. Chen Ting also bowed 
along with them. While verbally announcing the three bows for the bereaved is not 
exclusive to Chen Ting, her bowing along with the bereaved was one of her extra 
touches.  
 When they finished bowing, they put the yellow flowers they had been holding 
the whole time on top of the plastic cover that enveloped the coffin. While everyone else 
simply held the flower and then put it down, Wang Dashan’s wife held the flower 
specifically in a way that resembles the act of holding prayer incense. She even 
performed the gesture of worshiping with flower before she put it down. What Wang 
Dashan’s wife did, though most likely not rehearsed, was not uncommon. I saw it happen 
quite frequently. Shaoquan’s group walked to the right side of the deceased after they 
performed their farewell to form a receiving line so that other people could express their 
condolences to the bereaved after they performed their farewell. Meifang’s nuclear 
family then repeated the same acts and eventually joined Shaoquan’s group to stand on 




 After both Shaoquan and Meifang’s families performed their farewell ceremony, 
Chen Ting then directed the work unit representative to give his three bows by himself. 
Again, making the work unit representative bow alone was Chen Ting’s extra touch. For 
the rest of the funeral participants, Chen Ting made seven people at a time stand in a row 
to perform their farewell even if there were more than seven people in the original rows 
to begin with. Chen Ting did not like to have big groups performing the farewell 
ceremony because she felt that this indicated that people were just trying to rush through 
the farewell ceremony so they could be done with it. She once told me that “Shanghai 
funerals are already short enough. There is no need to speed things up.” Using the 
number seven was because, first, odd numbers are the proper numbers for funerals in 
Shanghai. Even numbers suggests a “doubling” and thus indicates the possibility of a 
second death. As for why seven exactly, it was more of Chen Ting’s arbitrary choice. She 
felt that five or fewer people each time would prolong the farewell ceremony too much 
and nine or more people each time just felt like rushing through. Wang Dashan’s 
memorial meeting was officially finished when the last group of funeral participants 
finished their farewell ceremony. This memorial meeting took about twenty minutes, like 
the majority of meetings I saw.  
 From the above description, we can clearly see that memorial meetings are 
composed of five ritual acts. An MC facilitates and explicitly directs participants to move 
from one step to the next. Instead of analyzing these acts in sequence in the following 
sections, I want to pull out the two most important characteristics that run throughout 




socialist narratives. These socialist narratives are articulated through two different 
formats: musical sounds and verbal utterances. The former refers to the particular dirge 
that is used in all Shanghai funeral parlors (at least). The latter refers to the lexicon used 
in memorial speeches and thank you speeches. The second characteristic is the modernist 
body movements performed in memorial meetings. These are especially expressed 
through the act of bowing and other outward bodily expressions of grief and mourning.      
 
Socialist Narratives 
I. Musical Sounds 
 In Shanghai, all funeral parlors used the same dirge. Several people told me that 
this dirge is also used in funeral parlors in other parts of China. If the bereaved hire a 
band, then the band will play the dirge. Otherwise it would be played on a CD player as 
in Wang Dashan’s funeral.185 There is no rule that forces the bereaved to use this 
particular dirge. In fact, the Shanghai Funeral and Interment Service Center published a 
pamphlet, Funeral Guide (baishitong 白事通), specifically saying that bands could 
perform whatever song the bereaved chose. Several state practitioners also told me that if 
the bereaved wanted to use their own music as the dirge, they only needed to prepare 
their own CD. There would be no extra charge and state practitioners would be happy to 
play the chosen CD for the bereaved. All of these options and formal invitations are 
consistent with Shanghai funeral parlors’ attempts to promote personalized funerals. 
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However, as mentioned in the last chapter, most state practitioners working in the sales 
department did not even mention this option to the bereaved since they assumed that the 
bereaved had no interest in choosing their own music. Among the countless business 
meetings I sat through, I never heard one family demand their own choice of music be 
used as the dirge. All the memorial meetings I attended used the same dirge heard in 
Wang Dashan’s memorial meeting.  
 This particular dirge is a slow and solemn melody played by western instruments 
without any human voices. Yet, having no verbal description does not mean that it is 
devoid of meaning. On the contrary, I argue that this dirge is a form of socialist narrative. 
What makes this particular dirge a kind of socialist narrative relates to the perception of 
how the dirge came about. I found three different well-known narratives that explained 
the birth and popularity of this particular dirge. The first traces the dirge to Liu Chi (劉熾
) (1921-1998) and his colleagues who were all musicians in the Lu Xun College of Art—
later a communist propaganda art school (Wang J. 2013). At that time, China was still 
under KMT rule. Liu Chi and his colleagues were on a mission to collect folk music in 
Yan’an, Shaanxi Province. While there, they encountered a piece of folk music played 
with a suona horn titled fenhonglian (粉紅蓮 meaning Pink Lotus), sometimes also 
known as fengfengling (風風鈴 meaning Wind Chimes). This version says that Liu Chi 
and his colleagues were so moved by its directness and bucolic overtones that they 
transcribed the music and then modified it for potential wider use in the future. In 1949, 
around the time the Communist Party took over, the Politburo of the Central Committee 




rewrote the piece for a movie, Battle on Shanggangling Mountain. This patriotic movie 
focused on the heroism of Chinese soldiers who fought against America in the Battle of 
Triangle Hill during the Korean War. This, I was told, was how the current dirge used in 
all Shanghai funerals came about.186   
 The second origin story I collected relates the musical piece to the memorial 
meeting of Comrade Liu Zhidan (劉志丹) (Wang F. 2001; Wang J. 2007). Liu Zhidan 
was an early CCP member, a primary organizer of the CCP's rural-based guerrilla attacks, 
and the founder of the Chinese Red Army. He was killed in battle in 1936. The Party later 
named him a communist martyr. In 1942, the Central Committee of the CCP decided to 
move his coffin back to his hometown. There the Party organized a big memorial meeting 
for Liu Zhidan. Musicians Anbo (安波), Ma'ke (馬可), and their colleagues had collected 
folk music in the early 1940s in Shaanxi (Wang F. 2001). When they got the order from 
the Party about Liu Zhidan’s memorial meeting, they decided to let Anbo write lyrics for 
this music and rename it “Publicly Commemorating Liu Zhidan” (公祭劉志丹). And, 
this was how the current dirge was created (Wang J. 2007).  
 The third versions says either that Anbo’s (or Ma'ke’s) work was later once again 
modified by Luo Lang (羅浪)—the first chair of the PLA’s marching band—or that Luo 
Lang was its original writer (Yu Ge 2011). In this version, there was no mention of folk 
music collected in Shaanxi. Luo Lang wrote many famous Chinese Communist musical 
pieces. They include “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army March,” “The Three Main 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 See N.d. 2004. Yinyuejia liuchi 音樂家劉熾 [The musician Liu Chi] from Chinawriter.com.cn. 




Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention,” “The East is Red,” “The 
Flowers,” and so on. This version reports that the dirge was first played in a collective 
memorial meeting for martyrs in Zhangjiakou. This music was played again in 1949 in 
Tiananmen Square to celebrate the establishment of the Monument of People’s Heroes 
after the official founding of the PRC. Then, in 1953, when Stalin died, the dirge was 
played on the Central People’s Broadcasting Station for the first time (Yu Ge 2011).  
 To some degree, which version (or part of a version) is correct does not matter 
much. What is important for us is the way that each story of how the dirge came to be 
played in memorial meetings today is deeply intertwined with the construction of the 
party’s desire to commemorate martyrs as model socialist citizens whether in movies (the 
first version) or in early memorial meetings (the second and third versions). These 
martyrs might be a group of anonymous soldiers (soldiers who fought against America in 
the Battle of Triangle Hill during the Korean War or martyrs in Zhangjiakou) or specific 
persons (like Liu Zhidan in the second version). Moreover, the first two versions link the 
dirge to the sacred site of the CCP, Shaanxi, the same place where Zhang Si'de, the main 
character of the Serve the People speech, died. Although this sacred site is not the 
birthplace of the CCP (that was actually Shanghai), Yan’an in Shaanxi marked an 
important shift in making the CCP into the peasant-based party that eventually carried out 
the revolution. Furthermore, the first and second versions both emphasize that it 
originated first among the people (as [rural] folk music). Locating the roots of the dirge 
among the ordinary folks echoes the CCP’s own narrative of how socialism came to 




version by linking the dirge to the establishment of the Monument of People’s Heroes 
and to the early People's Liberation Army and to one of its most famous “red” song 
writers. Red songs were official, frequently played songs, that praised and cultivated 
socialist ethics. Regardless of any particular version, although nothing is spoken during 
the silent commemoration, the playing of this particular dirge in funeral parlors clearly 
shows the work of socialist narratives in its musical expression of sounds that fill the  
public space. The parallel histories of the dirge and the familiarity of these histories and 
the music to the audience helps to construct the socialist subjectivity of dead bodies by 
sonically memorializing the deceased as a model socialist citizen among other socialist 
citizens.  
 
II. Verbal Utterances 
 The second type of socialist narrative in memorial meetings is linguistic,  
expressed through verbal utterances of the socialist lexicon in conceptualizing the dead. 
There are at least two kinds of socialist vocabulary evoked in memorial meetings. The 
first relates to socialist ideas of time such as Old China, New China, and Liberation. 
Socialist time is essential because the CCP’s legitimacy was built on promising a radical 
temporal disjuncture between the Old and the New. In order to create New China, 
however, the CCP needed to first create a specific interpretation of what China was like 
before the revolution: the Old China. This was done by extracting, essentializing, and re-
conceptualizing certain characteristics of the past. For example, Myron Cohen (1993) 




'feudalism,' and 'customs' or 'religion' into 'superstition,' there was invented not only the 
'old society' that had to be supplanted, but also the basic negative criteria designating a 
new status group, [the Peasant,] one held by definition to be incapable of creative and 
autonomous participation in China's reconstruction.”187  
 Once the concept of Old China was created, then there needed to be a rupturing 
process that separated the Old from the New China. This rupture was understood as 
“Liberation.” It was a rupturing because once China was liberated, all the old vices were 
gone. Even if there were practical inequalities in the new society, these were simply 
remnants of the old (Hinton 1966). This universal temporal shift meant that working in 
New China means that you are joining the revolution or contributing to the revolution no 
matter whether or not your labor is directly linked to politics. This is why Wang Dashan’s 
mundane work in the factory was described as “work for the revolution.” A person could 
contribute to the revolution by sweeping the streets so long as the act was conscientiously 
carried out in New China.  
In fact, I realized this personally from a lady I met in Shanghai. She was in her 
late fifties and was also a sent-down youth. She spent most of her productive life in 
Guizhou, a mountainous province in southwestern China. We spent a night in a temple 
outside Shanghai together because her friend’s relative was going to have a Buddhist 
salvation ritual performed early in the morning the next day. It was quite a surreal night 
for me—I felt like I was having a slumber party with six old ladies whose ages ranged 
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from 50 to 80 years old. Before we turned off the lights and proceeded to talk in the dark 
for the next three hours, my friend showed me her “Retirement Certificate”—a red 
booklet-like document. One column on the certificate indicated her “date of joining the 
revolution” (canjia geming gongzuo nianyue 參加革命工作年月). When I saw this, I 
asked her, “were you in the army before or are you a Party member?” I had assumed 
phrases like “join the revolution” must indicate some kind of involvement in the Party or 
military apparatus at that time. It took her a while to understand my question, however. 
Once she figured out what I had asked, she explained that the date was her first day 
working in a factory in Shanghai after she graduated from junior high school. Her first 
date of joining the work force was her first date of joining the revolution.  
This is why Wang Dashan’s humble work history is interpreted as contributing to 
the Chinese socialist textile industry (see the last sentence of the second paragraph of the 
memorial speech). If you contribute to your work in textiles, then you are contributing to 
“the Chinese socialist textile industry.” Consequently, these socialist clichés describe 
Comrade Wang Dashan as born in a Peasant family of the Old Society and then liberated. 
This is in spite of the fact that Wang Dashan was not a farmer for the majority of his life 
and that his children did not call him comrade in real life. This kind of re-iteration freezes 
the deceased within a socialist idea of time and person regardless of how he may have 
lived over the last several decades. 
 The second set of socialist terms used in memorial meetings relates to a socialist 
idea of personhood. We can see this by at least two indications: status categories and 




family. The word “Peasant” is more than a simple description of a job in China. It was 
first and foremost a political status category. As his quote mentions above, Cohen (1993) 
pointed out that one of the most crucial creations in this New versus Old China was that 
of the Chinese “Peasant.” It was creative since, at least the Song Dynasty, the political 
and economic relations of pre-revolutionary farmers in China did not even remotely 
resembled the “feudal” relations of Europe. Even then the rural-urban relationship was 
quite different in China. The concept of “Peasant” was further complicated when it was 
merged with class classifications during the CCP land reform in the early 1950s. Under 
such class classifications, each household was assigned a class category of Landlord or 
Rich, Middle, or Poor Peasant. These categories became hereditary and largely remained 
with descendants of the household until the beginning of the reform period.188 This was 
why in the thank you speech, we see an underlined blank right before the word Family 
(the first line of the second paragraph). Although this blank was reserved for addressing 
the class category of the deceased, I only ever heard people addressed by their class 
categories when they were Peasants or Workers during my fieldwork. I never heard a 
memorial speech or a thank you speech describing the deceased as a “Capitalist,” 
“Landlord,” or other politically incorrect categories. In these cases, people simply 
omitted the class category.     
 Other than “Peasant,” one of the most obvious elements of this socialist lexicon is 
the word comrade (tongzhi 同志). This is probably one of the most obvious socialist 
terminologies in the speech that any reader would recognize without having special 
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knowledge about China or socialism in general. Comrade was used as a general title to 
refer to anyone disregarding sex, age, and political hierarchy in the PRC well into the 
reform period. Although, as I mentioned in my description of choosing couplets in the 
last chapter the ubiquitous usage of comrade has disappeared in daily life since the 
reforms,189 nonetheless at least half of the total memorial meetings I observed addressed 
the deceased as comrade. In fact, memorial meetings were the only occasions I ever heard 
people use this term of address in Shanghai. Comrade indicates a way of conceptualizing 
the dead as equal and non-differentiated people whose identification directly ties to 
citizenship. This was in contrast to conceptualizing the deceased as embedded in kinship 
or other horizontal networks. As a result, no matter which status category any person 
belonged to, each person was conceptualized as atomized and directly linked to the state.  
 The second indication of the socialist idea of person relates to specific ethics that 
the deceased was said to have embodied. From the memorial speech quoted above, the 
third and fourth paragraphs narrate the idealized (if not outright imagined) merits of the 
deceased. These ethics include being diligent, hard working, dedicated, honest, frank, 
humble, cautious, frugal, simple, law abiding, and studious as well as having endured 
hardships and bitterness, suffered and oppression. The same kind of ethics were also 
repeated in the thank you speech. While these ethics are not “new,” they are those 
characteristics long emphasized and promoted by the CCP. For example, a famous early 
CCP leader, Liu Shaoqi (1952), in his article, How to Be a Good Communist, said:   
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He will worry long before the rest of the world begins to worry and he will rejoice 
only after the rest of the world has rejoiced…Both in the Party and among the 
people he will be the first to suffer hardship and the last to enjoy himself. He 
never minds whether his conditions are better or worse than others, but he does 
mind as to whether he has done more revolutionary work than others or whether 
he has fought harder…He is capable of possessing the greatest firmness and moral 
courage to resist corruption by riches or honors, to resist tendencies to vacillate in 
spite of poverty and lowly status and to refuse to yield in spite of threats of 
force… 
 
As we can see, the narratives of Wang Dashan’s ethics are identical to Lin Shaoqi’s 
propaganda work of How to Be a Good Communist.  
 Moreover, Wang Dashan was delineated as having been honest (老實 !laoshi), 
simple (簡樸 !jianpu), and frank (坦白 !tanbei). Whether these personal traits were 
indexical or not, they are also desired characteristics in the CCP’s narratives because of 
their correlation with “Peasant” virtues (Hinton 1966). These are in contrast to the 
common view of business people who build their wealth with their cleverness and 
calculation, therefore implying they were somewhat dishonest within a Chinese cultural 
idiom. We can see this from the old proverb wushang bujian (無商不奸). This phrase 
means that all businesses engage in profiteering and calculation. This specific description 
of proper communist morality should also been seen as a critique of the group that held 
power before it and that the CCP defeated during the revolution, the Nationalist Party (or 
KMT). The Nationalist government, especially given its loose control over the nation, 
was known for its corruption before the CCP’s take over. Whether Wang Dashan was 




these verbal narratives of his socialist personality traits constructed him, posthumously, 
as a socialist person through public acts.   
 Finally, the emphasis on enduring suffering, bitterness, and oppression during his 
life was more than a literary device to describe a personal journey in commemorating 
Wang Dashan. These verbal utterances were actually transformed into concrete ritualized 
activities during the Revolution and again during the Cultural Revolution. They were 
shown in the form of public gatherings known as “yiku sitian” (憶苦思甜), translated as 
“Remembering the Bitterness of the Past and Appreciating the Sweetness of the Present” 
(Liu, Xin 2004: 139-140). Through this ritualized activity, people who were born after 
Liberation could get a taste of past suffering by hearing the suffering narratives recited by 
those who had experienced the bad old days. These stories could therefore be juxtaposed 
with their present happiness as a person who was born and lives in New China. By 
rehearsing and (re)experiencing the bitterness of the past for those who were born before 
the Liberation through (re)constructing past memories, the young were reminded about 
how far China had come and how much the people had gone through. By artificially 
injecting an imagined past into the present, current reality is fictionalized as real and 
happy.  
 The above described socialist ethics narrated in memorial meetings entered the 
public discourse at the mass level historically throughout several “sacred” texts and the 
continued reciting of such texts during the high socialist period. For example, I began this 
chapter by talking about Serve the People. This along with In Memory of Norman 




Mao from before the establishment of the PRC.190 They later became known as the Three 
Old Articles (Laosanpian 老三篇). One of them article was written to commemorate the 
death of Norman Bethune, a Canadian Communist and physician who died in China from 
infection while treating Chinese patients.191 The Foolish Man article describes a fictional 
Chinese historical character, Mr. Fool, who wants to move the two mountains in front of 
his house. His neighbor, Mr. Wise, laughs at him for entertaining such a silly wish. But 
Mr. Fool responds that as long as all of his descendents work continuously on moving the 
mountains, they will eventually complete this task. Mr. Fool’s persistence moved the God 
of Heaven such that he granted the Fool his wish by removing the two mountains with his 
power. Based on an interpretation by Lin Biao, the Minister of National Defense, Mao’s 
moral lessons in each of the Three Old Articles were Serve the People; Never Selfish, 
Only Altruistic (haobu liji zhuanmen liren 毫不利己專門利人); and Painstaking Effort 
and Arduous Struggle (jianku fendou 艱苦奮鬥) respectively.  
 The Three Old Articles provided the fundamental ideals for socialist ethics 
throughout the revolution and were again key texts during the Cultural Revolution. In 
1959, Lin Biao mandated that all People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers study these 
three articles as part of their training. He said, “to study Mao Zedong Thought, it is 
enough that we read the three articles” (Li, Gucheng 1995: 225-6). In 1966 when the 
Cultural Revolution began, Lin lumped the three together again for the masses' political 
work. The Three Old Articles not only became everyday must-reads for everyone's 
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political training, but also in June 1966, at the start of the Cultural Revolution, became 
one of the few pieces of endorsed educational material for the curriculum of the 4th, 5th, 
and 6th grades throughout China (ibid.). 
 To be clear, pointing out how speeches, especially memorial speeches, in 
memorial meetings are based on socialist verbal utterances and canonical texts does not 
in any way indicate that funeral speeches (whether memorial speeches or thank you 
speeches) are a socialist invention or something exclusive to the socialist regime. China 
has a long history of a wide variety of literary genres associated with death. What I mean 
here is to point out the specifically Chinese-socialist ideas of time and person in speeches 
read in memorial meetings in contemporary Shanghai. More importantly, I stress that 
these socialist narratives, whether in the form of musical sounds or verbal utterances, do 
not have any actual denotative meaning even though they are tools used to memorialize 
the deceased. This is the case even referring to the thank you speech given by the family 
members.  
 Many funeral professionals told me that thank you speeches serve three functions: 
1) to thank people, especially the work unit leaders, who come to the memorial meeting 
(or who could not come in person but sent their condolences earlier), 2) to introduce the 
deceased to funeral participants, and 3) to express grief and mourning of loss. Even 
though the last two points, combined with the fact that the one who writes and reads the 
speech is a family member, seem to suggest it would be more likely to see denotative 
meanings in the thank you speech, as it turns out, however, the thank you speech is no 




who intimately knew the deceased makes little difference in practice. We can see this 
clearly from the usage of the template. Not only were there relatively few blanks to fill in, 
but the literal space they gave for improvisation was miniscule and most blanks had easy, 
generic “answers.”  
 
II. Modernist Bodily Movements 
Constrained Bodily Expressions of Emotions  
 The first prominent bodily movement in Wang Dashan’s memorial meeting was 
related to the bodily expression of grief and mourning. In traditional funeral rituals, 
people were supposed to weep, to pull their hair, to stomp, and to perform all sorts of 
externalized bodily expressions of mourning in a cacophony of sound and chaos. The 
harder you cried, the more filial you were (R. Watson 1989). If you could not do these 
things yourself on cue, you could even hire someone to do them for you (or to amplify 
your own performance). Ritualized wailing and professional weepers were prominent 
parts of traditional Han Chinese funerals (J. Watson 1989). Memorial meetings, however, 
would be halted if someone, especially one of the chief mourners, outwardly expressed 
his or her grief without showing severe self-restraint. In one memorial meeting I 
attended, the wife of the deceased began wailing before the meeting had even started. 
Chen Ting pulled her and her son to the side after she realized that this lady did not seem 
to want to stop. She told them, “It is ok if you want to cry now. I understand. But later 
when we actually start the memorial meeting, you have to control yourself. Both of you 




ourselves no matter how sad we are.” Uncontrolled crying, blubbering and wailing are 
seen as disruptive and inappropriate for the operation of a memorial meeting. Of course, 
the bereaved can cry tears and sob softly during the performance, and they often did. Yet 
once the bereaved started to show strong outward expressions of emotion before the 
memorial meeting had finished, funeral professionals always spoke out to stop them.  
 The incompatibility of outward expressions of grief and mourning and memorial 
meetings is probably best described in another funeral I saw. The deceased of this 
memorial meeting was a man who died in his fifties—a rather young age in Shanghai. 
This family was originally from Heilongjiang, a province in northeast China. The direct 
descendants all wore a full set of traditional mourning dress. This itself already made 
them very noticeable in Huangpu Funeral Parlor since everyone else wore normal clothes 
with the addition of a black armband. A more elaborate version I saw was for people to 
wrap coarse (almost burlap) clothes around their waist in addition to having the black 
armbands. I saw this only occasionally. However, this family was the first (and also the 
last) time I saw people wearing traditional mourning dress at Huangpu. The outward 
expression of mourning in full body dress made other people at the parlor give this family 
second glances and sometimes even extra long sideways stares. I actually happened to 
walk next to this group on their way to the meeting hall from the main entrance. While 
walking, I saw many people (who came to join other memorial meetings) blatantly turn 
their heads around to look at this family even after they had passed us. At some point, I 
even heard three women who were passing by make a comment in Shanghainese. One 




comment was that this group was not Shanghainese. They were outsiders and therefore 
less modern. For these three ladies, the “backward” status of being non-Shanghai people 
explained the full body traditional mourning dress.  
 Later, after everyone finished lining up and right before the meeting started, Chen 
Ting went to the back room to bring the deceased in so they could actually start the 
meeting. However, as soon as Chen Ting and the deceased entered the meeting hall from 
the back, the people who stood in the first three rows (all wearing the traditional 
mourning dress) suddenly knelt down and started to weep loudly. It all happened so fast. 
Having seen emotional control over and over again, I totally did not expect I would see 
this kind of outburst at Huangpu. However, equally fast was Lu Yang’s reaction (he 
happened to be in charge of that meeting hall as well on that day). He ran to the front 
center of the Hall (facing the crowd) and almost yelled at the bereaved. He said, “All of 
you stand up! Don’t kneel down. This looks really inappropriate. Stop crying! This looks 
really bad. How could we have a memorial meeting when you [chief mourners] cry like 
this. Control yourself. We are at a funeral parlor.” Lu Yang was probably the only one 
who “dared” to say things like this to the bereaved. After all, he was a state practitioner in 
a broker-run memorial meeting. Aghast as Chen Ting was, there was no way that funeral 
brokers would dare to yell at their customers in this way.  
 Moreover, funeral professionals clearly saw a direct link between this highly 
constrained emotional expression and class. On another day, on the way from the meeting 
hall back to the office, Chen Ting and I had the following conversation.  
 




Chen Ting: That’s because we’re in Huangpu.  
Me: What do you mean by that? 
Chen Ting: Well, Huangpu is like a five-star hotel, it is a five-star parlor 
compared with other parlors. Thus, people who have funerals here 
are generally those having more “culture” and better “quality” (素質
). Have you ever been to other funeral parlors? If you have been 
there, you would see many more memorial meetings with people 
“crying loudly and making noise” (大哭大鬧).  
Me: Do you mean that crying is bad for a proper memorial meeting? 
Chen Ting: Yes, of course. Crying ruins the solemn atmosphere of a memorial 
meeting.  
Me: What kind of memorial meeting do you think is more popular in 
Shanghai? The “crying loudly and making noise” one or the calm 
one?  
Chen Ting: I think I’ve seen a lot more calm ones since most of my clients had 
funerals in Huangpu. I would say that six out of ten funerals I’ve 
seen were like this calm one.  
 
Chen Ting’s comments on associating Huangpu with a five-star hotel, “culture,” and 
“quality” shows that she linked class (both in terms of economic and educational 
difference) with the ability of controlling emotion.  
 Overall, most memorial meetings I attended were calm and solemn. I am not 
saying that the bereaved did not cry; they did. They just cried in controlled ways. For 
example, it was not uncommon to see the bereaved’s representative sobbing by the end of 
the thank you speech (even having used a template!). However, the vast majority of the 
bereaved’s representatives could finish reading the speech, despite showing some grief. 
In fact, there was only one memorial meeting that I attended where the bereaved could 
not finish his speech. He did not wail in the sense of weeping. He was sobbing 
uncontrollably so that he could not say anything. This particular funeral was an unusual 




years of age due to cancer.192 This funeral was actually the youngest deceased’s funeral I 
attended during my fieldwork. Even though traditional funerals prohibit the parents from 
participating in their children’s funeral (because dying before your parents is considered 
an extremely unfilial act), Shanghai people today generally go to their children’s funerals 
when such tragedies happen. They just cannot bow to their children. For this young 
lady’s funeral, her family decided to let the deceased’s mother’s sister’s husband read the 
thank you speech. This uncle (from the deceased’s perspective) was so sad that he could 
not finish reading his speech. Even though the speech was not that different from other 
thank you speeches, he barely finished reading the first paragraph. He paused many times 
but he still could not get the words out of his mouth. In the end he asked a state 
practitioner (this funeral was operated by state practitioners directly) to read the speech 
for him.  
 In other words, memorial meetings forced grieving bodies to move in a way that 
was calm, solemn, and restrained. Crying is tolerated only as long as people cannot really 
hear you. There was definitely no space for ritualized weeping sorts of bodily movements 
or uncontrolled bodily expressions of emotion. In this sense, the kind of “emotion 
regime” (Reddy 2001) present in memorial meetings is very different from that in 
traditional death rituals. In memorial meetings, the proper emotion regime is a more 
Puritan-like one that emphasizes self-control, calm, and solemnity.  
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 One of the most prominent bodily movements described in Wang Dashan’s 
memorial meeting was the act of bowing. Recall how Chen Ting bowed to the 
participants once as she opened up the ritual. And then both the work unit representative 
and Shaoquan bowed three times to the deceased and one time to the bereaved right 
before and right after they gave their respective speeches. Later, everyone bowed to 
Wang Dashan in unison. Finally, when people performed the farewell ceremony in small 
groups they also bowed to the deceased three times. Before I discuss the act of bowing in 
more general terms, let me say a few words about this “three bows to the deceased and 
one bow to the mourners,” the three and one bowing rule. People often don’t know about 
this rule unless they are told about it in advance by funerary professionals (this is 
especially so since funeral MCs do not verbally direct the work unit and the bereaved’s 
representatives when they bow right before and right after giving speeches). Even the 
work unit representatives, who in theory have more experience in attending memorial 
meetings, also often have to be told what to do by the funeral professionals before the 
memorial meeting starts. Furthermore, not every funeral professional bothered to remind 
people about this rule and some do not follow it. I have seen funerals (operated by state 
practitioners and funeral brokers) where speech givers bowed three times to both the 
deceased and the bereaved. According to Chen Ting, the three and one distinction is 
important because “the deceased is the most important” (sizhe weida 死者為大) at his or 
her own funeral. The three bows therefore should be reserved for the deceased only. 




about this rule before the memorial meeting started. Chen Ting even felt that if any of the 
representatives accidentally bowed three times to the participants, it might make those 
few who do know the rule upset since people could interpret this act as a sort of curse.    
 Nevertheless, while the three and one rule is not consistently implemented in 
Shanghai, there is no doubt that everyone bows. The act of bowing is the most frequently 
repeated bodily movement in memorial meetings. Yet, bowing is not performed in 
traditional Han Chinese death rituals. Traditionally, prostration (also known as 
kowtowing) was the proper bodily movement to show respect in funerals. Just as common 
people prostrate themselves to the emperor, so too must sons and daughters prostrate 
themselves to their parents not only in funerals, but also in all kinds of rituals. Prostration 
was a bodily representation of a hierarchical relationship as well as one site where 
performance actually produces such relationships. Andrew Kipnis (1997) argues that 
kowtowing and the rules for who kowtows to whom produces the membership of social 
groups and the relationships among members.  
 During funeral reform campaigns in 1950s and 1960s, instead of governing all the 
possible bodily performances by the living for the dead, state practitioners’ primary goal 
was to persuade the bereaved to accept five rules that were summarized in a campaign 
slogan called the “Five Replacements” (wuyi wudai 五以五代) during its funeral reform 
campaign prior to the beginning of Cultural Revolution. They were: using cremation to 
replace body burial, using flowers and wax fruit to replace the burning of spiritual money 
and offerings of candles and incense, using black arm bands and yellow flowers to 




kowtowing, and using memorial meetings to replace old funerary rites. It was in this 
context that state practitioners started to urge people to bow instead of perform 
prostrations under the CCP.  
 The Communist Party’s attempt to replace prostrations with bowing was meant to 
transform this embodied hierarchy to a reinforcement of equality. To be clear, the CCP 
was not the first modernist regime to promote bowing. The Republican government 
announced its own reforms to replace prostration with bows as the proper way of 
interacting both among the living and between the living and the dead as early as 1912 
(Xiang 1992: 22). However, the CCP’s removal of kowtowing in these public sacrifices  
(and in all other modernist family rituals) was not simply the abolishment of a “feudal” 
practice that honors hierarchical relationships, but also the elimination of an emphasis on 
the social relationships themselves (Kipnis 1997). This is consistent with the CCP’s effort 
to erase horizontal ties after its take over. In Chapter 3, I also discussed such attempts 
through an examination of the nationalization of funeral institutions. Such efforts were 
meant to create a direct link between atomized individuals and the state without any 
intermediate links such as lineages, religious affiliations, native place associations and so 
on. It is worth pointing out, however, that this attempt has never been completely 
successful in reality. The relatively easy revival of horizontal ties in the post reform era 
has even further proven that this attempt was more a fiction than anything real (cf. Yan 





Memorial Meetings as a Site of Subject Formation 
 One of the Five Replacements was to promote memorial meetings. At that time, 
state practitioners called the kind of memorial meetings promoted in funeral parlors 
gongji yishi (公祭儀式) meaning “public sacrifices.”193 The Nationalist government 
developed public sacrifice for its civil servants, martyrs, and national heroes in its effort 
to promote a simple and uniform civic ceremony (Nedostup 2010: 251-253) because in a 
Republic no one was to be as different in stature as an Emperor and his subjects.194 The 
specific procedures of a public sacrifice ceremony in 1959 in Shanghai were as follows:  
 
Step 1: The bereaved family members (and later, relatives and friends as well) 
offer wreaths and flowers.  
Step 2: The bereaved family members, and then relatives and friends respectively, 
bow to the deceased three times and then stand to the side (the deceased’s 
immediate family members stand next to the body).  
Step 3: Everyone stands up facing the deceased and commemorates them in 
silence for three minutes while playing the funeral dirge.  
Step 4: The bereaved family members then introduce the life history of the 
deceased to the participants.  
Step 5: Relatives and friends may give speeches.  
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governance II], pp.14, CFIPL archive. 
194 Memorial meetings, the usage of black armbands, and wreaths all showed up in China even 
before the establishment of the Republican government in 1911. The Republicans’ new ritual 
guidance also suggested for men to wear black armbands and women to wear black knots on their 
chests, using wreaths, and replacing the photograph of the deceased with a tablet with their name. 
For the ceremonial part, the playing of military style music, offering flowers, and reading of an 
obituary were listed as new and properly modern funeral rites. Republican ritual regulation is 
exemplified in “Record of Bei Quan Ritual Discussion” (Beiquan Liyilu 北泉禮儀錄) published 
on October 3, 1943. Also, public sacrifice is still practiced in Taiwan. Taiwanese in general 
distinguish public sacrifice from family sacrifice (jiaji 家祭)—something that many Shanghai 




Step 6: Everyone then walks around the body once to say goodbye to the 
deceased.195  
  
 If we compare memorial meetings in 2011 with the public sacrifice ceremony 
from 1959, we can see that they actually appear to be very similar. The most obvious 
similarity is in the overall ritual procedure. Other continuities include bowing to the 
deceased three times, commemorating them in silence while playing a dirge, and family 
members giving speeches to introduce the life history of the deceased to the participants. 
Moreover, Step 6 in the public sacrifice that describes everyone walking around the body 
to say goodbye to the deceased is Step 6 in memorial meetings, now known as the 
farewell ceremony. Overall, bodily performances in public sacrifice and in memorial 
meetings are more or less the same.  
 However, there were also differences. For example, we can see that public 
sacrifice commemorates the deceased through giving offerings and narratives (see Step 
1). The objects of offerings were wreaths and flowers rather than incense, spiritual 
money, or anything that suggests the possible needs of the deceased in an afterlife. The 
deceased is treated as already gone, living only in the memories of the living, rather than 
as co-existing with the living and still requiring money, food, and companions; who 
therefore needs to be pacified, transformed, and re-incorporated. This was actually still a 
part of 2011 memorial meetings. Mourners still gave wreaths and flowers today, but the 
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minzhengshi xiabian chugao 上海民政史下編初稿 [Draft of the history of the Shanghai civil 





act of giving (offering) itself was not ritualized. This part was done before the beginning 
of a memorial meeting.  
 The important change that emerged when comparing the two was the presence of 
work units and their reading of a memorial speech. There was no mention of work units 
giving speeches in the public sacrifice described above. It simply says “relatives and 
friends may give a speech.” This difference is crucial because the memorial speech is the 
most important step in memorial meetings in Shanghai today. In fact, Shanghai funeral 
professionals even maintained that funerals without memorial speeches are not memorial 
meetings. Instead, they are memorial services (zhuisihui 追思會) or merely farewell 
ceremonies.196 In Shanghai funeral professionals’ jargon, memorial services only have a 
thank you speech. Farewell ceremonies, on the other hand, have no formal speeches. 
These last two situations did not happen often. They were usually associated with 
abnormal deaths.  
 What makes a speech a memorial speech (instead of any other kind of speech) is 
determined by the identity of the speakers. These speakers have to represent the work 
unit of the deceased. If the deceased did not have a work unit, but the bereaved still 
wanted to have a memorial meeting, then a representative from the deceased's residential 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 I was told at one point that people in Beijing did not follow this categorization. There seem to 
be regional differences as well. I once heard a bereaved out-of-towner family member argue with 
a state practitioner right before his father’s funeral. He questioned why the practitioner used the 
term “zhuidaohui” instead of “gaobie yishi” for the memorial meeting. The practitioner asked him 
if there would be a memorial speech given in the funeral. The son said yes. The practitioner then 
told him that in this case this is a zhuidaohui. The son replied, but in Beijing where I live, we 
don’t call this zhuidaohui. We called it gaobie yishi. The practitioner insisted that as long as 
memorial speeches and thank you speeches were involved, it was a zhuidaohui, not a gaobie 





committee (juweihui 居委會) could give a memorial speech. To be clear, who counts as 
the representative of the deceased’s work unit is not entirely unambiguous today. The 
default representative is the representative of the deceased’s last work unit prior to his or 
her official retirement. However, Chen Yu told me that today many people are hired 
again after their official retirement, especially those who were relatively high up in an 
industry. As a result, it is not uncommon for the deceased’s final work unit before death 
to claim the right to give the speech instead. The second complication relates to how 
promotion works. In state-related organizations and companies, employees could only 
move up or stay at the same level. It was rare to ever move down.197 However, when a 
leader was about to retire, his/her work unit needed to sort out their succession issues 
before the actual retirement without demoting this person. The usual alternative was to 
transfer the (now) former leader to another parallel organization and make him or her the 
Party leader of that new organization for the last two years of his or her career. Since 
Party leaders enjoy a higher status than administrative leaders (thus, for instance, the 
Party Secretary of the Shanghai Government is of a higher rank than the Mayor of 
Shanghai), this arrangement allowed for the promotion of the about-to-retire leader 
without endangering the succession process. When this person dies, although the last 
work unit before the retirement has the right to deliver a memorial speech, the work unit 
where the deceased actually spent most of his or her life often demanded a much bigger 
role in the memorial meeting. These two possibilities were further complicated in recent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Shanghai depends much more on a state-centered economy than their southern counterparts 
such as Guangzhou. In 2004, 61.6% of Shanghai's economy depended on state capital, 24.9% 





times with the rapid changes in Shanghai's economy where many work units will have 
been transformed, partially privatized, or spun off into different companies multiple 
times. Should a former high ranking state employee be memorialized by a party 
representative in the now private company that her work unit became since her retirement 
or by someone in the bureau her state position originally reported to? 
 Nevertheless, only Party-state institutions such as work units could give memorial 
speeches. Even if the content of the speech is exactly the same, when it is given by 
someone else, this speech could no longer be a memorial speech. And without a 
memorial speech, the funeral would not count as a memorial meeting. In this sense, what 
had been more of a family ritual (public sacrifice in 1959) became a Party-state centered 
ritual afterward. As a result, one wonders what happened to memorial meetings between 
1959 and today that made work units and their memorial speeches so essential that the 
lack of them could render a funeral in its most important sense, not a funeral?   
 To answer this, I would like to quote a long interview I had with Master Gao. 
Master Gao entered the Shanghai funeral industry in 1959 at the age of 14. He first 
worked in one of the only five funeral homes left after the FID’s nationalization of all 
funeral homes in the early 1950s. When the Red Guards shut down all funeral homes and 
cemeteries at the end of December 1966 as the Cultural Revolution began, Gao was 
transferred to Longhua Crematorium—one of the only two funeral facilities still open in 
Shanghai at that time. Due to construction, Longhua did not actually open to the public 
until July 1, 1967, six months after the closing of all funeral homes in Shanghai. Master 





Gao: No, no, the kind of funeral in 1965 was different from the current kind 
(memorial meetings). In 1965 when I was still at Peace Funeral Home, we still did 
superstitions.  
 
Me: Do you mean that there was no work unit giving memorial speeches in 1965?  
 
Gao: No, no work unit gave memorial speeches in 1965. […]  
 
Our current ritual, the memorial meeting kind of ritual, originated from pingfan 
zhaoxue (平反昭雪 , meaning “righting the wrongs and rehabilitating the 
disgraced”) during the Cultural Revolution. That was the Cultural Revolution. 
There were a lot of injustices (yuan 冤). So many people needed pingfan zhaoxue. 
This is how memorial meetings actually started. […]  
 
When the Cultural Revolution began, you could not do the old stuff anymore. So 
in the beginning [of the Cultural Revolution], people came [to Longhua 
Crematorium] for funerals simply “took a look and had a cry” (kanyikan, kuyiku 
看一看哭一哭). Some may have bowed once (jugegong 鞠個躬). Then they 
pushed the bodies to the cremation units to burn them. We did not know what to 
do after we could not do the old stuff anymore. […] There was no coffin. Coffins 
were superstition. You put dead bodies in bags and then burned them. […] 
 
Nothing really. No ritual (yishi 儀式). Only “taking a look and having a cry.” 
Everything was simple. Then some work units did rehabilitation here [at Longhua 
Crematorium]. We [state practitioners] soon learned that this way of doing ritual 
was how you could do [it, then]. So later when the bereaved came to ask us how 
to do a funeral, we told them about this kind. I would say that memorial meetings 
[with memorial speeches] started to show up in Longhua in the second half of 
1968. 
 
 From Master Gao’s words, we can see that the goals of Transforming Customs 
and Changing Habits Campaign were never fully realized in Shanghai until the beginning 
of the Cultural Revolution. Like he said, “we still did superstitions.” First, the campaign 
did not last all that long. I estimate that it lasted about one year and probably no more 




sacrifice. One Funeral and Interment Administration internal report claims that in April 
and May 1960, 50% of the bereaved accepted the Five Replacements.198 Even assuming 
this number is plausible, this actually indicates that only 50% of the bereaved accepted 
something from the Five Replacements. 199  This is because several senior funeral 
practitioners told me that when they negotiated with the bereaved at that time, they had to 
negotiate the changes one by one rather than getting anyone to accept the Five 
Replacements as a package deal. Whether the 50% success rate is accurate or not, one 
thing is for sure: this was when and how modernist funeral ritual acts, for the first time, 
actually began to take root, albeit slowly, in funeral institutions in Shanghai. It was 
during this transitional process, negotiated between the bereaved and state funeral 
practitioners, that these modern bodily movements in death ritual were defined and 
enacted. However, as the Red Guards broke in to smash coffins in funeral parlors and dig 
up graves in the cemeteries starting from December 1966 in their attempts at “breaking of 
the Four Old” (destroy anything that represented superstition or rightist “feudalism”), 
suddenly no elements of traditional death rituals were allowed in crematoria. As a result, 
Shanghai people were left with no ritual. Until the popularization of work units making 
memorial speeches, all the bereaved had was “taking a look and having a cry” and 
“having a single bow”. This reference to bowing also reinforces my analysis on how 
bowing had become the most important bodily movement in memorial meetings.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 Shanghai Funeral and Interment Administration 上海市殯葬管理處. 1960. Shanghai Binzang 
shiye de yixie qingkuang 上海殯葬事業的一些情況 [The general condition of Shanghai funeral 
and interment industry], Library of the Chinese Funeral and Interment Profession, Shanghai, 
China. 
199 In Chapter 3, I described this campaign for cremation in detail. Cremation is one of these Five 




 The spread of the memorial meeting from the Party to become common usage 
among the people provided a new ritual imbued with deep new meanings and 
consequences for notions of socialist personhood. I once asked the Vice Chair of the 
Shanghai Funeral Culture Institute, Xin Bingyong ( 忻 秉 勇 ) about the actual 
popularization of memorial meetings in Shanghai. He had never worked in funeral 
parlors so he did not necessarily know how things evolved on the ground. But he also 
told me that despite Mao calling for memorial meetings as early as the 1940s (as shown 
in his Serve the People speech), memorial meetings did not actually emerge in Shanghai 
as the default ritual until the Cultural Revolution. Questions about political rehabilitation 
occupied the Cultural Revolution from its earliest stages (Barme 1993; Lee 1978:309-
312). Most debates over political rehabilitation were about the living, but some were 
about the dead.  
 To understand how memorial meetings could rehabilitate (pingfan zhaoxue) the 
dead, we need to know what kinds of people qualified to have memorial meetings in the 
first place. Recalling Serve the People, Mao said that no matter if the deceased was a 
soldier or a cook, as long as he “has done some useful work” he deserves “a funeral 
ceremony and a memorial meeting in his honor.” Mao aimed to create a disjuncture 
between locating the deceased in hierarchical relationships and locating him in a new 
location of equal comradeship. This equality-based commemoration was to eventually 
become a standard practice not only among people in “our ranks” (i.e., the Party), but 
also among “the people” in general. As such, the only distinction allowed was to separate 




work for “the people” or for “the fascists, exploiters, and oppressors.” If you work for 
“the people” even if you die in a politically insignificant event or serve in a menial job, 
your death is worthy and meaningful. This is why dying in an accident as unremarkable 
and undistinguished as getting caught under a falling kiln can still count as “dying for the 
people.” However, if you work for the fascists, exploiters, and oppressors, even if you die 
in the middle of political duty, you die for nothing and did not deserve a memorial 
meeting. These latter were not “the people.” Consequently, to be a part of the people 
meant to be socialist, and vice versa. Being a non-socialist rendered you neither “of” the 
people nor “for” the people. Personhood and citizenship here coalesce; the denial of the 
latter also denies you the former. This is also why the word comrade is used so frequently 
in memorial speeches. Comrade, citizen, and person were merged into one single concept 
in memorial meetings. 
 As a result, politically problematic people, who were often labeled “ox demons 
and snake spirits” (niugui sheshen 牛鬼蛇神), could not have (official) funerals; their 
identities were obliterated. They were not people. Such identity labels themselves were 
ironic because, despite the CCP’s efforts to remove “superstitions,” this political 
vocabulary was borrowed directly from Buddhist demonology and Mao himself “was 
responsible for the revival of demonic symbolism as a whole” in the Chinese political 
lexicon (Ji 2004:195). Nevertheless, as non-people, their deaths did not deserve funerals 
(memorial meetings) and need not (read “could not”) be mourned because the death of 
the people’s enemy should be celebrated (R. Watson 1994). Some people even died 




did not know about it until years later. One informant told me that every once in a while 
she and her colleagues went to a beach outside Shanghai to “deep bury” (shenmai 深埋) 
unclaimed cremated remains collectively at that time. Those cremains often were 
cremated under a fake identity and buried in a mixture of undifferentiated ashes whose 
identity was completely scattered like the sand around them. 
 Consequently, for those who were wrongfully accused, memorial meetings were 
their final chance to regain personhood no matter if they were newly dead or had long 
gone from the living world. The mere fact of having a memorial meeting with a work unit 
agreeing to deliver a memorial speech already indicated that the deceased was 
rehabilitated. What was actually said in the memorial meeting was therefore less 
important than the fact of having a memorial meeting in the first place. By the same 
token, if your work unit did not give you a memorial speech even if you were a part of 
the People when you were alive, this refusal effectively removed you from humanity. 
You became non-human. This postmortem evaluation thus had the power to officially 
override whatever you had accomplished when you were alive.  
 It is in this sense that I argue regardless of who the deceased really were, what the 
bereaved believed about who the deceased were, and whether the memorial meetings 
transformed the deceased into an authentic socialist subject, the act of performing such 
ritualized, externalized, formalized, and convention based socialist rituals effectively 
constructs socialist subjectivity in the public domain. Death Ritual here is a site of 
subject formation for both the living and the dead. Catherine Bell points to this as “the 




special or privileged status” (1997:166). Ritual is performative in that it does something 
rather than says something. What it does in this particular case is to construct socialist 
subjectivity for these already dead bodies by carrying out an act of public commitment 
that allows dead bodies to re-enter, remain, or be excluded from the social world of 
proper persons, meaning socialist citizen subjects.  
 It is equally important to point out, however, that the bereaved may in private 
reject the socialist subjectivity constructions that are asserted in memorial meetings. 
Robert Hefner (1985) has shown that public culture does not equal individual 
subjectivity. It is just one aspect that shapes an individual’s subjectivity. Therefore, when 
I say that the ritual acts of living bodies, socialism’s promise of temporal rupture, and its 
sacred texts encoded in verbal utterances and musical sounds construct the public aspect 
of (dead bodies’) subjectivity by transforming dead bodies into proper persons, I am 
making a much more limited claim about subjectivity. What I mean is that this public act 
is highly significant for societal reproduction of socialist subjectivities among the people 
in the public domain. Yet, this ritual need not be the only way to produce (and reproduce) 
socialist subjectivity. This is not even mentioning that socialist subjectivity is here by no 
means the only kind of subjectivity in contemporary memorial meetings. I will discuss 
the potential for and emergence of pluralist subject formations within socialist civil 
funeral in the following two chapters.    
 Finally, constructing dead bodies’ socialist subjectivity in memorial meetings is 
not merely symbolic. It had real social impact on the living. This was because bad status 




So if you were a counter-revolutionary, all of your nuclear family members would be 
classified as such as well, and their children too could be so classified. Consequently, 
once a dead non-person was rehabilitated, all his/her living family members would be 
rehabilitated as well. This is why there were so many memorial meetings for people who 
were already long gone.  
 This is rather ironic because Mao’s idea for a funeral, though memorializing the 
dead, was meant to be for the living only. Unlike traditional funerals which are oriented 
toward transforming corpses into ancestors (cf. Puett 2013), the socialist funeral was 
productive and valued not because the ancestors would later bless their descendents, but 
because the living transformed their mourning into revolutionary acts and integrated 
themselves further into the socialist world. The dead's devotion to the revolution was to 
“unite the people.” The productivity of the funeral was not to bring prosperity to the 
deceased’s family, but rather to bring about the continued construction of a socialist state 
by accepting its pre-eminence in memorializing the dead. In a truly satirical twist, as it 
turned out rehabilitation through the socialist memorial meeting was much more 
immediately effective in bringing prosperity to the deceased’s descendants than the 
traditional death ritual’s creation of benevolent ancestors ever had been!  
 
Memorial Meetings as Dissonance  
  Memorial meetings are the default death ritual in urban Shanghai today. This is 
the primary time and place where the deceased is represented and where commemoration 




memorial speech. Whether or not the bereaved actually like memorial meetings or believe 
what is being said and done in them, the memorial meeting is what the bereaved want for 
their recently departed relatives (mainly their parents). This despite the fact that this 
format is no longer required. I sat through countless business meetings between the 
bereaved and funeral professionals (both state funeral practitioners and private funeral 
agents). When funeral professionals asked if there would be a memorial speech given by 
a representative of the deceased’s work unit, the grieving family members often made a 
face as if the question was silly. They responded as quickly as possible, “yes, of course.”  
 This taken-for-grantedness is critical for a variety of reasons. For one, the right to 
and responsibility for organizing funerals has been returned from work units to families 
ever since the Reform period initiated at the end of the 1970s. The rapid changes that 
have taken place in work units through privatization, restructuring and the increase in 
private space over the last three decades have eroded the previous relationship of the 
domination of the work unit over individuals in urban China (cf. Davis et al. 1995; Lu 
and Perry 1997; Zhang and Ong 2008). The bereaved no longer need permission from 
work units to organize funerals. Work unit representatives also no longer show up at 
memorial meetings unless they are invited, technically speaking. In fact, most work units 
would not even know about such deaths if the deceased's families did not notify them. 
Yet, in reality, most bereaved “bothered” to invite work units to deliver memorial 
speeches. This means that the bereaved are not forced to follow memorial meetings as 




 Furthermore, the CCP actually has issued several documents to discourage 
memorial meetings since the end of the Cultural Revolution, especially with regard to 
high-ranking cadres. The politically correct trend, for party members especially, is now 
not to have memorial meetings. In 1980, the CCP released a statement that prohibited 
Party members from having a memorial speech.200 Point Five of the statement says, “in 
the last few years, in order to pingfan zhaoxue those old comrades who were wrongfully 
accused, we had a lot of grand memorial meetings. This situation should be close to an 
end now. We should not spend so much labor force and money on it.” This central 
government policy could be understood at two levels. The first is related to the CCP, as a 
modernist regime, having always wanted to simplify ritual. Investment in ritual, both in 
time and money, is seen as a kind of waste. It not only fails to contribute to production 
and to the material well-being of the people, but also takes away the fruits of production 
(it wastes money!). The second is related to the political consequences of memorial 
meetings. Death in China has often been a powerful symbol for protest. The two 
relatively recent big political movements in China, the Tiananmen Incident in 1976 and 
the Tiananmen Democracy Protests in 1989, both started as people mourned recently 
deceased leaders: Zhou Enlai and Hu Yaobang respectively (R. Watson 1994). This 
power of death combined with the power to rehabilitate makes memorial meetings 
particularly dangerous moments as mourners were allowed to witness an authoritarian 
regime admitting its mistakes (not explicitly, but through the holding of the ritual itself) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 The General Office of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee 中共中央辦公廳.  
1980. zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jianchi shaoxuanchuan geren de jigewenti de zhishi 中共中




in public. The seemingly counterintuitive combination of descriptions of ritual as 
wasteful, but also politically dangerous suggests that the CCP was well aware of ritual’s 
efficacy even if it denied it. As a result, the CCP’s governing on ritual actually gave ritual 
more power than previous regimes had done.201 
   Shanghai funeral parlors, however, decided to interpret the central government’s 
effort to ban memorial meetings as merely a means of regulating high ranking cadres. 
According to the Funeral and Interment Administration’s internal documents, officials 
decided to continue holding memorial meetings in Shanghai funerals (since they had 
already been popularized) because “memorial meetings are better than superstitious 
traditional funerals after all.”202 Shanghai funeral governing institutions chose to focus on 
treating Shanghai people as religious subjects who needed to be governed instead of as 
political subjects. In the last ten years or so, as discussed in the last chapter, Shanghai 
funeral governing institutions have further chosen to promote personalized funerals. 
However, what we see today is that Shanghai people overwhelmingly choose to die 
socialist (in addition to embracing religious aspects, as I will discuss in the next 
chapters). By continuing to perform stylized socialist memorial rituals, Shanghai people 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 Another example is the traditional use of suicide by Han Chinese women as a means to level 
powerful accusations (M. Wolf 1975).	  
202 Shanghai Funeral and Interment Administration 上海市殯葬管理處. 1984. Zhenfenjingshen, 
maikaigaigebufa 振奮精神邁開改革步伐 [Stepping forward to the reform], Library of the 
Chinese Funeral and Interment Profession, Shanghai, China. On page 7, the text says: “Regarding 
the No. 75 Document (the one asking party members to not have memorial meetings, see details 
in Chapter 4), it asks people not to keep cremains nor have memorial meetings. We should 
understand No. 75 Document correctly. This was meant to solve internal Party issues. This was to 
correct the Party line [within the Party]. The intention was to have “There are no good people in 
criticism meetings and there are no bad people in memorial meetings” (pipinghuishang 
wuhaoren, zhuidaohuishang wuhuairen 批評會上無好人，追悼會上無壞人). As for ordinary 
people’s funeral and interment issues, we cannot fix this in any short term period. Having emorial 




constructed the subjectivity of dead bodies as socialist citizen subjects, in spite of the 
stated opposition of the government itself.      
 Performing stylized rituals is not new in the history of Chinese funerals. What’s 
new here is what memorial meetings index—socialist ideas of person. This then brings 
out two fundamental questions: what if the deceased had never lived the way that the 
narratives describe? What if the bereaved do not believe the content of their verbal 
utterances? These are questions I am asked all the time from fellow anthropologists and 
other people in China. These two questions reveal two important assumptions about 
rituals both in social life and in ritual theory. Does ritual simply stand as the antithesis of 
authenticity and sincerity and therefore is it irrelevant to understanding what being a 
person means? For the latter, if ritual by definition is an “inauthentic” representation of 
self and even of culture at large, then how can we analyze ritual beyond an interpretative 
paradigm that searches for the symbolic meanings of rituals?  
 To be clear, when I say that memorial meetings construct socialist subjectivity for 
dead bodies, I do not mean that by performing memorial meetings, the deceased 
somehow magically becomes an “authentic” socialist subject (no matter what we mean 
by authenticity) or that the bereaved somehow sincerely come to believe their beloved are 
now good socialists. What asserts socialist subjectivity is the act of accepting social 
conventions that existed before and beyond those individuals. Through modernist bodily 
movements (bowing instead of prostration, solemn and calmly expression of grief and 
mourning) and socialist verbal utterance (socialist dirge, stylized memorial speech, and 




socialist citizens. It is this act of pretending that allows ritual participants to momentarily 
enter a socialist subjunctive world (Seligman et al. 2008) where everyone lives as if they 
are model socialist citizens. Consequently, issues of sincerity and authenticity are less 
important if not outright irrelevant. What matters is the commitment to accept such social 
conventions during the ritual performance (Rappaport 1999). 
 As a result, ritual should be seen as a cognitive frame that provides “a spatial and 
temporal bonding of a set of interactive messages” (Bateson 1972 [2000]). Such a 
cognitive frame allows ritual participants to conceptualize words and behaviors 
performed in ritual in a way that is different from those enacted outside of ritual. To use 
Bateson’s examples, by evoking “this is a play,” participants would understand the same 
act of fist fighting as a play rather than a fight. Phrases evoked in memorial meetings, 
whether they are based on socialist time, person, and ethics, were not meant to be an 
authentic representation of the deceased or an indication of the bereaved's beliefs about 
the deceased, but rather to emphasize the presence of the work unit and therefore to 
underline the socialist humanity of the deceased. This was why memorial speeches (and 
thank you speeches in this regard as well) are so often based on templates. Many funeral 
professionals told me that when work units get memorial meeting requests, they simply 
take out the deceased’s dossier (dang’an 檔案) and fill in the blanks based on their own 
templates.203  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 This is in addition to the fact that representatives of the deceased’s last work unit usually did 
not actually know the deceased in person in the case of a normal death . This is mainly because of 
age differences and possible differences in rank that date back to the time when the deceased was 




 Consequently, those words and actions spoken and enacted during memorial 
meetings do not contain denotative meanings that connect the words to the person they 
addressed. What is being “communicated” is the frame of ritual (Goffman 1974). It is in 
this sense that Bateson says that ritual is always meta-communicative (Bateson 2000). 
This lack of denotative meanings is one crucial characteristic that I will continue to 
discuss in the next two chapters.  
 Since ritual is always meta-communicative, this means that the moment of 
“pretending” to be socialist is also the moment that makes people realize that they are 
actually not socialist (otherwise they would not have to pretend). Entering this 
subjunctive world de-naturalizes the social reality outside the frame of the ritual. In 
Shanghai, people have been through rapid social change over the last three decades. The 
change has been especially dramatic since 1992 when Deng Xiaoping reaffirmed a 
commitment to continue to deepen economic reform during his Southern Tour (Shanghai 
was one of his stops) as well as since the implementation of the Pudong New District 
project that eventually transformed Shanghai into a world financial center of the PRC 
today. As a result, Ellen Hertz’s (1998) ethnography of Shanghai’s “stock fever” in the 
1990s was much closer to Shanghai people’s reality in 2011 (when I did my fieldwork) 
than idealist socialist visions performed in memorial meetings. Shanghai in 2011 was a 
cosmopolitan city where residents spoke with great pride over their hosting of the 2010 
World Expo just on the heels of the grand 2008 Beijing Olympics. Shanghai’s everyday 
is probably everything but socialist. In this sense, memorial meetings strike a dissonant 




 Dissonance in this sense is a challenge, but not a rebellion; a dissonant note 
violently disrupts taken for granted harmony, but does so only for a moment and then it, 
too, is gone. Yet it provides a striking alternative in making everyone, for that moment, 
outwardly pretend they are model socialist citizens. This ritually framed and constructed 
subjectivity, at the same time, allows boundary crossing from one kind of subjectivity to 
others. Many scholars working in China have pointed out that an individualized self has 
emerged in China since the adoption of a market economy (Yan 2003; Link et al. 2002; 
Zhang and Ong 2008; Rofel 2007). The act of entering a subjunctive world that 
constructs socialist subjectivity thus simultaneously allows ritual participants to cross 
from market subjectivity to the performance of a socialist one in a public domain. This 
socialist as if ritual is particularly striking in that it occurs precisely to mark one of the 
major rites of passage – the moment of collective representation of the recently dead. In 
this sense, dying socialist is an unintended but potent act of dissonance. It provides a 
potential critique of contemporary Chinese neoliberal governance by recognizing 
alternatives. As the state itself promotes “market” governance, actual opposition to the 
state is less linked to a triumph of capitalism or an embrace of liberal democratic values, 
and more expressed by clinging to socialist rituals. This subjunctive world whereby both 
dead and living bodies “regain” socialist social lives therefore is both a reminder that 






CHAPTER 8 CREATING RELIGIOUS AND RELATIONAL 
SUBJECTIVITY FOR SOCIALIST CITIZENS  
  
 With the failure of personalized funerals, the strong historical momentum of the 
memorial meeting, and the ongoing desire for the memorial meeting as a haven from 
profiteering, I have purposefully worked in the previous chapters to leave the impression 
of a strong socialist presence at the end of life. Without a memorial speech and thus 
without a work unit or residence committee representative—both Party representatives—
a funeral simply cannot be a memorial meeting. You might wonder, however, is this all 
there is in urban Shanghai death rituals today? What kinds of alternatives exist in subject 
formation in urban Chinese death ritual? If such alternatives exist, how do they work in 
relation to the socialist subjectivity? In this chapter, I provide an ethnographic description 
of these variations in memorial meetings. By exploring memorial meetings and their 
variations, I mean to tackle what other kinds of subjectivities are also enacted in 
memorial meetings and how seemingly incompatible ideas of death and dead body may 
co-exist.   
 
After the Memorial Meetings End… 
 Recall the structure of memorial meetings discussed in the last chapter. An MC’s 
announcement and farewell ceremony respectively delineate the beginning and the end of 
the meeting. They mark the boundaries of this subjunctive socialist world. The last step 
of a memorial meeting is the farewell ceremony where participants take turns to have a 




Opening Up, funeral practitioners would then zip up the body bags (since there were no 
coffins) and push the deceased to the crematoria immediately after performing the 
farewell ceremony.  
 Today, however, this “double farewell” to the deceased and to the bereaved's 
family members, is not the end of memorial meetings. In fact, if we use the language of 
music, the farewell ceremony is not even a “rest” within memorial meetings. It is more of 
a fading out of one movement and a fading in of the next one. If the old movement is 
about socialism, then the new movement is about spirits, afterlife, and social reciprocity.  
 Today, when the very last group of people finishes their farewell bowing, the 
immediate family members who were standing next to the deceased form a circle around 
the coffin. While the tempo of this congregating act could be fast or slow, once the circle 
is formed, the solemn atmosphere and highly restrained bodily movements that defined 
the socialist ritual suddenly break down with an outburst of tears, weeping, stomping, 
kneeling down, punching or shaking on or around the plastic cover over the deceased. 
There is no choreographed harmony in this instant moment of change; not even 
dissonance but only cacophony, chaos, and spontaneity. Bodies that were standing 
upright and straight just seconds prior all of sudden lose their proper forms and postures 
as if gravity has momentarily reappeared. Sometimes the outward expression of grief and 
mourning that were repressed earlier come out like lava from volcanic eruptions. The 
grief swallows both the modernist bodily movements and the socialist verbal utterances 
within a second as if they had not been performed so solemnly just moments earlier by 




 Just as wailing functioned as a notice of death that opened up the performance of 
folk death ritual in the past, wailing at this moment hails the raising of a curtain for the 
newly added folk death ritual within memorial meetings in modern Shanghai. When it is 
time to stop this moment of crying, the funeral professionals break the circle by opening 
the plastic cover that envelops the coffin and then push the coffin to the center of the hall. 
This is now the time to “place offerings” (baifang yiwu 擺放遺物). These offerings are 
not commemorative objects—personal belongings of the deceased while they were alive. 
Instead, they are religious and ritual objects. These objects are based on prior 
assumptions of the general existence of spirits and afterlife after the biological death. 
There are no personal sentiments that connect the life of the deceased and these objects.  
 If we pan, like a film director might, in a horizontal movement from shooting 
inside the meeting hall to the outside, we would see a vastly different world. The 
representative of the deceased’s work unit and some of the funeral participants leave the 
memorial meeting as soon as they perform their farewell ceremony. Other participants 
continue hanging out outside the meeting hall to satisfy their nicotine urge or to resume 
the socializing activities that were “interrupted” by the beginning of memorial meeting.  
Some of them stay for quite a long time because they plan to go to the funeral banquet 
afterward. These people have to wait outside because the immediate family members of 
the deceased (and anyone who wanted to stay inside the meeting hall) are still performing 
those post farewell ceremony events. 
 Inside memorial meeting halls, the exact sequence of placing offerings varies 




child of the deceased to put a handkerchief and a wooden foldable fan in the deceased’s 
right and left palms respectively (though people only follow the right and left hand rule 
very loosely) so the deceased can use them in the afterlife. This was in spite of the fact 
that contemporary Shanghai people do not usually use handkerchiefs (most people use 
tissues) or foldable fans. Both objects appear to be traditional so they provide an aura of 
invariance—one key characteristic of ritualized actions (Bell 1997; Rappaport 1999).      
 Then the child of the deceased uses a wooden comb to comb the deceased’s hair 
three times before breaking the comb in half—one half is thrown to the floor and the 
other is placed in the casket. The combing and breaking of the comb symbolizes the 
social ties between the generations and their consequent break with death. This breaking 
symbolically allows the deceased to move on to the next world without lingering around 
in this one. The combing and breaking of the comb shows a classic image of a rite of 
passage (Van Gennep 1960). In professional jargon, a comb, a fan, and a handkerchief 
together are called the “Three Minor Things” (xiaosanjian 小三件). 
 After placing the Three Minor Things, the funeral professional directs the 
bereaved to place afterlife consumer products as well as “spiritual cash” (mingbi 冥幣) in 
to the coffin to enhance the joy of the deceased's afterlife. The former commonly include 
mahjong tiles, maotai liquor, cigarettes and so on. All these afterlife consumer products 
are made of paper. While mahjong is usually gender neutral, maotai liquor and cigarettes 
are usually only for men. Spiritual cash includes cash that looks like Chinese Yuan, Hong 
Kong Dollars, US Dollars, Visa and Master Cards (all made of paper), or gold and silver 




of spiritual cash in one package for sales.204  
 Occasionally, people place personal items used by the deceased such as her 
glasses or favorite chest set. I had expected such personal items to be popular. However, 
based on the 75 or so memorial meetings I observed, this was not the case, placing 
personal items was relatively rare, occurring in no more than 7 % of these.  
 After placing the above objects, it is then time to add xibo (錫箔), the most 
important kind of spiritual money, into the coffin. Xibo are “silver” ingots made of tinfoil 
paper. They are used for all kinds of rituals in Shanghai, whether for salvation rituals, 
wake keeping, ancestor worship, or (cremains) burial ceremonies. During my fieldwork, 
while occasionally I saw people choosing not to use spiritual cash, almost everyone used 
xibo (unless they were Protestants, see Chapter 8). In general, there needs to be enough 
xibo to cover the deceased’s entire body except for the face. The bereaved (usually 
women and young men) often fold them by hand from special square tin foil paper during 
the wake. You can also purchase pre-folded xibo. Some funeral professionals told me that 
handmade xibo show more filial piety than the store bought version; therefore they might 
be more efficacious in granting wishes.  
 Prior to the Winter Solstice in 2011, I helped Chen Yu and the Longevity get 
ready for a night sacrifice they would perform outside their office building. In Shanghai, 
this day is the most “yin” day of the year—ghosts are out and about that night, wandering 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 Chen Yu told me that they used to sell spiritual cash separately. However, they found out that 
the bereaved did not like to choose these things one by one. The bereaved interpreted such lists of 
choices as the funeral brokers trying to sell more things. From funeral brokers’ perspective, they 
could sell spiritual cash much more easily and with higher prices after making a spiritual cash 




around in the human world. It is also one of only two annual time periods for Shanghai 
people to bury the cremains of their dead and to worship their ancestors (the other time 
was during the Tomb Sweeping Festival in April). I arrived at Longevity in the afternoon 
and approached Chen Yu to help her fold xibo. She told me that I could help, but instead 
of putting the ones I made into her existing pile, she instructed me to put mine in a 
separate one. I asked why. She told me that they had to be separated because her pile (of 
xibo) was for her ancestors, so she wanted to make them all by herself to show her filial 
piety so that they would then be more likely to grant her wish for prosperity. The ones I 
made could go to the pile for the previous “customers” of Longevity (all of the deceased 
for whom brokers at Longevity had previously organized funerals). These previous 
customers were those on whom Longevity’s livelihood depended (yishi fumu 衣食父母), 
since they introduced new customers to the agency from the other world.   
 After placing xibo, funeral professionals ask the bereaved to pick flowers from the 
flower baskets that were displayed on both side of the meeting hall during the meeting. 
They often ask the bereaved to pick the Chinese daffodils (shuixian 水仙花) from each 
basket because that is usually the most expensive flower in the baskets. They then put 
these flowers on top of the xibo so the flowers also cover the whole body (except for the 
head). Chen Ting often specifically tells the bereaved to pick one flower from each 
basket so the deceased will be accompanied by everyone’s hearts—she was very good at 
inventing satisfying details for directing the rituals.  
 The time needed to place offerings varies depending on how calm the bereaved 




Time management is important because meeting halls are booked in one hour time slots 
and there is only a ten minute break in between funerals for the parlor’s janitors to clean 
them up and set them up for the next family. Therefore, if placing the offerings takes up 
too much time, experienced funeral professionals call in the funeral practitioners who are 
responsible for bringing the coffin’s lid in before the bereaved actually finish. Once the 
lid arrives, the bereaved know that they have to finish placing the offerings in as soon as 
possible. When this is done, it is then time to put the lid on the coffin.   
 The professional coffin lid carriers, always men, also bring a hammer, four 
“descendant nails” (zisunding 子孫釘), and a “resting-in-peace covering” (安息罩) along 
with them. Descendant nails look like regular long nails. Nailing them is said to work as 
protection and as a blessing for the descendants of the deceased. Today, the descendant(s) 
of the deceased hammer the three nails down through the lid into three corners of the 
coffin. The bereaved are instructed, however, not to punch the fourth nail in all the way. 
Leaving the head of the nail standing out (or “rising out from the lid”) resembles a 
“descendant outgrowing” (zisunchutou 子孫出頭) and represents the protection of an 
ongoing line of descendents. The nailing is purely symbolic since the coffin will not 
actually be sealed and need not be airtight for the cremation.  
 Either the children or grand children, both male and female, of the deceased 
perform the act of nailing today. These four variables (children or grand children and 
males or females) are very flexibly combined depending on the specific funeral 
professionals and their ad hoc judgment based on the situation of the grieving family. For 




the nailing  depending on different funeral professionals. Even the same funeral 
professional will change her “rule” based on her observations of family politics. For 
example, Chen Ting once made all four children of the deceased (one man and three 
women) do the nailing in one funeral. However, she made the grandchildren of the 
deceased do the nailing in another funeral. She told me that this was because the deceased 
had three children, but four grandchildren. Since funeral costs in Shanghai are generally 
split equally among children disregarding gender, she reasoned that this way avoided 
making a particular child more important than the others in the ritual.  
 The “resting-in-peace covering” is a red cloth covered with a printed Chinese 
character for luck or fortune (fu 福) that is used to cover the coffin after it is 
(symbolically) sealed. This covering prevents the deceased from being exposed to light. 
Since the deceased is in a liminal stage, it is vulnerable to all of the various kinds of 
spirits that fill the world. The act of covering someone who is in a liminal stage is very 
common in Chinese ritual practices. In Taiwan, for instance, when a bride walks out of 
her house after beginning the marital ceremony and is sent on her way to her future 
husband’s house to complete the wedding ceremony (thus while she is neither single nor 
yet fully married), she has to walk under a black umbrella so she is protected from spirits. 
However, it is worth pointing out that both the resting-in-peace covering and the 
descendant nails are not used in all funeral parlors in Shanghai. Among the three city 
funeral parlors, only Longhua has them. They became service items after the 
marketization of the parlors.  




were changed to fit new circumstances when the ritual was “brought back.” For example, 
according to Master Gao (who started to work in the Shanghai funeral industry in the 
1950s and who I quoted in length in last chapter), traditionally there was only one 
descendant nail (instead of four). At that time when body burial was the main way of 
disposing of the body, funeral professionals nailed the coffins themselves because they 
actually needed to be properly sealed to be airtight. The descendent nail was a single 
large long nail with a lotus flower attached to it. It was symbolically nailed in the center 
of the top edge of the coffin close to the head. Moreover, instead of having the 
descendant perform the nailing, it was the maternal uncle of the deceased who performed 
this act (for the role of maternal uncles in Chinese folk death ritual, see Emily Martin 
1973 and Rubie Watson 1988).   
 When the nailing ritual is complete, the funeral professionals lay the resting-in-
peace covering on the top and sides of the coffin and then direct the bereaved to 
accompany the deceased to the parking lot. From the meeting hall to the parking lot, 
many funeral parlors have a service item called “ceremonial funeral procession” (liyi 
chubin 禮儀出殯) as introduced in Chapter 6. Several state practitioners told me that this 
kind of military style ceremonial funeral procession was borrowed from Taiwan. 
 In some funeral parlors, the bereaved were expected to accompany the deceased 
to the crematorium, this was especially the case in Yishan Funeral Parlor and all the 
suburban funeral parlors where they have crematoria on site. The bereaved in these 
funeral parlors usually accompany the deceased all the way by walking from the meeting 




Longhua and Baoxin have moved their crematoria to Yishan funeral parlor. Thus if the 
funeral is held in either of these downtown parlors, the coffin will be placed in a hearse to 
be driven to Yishan for cremation. Thus, the bereaved in Longhua and Baoxin usually did 
not accompany the deceased to the crematorium at Yishan Parlor. Either way, this last 
journey (from meeting halls to parking lot or to crematoria) is the mourners’ last chance 
to send the deceased off on his or her way (song zuihou yicheng 送最後一程). 
Meanwhile, on the bereaved's side, the bereaved who watch the coffin entering the hearse 
are standing, bowing, or even kowtowing during this process of sending away. They may 
also sob, weep, or do nothing. Funeral professionals usually do not offer any direction to 
unify their movements for this part.  
 Once the people who stayed inside for the post-farewell ceremony rituals join 
those hanging out outside the hall, they then go to a pre-booked restaurant together either 
by rented tour bus or on foot to the parlor's own restaurant to have “doufufan” (豆腐飯), 
funeral banquets. Funeral banquets were banned at the peak of the Cultural Revolution in 
Shanghai because they were considered feudal practices that were centers for both waste 
and social reciprocity. Funeral banquets returned to Shanghai people’s public life as soon 
as state control over funerals lessened. After the marketization of funeral parlors, all state 
funeral parlors established their own funeral banquet restaurants to compete with the 
private ones. For example, Longhua Funeral Parlor has a funeral restaurant called Angel 
(tianshi jiujia 天使酒家). 
 In addition to these state run funeral banquet restaurants within funeral parlors, 




Quanshan (泉山), Haijie (海傑), and Jin Zhuang (金庄) Restaurants are located in the 
north and therefore primarily serve funeral attendants in Baoxin Funeral Parlor. Haomen 
(豪門) and Deqifu (德齊福) Restaurants are located in the south and therefore mainly 
serve people who go to Longhua Funeral Parlor. These private funeral banquet 
restaurants often worked with funeral brokers to ensure ongoing business. For example, I 
described in Chapter 5 how some funeral banquet restaurants set up “shell companies” 
for independent funeral brokers to be “nominally affiliated” with so that the latter could 
be registered with the Funeral Trade Association to obtain work permits.  
 Before entering restaurants, people usually perform a cleansing ritual called 
guohuo (過火), meaning crossing the fire. Mourners put their black mourning armbands 
and condolence couplets into a small fire on the ground and then cross over the fire with 
one leg. However, although both Christian and non-Christian bereaved ended their 
memorial meetings with funeral banquets, Christians did not participate in all of this 
ritual. Christians simply threw their armbands into the fire and walked in. I will discuss a 
Protestant version of the memorial meeting in detail in the next chapter.  
 Christians are not the only group who do not participate in crossing the fire. The 
chief mourners also cannot participate because they are supposed to stay in mourning 
longer than other funeral participants. In Shanghai, the most common ending date for 
mourning was the 35th day after death occurred (seven days count as one cycle and the 
mourning period usually contains five cycles).  
 In all funeral banquet restaurants, crossing the fire was done in an outdoor space 




served with sweet tea. Everyone drinks this sweet tea regardless of their religious 
affiliations. It is worth mentioning that drinking sweet tea is a very common ritual in all 
kinds of life cycle rituals among Han Chinese. Also, funeral professionals were rarely 
invited to these funeral banquets, if a private broker arrived with the bereaved, they most 
likely will retire to a separate room to deal with logistics or chat with the employees and 
owners of the restaurant.  
 Overall, we can see three important transformations in the transition from socialist 
civil funeral to the post memorial meeting events described above. The first is a transition 
from ritual as a collective act to ritual as a relational act. Recalling my description, after 
everyone performs the farewell ceremony the family of the deceased stays in the meeting 
hall while the other people are free to decide what they want to do. They could go in to 
join the bereaved to put xibo in the coffin or they could stay outside the meeting hall to 
hang out. They could even leave right away if they did not plan to go to the banquet. 
Such change indicates a shift from socialist collectivism where everyone is doing the 
same thing at the same time to a popular religious world where many things occur either 
simultaneously or at different times. This was because folk death ritual is based on 
relational acts. Depending on the distance of their relationship to the deceased, ritual 
participants were now expected to perform different acts. The funeral could already be 
over as far as you are concerned depending on your relationship. This was in contrast to 
socialist civil funerals where everyone is related as comrade to comrade and there is no 
need to do perform ritual differently. 




regimes as a spectrum of normative forces for regulating emotion (2001:124-125). As 
soon as the bereaved formed a circle around the coffin after the last group of mourners 
performed their farewell, they leave the socialist emotion regime and enter the emotion 
regime of folk death ritual. Their wailing might be accompanied only by crying sounds, 
tears, and sobbing, but it was also not uncommon to see dramatic bodily movements such 
as shaking bodies or stomping and screaming. Sometimes people even knelt in partial 
prostration even though the whole point of promoting bowing during the socialist civil 
ritual was to replace feudalistic kneeling. This was all in stark contrast to the emotion 
regime in the socialist subjunctive world; only moments before, individuals were 
expected to show solemnity and calm – even though that façade sometimes did crack. But 
a complete loss of control meant that the memorial meeting could not continue.  
 To some degree, the bereaved not only could but also should cry once they enter 
post memorial meeting events. This is because weeping is an important sign of filial 
piety. Under this emotion regime, the lack of outward expression of grief and mourning 
implies an absence of affect and therefore a breach of social propriety. For example, one 
day a funeral broker asked me to look at two crying women in a funeral. The broker 
whispered to me and said, I bet the woman on the right is the daughter of the deceased 
and the one on the left is the daughter-in-law. I asked him how he knew this. He said, it’s 
easy. One looks like she is really crying and the other looks like she is faking it. The 
assumption behind the broker’s description is that daughters-in-law, the ultimate outsider 
of the Chinese patrilineal system, are the prime suspects for not being able to cry at a 




daughters-in-law could produce tears and cry hard, this does not exempt them from 
public opprobrium for “fake” crying in contemporary Shanghai. The obligatory aspect of 
outward expressions of grief and mourning is why traditionally people hired professional 
weepers if the bereaved felt that they were unable to cry for the full socially expected 
length and strength.205 James Watson’s (1988) classic work on Han Chinese death ritual 
specifically addresses the importance of professional weepers based on his fieldwork in 
1960s in the rural Hong Kong.206 
 Today, funeral professionals actually perform a key role in regulating emotion in 
different emotional regimes in urban Shanghai. In the last chapter, I described how they 
made sure the bereaved control their expressions of grief and mourning during the 
socialist ritual. As soon as a funeral switches to these post memorial meeting events, 
funeral professional had to know exactly when the “appropriate” moments for crying out 
loud without too much self-restraint were and how much time was the right amount. That 
is, if you don’t give the bereaved enough time to “let it out” right after they formed the 
circle around the body, then when you try to direct them to place offerings in the casket at 
the next stage, they will still be too busy crying to do what they are supposed to do 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 One informant, whose hometown was in rural Shanghai, told me that a couple of years ago 
when her mother died, she had to hire professional weepers. She said, in her village, people 
expected mourners to weep in a stylized fashion. This kind of weeping often involves verbal 
laments. Despite herself being an urban funeral professional, she did not know how to do this 
properly she had to hire a weeper.  
206 Professional weepers are still alive and well in many parts of China. Shanghai is not 
exceptional even though weepers are only found in rural Shanghai. This was especially the case 
for people on Chongming Island (崇明島), a rural area in Shanghai where there is a long history 
of wailing. One state practitioner I knew told me that her mother was a professional weeper on 
Chongming. Another state practitioner whose natal home was on Chongming told me that when 
she went home for her mother's funeral, she had to hire a weeper to cry on her behalf because, in 





thereby delaying the whole procedure. If funeral professionals gave the bereaved too 
much time, however, it could also delay the meeting hall’s schedule.  
 Leaving too much time for wailing could cause embarrassment if the bereaved 
stopped crying on their own before the funeral professional forces them to stop. In cases 
where the professional was late in stopping the crying it creates an awkward moment of 
silence because of the obligatory aspect of wailing in performing traditional folk funerals. 
Shanghai people in general have an ambivalent attitude toward excessive outward 
expression of grieving and mourning as discussed in the last chapter. This was consistent 
with James Wilce’s (2009) argument on how modernity further makes lament seem to be 
“traditional.” In fact, several funeral professionals (especially those who were rural 
migrants) told me that “stopping their crying before they have to” is a “Shanghai thing” 
because (they thought that) Shanghai people have less affection for their aged parents.  
 Finally, the third transition is the movement from a spiritless world to a world of 
spirits. While the socialist civil ritual is built on an atheist assumption that denies spirits 
and afterlife, in those post memorial meeting events, the most important goal is to take 
care of the spirit of the deceased to ensure a smooth transition into afterlife. In this world 
of spirits, one of the most important things is to please the deceased. This includes giving 
material wealth to the deceased through offering spiritual cash, paper made mahjong tiles, 
maotai liquor, cigarettes, and gold and silver ingots, and through giving “face” (mianzi 面
子) to the deceased by purchasing ceremonial funeral processions and a nicer hearse for 
sending them off for instance. Through the act of providing provisions (Stafford 1995), 




We could see this materialized in the act of combing. The act of combing symbolizes the 
last affective act that was based on a relationship between parents and children. The 
breaking of the comb means that that kind of affective bond has to be changed (literally, 
broken with the funeral) to one between ancestors and descendants. Ideally, these 
ancestor spirits will grant prosperity to their descendants. The ritual of nailing the 
“descendant nail” is the direct enactment of such hopes today.  
 As a result, the tripartite transitions from collective act to relational act, from an 
emotion regime of being solemn and calm to one of highly emotional outward 
expressions of grief and mourning, and from a material world to a spiritual world are all a 
part of the exit from the solemn and entrance into the cathartic phenomenological world 
of “heat and noise” (renao 熱鬧) that marks all social occasions in Chinese public life, 
from night markets and temple festivals to weddings and traditional funerals (Yu Shuenn-
Der 2004). This hot and noisy atmosphere is one of the most important characteristics 
that structured and sustained popular religion in Chinese societies (Adam Chau 2006; DJ 
Hatfield 2009; Weller 1994; Stephan Feuchtwang 2010: 81; Han Steinmuller 2013:74).   
 The extra ritual acts of memorial meeting are mixtures of Confucianism, 
Buddhism, Daoism, popular religion, and gift exchange between the living and the dead 
and among the living. Whether a funeral is arranged through a funeral broker or a state 
practitioner, these extra ritual acts are very standardized. The variation is primarily 
delineated along the lines of an urban-rural distinction.207  In the past, these kinds of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Variations are primarily drawn along parlors’ lines. This means that Longhua, Baoxin, and 
Yishan are slightly different from each other. Among them, the first two share more similarity. 




rituals were the prime targets for crackdowns during Funeral Reform because religion is 
“superstition” and gift exchange is “feudalism” under the CCP. In today’s Shanghai, 
however, various funeral professionals told me that over 90% of memorial meetings 
contained the set of rituals I described above. This number was even higher in my sample 
since almost all memorial meetings I observed contained these post memorial meeting 
events as long as they were not Christian versions of memorial meetings (Christians do 
also have funeral banquets, however). 
  
Creating Religious and Relational Subjects in Socialist Civil Funerals 
 The extra rituals of memorial meetings held in funeral parlors not only recognize 
the spirit of the deceased, but also see such spirits as situated in reciprocal relationships. 
Consequently, in these extra rituals, the deceased are not conceptualized as socialist 
citizen subjects. Instead, they are conceptualized simultaneously as religious and 
relational subjects in public as well. In the following section, I provide several vignettes 
to further delineate how the deceased were conceptualized as religious and relational 
subjects in these extra memorial meeting events.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Longhua and Baoxin consistently told the bereaved that cremation does not require the family’s 
presence since this would be “too painful to watch” while Yishan told the bereaved that the 
journey from the meeting hall to cremators was the deceased’s last journey and people of course 
should “accompany their beloved at their last journey.” In a Pudong Funeral Parlor, a suburban 
one, body cosmeticians perform the “displacing the body into the coffin” (ruguan 入棺) ritual in 
front of the chief mourners before the memorial meeting starts. Meanwhile, in all three city 
funeral parlors, the “displacing of the body into the coffin” is not in any way ceremonial at all. 
Body cosmeticians simply put the deceased into a cremation coffin as a part of the overall 




Conceptualizing the Dead as Buddhist Subjects I: Dharani flag 
 The first time I saw a Dharani flag was also the time I first met my sleepover 
friend who taught me that her first day of working in a factory was her date of joining the 
revolution—the story I told in the last chapter. The deceased in this memorial meeting 
was an old bachelor. He had spent his most productive years as a sent down-youth in 
rural Heilongjiang (in northeastern China). Eventually, he was able to switch his 
household registration to Shanghai and therefore could legally return. After relocating 
back to Shanghai, he worked in a middle school until he completely retired. His job was a 
combination of security guard and janitor. His younger brother and the younger brother’s 
nuclear family (a wife and a son) lived with him after he moved back to Shanghai and 
took care of him before he died.  
 The younger brother felt that he owed his older brother a great deal because the 
latter’s acceptance of being a sent-down youth had meant that he himself was exempted. 
He also felt the fact that his older brother had never been married and therefore had no 
descendents was all directly a result this same sacrifice. For Han Chinese, dying as a 
bachelor without any descendents is one of the worst conditions of death (not to mention 
being an unfilial act to one's own ancestors). The deceased's situation was in stark 
contrast to the younger brother's, who had both a wife and a son. Finally, the younger 
brother also felt guilty about his own financial prosperity. In the beginning of the 
Opening Up period, the younger brother managed to find a job as a manager of a 
Taiwanese plastic molding company. This company made a lot of money since there was 




skills he needed from his Taiwanese boss and then moved on to open his own factory. He 
prospered greatly. He felt that he would not have had such a chance to prosper if he had 
been the one who was stuck in Heilongjiang.  
 The younger brother held a normal memorial meeting for the older brother. He 
made his only son hold the photographic portrait of his older brother, a role that is usually 
strictly played by direct descendents of the deceased. He also informed the school where 
the older brother had worked so the school could send someone to give a memorial 
speech. The wife of the younger brother was a lay Buddhist and she was a part of an 
informal group of lay Buddhist friends who did chanting and visited temples together. All 
of the members of this group were women. The lady I mentioned in the beginning of this 
vignette was actually the charismatic leader of this group. Through the connection of the 
younger brother’s wife, several lay Buddhists joined the funeral even though they did not 
know the deceased in person.  
 On the day of the funeral, the chief mourners and a group of six lay Buddhists 
arrived at the meeting hall together. There was no funeral broker involved in this funeral. 
At that time, I did not know that these lay Buddhists were not part of the deceased's 
family. There was no visual sign to distinguish the lay Buddhists from the chief 
mourners. After all, every funeral participant wore the same black armband and the 
regular clothes that Shanghai people wear every day. All I knew at that time was that they 
came together so they were all counted as chief mourners. I only found out the difference 
later when I was invited to the funeral banquet (one of the few times that I was invited to 




documents, the state practitioner led these people to the body preparation room located in 
the back of the meeting hall. In general, only direct family members of deceased go to the 
body preparation room (in addition to funeral professionals and the occasional stray 
ethnographer).  
 Once they were in the body preparation room, the charismatic leader got her 
Dharani flag out. She draped it on top of the deceased's body. A Dharani flag is a yellow 
flag printed with red Buddhist sutra texts on it (see Figure 8.1). Lin Wan from Longevity 
once told me that “having a Dharani flag to cover the body is like having the National or 
Party flag covering the body.” Thus, when the memorial meeting is finished, “just like 
you would not burn the National or Party flag, you need to take the Dharani flag out 
before closing the coffin for cremation. You use Dharani flags to wrap around a cremains 
casket like those who have National or Party flags do.” In other words, each of these flags 
provide protection for the deceased; they just do so by associating with different sources 
of power.  
 Meanwhile, the printed sutras function to produce merit for the deceased on their 
journey. After laying this down, the leader began to chant amitabha a couple of times 
while making the hand gesture of namaste (having two hands held against each other in 
front of her chest). In turn, the other people in the room began to do the same thing on 
their own. Their chanting was not collectively coordinated. I looked at the state 
practitioner to see what reaction she had. This was the first time I had seen people placing 
Dharani flags and chanting amitabha with the namaste gesture within a state socialist 




Figure 8.1 A Dharani flag 
 
 
  The mourners stayed in the body preparation room a little bit longer than usual so 
that the family could take another close look at the deceased. Then the state practitioner 
told them that it was about time to return to the meeting hall. After receiving this 
instruction, instead of walking back to the hall, the charismatic leader again started to 
chant amitabha with the namaste gesture again. This time, however, all of the women 
followed at once and their chanting voices slipped into unison. Moreover, they did not 
just chant amitabha once or twice. They continued chanting a long chain of amitabhas. 
Since this was done in unison this time, the volume of the chanting increased 




heard above the background noise so mourners in other body preparation rooms could 
hear them. It was at this time of rising profile that the state practitioner suddenly stopped 
the chanting. She told them what they are doing was inappropriate. They stopped and all 
of us then returned to the meeting hall to wait for an otherwise quite unremarkable, 
equally socialist memorial meeting to start.  
 
Conceptualizing the Dead as Buddhist Subjects II: Monks in kasaya 
 This funeral was a very unusual one. The deceased died young (in her early 
forties) and her husband was very rich—so rich that when she died in the accident that 
night, her husband was still in a jail somewhere serving a corruption related sentence. In 
addition, although the family were local Shanghai people, they had acquired Hong Kong 
residency at the beginning of the Opening Up period. Her death therefore counted as the 
death of a Hong Kong person instead of as one of a Shanghainese. This meant that the 
deceased was exempted from cremation. Finally, the deceased was not only rich (through 
her husband) but also famous in the entertainment business and in philanthropy in Hong 
Kong and Shanghai. She even made it into fashion magazines every once a while as a 
glamorous celebrity. The combination of these factors—of being a Hong Kong resident, 
rich, and famous—meant that the family was able to push the edges of regulation quite 
far in the process of handling this sudden and accidental death. Meanwhile, both the 
funeral broker and state practitioners gave this family a lot of leeway when organizing 
her funeral.   




right from the beginning. Chen Ting and I went to the deceased’s luxurious colonial style 
house in downtown Shanghai to have our initial business meeting. Her memorial meeting 
was held in the biggest meeting hall at Huangpu Funeral Parlor. Although her family 
estimated that they would “only” have several hundred funeral guests, they insisted on 
renting the biggest hall because, as her sister told Chen Ting at our initial business 
meeting, “she deserved the best.” Before the memorial meeting started, twenty monks 
arrived in the meeting hall wearing bright yellow and red kasaya. The kasaya is a 
garment for practicing Buddhist monks. Moreover, such colors made this group of monks 
even more conspicuous in a socialist public place like a memorial meeting hall that rarely 
saw actual practicing monks and where the primary colors were of the buildings were 
white and light grey.  
 As soon as I saw the monks, I looked to Manager Liu, the manager of the Sales 
Unit at Huangpu. He showed up for all of the funerals held in the largest meeting hall. 
Not surprisingly, he had an expression of distinct disapproval on his face. By that time, I 
had learned how “monk rules” worked in the parlor. At Huangpu, monks were not 
allowed in meeting halls. They were only allowed in the wake keeping rooms located in a 
different building. The monks at Huangpu were also almost always non-practicing 
professional “monks” contracted by the parlor to perform chanting services for its 
customers. These, however, were not their monks. I immediately walked over closer to 
Liu in order to see what he would do next. As I approached, Manager Liu told me, “I am 
about to talk to the bereaved. In a place like this [the largest hall] with a memorial 




have so many monks in kasaya]. They should at least wait until the meeting is finished [if 
they want to have monks performing rituals].”  
 Manager Liu first asked the monks to take a break in the resting room adjacent to 
the meeting hall to get them out of the public gaze. Then he went over to talk to Chen 
Ting about this. Chen Ting told Liu that the family originally told her that they wanted to 
perform a salvation ceremony after the meeting. She protested that she also had only just 
found out that the one who hired the monks insisted on having a short sutra chant 
performed before the meeting as well because the deceased had died so young and so 
suddenly. The soul of someone dying young is even more desperate for salvation and 
merit to ensure that she does not stay in limbo and linger around in this world. Manager 
Liu nonetheless insisted that it was inappropriate to have monks in the meeting hall 
especially in such a grand public space. After all, this largest hall is the same hall where 
memorial meetings of high-ranking Party leaders are held.  
 For a while I thought that the issue had been settled and that the monks would not 
chant. Later, however, Chen Ting told me that Manager Liu had agreed to step back and 
allow a brief chant to be performed before the meeting. It turned out that the monks were 
from the Jade Buddha Temple (Yufosi 玉佛寺). This is one of the four most famous 
Buddhist temples in Shanghai. In fact, one rumor that was circulating in Shanghai was 
that the late Deng Xiaoping himself had visited the Jade Buddha Temple every Chinese 
New Year. This rumor shows the extra power that the Jade Buddha Temple was seen as 
having. In any case, the deceased was active in philanthropy and a devout Buddhist. The 




not usually send their monks out to perform salvation rituals. Moreover, one of the monks 
turned out to be a personal acquaintance of Manager Liu. All of these factors added 
together to make it such that Liu could not absolutely say no.  
 Manager Liu, Chen Ting, and the son of the deceased finally came to a solution so 
they could do this “properly.” They decided to first ask everyone to leave the meeting 
hall. They then could bring the deceased in while only inviting the family members to re-
enter to join a short domestic salvation ceremony before the memorial meeting would 
begin. When this was done, they then could invite everyone else in again to start the 
public and official memorial meeting as usual. However, since there were about three to 
four hundred guests there, it turned out to be impossible to execute this alternative plan. 
The funeral professionals managed to ask some people to leave the main portion of the 
meeting hall, but when the deceased came in, everyone (and not just family members) all 
came back in (and many had never even left the hall as required in the first place). In the 
end, the twenty monks stood around the deceased to perform ten-minutes of sutra 
chanting in front of all funeral participants.  
 When this salvation ritual was over, the MC announced the beginning of the 
memorial meeting, pretending that the previous chanting and early entrance of the rest of 
the participants had not just happened. Through the power of officiating, the MC soothed 
the social glitches (Goffman 1974) as if everything was as it should be. The remaining 
parts of the memorial meeting then proceeded in the socialist manner as usual.208  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 The work unit representative who gave the memorial speech in this funeral was someone from 




Constructing Buddhist Subjectivity for Socialists  
 In Shanghai memorial meetings, rituals that are specifically related to Buddhism 
are less common when compared with the folk death ritual and funeral banquet additions 
described in the beginning of this chapter. In the context of memorial meetings, the 
socialist civil funeral, the most common Buddhist rituals are the use of the Dharani flag, 
chanting amitabha, or having monks in kasaya. Among these, you would be much more 
likely to run into a memorial meeting using the Dharani flag than one with monks in 
memorial meetings. All funeral brokers I know of regularly stocked Dharani flags even 
though funeral parlors themselves usually did not sell them. As for having monks in 
kasaya inside the meeting hall, among the 75 entire memorial meetings and numerous 
other parts of meetings I saw, I only witnessed this happen twice. The story I just 
described was the second time I saw it happen. The first time I saw three monks in grey 
kasaya in a medium sized meeting hall. Even though bright yellow and red kasaya and 
grey kasaya are both kasaya, I do think that the less conspicuous color of the gray robes 
gave these other monks a little bit more leeway. This was not to mention that this funeral 
was quite small, probably with less than fifty participants. As a result, when they did a 
quick chanting before the meeting started, the state practitioner who was in charge did 
not intervene.  
 In addition to these two, I also heard a different state practitioner complain about 
a third case one day. She told me that a funeral broker had allowed his customers to bring 
monks to the meeting hall that she was in charge of the day before. I could not probe for 




inform me of the way that funeral brokers were “messing around” (luangao 亂搞) and 
making everything chaotic. These examples are consistent with my description and 
analysis in Chapter 5 of how the structurally fragile position of funeral brokers creates the  
possibility for exactly this sort of religious revival within socialist civil funerals.   
 To some degree, the deaths in above two vignettes both involved abnormal 
conditions of death. The deceased in the first vignette was an old bachelor without any 
descendents. The deceased in the second vignette died young in an accident. According 
to Chinese lore, both cases might engender malicious ghosts and, at least, suggest extra 
difficulties that the deceased might encounter on their way to the next world. They 
therefore needed more help from the living on their route to salvation. As a result, it is 
understandable that the bereaved tried to do more than usual, pushing the boundaries a bit 
more.  
 Since the Buddhist ritual is not yet routinized (especially as compared to the post 
memorial meeting rituals), it provides a particularly salient point to analyze the kind of 
techniques used in adding new rituals to the socialist memorial meeting and therefore 
adding new ideas of self other than being singularly socialist. I argue that the most 
important technique is to carve out a momentarily alternative space within the socialist 
subjunctive world. In the first vignette, I described how the state practitioner did not stop 
them when the family (along with the lay Buddhist friends) chanted while they draped the 
Dharani flag on the coffin. This was possible because the body preparation room is 
behind the meeting hall and therefore far away from the official socialist space. Only 




addition, those sporadic and individual amitabha chants really were not easily 
apprehensible. People who were in the next body preparation room probably could not 
hear what was going on let alone people in the meeting hall itself. All these factors 
allowed the chanting act to be conceptualized as a domestic ritual even though it occurred 
in funeral parlor, a de facto state socialist space. However, as soon as the individual 
chanting became a collective act that allowed the chanting sounds to penetrate the walls 
of the body preparation room, it broke the bubble of the temporarily created alternative 
space and the state practitioner intervened.  
 In the second vignette, when Manager Liu (a state practitioner) saw a group of 
twenty monks in kasaya present and trying to perform chanting, he immediately removed 
them to the resting room so they were not seen in the meeting hall. However, due to the 
deceased’s influential background, the status of the temple that these monks represented, 
and the fact that Manager Liu knew one of the monks, he decided to compromise so the 
monks could perform a chanting ritual before the meeting started. The collaborative 
solution they came up with was to evacuate everyone from the meeting hall (although this 
solution failed). This evacuation of funeral participants allowed whatever events that 
were held in the same space to be viewed as domestic rituals. In other words, by 
removing the crowd, funeral professionals and the bereaved could (attempt to) turn a site 
of socialist mourning into a site of a family mourning. Though the funeral professionals 
and the bereaved did not execute their plan successfully, this solution nevertheless still 
indicates their belief that by momentarily carving out an (imagined) alternative space 




both occurred in the same state space, the memorial meeting halls. During this Buddhist 
ritual, the deceased is not a (dead) model socialist citizen. Instead, she is a wandering 
soul who needs the power of Buddha to guide her onto her incarnation journey. And even 
though the isolating strategy failed, the attempt to do so apparently made the chanting 
performance acceptable – it was ‘as if’ the room had actually been cleared. 
 The need to carve out an alternative space (at least monetarily) within the state 
socialist space is partially a result of contemporary legal regulations on religion in China. 
Chinese law separates religious spaces (zongjiao changsuo 宗教場所) from “public 
spaces” (gonggong changsuo 公共場所). Legally speaking, people can only have 
religious activities in religious spaces. It is illegal to have religious activities in public 
spaces because public spaces should be secular, socialist, and free of religion—a concept 
that is somewhat parallel with laicism in French.  
 Taking Longhua Funeral Parlor as an example, the first time I visited Longhua 
was during my preparatory fieldwork in 2009. I talked to a Mr. Huang who was relatively 
high up in the parlor about Shanghai funeral parlors in general. At that point, I had never 
been to any funerals in China. During our conversation, I asked him if religious activities 
were allowed in funeral parlors in Shanghai. He said that the law says that religious 
activities are only allowed in religious space. Funeral parlors, however, are public spaces. 
This means that technically religious activities are not allowed in funeral parlors.  
 However, as Huang went on to explain, since the parlors’ consumers (the 
bereaved) have “religious demands” (zongjiao xuqiu 宗教需求), funeral parlors today try 




there are several western style memorial meeting halls that can be used for Protestant or 
Catholic memorial meetings. These meeting halls have stained glass windows to 
resemble those in Christian churches, albeit without the Christian symbols. This religious 
ambiguity is a part of the design since both Christians and non-Christians rent such 
Western style meeting halls. I then asked Huang if there were any meeting halls for 
Buddhists or other religions. He said that there are some meeting halls with decorated 
with wooden windows that appear more Chinese in style, and that such believers could 
use this kind of hall.  
 At that time, I did not know that people “die socialist” in China. I also did not 
know that when people book meeting halls, they rarely choose them based on how the 
decor might fit with their specific religious needs. Due to limited supply, people usually 
choose meeting halls based on size and then pick the best time slot accordingly. In any 
case, maybe because Huang sensed my interest in religion, he told me that one of the six 
wake keeping rooms (shoulingting 守靈廳) at Longhua is Buddhist—the Jade Lotus 
Room (Yulianting 玉蓮廳). This room is decorated with statues of the Eighteen Arhats 
(Shiba Lohan 十八羅漢). According to Mahayana Buddhism, the Eighteen Arhats are 
disciples of the Buddha who have ended the cycles of reincarnation and reached 
nirvana.209 
 A year after that interview when I did start my fieldwork, I visited the Jade Lotus 
Room several times. This room (and all other wake keeping rooms) is not located in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 Eighteen Arhat status are very common in temples in China. Many Chinese people believe that 




same building with all the memorial meeting halls. All the wake keeping rooms are 
located in the office building itself on the fourth floor. Unless someone already knew 
where they were going, it is highly unlikely for someone to just pass by and see any of 
the wake keeping rooms. The room is rectangular just like any of the other halls in 
Shanghai’s funeral parlors. One short side of the room opens to the back hallway where 
the body comes in from the preparation room in the Cosmetics Unit. The other short side 
is adjacent to a separate lounge where several Chinese style wooden chairs are provided 
and a shower room. The bereaved sit in the lounge while monks perform sutra chanting 
and salvation ceremonies in the room. They need not be constantly present themselves 
because the bereaved only need to offer incense and prostrations to the deceased at 
certain moments. They don’t have to sit through the whole ceremony with the monks.  
 Extending from floor to ceiling along each of the two long walls of the room are 9 
dark-stained wood-paneled display cases. While the bottom three feet of the cases are 
intricately carved solid wood, in the alcoves of the 9 top portions are golden painted 
statues in a variety of poses standing on white marble blocks. These Eighteen Arhat 
statues oversee all of the services that take place in the room. The impression they give is 
quite striking—each is about two feet tall and lit with a single spotlight from above—as 
their golden color sparkles in the light and presents a strong contrast with both the dark 
wood paneling and the white of the floor and the ceiling. This feeling grew even stronger 
once I became familiar with Longhua’s environment because its architecture and interior 
design is everywhere else modernist and minimalist. There is a lot of empty space and 




even more both as religious symbols and as extravagant decorations.  
 While the Jade Lotus Room at Longhua certainly stood out due to its deliberate 
decorations, all three city funeral parlors were much more likely to allow monks chanting 
in such separate, less accessible wake keeping rooms than in their actual memorial 
meeting halls. Huangpu Funeral Parlor allowed people to hire monks doing chanting in 
their wake keeping rooms as long as the bereaved hired these monks through the parlor. 
Several state practitioners told me that this was because they knew that the monks they 
worked with would follow the funeral parlor’s rules. However, the “problem” here is that 
most ordained monks in Shanghai did not go out of their temples to perform rituals at all, 
to have a ritual performed, you had to go to their temples instead. This is particularly true 
for those monks who are based in famous temples. Monks who are willing to go out to 
perform rituals at people’s homes are usually not “real” monks (meaning they were not 
ordained based on state rules). According to my informants, these “fake” monks are 
people who provide Buddhist rituals for their livelihood. These monks might know how 
to chant, but they do not practice celibacy and might not even be vegetarians. Many 
funeral brokers told me that the monks associated with funeral parlors are also this type 
of monks. 
 Regardless of whether the funeral parlors’ monks are “real” or “fake,” the fact 
that monks are not allowed in memorial meeting halls by itself is strange. This is because 
Protestant pastors and Catholic priests both can go into memorial meeting halls with their 
followers. I used to think that maybe this was because monks’ kasaya are too obviously 




no less conspicuous in funeral parlors. My funeral broker friends were not at all confused 
by the religious discrepancy I saw, however. They thought it was not strange because 
parlors could make money by providing monks while they could not very well do the 
same in providing priests or pastors. Confining monks to the wake keeping room was 
merely a means to prevent the bereaved from hiring their own monks and to encourage 
them to purchase the overnight rental of wake keeping rooms.210  
 I once asked a state practitioner why people have to hire monks through the 
parlor. He told me that if funeral parlors allow the bereaved to hire their own monks, 
funeral parlors would lose control of the ritual performance. Thus, these monks might 
burn spirit money or light up oil candles (instead of electric candles) inside the meeting 
halls. While this might be one reason, the fact that salespeople in funeral parlors received 
commissions from selling chanting services probably contributes at least equally (if not 
more) to why funeral parlors forced the bereaved to hire the parlor’s monks. Whenever I 
visited the main sales office at Huangpu, there was always a note on the whiteboard. This 
note showed how many Buddhist chanting services each salesperson had sold in the last 
month and how big a bonus they had earned respectively in the past few months.  
 Nevertheless, the ambiguous nature of Buddhist rituals within socialist civil 
funerals allows us to see some possible ways of creating and adding new rituals to the 
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had hoped to fully promote wake keeping rooms for everyone. They got their inspiration from 
funeral parlors in Sichuan Province. People there often kept their three days of wake in funeral 
parlors immediately before holding memorial meetings. From the funeral parlors’ perspective, 
this meant three days of wake keeping room rental, not to mention three days of catering food, 
cigarettes, and other services. They told me that wake keeping was one of the biggest profit items 
for funeral parlors in Sichuan. However, this service item never took off in Shanghai. As 
discussed, most people held their wakes at home (even though there was no body there). I was 




socialist civil funeral. Bad deaths provide a particularly useful site to examine the 
experimental creation of new ritual in performing socialist death ritual. By creating an 
alternative space within the state socialist space, either through the designation of wake 
keeping rooms or the temporary re-conceptualization of state space as a domestic one 
(such as the attempt to evacuate funeral participants in the second vignette), religious 
rituals are able to co-exist alongside socialist ritual. In this religious subjunctive world, 
the deceased is conceptualized as a religious subject.  
 
Conceptualizing the Dead as Relational Subjects I: White Envelopes 
 One of the first things I noticed about Shanghai funerals was that Shanghai people 
did not set up a gift table outside the meeting hall to receive white envelopes (baibao 白
包). I thought this very strange. Cash gifts in envelopes are the most common form of gift 
giving for Chinese life cycle rituals (and even for some gift giving beyond these ritual 
occasions). White is the traditional color of mourning for Han Chinese, so where 
wedding gifts are given in red envelopes, funeral gifts are given in white ones. Generally, 
the host family sets up a gift table at the entrance. Someone from the hosting family 
would receive the envelopes, take the money out from envelopes, calculate the exact 
amount of money, and then record the name and the amount of money in a gift book. 
This then would be the basis for future reciprocity. Such gift exchange is one of the key 
foundations for creating and maintaining social relations among Han Chinese, something 
that only slightly changed its form and intensity even during the high socialist period. 




funeral banquets) to be such a strange sight right from the beginning.  
 Once I had become a little bit more familiar with memorial meetings, I suddenly 
noticed a funeral participant push his hand into a chief mourner’s hand as they socialized 
with each other before the meeting started. The former gave the latter some kind of rolled 
up white paper. After this act, they exchanged eye contact, the chief mourner said thank 
you, and then put the white paper roll into his pocket in the back of his pants. They then 
carried on their conversion as usual as if nothing had just happened. The act of giving 
happened so fast that it was almost unnoticeable.  
 This furtive act was more like a drug dealer handing a bag of dope to a customer 
than it was like the normally very public gift exchange at non-Shanghai funerals.  It was 
done in a very subtle and almost secretive way. Once I noticed this particular exchange, I 
started seeing it happening again and again between various chief mourners and funeral 
participants. At one point when I saw this act happen again, a state practitioner happened 
to be standing right next to me. I whispered to her and asked her to look what was 
happening in these secretive acts of passing white paper. She looked and then stared at 
me in disbelief.  
 “Those are white envelopes. They are funeral participants’ expression of 
condolence to the bereaved.”  
 “White envelopes?!” I replied. “Why do they give white envelopes in such a 
secretive way?”  
 “Don’t you give white envelopes in Taiwan?”  




out of the envelopes and then makes a written record of who gave and how much they 
gave. Giving white envelopes is not a criminal act. Why do you hide it?”   
 “Oh, your way is like our rural way. We urban Shanghai people don't do that.”  
 It turns out that the rule for giving white envelopes in Shanghai is that they have 
to be given before the memorial meetings starts. Many people, especially if they are close 
to either the deceased or the bereaved, give their white envelopes at the wake. Most 
wakes are held at the deceased’s homes in Shanghai. When I later accompanied funeral 
professionals to do business meetings at the bereaved's houses, I often saw people 
coming to pay their respects. They offered incense and prostrations to the deceased’s 
portrait or simply gave the bereaved white envelopes and exchanged a few words. When 
it happened at home, the act of giving white envelopes was usually less “secretive” than 
what I had seen happen in the funeral parlors. However, not everyone could pay a visit 
during the wake. For those people who could not do so they would need to complete their 
white envelope transfer during the short time period before the official beginning of the 
memorial meeting. 
 
Conceptualizing the Dead as Relational Subjects II: Flower Baskets and their Mini-
Couplets 
 One day Chen Ting, Chen Yu, another staff member from Longevity, and I went 
to prepare the second largest meeting hall at Huangpu for a memorial meeting. This hall 
could accommodate several hundred people. The deceased for this meeting had 




died (in fact, she leapt from her office building window), her work unit organized the 
funeral. Chen Ting said that over one hundred flower baskets had been booked. As soon 
as the florist delivered the flower baskets, Chen Yu and I began to deal with their 
arrangement. All of the flower baskets had “mini-couplets” (xiaowanlian 小輓聯) 
attached to them. Mini-couplets are different from the vertical banner (hengfu 橫幅) and 
horizontal couplets (wanlian 輓聯) that were hung on the wall of the meeting halls (I 
discussed these in detail in Chapter 6 while recounting the details of a business meeting 
between state practitioners and the bereaved). Mini-couplets record the names of the gift 
giver, receiver, and kinship terminology that links the two sides of the flower basket gift. 
 After we arranged the flower baskets, Chen Ting asked the sisters of the deceased 
to verify our arrangements. Chen Yu went on to do other important things while Chen 
Ting directed me to do these final adjustments. She liked to make sure that the base part 
of all of the flower baskets were set up in a straight line for aesthetic reasons. In the 
middle of doing this, the sisters of the deceased came to Chen Ting and told her that they 
needed to talk about something with her. One of the sisters began, “I don’t know how to 
say this. This is kind of embarrassing. My sister [the deceased] and her husband got 
divorced a long time ago. She had since been seeing Mr. Lee for several years but they 
never got married. We called Mr. Lee Big Brother Lee. He, instead of her ex-husband, 
was more like family to my sister and me. Could you rearrange Mr. Lee’s and my sister’s 
ex-husband’s flower baskets so that Mr. Lee’s will be in front?” Chen Ting said, “I 
understand. Which flower basket was sent by Mr. Lee?” One sister led us all the way to 




 The mini-couplet on the flower basket from Mr. Lee simply said “dear friend” 
(zhiyou 摯友). The mini-couplets from the ex-husband’s flower basket did not describe 
his relation to the deceased as “ex-husband.” Instead, he had avoided mention of their 
relation, describing instead their unmarried daughter's relation to the deceased as 
daughter to mother. In general, the closer a person is related to the deceased, the more to 
the front her or his flower basket should be. For example, since kinship ties are 
considered closest, all baskets that addressed the deceased as friends are supposed to be 
at the back of the line. Flower baskets of immediate family members of the deceased are 
placed in front.  
 Since Mr. Lee’s flower basket defined his relationship to the deceased as “dear 
friend” while the ex-husband’s one described his daughter's relation to the deceased as 
daughter to mother, of course Chen Yu put the ex-husband’s one (without knowing that 
they were divorced long ago) in front while leaving Mr. Lee’s in the back of the line. 
Chen Ting apologized for the mistake. The sisters said that it was not her fault since she 
did not know these personal matters beforehand. Chen Ting then asked the sisters of 
bereaved where she should put Mr. Lee and the ex-husband’s flower basket. The two 
sisters talked to each other for a while. They decided to put Mr. Lee second, after the 
basket of the mother of the deceased. The third and forth basket were then their own 
baskets (given along with their respective nuclear families). The fifth one, the last prior to 
other relatives and friend's baskets, would be that of the ex-husband and their daughter.  
 




 Almost all memorial meetings in Shanghai contain elements of gift exchange as 
described above regardless of their religious differences. Whether referring to popular 
religious, Buddhist, Protestant, and Catholic versions of memorial meetings, they all also 
contained the ritual of giving white envelopes, flower baskets, and funeral banquets. This 
universal character testifies to the well-documented foundational place of gift exchange 
in the social fabric in Chinese societies (cf. Morton Fried 1953; Fei Xiaotong 1949). In 
contemporary China, many scholars have identified the importance of the gift economy 
in late socialist China and have extensively documented how such reciprocal exchanges 
construct relational subjects (Yan Yunxiang 1996, Mayfair Yang 1994, Andrew Kipnis 
1997).  
 One of the few funerals that I know of that did not end with a funeral banquet 
(although this funeral did have flower baskets) was one related to the death of a child. I 
interviewed the mother of the deceased whom I met through a grief-counseling group in 
Shanghai. She lost her only child when she was in her thirties about ten years prior to our 
interview. She hired a funeral broker to arrange her son’s funeral in a funeral parlor. This 
funeral was not a memorial meeting since there was no work unit giving the speech. Her 
funeral broker helped her prepare funeral baskets so she could put gift givers’ names 
down on the mini-couplets. However, my informant could not bear to have a funeral 
banquet so they decided not to organize one. She said that a funeral banquet only works 
when the dead is an elder. She told me that she just could not imagine eating and 
socializing with people after her son’s funeral. She looked me straight into my eyes and 




imagination. I immediately felt deeply embarrassed and guilty about even asking her this 
question even though we were talking about a funeral that happened 10 years ago.    
 For non-personalized funerals, flower baskets are the primary and often the only 
decoration of the meeting hall. The aesthetic value, however, is not why people have 
flower baskets. Like the funeral brokers at Longevity told their customers, flower baskets 
are records of renqing wanglai (人情往來  literally meaning human relationship 
interactions). These “human relationship interactions” are exchanges in three ways. First, 
it is a gift between the living and the dead. Traditionally, people gave silk or paper 
wreathes to the bereaved family in Shanghai. These wreathes had mini-couplets attached. 
By the end of funeral, the wreathes and the mini-couplets on them are burned, along with 
other things such as xibo, as an offering to the deceased. However, as explained in 
Chapter 3, wreathes and their immolation were considered to be feudalist superstitions 
(all folks practices were feudalist superstitions). They were completely banned at the 
peak of Cultural Revolution. Today, while both funeral parlors and private funeral 
brokers all sell paper and silk wreathes, flower baskets are their top selling item. At least 
one unspoken reason is that flower baskets have much higher profit margins (even though 
funeral professionals’ explanations to the bereaved are that flower baskets look prettier 
and are more modern). Nevertheless, even though many Shanghai people changed from 
wreathes to flower baskets, they still burn the mini-couplets as a way of notifying the 
deceased about who sent her or him a posthumous gift. The act of burning makes flower 
baskets a gift from the living to the dead.  




common explanation that funeral professionals offer when explaining the necessity of 
buying flower baskets. When someone gives the chief mourners a white envelope, the 
latter needs to return it. One way to (partially) return the gift is to buy flower baskets and 
put the name(s) of the giver(s) of the white envelope on the basket's mini-couplets to 
announce them as the flower givers. If the relationship between white envelope givers 
and the deceased (or the chief mourners) are distant or if the amount of money in the 
white envelopes is small, the chief mourners might simply write mini-couplets for them 
without purchasing flower baskets on their behalf. Every memorial meeting hall has 
several iron stands where people can hang those mini-couplets that are not attached to 
flower baskets. Funeral professionals put these iron stands behind the flower baskets if 
there were just too many baskets. Finally, flower baskets are a gift among the living. 
Funeral participants (either as individuals or representatives of institutions) can decide to 
give a flower basket to the mourners whether or not they had given white envelopes. 
These three kinds of gifts are not necessarily mutually exclusive either, especially in 
reference to the first and third.  
 However, while flower baskets are exchanged very publicly, exchanging white 
envelopes is not. This even though flower baskets actually served as a partial return gift 
of the white envelopes. I once asked Chen Yu about this. She told me that people in her 
hometown (in rural Jiangsu) also set up a gift table for funerals (and other life rituals). 
She thought that Shanghai people did not set up gift tables because they are both too 
frugal and too concerned about other people knowing how frugal they are (since this 




especially frugal by my rural immigrant informants.  
 I also asked about this subtle and almost secretive manner of giving envelopes to 
a state practitioner who was himself a local Shanghainese. He gave a very different 
explanation. He said that Shanghai people do not have public gift books to record gift 
exchanges because they are more sophisticated. He said, being sophisticated means being 
less direct. For him, giving money and counting it in public is too direct and almost 
vulgar. This is why their act of gift giving had to be subtle and unnoticed. He definitely 
did not say that Shanghai people were frugal nor did he suggest that they did not want 
their contributions known because they were afraid of losing face.  
 To some degree, such discrepancy is not that surprising since neither statement 
really explains the secretive style of gift giving. I suggest that such a secretive way of 
exchange is a way of making gift giving, something conducted in (State) public spaces 
(such as funeral parlors), into something domestic. Since not all funeral participants had 
time to pay a visit before the day of the funeral, not having gift tables or gift books and 
giving white envelopes in secretive gestures allows people who are involved in the 
exchange (as well as the audience who see the exchange) to see such acts as family 
matters instead of public matters.  This was why there was no gift table in the meeting 
hall.211 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 Another interesting part about envelope giving is that instead of treating the hosting household 
as a corporate unit in gift exchange, Shanghai people exchange gifts at a more individual level. 
One day when Chen Yu and I were at a wedding organized by Chen Ting, I noticed there was no 
gift table or gift book to receive and record “red envelopes” there either, just as there wasn't one 
for white envelopes at funeral banquets. To be clear, there was a sign-in table. In fact, I was in 
charge of the sign-in table. However, there was no gift book to record the exchange of red 




 Nevertheless, all these acts construct the deceased and the living as socially 
embedded persons whose identity is defined and maintained by reciprocal exchanges of 
“gifts, favors, and banquets” (Yang 1994). One of the best places to observe these 
relationships is the mini-couplets attached to flower baskets. Mini-couplets have a right 
and left component. On the right, they announce the mourning of the gift giver over the 
loss of the deceased by identifying them relationally based on their closest relationship 
with the deceased. On the left, they show a hierarchical respect through the perspective of 
the gift receivers by identifying how the deceased would refer to the gift givers. For 
example, a mini-couplet given to a grandfather by a grandson might be like this:  
 
Right: Deeply Mourn Paternal Grandfather (沈痛悼念祖父大人) 
Left: Respectively Given by Patrilineal Eldest Grandson Ma Wen and Grand 
Daughter-in-Law Jiang Mei ( 長孫馬文長孫媳婦江美敬輓)212  
 
 As we can see, the writing of mini-couplets indicates at least two things. First, 
mourning is by definition a relational act. A person mourns for the loss of her or his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
shoved red envelopes into the hands of the bride, groom, bride’s mother or father, or groom’s 
mother or father. While the parents of the bride and groom had pursues and pockets to store these 
red envelopes, the bride and groom had to pass the envelopes (once they received them) to a 
bridesmaid and a groomsman since their European style white wedding dress and black tuxedo 
had no storage space. Chen Yu told me that wedding guests gave their red envelopes to the people 
they knew personally (the bride, the groom, the bride’s parents, or the groom’s parents). This was 
not just an act of convenience due to their not having a “central station” to collect the money. On 
the contrary, by receiving the money as an individual, that individual enters into a debt 
relationship through gift exchange. They therefore take individual reciprocal responsibility 
respectively even if the condition of creating that debt relationship (the wedding or funeral) was a 
household matter. 
212 Chinese kinship terms distinguish patrilineal and matrilineal sides, generation, and gender. In 
this particular case, if Ma Wen and Jiang Mei have unmarried children, these children would be 





paternal grandfather or maternal grandmother, not by their names or just as a person who 
did great things or simply with status. The kind of relationship that existed is so important 
that there is no need to even say the name of the deceased. Second, there is no single 
definition of mourning. The length of mourning period and the kind of mourning 
garments to wear vary depending on how a specific living individual relates to the 
deceased. As a result, these mini-couplets articulate Confucian moral personhood. In this 
vision, everyone is embedded in five set types of hierarchical bonds: ruler to ruled, father 
to son, husband to wife, elder brother to younger brother, and friend to friend. In this 
sense, self is not only relationally, but also hierarchically embedded. 
 These kin based relationships articulated on mini-couplets are easily used also to 
include relationships based on socialism. By describing gift givers and receivers either as 
a comrade or a work unit, these flower baskets and their mini-couplets can also delineate 
a socialist ideal of a person who is in comradeship with other fellows and who is directly 
tied to the state through work units. Consequently, the more flower baskets the families 
receive in the funeral, the wider the network of gift exchange “the families” have whether 
we are talking about kinship based or work unit based. Having many flower baskets then 
makes a public statement about the status of the deceased, the bereaved (or the specific 
bereaved), the family, or all of the above. As a result, it is not surprising to know that one 
common thing people do before memorial meetings start is to browse through the mini-
couplets on the flower baskets so they know who (including institutions) have 
participated in gift exchange. Many times I saw funeral participants making comments 




flower basket” while looking around. 
 However, it is crucial to point out that flower baskets and their mini-couplets as 
well as funeral banquets are more than “the representation of the social” in a 
Durkheimian sense. They are also sites of creation. One of the best examples is the last 
vignette. I described how the sisters of the deceased asked Chen Ting to re-arrange Mr. 
Lee’s flower basket. By moving Mr. Lee’s basket to the front as the second basket, right 
after the mother of the deceased, the sisters of the deceased made a public announcement 
to declare how they and the deceased related to Mr. Lee (as a brother-in-law) even though 
there was no marriage between the deceased and Mr. Lee in the first place. For anyone 
who browsed the couplets, it would be clear that this “dear friend” was much more than 
that. 
 Negotiations over the sequential order of flower baskets happen all the time. For 
example, if the deceased was a woman and her parents were still alive, should the flower 
basket of her parents stand before that of her parents-in-law or vice versa? (I found that 
the former arrangement is more common in Shanghai.) If the deceased had several 
children and some were men and some were women, should their flower baskets be 
arranged purely based on birth order or separated by gender first and then birth order? 
Although funeral professionals all know the general rules and all have their own 
preferences for making arrangements based on their interpretation of the general rules, 
these rules are constantly negotiated on site. It is in this sense that I argue gift exchange 
and the social relationships articulated through it are more than the representation of 




understanding of the general rules (including perhaps most strongly the funeral 
professionals who do the original arrangement), they actually create, upgrade, and 
downgrade relationships. 
 Such negotiation occurs with flower baskets on the work unit’s side as well. The 
general rule is to have the deceased’s last work unit first, since that work unit was the 
closest organization that the deceased belonged to.213 This rule sounds straightforward, 
but it is more complicated when carrying it out. In fact, many state practitioners told me 
that for memorial meetings of important people in the largest meeting hall, arranging 
flower baskets is one of the most time consuming preparations. They sometimes had to 
spend the whole night before doing it. This is complicated due to the rapid restructuring 
process that has been happening in all kinds of institutions (government or not) since the 
Opening Up whereby, for instance, an institution that was a state bureau when the 
deceased worked there is now a quasi-private entity, but staffed by a high ranking party 
official (albeit a retired one).  
 In addition, hierarchy between different work units sometimes overrides the 
actual affiliation between the dead and the institutions. Furthermore, the exact 
hierarchical relationship is never as clear as people like to think it is, even if we are 
talking about government bureaus (or, perhaps, particularly when we are talking about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 For memorial meetings organized by the family of the deceased, flower baskets based on kin 
ties and other personal ties are placed on the left (from the deceased’s perspective) because the 
left side is the superior side (shangshou 上首) in Shanghai funerals. Flower baskets from work 
unit are placed on the right side of the meeting, the inferior side (xiashou 下首). By the same 
token, when work units are the organizers of a memorial meeting, its flower baskets should be on 
the left. However, several funeral professionals told me that since most funerals were organized 
by family now, many professionals prefer to place the family’s flower baskets on the left and 




government bureaus). So, to make up an example, say the head of Funeral Parlor A was 
made the Party secretary of Funeral Parlor B two years before he retired so as to solve the 
succession issue at Parlor A. Having retired from Parlor B, he went on to work as a 
consultant on funerals for the Civil Affairs Bureau. For his funeral, his last work unit 
before retiring was Parlor B. However, he actually spent much more time (and was much 
more well known) at Parlor A. Moreover, after he retired, he worked more informally for 
the Civil Affairs Bureau which is itself the parent organization of both parlors. Such a 
case would require a set of negotiations to determine the order of the baskets. This 
negotiation could take even longer when the staff who were sent to supervise the flower 
basket arrangement by different institutions needed to call their superiors (or their 
superiors need to call their superiors) to find a resolution when different understandings 
of hierarchy arose. Finally, once a particular flower basket is moved, all the other flower 
baskets after this one may need to be moved as well. As a result, arranging flower baskets 
on the work units side involved clarifying and delineating the exact hierarchical 
relationships among institutions, among people who represented the institutions, and 
between these and the deceased or the bereaved.  
 In addition to pointing out how gift exchange is not merely a representation of the 
social, I also want to emphasize that the engagement of reciprocity does not guarantee 
social solidarity. Taking funeral banquets as an example, they may, but do not always, 
facilitate the consolidation of social ties damaged by death. On the contrary, they could 
just as easily facilitate the destruction of social ties. While memorial meetings 




permanent resolution. Funeral banquets then became the site that allows such displaced 
conflicts to resurface.214 As Tang An said, imagine you had few drinks of yellow rice 
wine (huangjiu 黃酒) and just spent time doing things together with siblings whom you 
may just have had a big fight with at home right before the memorial meeting. Of course 
you would be very likely to let all that repressed anger come out. A state practitioner who 
used to be a manager of a funeral parlor’s restaurant told me that when he first got that 
job, he was surprised to find out that mediating quarrels was one of his primary jobs even 
though it was not listed in the job description. He also had to make particularly sure that 
people did not start to smash cups and dishes or even flip the tables in their anger. And, if 
it did happen, he needed to make sure that he kept track of the restaurant’s property 
damage so he could ask the bereaved to pay for the damages. Though which bereaved he 
would need to ask to pay the damages might start another quarrel later.                              
 All these examples show that gift exchange (through flower baskets, their mini-
couplets, and their funeral banquets) constructs relational subjectivity both for the dead 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 One of the key causes of banquet/funeral conflict is related to property, especially real estate 
property. Scholars working in China have long pointed out the conflicts associated with dividing 
households (as opposed to the American style inheritance post-death). Cases where the death of 
the head of a household precedes this division were one such moment ripe for conflict because 
one of the key figures that might have upheld or enforced the agreement is the very person who 
died. Funeral professionals I spoke to thought that these quarrels over property had only gotten 
worse in post economic reform China as the real estate bubble continued to grow in Shanghai. 
Not to mention that many elders’ real estate properties were purchased decades ago in what is 
now downtown Shanghai and therefore had even higher property values. Many of these elders 
gained these properties through work unit distributions in the first place. The high property value 
meant that the children of the deceased could completely turn around (fanshen) their financial 
situation if they successfully fought for their “appropriate” share of the property. While quarrels 
caused by death are common, in most cases, people are able to put conflict aside at least 
temporarily in order to hold the memorial meeting. However, I did hear of cases in which the 





and for living in the public domain. However, while we can gain insight into the social 
relationships of the deceased and the bereaved through their gift exchange, we should 
focus also on the productive value, instead of merely the representational value, of such 
exchanges. Finally, conceptualizing the deceased as relational subjects is the most 
common kind of alternative observed in contemporary memorial meetings since it 
transcends religious differences. 
 
The Preface-Appendix Approach and Plural Subjectivities  
 So far I have analyzed what alternative kinds of subjectivity are enacted within 
socialist civil funeral and how they are enacted. I have shown that there are at least two 
alternative kinds of self that are commonly constructed in memorial meetings today: 
religious and relational kinds of self. The dominant idea of a religious self is articulated 
through folk death ritual performed right after memorial meetings. This folk death ritual 
model is itself a combination of both the secular (e.g., focusing on filial piety) and the 
sacred idea of death and dead bodies (e.g., focusing on spirits and afterlife). Overall, folk 
death ritual includes Confucian, Daoist, Buddhist, and popular religious ideas and 
practices. At the same time, the idea of a relational self is articulated through gift 
exchange, whether we are talking about white envelopes, flower baskets (and their mini-
couplets), or banquets. These two ways of conceptualizing the deceased are in more or 
less “peaceful” relationship with the dominant socialist self as evidenced in the fact that 
they are standard practices in funeral parlors and now commonly practiced in the 




 Buddhist ideas of conceptualizing the dead, meanwhile, are secondary within 
socialist civil funerals. I suggest that the Buddhist idea of self is particularly salient when 
the death is considered to be “bad” (usually meaning someone died young or died from 
an accident) in Shanghai. Nevertheless, although the Buddhist idea of a person is a little 
bit more problematic within socialist civil funerals, it is rendered more or less acceptable 
by way of a deliberate act of creating an alternative space within state socialist spaces. In 
this alternative space, both funeral professionals and the bereaved perceive what they are 
doing as merely domestic ritual even though this “domestic ritual” is now being held in a 
“public space” (rather than a “religious space”) and is seen by non-family members.  
 If we imagine the memorial meeting as a book of socialism, what Shanghai 
people did in performing this kind of religious and relational variations of socialist civil 
funerals was to add a preface and an appendix to the socialist book. While the story that 
makes the book is still about socialism, the preface and appendix of the book are 
concerned with religious conceptions of the world, the deceased, and of the afterlife as 
well as the reciprocal relationship between and among the living and the dead. 
Specifically, this preface and appendix approach is achieved through temporization. By 
making added ritual exist before or after the core socialist civil funeral, they are able to 
become routine, if optional, additions onto the socialist core. This was especially true if 
they were performed after memorial meetings (as the work unit representative could 
leave without watching this). The best evidence for this is the standardization of that 
whole set of rituals (including funeral banquets) that happen after the farewell ceremony.  




more time on post-memorial meeting rituals than on the actual socialist meeting itself. 
This was certainly the case if we add the time spent on funeral banquets to the non-
meeting total. Yet, while the length of the preface and appendix might be longer than the 
actual book, for participants the memorial meeting is still the primary event. Without it, 
the funeral would not have taken place. While some Shanghai people went without the 
banquets, Buddhist, or popular religious practices, it would make no sense to go without 
the memorial meeting and, by definition, the memorial meeting is (still) Socialist.  
 In the last chapter I suggested to conceptualize memorial meetings as a kind of 
cognitive framing that provides “a spatial and temporal bonding of a set of interactive 
messages” (Bateson 1972 [2000]). In this chapter, I propose that when people create 
religious and relational variations of memorial meetings, they transform the frame of 
memorial meetings into a kind of modular frame. In this modular frame, socialist ideas of 
person provide a base that allows religious and relational ideas of person to co-exist. This 
priority is important because it would make no sense to Shanghai people to only have gift 
exchange, folk funerals, and/or Buddhist ritual without having the socialist ritual.  
 To be clear, some people indeed do not hold memorial meetings at all. As 
explained in the last chapter, some people only had farewell ceremonies (meaning no 
work unit’s memorial speech). I encountered one son of a deceased who refused to let me 
attend his father’s farewell ceremony. He told me that his “father was an intellectual. He 
did not believe in those ritual things and we will not have rituals. His farewell ceremony 
will be a simple event of close family members saying goodbye.”  In this sense, what he 




than being a challenge to the socialist idea, this refusal of the memorial meeting was a 
rare case of a person following the Party line by completely excluding ritual. 
Nevertheless, although a modular frame is potentially pluralist in nature, it does not here 
allow pluralist ideas of self to exist equally.  
 Moreover, it is important to point out that the boundaries between different ideas 
of person within this modular frame are fuzzy and porous. There are no concrete walls 
between the base and the addition. One of the best examples is the Dharani flag. While 
the state practitioner successfully asked the bereaved to chant individually and only in the 
body preparation room, she did not remove the Dharani flag as the body was moved into 
the memorial meeting hall afterward. As a result, the Dharani flag covered the body, in 
public, throughout the memorial meeting. This description has a much bigger influence 
than it might sound. Nearly all memorial meetings are open casket ceremonies in 
Shanghai.215 For open casket memorial meetings, many deceased are displayed in coffins 
where their bodies are covered by a layer of fresh flowers like a blanket—a new service 
item called “flowers on the body” that has emerged since the marketization of funeral 
parlors. Having a Dharani flag on top of the flowers means that it visually symbolizes a 
prominent religious expression in the place everyone will be focusing throughout the 
meeting.  
 Another example of a fuzzy modular frame occurred during a different funeral I 
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participated in. The bereaved rented a wake keeping room at Huangpu starting from the 
night before the memorial meeting. In addition to hiring monks to chant that night, they 
had one more chanting session in the morning right before the memorial meeting. 
Huangpu allows the mourning family who rents a wake keeping room to rent one extra 
session and to have the memorial meeting there too. However, you could not just rent a 
wake keeping room to hold a memorial meeting in, rather you had to buy the entire 
package. Since the chanting in the morning session and memorial meeting were held in 
one space right after each other, many participants who arrived earlier for the memorial 
meeting observed the end of the sutra chanting session. Some even joined the bereaved 
family members to offer incense and prostrations to the deceased. Similarly we saw this 
in the case where state practitioners, funeral brokers, and the bereaved failed to clear the 
hall and hold a private Buddhist family ritual before the meeting started. Both cases 
allowed Buddhist conceptualizations of the deceased and his journey to infiltrate the 
meeting right from the beginning. While added rituals inside the funeral parlor such as 
chanting are confined to (imagined) domestic space as people move from their pre-
memorial meeting activities to memorial meetings proper, they do leave traces that 
therefore could be observed even when people are participating within the socialist civil 
funeral.  
 Of course, saying the boundaries of modular frames are fuzzy and porous does not 
mean that there is no attempt to govern and maintain them. On the contrary, as several of 
my examples show (especially concerning those rituals that are not yet routinized as 




(including the effort of not governing on the state side), define and regulate proper 
behavior, and negotiate these boundaries.  
 Being modular, however, is not the only characteristic of religious and relational 
versions of memorial meetings. In the last chapter, I discussed how within memorial 
meetings, socialist subjectivity is constructed through ritual participants’ commitment to 
prescribed social convention instead of through the denotative meanings of ritual. I 
suggest that this lack of denotative meanings not only remains in these religious and 
relational versions of memorial meetings, but also plays a key role in making 
incommensurable ideas of self commensurable. Through the emphasis on doing instead 
of pursuing authenticity and sincerity, Shanghai people construct pluralist subjectivity 
that simultaneously constructs the deceased as a religious, relational, and socialist person 
even if these share very different epistemologies of death, spirits, and afterlife. In this 
kind of funeral, the living sequentially construct dead bodies as spirits needing to be 
pleased, ancestors in kinship relationships with the living, and sources of pollution that 
need to be managed. They also construct reciprocal and relational kinds of subjectivity of 
dead bodies—a guanxi kind of self that continues as the deceased is transformed by these 
exchanges into a beneficent ancestor. What the temporization does here is to create a 
particular set of plural subjectivities that allows socialist subjectivity to exist in sequential 
conjunction with religious and relational subjectivities. As a result, by not emphasizing 
sincerity and authenticity through the denial of denotative meanings of memorial 
meetings, ritualized acts (such as memorial meetings) allow ambiguity (Seligman and 




 If you recall from Chapters 2 and 3 on the history of Funeral Reform, the CCP 
originally aimed not only to establish a socialist identification, but also to eliminate all 
other sources of identification, actively working to destroy or diminish alternative ties to 
foreigners, nuclear families, lineages, temples, and native place associations. By turning 
memorial meetings into a modular frame through the addition of religious and relational 
rituals, Shanghai people covertly challenged the singular primacy of socialism. 
Meanwhile, however, the exact same act of creating modular frame also means that the 
socialist idea of self is re-affirmed. While this pluralist idea of self does not pose a 
challenge to the socialist state, it did challenge the necessity of a collectively shared 
singular socialist self. By turning the original socialist frame into a modular frame where 
socialism was the dominant, but not the only way of conceptualizing the deceased, 
religious and relational versions of memorial meetings allow the possibility for pluralist 
subjectivity. This is possible exactly because ritualized acts transcend the denotative 
meaning of ritual.   
 This preface and appendix approach, however, is not the only possible way to 
create a modular frame. Protestants, and especially those who use Protestant memorial 
meetings as a site of proselytizing, must transform the performative nature of the socialist 
ritual into one wherein the denotative meaning of the meeting can be realized so as to 
facilitate the conversion of non-believers. In the next and also the last content chapter of 
this dissertation, I discuss these Protestant variations of memorial meetings, their 
contrasts with this book, preface, appendix approach, and some of the consequences of 




CHAPTER 9 THE RETURN OF THE SINGULAR: PROTESTANT 
VARIATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST FUNERAL  
 
A Protestant Version of Memorial Meetings 
 One afternoon Chen Yu asked me if I wanted to go to a memorial meeting with 
her the next morning. A funeral broker, Lin Bingzhong, from a different funeral agency 
had hired her to be the videographer for a funeral he was putting on. Early the next 
morning we arrived at the parlor from our respective homes. Not long after Chen Yu and 
I arrived in the parking lot, Lin Bingzhong drove in as well. He gave Chen Yu RMB 500 
(USD 77) up front for her work that day because he might be too busy to pay her later 
since the endings of memorial meetings are usually quite chaotic. He told Chen Yu that 
this family had requested that the video recording start in the parking lot in order to 
record the arrival of the bereaved (and the deceased as materialized in the picture). 
Without such a specific request, the usual funeral recording only covers those rituals that 
happen inside the meeting hall along with the final act of sending the body away.216 We 
waited another twenty minutes or so before we saw three buses filled with guests drive 
into the parking lot. The first group who got off from the first bus were members of a 
marching band. They all wore marine-like white uniforms. Three of them were 
percussionists and the other four played a variety of wind instruments such as clarinets 
and saxophones. After leaving the bus, they formed two lines on the sides of the 
walkway, got their instruments ready, and started to play Christian hymns.     
 As soon as the music started, the immediate family of the deceased then 
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descended from the first bus. The first one held the deceased’s portrait. This meant that 
he was the deceased’s eldest son. As more and more people got off all three buses, I 
quickly realized that, despite the hymns, the immediate family members of the deceased 
were not Christian. Most of the people in the last bus, however, were. I knew this because 
the people who got off from the first and second buses all wore black armbands. As I 
mentioned before, black armbands (having replaced full mourning dress) are the standard 
form of mourning dress in contemporary Shanghai. By contrast, the people who got off 
the third bus wore a white armband with a red cross on it. I later confirmed my 
speculation with Lin Bingzhong. He told me that the deceased was a devout Protestant 
but none of her five children were. It was her (the deceased’s) wish to have a Protestant 
memorial meeting.  
 Once everyone got off the bus, they started to walk together to the meeting hall. 
The marching band was in the lead, followed by the eldest son (holding the deceased’s 
picture) and other immediate family members, then distant family members and friends, 
and finally the Protestant group from the third bus. Since Chen Yu had to film this march, 
we had to run so that we got ahead of everyone again. After finding a proper distance 
between ourselves and the mourners, we then walked backward so we could face the 
crowd. While Chen Yu recorded the march, I helped her to carry the equipment and 
camera cases. This ceremonial march from the parking lot to the meeting hall was a new 




such conspicuous marching inside funeral parlors in Shanghai.217  
 After the band arrived at the meeting hall, they stood outside just by the door so 
that the deceased (via her picture) could enter first. They then continued to play to 
welcome the rest of the funeral participants as they walked past them into the hall. Inside 
the meeting hall, once the funeral participants had signed in, they then began to socialize 
with each other. Some walked around the meeting hall so they could read the couplets on 
the flower baskets. As explained in the last chapter, these couplets are the textual record 
of the social relationship that the giver had with the deceased or the deceased’s children 
embodied. In fact, whenever she was hired to be a videographer Chen Yu had to film the 
couplets of each flower basket one by one so the family had a record of gift giving. She 
quickly set about doing this to ensure she had filmed each basket prior to the start of the 
meeting itself. 
 Meanwhile, Lin Bingzhong (the broker) was talking through some last minute 
preparations with the eldest son of the deceased, the state practitioner who was in charge 
of this meeting hall, and another man I did not know. I later found out that this man was a 
pastor. He wore a black button down shirt and a pair of black suit pants. While his dress 
was on the relatively formal side, this was obviously not a uniform. Later, a much 
younger man joined this group discussion as well. He was the representative of the 
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deceased’s work unit. He looked a little bit timid and inexperienced to me. From the 
conversation, I realized that he did not know the deceased in person. As I explained 
earlier, though, this was a fairly common situation in Shanghai. 
 About twenty minutes later, the pastor started to test the microphone. He, rather 
than the broker, would be the MC for today.  He told funeral participants that the 
memorial meeting was about to start so they should line up. As explained in Chapter 7, 
the general rule is to have immediate family members stand in the first few rows while 
the work unit representative stands somewhere in those rows along with the immediate 
family (See Figure 9.1). However, perhaps because participants were busy socializing 
with other people and therefore did not hear the pastor's instructions or maybe because 
the pastor did not try very hard to make people line up “correctly,” the participants ended 
up lining up in a very unusual way. The first few rows split into right and left sections 
(from the deceased’s perspective) with 1 to 2 ratio. On the left was the family of the 
deceased as is the normal case. However, people from the deceased's congregation 
occupied the first few rows of the right side. The timid work unit representative was 
pushed all the way to the middle rows, just behind the Christian crowd (see Figure 9.2).    
 After the people all lined up, the pastor formally announced the start of the 
memorial meeting. In the following selections, I have transcribed parts of the memorial 
meeting. I have also numbered the pastor’s facilitation for the convenience of later 











Figure 9.1:  
The normal 
















Figure 9.2:  
The actual 
way of lining 
up in this case. 
The Pastor (1):  
God loves everyone. […] God is the creator of the universe. […] God sacrificed 
his only son. […] We are really happy that the family members of Sister Ma 
Donghua are willing to respect her religion and her wish to not have folk (shisude 
世俗的 ) practices in her funeral such as burning (paper money), offering 
(sacrifices), and worshipping (ancestors). We also will not have bowing today 




We Protestants only submit ourselves to the Holy God. […] Today we’ll have 
hymn-singing, praying, a family members’ thank you speech, and the church’s 
testimony. […]  Let us sing a hymn. […]  
 
I want to point out several things here briefly. First, in the list of funeral events, the pastor 
neglected to mention the work unit’s memorial speech. Second, the hymn singing was 
accompanied by the marching band’s music. However, it was clear that only those who 
wore white armbands (the Protestants) were singing. The immediate family members 
who stood in the first few rows had a piece of paper with the lyrics on it in their hands. 
Some of them looked like that they were reading the lyrics during the hymn singing, but 
most of them looked like they were simply listening to the hymn. Either way, they did not 
open their mouths and sing like the Protestant participants. That said, they “participated” 
in this hymn singing by agreeing to be there and to have such a ritual performed in the 
first place. Finally, the pastor’s “opening,” his combination of preaching and hymn 
singing, took a long time. He did not invite the body in for a good 10 minutes. After the 
pastor gave the instruction to bring in the corpse, a state practitioner pushed the deceased 
to the designated space. He then stepped to the side and remained more or less invisible 
in the meeting hall for the rest of the memorial meeting.  
 
The Pastor (2):  
Today, we are here in the biggest memorial-meeting hall of the Huangpu Funeral 
Parlor to have this funeral for Sister Ma Donghua. The people who came to join 
Sister Ma Donghua’s funeral are her family members, relatives and friends, her 
leaders and colleagues at her work unit, and her brothers and sisters from the 
congregation. Now I announce the beginning of Sister Ma Donghua’s funeral. 





The Pastor (3):  
Now we are going to pray to God. Please, everyone close your eyes and pray to 
God.  
 
Dear Holy Father, Thank you for loving everyone in the world. [Amen! The 
church members said in unison.] You created the sky, the earth, and everything. 
[Amen!] You created us, your human beings. [Amen!] Your glory enlightens us. 
[…] When the work unit’s representative gives his memorial speech, the 
bereaved's representative gives a thank you speech, and when we hear the 
church’s testimony, you are with us. You watch, lead, and guide us like a 
shepherd taking care of his flock! Now we invite the work unit representative to 
give the memorial speech.  
 
The work unit representative came up and stood facing the deceased’s portrait and body. 
He bowed three times to the deceased. He then turned around and bowed one time to the 
participants. 
 
The Work Unit Representative:  
Comrades! Today, with extreme sorrow, we all come to this memorial meeting to 
mourn Comrade Ma Donghua, a retired worker from the Shanghai Machine 
Limited Liability Company (Co., Ltd.). Comrade Ma Donghua died from failure 
to cure illness. She passed away at 22:30 on March 22, 2011 at the age of 77.  
 
Comrade Ma Donghua was born in Shanghai City on June 16, 1934. Prior to 
1949, Comrade Ma Donghua stayed in her hometown to help her parents with 
domestic affairs. Between July 1955 and 1965, Comrade Ma Donghua worked as 
a worker in the Fuxin District Committee and at the Shanghai Electric Factory. 
Starting in July 1968, she entered the Shanghai Machine Factory to work in the 
administrative unit. She retired in June 1984.  
 
Comrade Ma Donghua was born in the Old Society. During the decade before 
Liberation, she followed her parents and experienced much disturbance, hardship, 
and bitterness—like the other thousands and hundreds of millions of workers’ 
children. She experienced exploitation and oppression in the Old Society and had 
a difficult life.  After New China was established, she liberated herself (fanshen 
翻身 ). She joined the construction of socialism fully, heartily, and with 
enthusiasm. She devoted all her youth and life to this, especially after July 1968 
when she entered the administrative unit in the Shanghai Machine Factory.  She 




in glory in June 1984.  
 
After she retired, she never made excessive demands to the work unit. Over 
twenty years of retired life, she overcame all her difficulties herself without 
giving the work unit trouble. She showed excellent quality in being a retired 
worker. Who won’t feel pain and sorrow for her departure? Commemorating 
Comrade Ma Donghua is to learn from her love for the Party and for socialism, 
her hard working ethic and endurance, and her selfless (wusi 無私) spirit. The life 
of Comrade Ma Donghua was a laborious life; a life of dedication. We need to 
turn our grief into strength. From our own working location, we each need to 
contribute to construct China as a well-off and harmonious society as early as 
possible.  
 
Now, please allow me to represent the Retirement Committee of the Shanghai 
Machine Co., Ltd. and all employers in the Shanghai Machine Co., Ltd. to give 
deepest condolences to Comrade Ma Donghua. Comrade Ma Donghua, please let 
her rest in peace! It is March 26, 2011.  
 
After the work unit representative went back to where he stood, the oldest son of 
deceased came up to the front. Note that he did not bow three times to the deceased 
before giving his speech. He “stared” at the picture for several seconds and then nodded 
to the audience. 
 
The Oldest Son of the Deceased:  
This is the thank you speech. Dear [work unit] leaders, relatives and friends, 
Protestant brothers and sisters, good morning. First, I am representing my family 
to thank you for coming to my mother’s memorial meeting despite the busy 
schedules you have. Thanks to those Protestant brothers and sisters who visited 
and helped my mother while she was alive and sick. I give all of you my deepest 
gratitude. My dear mother was born on June 16, 1934. She entered the Shanghai 
Machine Factory in July 1968 to work in the cafeteria under the administrative 
unit.  She retired in glory in June 1984 from the Shanghai Machine Factory. On 
February 23, 2011, she was admitted to the No. 5 People’s Hospital due to her 
long-term illness with diabetes. Due to her illness deteriorating, she left this world 
forever at 22:30 on March 22, 2011. She passed away at the age of 77.    
 
My dear mother was born in a poor worker’s family. She worked diligently in her 




to earth. She raised five children in her life. She helped her husband and taught 
her children. She was frugal and prudent in order to bring us up. She loved and 
cared about us all wholeheartedly. She taught us how to be a person and how to 
lead the next generation to become a proper person. She was a typical Chinese 
style good wife and good mother.  
 
Dear mother, your departure made us feels so much pain and sorrow. Dear 
mother, how could you leave so soon? It is just about time for us children to 
return your upbringing and love—how could you leave us forever without 
enjoying this? Your sons are crying. Your daughters are crying. Your departure is 
so bitter and our hearts are in pain. Dear mother, please leave without worrying. 
We will never forget your wish—your wish for us siblings to stay together and 
educate the next generation. We hope you are peaceful and cheerful in heaven 
(tiantang 天堂). We hope to be your children again in the next life. My dear 
mother, please rest in peace and have a good last journey.  
 
Finally, I represent our family again to show our deepest gratitude to all of you 
who have come to her memorial meeting today.   
 
He then turned around and “stared” at his mother’s picture portrait for several seconds 
and then nodded to the audience before walking back to where he stood earlier.  
 
The Pastor (4):  
Now, let us sing another (Christian) hymn. […] 
 
Again, as in the beginning, it was clear that one third of the participants appeared to be 
deeply immersed in the hymn singing while the other two thirds were simply listening.   
 
The Pastor (5):  
Yes, Jesus loves you [spoken in response to the last line of lyrics in the hymn]. 
Jesus saves you. Our dear Ma Donghua Sister left all of those wonderful 
memories to us. We heard all these beautiful testimonies about her, whether from 
her family or her work unit. We need to know today that she was also a good 
example in the church. She was very pious in her beliefs. She went to church 
service; she also went to home prayer gatherings. With fellow brothers and sisters, 




bible, and listened to sermons. All these are beautiful testimony and valuable 
treasures in the eyes of God. Today, we see all these family members, relatives, 
friends, and leaders from the work unit all respect this old lady and all love this 
loving mother. We all feel sorrow for her departure.  
 What she has left to us is her faith. She found God, this unchanging God. 
[…] In today’s China with over a billion in population, there are not many people 
who know God. Ma Donghua Sister was blessed because she had this chance to 
know the only one true God. […]  
 
 I am skipping here the portions of his preaching that involved narrating the life of 
Jesus, that there is only one God, that all other folk religious practices were idolatry, that 
God loves us and sacrificed his life to save us, that simple belief can save you too, and so 
on. The pastor’s preaching went on and on. I started to feel my legs getting sore. After 
all, I had been standing up ever since I arrived in the parking lot (this was in addition to 
my hour plus of standing up during my commute from home to the parlor). I quickly 
noticed, however, that I was not the only one who felt this way. I saw many people, 
especially those who did not wear Christian armbands, starting to stretch their feet. They 
began with subtle stretching but soon their actions became more obvious. More than this, 
some non-Protestant participants started to get restless and exchange eye contact. Some 
of them even began whispering to each other. After all, a normal memorial meeting 
should be finished within 20 minutes. Yet, we had already passed the 40 minute mark and 
the pastor had not yet even invited the participants to begin the farewell ceremony.  
 I was standing next to Chen Yu facing the crowd from the front. I could see that 
the Protestant participants were still very much concentrating on their pastor’s preaching. 
Meanwhile, the faces of more and more non-Protestant participants changed from 




even among the immediate family members of the deceased. I felt an awkward 
atmosphere continue to build up, but the Pastor kept preaching. Then, at some point, I 
accidentally made eye contact with the eldest son of the deceased. He subtly asked me 
over to him with his eyes. I looked around to make sure that he was indeed looking at me. 
The state practitioner and Lin Bingzhong the funeral broker were out of sight and Chen 
Yu, though also facing the participants, was standing on the other side of the meeting hall 
from me by that time. I approached the eldest son as requested. He whispered to me to 
tell the pastor to finish his preaching soon because they were running out of time. Not 
knowing what to do, and feeling I should not talk to the preaching pastor directly, I left 
the meeting hall to find Lin Bingzhong. My guess was right—he was enjoying a cigarette 
outside. I told him about the chief mourner’s request. He then tossed his unfinished 
cigarette and walked back to the meeting hall and went straight to the pastor and spoke a 
few words to him. The pastor acknowledged Lin Bingzhong’s reminder. However, he 
went on for another several minutes before he finally announced the beginning of the 
farewell ceremony.  
 We could finally start the farewell ceremony—the last step of the official part of 
memorial meetings. Recall that in the usual memorial meeting as I described it in Chapter 
7, people bowed to the deceased three times collectively before the farewell ceremony. 
Then during the farewell ceremony, small groups of people each approached and bowed 
to the deceased another three times. However, in this particular memorial meeting, as the 
Pastor requested at the beginning of his performance there was to be no personal nor 




person who had bowed during the whole meeting. When the immediate family members 
(and the Protestant participants) performed their respective farewell ceremony, they did 
not bow since prior to the memorial meeting the pastor had specifically asked them not 
to. They just “stared” at the deceased and then left flowers on top of her body. Some 
participants, however, bowed as usual when they performed their own part of the farewell 
ceremony. This may be because that they were unclear about the Protestant rules, because 
they did know the rule, but forgot, or simply because they did not want to follow the no 
bowing rule. In any case, without the bowing the farewell ceremony went very fast.  
 Some people left the meeting hall after the farewell ceremony, but some stayed. 
As I described in the last chapter, this movement marked a change in modality from 
mourning as a (socialist) collective act to a more popular religious idea that sees 
mourning as relational. The immediate family then formed a circle around Ma Donghua's 
coffin. Once the circle was formed, they suddenly started to wail loudly. This, too, was 
consistent with the memorial meeting “appendix” where we saw a change in emotion 
regime from self-restraint to outward (sometimes obligatory) expression of grief and 
mourning. The big difference here in this Protestant version, however, was that as soon as 
the immediate family members started to weep, the pastor, who was not standing in the 
circle, gave the bereaved a withering “look” that looked like condemnation to me. He 
then walked close to the bereaved and reminded them that they should restrain 
themselves. The bereaved decreased their volume of wailing for several seconds, but 
soon began crying loudly again. Lin Bingzhong then said to the bereaved, “Aren’t you 




however, continued to wail. After all, they were not Protestants.  
 After a while the bereaved’s wailing gradually faded and the state practitioner 
pushed the body to the middle of the meeting hall. In this particular meeting hall, the 
deceased’s body rested on a “bed” during the memorial meeting instead of in a coffin 
(different funeral parlors have different ways of organizing these arrangements). Another 
practitioner pushed a white coffin into the hall. In Shanghai, only Christians used white 
coffins. Lin Bingzhong directed the direct descendants of the deceased to move their 
mother’s body from the bed to the coffin. Lin Bingzhong then asked the bereaved to pick 
flowers from the displayed flower baskets to put inside the coffin. There was no placing 
of xibo (the spiritual money discussed before) in this funeral. People brought so many 
flowers (as if they were xibo, hence, the more the better) that Lin had to stop them in the 
end. Otherwise, he told them, they would not be able to close the coffin's lid. The coffin 
lid was also white. Painted on top of the white lid was a big Red Cross. People continued 
to wail throughout this whole time as in the popular religious ritual described in Chapter 
8. Lin Bingzhong kept reminding them, “Don’t wail. Protestants do not cry. Protestants 
are happy in times of death because your mother now is in the heaven with Jesus. This is 
a good thing. She is in heaven now. No need to cry.” While Lin himself was not 
Christian, this comment was not his own idiosyncratic interpretation. The general 
knowledge among funeral professionals in regard to Protestant memorial meetings was 
that Protestants could not (or at least should not) cry at funerals because funerals were 
supposed to mean a happy reunification with God.  




like white uniforms came in. They lifted the coffin onto their shoulders and did a goose 
step march to carry the coffin from the meeting hall to the crematoria. Since this service 
resembles a secular military ritual, ceremonial funeral processions were quite popular 
disregarding religious difference during my fieldwork. Along with the marching band, all 
of us marched to the crematoria, which was located on the other side of the parlor. When 
we arrived at the cremator unit, the bereaved increased their wailing. A state practitioner 
then put the coffin into the cremator and pushed a button. We witnessed a conveyor belt 
sending the deceased away into a dark tunnel. Lin Bingzhong then led all funeral 
participants to a restaurant nearby to have their funeral banquet lunch. The immediate 
family members would pick up Ma's cremains after their meal on the same day.  
 Chen Yu called someone she knew at that parlor and asked him if he could give 
us a ride back to Longevity’s office. She saw this person driving into the Parlor earlier. 
He told Chen Yu that he had just dropped off a body so he now had an empty car going 
back downtown. We were welcome to join him. This was the first time I ever sat in a 
hearse. Chen Yu sat in the passenger seat and I sat in the back. There was only one seat in 
the back. Right next to my seat was a stainless steel board where the body would be (and 
was just recently) placed. On my way from the parlor to Longevity’s office I didn't speak 
much, instead I stared at that steel board and tried to figure out what (or how exactly) I 
should feel about it.  
 
Ritually Constructed Plural Subjectivities   




her simultaneously as a socialist citizen, as holding a traditional Chinese female social 
role, and as a devout Protestant. This was articulated in the sequential co-existence of the 
work unit representative’s memorial speech, the eldest son’s thank you speech, and the 
pastor’s preaching. I examine these three speeches in turn by showing how each genre of 
narrative delineates a particular kind of self of Ma Donghua.  
 First, the work unit representative’s standard and stylized narrative describes Ma 
Donghua as someone who was born in the Old Society, who experienced disturbances, 
hardship, bitterness, exploitation, and oppression, and who then liberated herself after 
New China was established. Recall the memorial speech of Wang Dashan in Chapter 7. 
These two speeches use the same narrative devices to delineate the life history of the 
dead. Moreover, the embodied ethics of Ma Donghua and Wang Dashan are also 
practically identical. As I analyzed in his case, these socialist narratives construct the 
identity of the dead within a particular socialist imagination of time and person. Just like 
Wang Dashan’s funeral created socialist subjectivity for him postmortem, through 
narrating this socialist idea of time, person, and ethics, Ma Donghua’s funeral made her 
into a model socialist citizen at the end of her life. As far as the public was concerned, 
whether or not it was an authentic or sincere representation of who she was while alive, 
she was now a model socialist citizen in the public domain, at least momentarily.   
 One thing worth pointing out is that Ma Donghua’s memorial speech further 
elaborates the relationship between the socialist state and its citizen(s) through a concrete 
example that illustrates Ma Donghua’s selflessness that we did not see in Wang Dashan’s 




excessive demands on the work unit. Over twenty years of retired life, she overcame all 
her difficulties herself without giving the work unit trouble. She showed excellent quality 
in being a retired worker.” In this narrative, a true selfless socialist citizen not only 
devotes all her productivity to the work unit, but also asks for nothing in return once she 
loses her productivity. She is a true socialist citizen due to this selflessness even though 
the company she had worked for had since been privatized (note that it is now a limited 
liability company). This one-sided devotion is in stark contrast to traditional Chinese 
ideas of social relationships, including that between ruler and subjects, which was 
essentially based on reciprocity. For example, the idea of filial piety is built on the 
assumption that parental provision creates a debt relationship. When parents are old, their 
children are expected to return the favor, taking care of old and infirm parents just as the 
parents took care of them as equally infirm babies. Confucius's idea of the ruler- subject 
relationship was an extension of filial piety. This is why in imperial China one important 
sign of an emperor losing the Mandate of Heaven (and thus his legitimacy to rule) was 
his inability to provide provision to his people during natural disasters and when a high 
number of the dead did not receive a proper burial. Recalling my analysis of the 
marketization of funeral parlors in Chapter 4, contemporary public concerns over death 
for profiteering, or more accurately speaking, that “the dead could not afford to die,” is 
itself a way of questioning the regime’s legitimacy. Nevertheless, by describing her as a 
good retired worker, her memorial speech transforms her into a true socialist citizen 
whose moral superiority transcends the implied utilitarian nature of the traditional moral 




different and maybe irrelevant matter since this speech was probably based on her 
company’s memorial speech template.  
 While the memorial speech makes Ma Donghua into a socialist citizen subject, 
the thank you speech, given by her eldest son, remakes her as both socialist and (Han) 
Chinese. Unlike the memorial speech, which is based on a singular ethical source of 
socialism, this thank you speech contains a variety of ethical sources in conceptualizing 
the deceased. We can see this in several parts. First, the eldest son started his speech by 
thanking work unit leaders, relatives and friends, and Protestant brothers and sisters. This 
was in contrast to the work unit representative who referred to everyone simply as 
Comrades. This recognition of different identity categories articulates a shift from 
conceptualizing all funeral participants as undifferentiated (and individuated) socialist 
citizen subjects who are collectively and directly tied to the socialist state (everyone is a 
“Comrade”) to differentiated groups of people whose identities are defined by their 
relationships to the socialist state (some are “leaders”), kinship and other reciprocal 
relationships (some are “relatives and friends”), and religious affiliations distinguished by 
gender (some are “Protestant brothers and sisters”).  
 The first conceptualizing framework in the thank you speech is socialist 
subjectivity. This operated through narrating Ma Donghua’s socialist status categories 
and socialist ethics. In the second paragraph of Ma Donghua’s thank you speech, the 
eldest son said that she came from a “poor worker” family. Moreover, the eldest son 
described his mother as honest, down to earth, frugal, prudent and so on. Just as Wang 




you speech also echo her memorial speech. Both the memorial speech and the thank you 
speech use the same narrative techniques. However, we can also see a shift in how to 
conceptualize such socialist status and ethics in Ma Donghua’s thank you speech. Instead 
of presenting these standards solely in terms of socialism, by the end of the second 
paragraph the eldest son illustrated his mother's merits by concluding that these had “led 
the next generation to become a proper person” and that his mother was a typical 
“Chinese style good wife and good mother.” This conclusion tacitly adds onto and 
transforms a socialist interpretative framework into a Chinese cultural interpretative 
framework for understanding what these moral characteristics mean in being a person. 
Thus, Ma Donghua being honest, down to earth, frugal, and prudent was (also?) because 
she was a “typical Chinese woman.”  
 The third paragraph of the thank you speech shifts voice from talking to the 
bereaved to speaking directly to the deceased. The intriguing part here is that this 
paragraph is a direct entrance into the traditional Chinese moral world where human 
relationships are defined by reciprocity again. The eldest son said, “It is just about the 
time for us children to return your upbringing and love—how could you leave us forever 
without enjoying this?” The evocation of “return” shows how the one-sided socialist 
social relationship has been submerged into a reciprocal folk Chinese relationship.  
Moreover, such reciprocity within family is built on the affection and nurturance between 
mother and children (Stafford 1995). Thus, right after grieving the emotional loss, the 
eldest son then talks through his regret at not having been able to fulfill his filial 




crying.” I discussed in Chapter 7 that externalized expression of grief and mourning is 
key to traditional Han Chinese death ritual. This was so important that ritualized wailing 
and professional weepers were integral parts of traditional funeral. In Chapter 8, I further 
discussed how funeral participants today experience a change in emotion regime between 
socialist and Chinese regimes of affect. The mention of crying in Ma Donghua’s eldest 
son’s speech articulates this sequential transformation in emotion regimes as well the 
embedding of such emotion regimes in reciprocal social relationships.  
 Moreover, Ma Donghua was not only conceptualized as a typical Chinese mother 
who was hierarchically and reciprocally related to her children, but also as a critical 
source of lineage continuity. The eldest son said, “We will never forget your wish—your 
wish for us siblings to stay together and educate the next generation.” Ma Donghua’s 
provision to her children was not only intended to elicit reciprocity between her and her 
children, but also was meant to create lineage consolidation and continuity through the 
provision for (and of)  “the next generation.” This was possible through her 
transformation into an ancestor. This was why the eldest son said that she was now 
“peaceful and cheerful in heaven.” Another thing worth mentioning here is that the eldest 
son used the word tiantang (天堂) here. Although this phrase usually refers to a Christian 
idea of heaven, the next sentence that followed shows that this might not be the case. The 
son described how he and his siblings “hope to be your children again in the next life.” 
The “next life” reference is based on an idea of reincarnation that is prevalent in 
traditional Han Chinese ideas of death, afterlife, and heaven that have long been heavily 




that the usage of the phrase tiantang first constructs Ma Donghua as a Christian person. 
But this Christian person is then immediately re-configured into a traditional Chinese 
person, now an ancestor who can take care of lineage consolidation and continuity, and 
who might be reborn into this world. 
 Finally, in the last paragraph, the eldest son switches from talking to the dead to 
talking again to the living. He stressed his gratitude to people who came to his mother’s 
funeral. Such thank you etiquette also creates and recognizes the debt relationship 
between the immediate family members of the deceased and other funeral participants. 
This means that the immediate family members have continuing obligations to attend 
fellow funeral participants’ life rituals and associated gift exchanges (whether through 
banquets or cash) to repay such debt.  
 Overall, if we compare Wang Dashan’s thank you speech in Chapter 7 and Ma 
Donghua’s here, we see slight variations. The bulk of Ma Donghua’s speech constructs 
her as a traditional Chinese mother more than as model socialist citizen. Possible reasons 
for this are many. For example, this might be caused by a different choice of templates or 
whether the funeral broker or the family member chose the templates. I did not have a 
chance to confirm whether Ma Donghua’s eldest son wrote his speech based on 
templates, but both Chen Yu and I felt that the speech sounded like a template-generated 
one. Nevertheless, as discussed, the “odd” part about the thank you speech in 
contemporary Shanghai was never the presence of a traditional Han Chinese idea of 
person and death. On the contrary, it was the presence of socialism, since socialism rarely 




Shanghai. What’s important here is that Ma Donghua’s thank you speech, ostensibly 
from her children's perspective, contains both the folk and socialist frameworks in 
delineating “who Ma Donghua was.”  
   Finally, the pastor’s preaching performs the postmortem construction of a 
Protestant subjectivity of Ma Donghua. Right from the beginning, she was delineated as a 
“sister” to him and his congregation instead of as a Comrade or a typical Chinese woman. 
In order to put this “sister” into context, it is important to first explain to the assembled 
participants who God was and what God’s relationship to Ma Donghua was. Perhaps this 
was why the Pastor immediately told funeral participants that “God is the Creator and he 
loved us so much that he sacrificed his own son” (see Pastor 1). In other words, the 
conceptualization of a Protestant person is first and foremost based on a relationship to a 
Christian creator God. However, such an understanding is merely the first step. The next 
necessary step is to separate Ma Donghua from the rest of the people who had not yet 
been saved by Jesus Christ. This is why the pastor stressed how they (those who were 
saved) were really happy that Ma Donghua’s family members (who were not yet saved) 
were willing to respect her religion by rejecting the “folk” practices of burning (paper 
money), offering (sacrifices), worshiping (ancestors), and bowing (prostration and 
worshiping). By respecting her faith, Ma Donghua’s remaining family distinguished her 
funeral from regular people’s funeral. It is worth noting here that the pastor used the word 
“shisu” when describing folk practices. This phrase actually has a double meaning in 
Chinese. In addition to meaning folk, shisu is also the Chinese translation of the English 




this sense, to distinguish themselves from the secular, Protestants need to reject both the 
profane and other religions such as popular religion and Buddhism.  
 Moreover, just as the work unit representative narrated the socialist ethics and the 
eldest son narrated both the socialist and traditional Chinese ethics that Ma Donghua 
embodied, so too did the pastor narrate her Protestant ethics: “She was very pious in her 
beliefs. She went to church service; she also went to home prayer gatherings. With fellow 
brothers and sisters, she attended church gatherings, sang hymns, prayed, worshiped God, 
read the bible, and listened to preaching. All these are beautiful testimony and valuable 
treasures in the eyes of God” (see Pastor 5). As a result, while the work unit lost a good 
comrade and the family lost a good (Chinese) mother and a good wife, the church lost a 
good and faithful Christian believer.  
 Yet, while losing a good Christian was already bad enough, there was something 
worse. That is, “[i]n today’s China with over a billion in population, there are not many 
people who know God.” Thereafter, the pastor’s narrative fully switched gears from 
commemorating Ma Donghua to introducing the salvation offered by Christianity to the 
funeral participants. This was why the pastor started to proselytize (although, more 
accurately speaking, the proselytizing tone and intention already existed right from the 
opening sermon). The pastor’s effort at proselytizing is a critical point that I will return to 
in the next section. What I want to stress here is that Ma Donghua’s funeral 
simultaneously constructed her as a socialist citizen person, a traditional Chinese, and a 
Protestant despite the apparently incommensurable ideas of person, death, and afterlife in 





 The co-existence of these three speeches provides a different lens through which 
to examine how and why religious variations of memorial meetings are a kind of modular 
frame. Even though the immediate family members and the work unit did not believe in 
Christianity, by following the pattern of the socialist civil funeral and standing through 
the hymn singing alongside the Protestant participants, they made Ma Donghua a 
socialist citizen, a mother embedded in Chinese kinship, and a Christian in the memorial 
speech, thank you speech, and the pastor’s preaching respectively. Their willingness to of 
commit themselves to social convention constructed a pluralist subjectivity of Ma 
Donghua. Through the acts of “as if”  (whether we are talking about the immediate 
family acting as if they were Protestants and model socialists, the work unit 
representative acting as if he were Protestant and traditional Han Chinese, the Protestants 
acting as if they were both model socialists and traditional Han Chinese, or whatever a 
specific individual had to pretend to be), their acceptance of social convention also 
establishes who they appear to be in public at that particular subjunctive moment. In 
other words, attending this Protestant memorial meeting allowed them to cross from one 
epistemological boundary to another. Whether these people feel any “authentic” 
ontological transformation is beside the point and irrelevant. This is consistent with my 
finding in Chapter 8 when discussing popular religious, Buddhist, and relational 
variations of socialist funeral.  
 Despite such similarities shared by all of these religious variations of socialist 




involved more than simply adding a preface or appendix to the socialist book. In the 
following section, I focus on the unique character of this Protestant version of a memorial 
meeting to show how the Christian version of the memorial meeting is trying to do 
something more than adding preface and appendix within this modular frame. I describe 
how this can undermine and even lead to the breakdown of pluralist subjectivities in 
performing religious variations of socialist civil funeral.  
  
Reconfiguring a Religious Socialist Funeral  
 From Pastor 2, we can see that, like the thank you speech (but unlike the 
memorial speech), the pastor’s narration recognizes different identities of funeral 
participants. Thus, “the people who came to join Sister Ma Donghua’s funeral are her 
family members, relatives and friends, her leaders and colleagues at her work unit, and 
her brothers and sisters from the congregation.” This recognition is parallel to the pastor's 
recognition of the co-existence of the Church’s testimony, work unit’s memorial speech, 
and family’s thank you speech in the memorial meeting itself. However, this recognition 
was merely a first step. In Pastor 3, we can also see that when the pastor prayed, he asked 
God to watch over all of these differentiated groups. He even asked for God to watch 
over the work unit leader, the effective Chinese Communist Party representative! 
Evidently, the pastor was attempting to symbolically submerge these differentiated 
groups of people under the power of his Christian God.  
 This new reconfiguration is best articulated when we examine the structure of this 




memorial meeting below. I mark the newly added or changed Protestant steps in bold.  
 
Preface: Pastor preaches and leads the assembled in collective hymn singing 
Step 1: The Master of Ceremonies (MC) verbally announces the beginning of the 
memorial meeting 
Step 2: Commemorate the deceased in silence while playing a dirge 
Step 3: Pastor prays 
Step 4: The work unit representative gives a “memorial speech” (daoci 悼詞) 
Step 5: The representative of the bereaved gives a “thank you speech” (daxieci 答
謝詞) 
Step 6: Collective hymn singing and the Pastor preaches 
Step 7: Farewell Ceremony (gaobie yishi 告別儀式) without bowing. 
Appendix: Weeping, placing flowers inside a Christian coffin, ceremonial 
funeral procession, and funeral banquet.  
 
 As we can see from this new structure, the pastor not only added a preface and 
appendix, but also changed the original steps of the memorial meeting by inserting hymns 
and prayers in between each socialist step. The hymn singing in the beginning was 
especially powerful because of its length and density. The opening hymn singing lasted 
about ten minutes.  Ten minutes is a long time considering the fact that people only need 
about three minutes to read a memorial speech or a thank you speech. Moreover, the 
sound of the hymn singing effectively filled with the whole space of the memorial 
meeting hall. During these ten minutes, Christian hymns were the only sounds that could 
be heard. Furthermore, even though bowing was meant to be the modernist bodily 
movement that replaced prostration’s extreme production of hierarchal relationships, 
Protestants treat bowing and prostrations as the same thing. They reject both because, as 
the pastor said, “protestants only submit themselves to God.”  




units' official memorial speech, the thank you speech by the bereaved, and the farewell 
ceremony—these have been surrounded and penetrated by a new, explicitly religious and 
aggressive ideological system as Ma Donghua’s pastor inserted Protestant Christian 
messages in between each socialist step over the course of his facilitation of the meeting. 
While Protestant memorial meetings, as one type of religious variation of socialist ritual, 
are still modular frames, they are on their way to changing the base from socialism to 
Christianity.  
 Such a change was possible because the pastor was the MC. Who the MC is, 
therefore, turns out to be much more important than it might at first appear. Before the 
decline of the work unit in daily life in Shanghai, work units, not families, organized 
memorial meetings. As such, the work unit would assign their own people to be the MC. 
This was consistent with the popularization of memorial meetings resulting from Cultural 
Revolution rehabilitation rituals. In fact, even at the beginning of the marketization of 
funeral parlors, state practitioners working in meeting halls were only in charge of 
meeting hall maintenance. One practitioner told me that when she worked in the meeting 
halls in 1999, she took care of six halls, but the main thing she did was to clean them up 
after meetings. She did not need to do the MC job. Today, however, funeral professionals 
are the default MCs. Each state practitioner only takes care of one hall and they do not do 
any cleaning.218  
 When funeral professionals act as the MC, they do not talk much. They say only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 The cleaning jobs have now been outsourced. While the state practitioners who were in charge 
of the meeting halls received roughly RMB 3000 (USD 479) per month, the outsourced cleaning 




enough to facilitate the memorial meeting by explicitly directing participants when to 
speak, bow, or walk around the coffin. However, when pastors are the MC, they not only 
say a lot, but also have the ability the reframe memorial meetings through their 
performance. John, a pastor from a different Protestant church, told me that through being 
the MC, pastors could “encase the original framing (kuangjia 框架) of memorial 
meetings with Protestantism” when hosting a Protestant version of a memorial meeting. 
As a result, the ideal situation for Protestant memorial meetings is for the deceased’s 
pastor to be the MC. Through being an MC, pastors are able to insert a more powerful 
ethical source for constructing the subjectivity of dead bodies.  
 Why, then, is it so important for pastors to be the MC in Protestant memorial 
meetings? John told me that there are three primary goals of Protestant memorial 
meetings: “the first (goal) is to commemorate the deceased. The second is to console the 
bereaved. The third is to proselytize (chuanfuyin 傳福音).” John was from one of the 
Three Self Churches (sanzi jiaohui 三自教會) in Shanghai—a state authorized Protestant 
church. This meant that his congregation was less evangelical than the family churches 
that are currently growing rapidly in the areas around Shanghai. Yet, although he 
represents a less evangelical church, John told me in no uncertain terms that proselytizing 
often ends up being the most important goal of having a Protestant version of a socialist 
funeral.  
 John explained that Protestant memorial meetings are for the living. That is to 
say, if the deceased converted to Christianity while they were alive, having or not having 




token, if the bereaved were to organize an idolatrous or other non-Protestant ritual for the 
deceased they could not “undo” their salvation. The deceased’s salvation solely depends 
on their individual relationship with God. Since what the bereaved did or didn’t do would 
not affect the deceased’s relationship to God, proselytizing the living therefore became 
the primary goal.  
 The move toward proselytizing is critical in analyzing this Protestant type of 
modular frame not only because this version attempts to change the base from socialism 
to Protestantism, but also because it also marks a shift from ignoring the denotative 
meanings of ritual to paying particular attention to them. Unlike other religious versions 
of memorial meetings described in Chapter 8, the Protestant variation is striving to make 
sure that funeral participants receive and understand the message of the ritual in correct 
ways and therefore act accordingly. Just by committing to social convention is not 
enough any more; proselytizing requires people to move in a way that they can 
understand the words and actions and so that they are inspired to belief and to achieve 
salvation. By emphasizing denotative meanings about God, pastors hope to eventually 
turn ritual participants into authentic and sincere Protestants. The mere commitment to 
social convention defeats the purpose of proselytizing.    
 For the preface-appendix type of modular frame (non-Protestant religious 
variations of socialist ritual), the deceased was conceptualized as a socialist citizen first, 
and then as religious and relational subjects. Both the preface and appendix added to the 
socialist core have significantly restricted audiences, limited to family and close friends 




appendix precisely because these aspects happen only after the beginning and end of the 
official meeting and they therefore have little effect on people who are not already 
believers. As a result, for the Protestant type of memorial meetings, the work unit’s 
memorial speech (and the family’s thank you speech) would just be one more speech 
submerged into a proper Protestant funeral. In other words, the key to reformulating 
Protestant versions of memorial meetings is to move away from the approach of adding 
preface and appendix instead toward a total rewrite of the book of socialism, replacing it 
with Christianity.  
 
Social Conflict and the Return of the Singular 
 Given these quite different varieties of religious versions of socialist memorial 
meetings, what then are some of the consequences of transforming the base of the 
modular frame and emphasizing denotative meanings? Let me relate a short story that 
Chen Yu told me to illustrate one possible consequence.  
 In many memorial meetings, there was often at least a sensible tension between 
Christian attendees and non-Christians, between the Pastor and the work unit 
representatives, or between attendees expecting a 15-20 minute meeting and the Pastor 
speaking for close to an hour. We could see these tensions in Ma Donghua’s memorial 
meeting. When the eldest son called me over and told me to ask the pastor to stop his 
preaching, this was certainly a breach of etiquette. However, this breach of etiquette did 
not turn into actual conflict. In Chen Yu’s example, however, the tension inherent in the 




 In mid-January 2011, there was a funeral where the deceased was both a scholar 
and a Communist Party member. Following his wife's earlier conversion to Protestantism, 
he himself had a deathbed conversion. None of his children were Christian. As Chen Yu 
told me, “when people are on their deathbed, they listen to anything.” After he died, his 
children arranged a Protestant memorial meeting based on his final wishes. He had 
passed away at the age of 61. This relatively young age meant that some people in the 
work unit still knew the deceased in person. Because he had been a relatively young and 
influential person, many people from his work unit came to the memorial meeting, 
including the leaders of the work unit. When the work unit people arrived and realized 
that this would be a Protestant memorial meeting, they decided they could not accept it 
and insisted that the funeral professional should be the MC instead of the pastor. They 
said that the pastor could say whatever he wanted to say after the memorial meeting 
(remember this is how people who practiced Buddhist or popular religion did their 
religious ceremonies). The funeral professionals listened but refused to take a stance, 
saying instead that they had to do whatever the bereaved, as their customers, wanted. 
 Not being appointed MC and only talking after the meeting was an unacceptable 
option for proselytizing because the people who stay afterwards are either already fellow 
Christians or people whom the church already has access to (like the bereaved's 
immediate family). The pastor therefore refused the suggestion, saying that it was the 
deceased’s wish for him to be the MC. The work unit people became angry, replying that 
the deceased was a Communist Party member for his entire life! He was an atheist. He 




ill and vulnerable. The Church people tricked him.  
 In the beginning of the quarrel, the children of the deceased were not sure what to 
do since it was their father’s wish to have a Protestant memorial meeting. However, the 
work unit people then said that if the pastor was the MC, all but one of them would leave. 
This remaining person would be the lowest ranking member and he would read the 
memorial speech. Additionally, the bereaved should also not even think about getting 
their father’s funeral expenses reimbursed (Shanghai people usually received some 
reimbursement from the deceased’s work unit). When the bereaved realized they might 
lose their funeral subsidy and their father might lose face, Chen Yu said, they then 
changed their minds. In the end, the work unit (and money) won. A state practitioner 
MC’d this funeral.  
 This incident was not an isolated case. John also told me that the most likely kind 
of conflict in Protestant memorial meetings today is between work unit and church. John 
said that in the past, when this Protestant version of memorial meetings was first allowed 
in funeral parlors after the Opening up, there were frequent conflicts between church and 
the bereaved's family as well. This was because conversion in Shanghai often happened 
at an individual instead of a household level. Back then, occasionally overly enthusiastic 
Protestant followers tried to perform a Christian service within the funeral of a Protestant 
without getting family permission in advance. This could often spark rather serious 
incidents such as fights.  
 After a few incidents, John’s congregation decided to only host a funeral when the 




removed the potential for conflict between the church and the family. It is understandable 
that John’s congregation made such a move since he belongs to one of the state 
sanctioned churches. He told me that some family churches might still try to hold 
Christian rituals within regular funerals without the consent of the deceased’s family. 
Recall the opening facilitation of Ma Donghua’s memorial meeting. The pastor even 
forgot to mention the work unit’s memorial speech in his opening talk (see Pastor 1). 
Although it was probably an unintentional omission, it may not be too farfetched to see 
such an absence as a Freudian slip on the pastor's part reflecting the tension that exists 
between the church and the state.  
 
Conclusion   
 In this chapter, I continue the two lines of exploration developed over the course 
of Chapters 7 and 8. The first investigates how socialist civil funerals (memorial 
meetings) construct dead bodies as socialist citizen subjects. I developed this line of 
argument primarily in Chapter 7, but then carried it through Chapter 8 as well. The 
second line of exploration concerns how religious variations on memorial meetings 
articulate with the socialist core and, in turn, construct plural subjectivities based on 
social convention. Specifically, in Chapter 8, I showed that within the urban funeral 
industry in China, ritualized and externalized acts enable subjectivities that might 
otherwise contradict each other instead to co-exist in sequential conjunction with one 
another through the addition of religious variations before or after, but rarely during the 




of modular framing. The specific characteristics of these modular frames depend on the 
creation of prefaces and appendices while at the same time ignoring the contradictory 
denotative meanings of these alternative versions of socialist funeral.  
 In addition to the continued analysis of these two sets of interrelated concepts, I 
also took these a step further to explore the breakdown of plural subjectivities, especially 
with reference to challenges to the socialist memorial meetings' construction of the dead 
as model socialist citizens. I did so by providing an in-depth account of a Protestant 
memorial meeting I encountered during my fieldwork. I asked how and why Protestant 
pastors change the modular frames of religious versions of socialist funerals and then by 
exploring some of the associated sociological consequences. Specifically, I argue that 
while Protestant memorial meetings do indeed add a Protestant preface and appendix, 
they also were attempting to override and rewrite the original portion of the socialist 
book itself. In this new book, what Protestants intend to do is to write Protestant Christian 
narrative of conceptualizing person, death, and salvation. Protestant pastors do so by 
repeatedly drawing attention to the denotative meanings of Protestant socialist funeral. 
Such emphasis on the denotative meanings of ritual acts and words is important because 
the goal of a Protestant socialist funeral is to convert, to make ritual participants into 
authentic and sincere Christian subjects whose socialist identity is submerged to their 
religious identity. As a result, I argue that Protestant and radical socialists actually share a 
similar view of subject formation despite their epistemological and ontological 
differences in conceptualizing death and dead bodies. Both seek a uniquely singular 




words and acts in memorializing the dead are denotative instead of performative, singular 





CHAPTER 10  CONCLUSION   
 
Ritual, Governance, and Subject Formation 
 Religious and ritual revivals in general have become a common process globally 
in many post- and late-socialist nations. Since the beginning of the Opening Up, many 
scholars have tackled why a religious resurgence has occurred. Some stressed that this 
revival resulted from local resistance to state power (cf. Anagnost 1994; Bruun 1996; 
Dean 1997; Feuchtwang 2001; Jing 1996). Others emphasized state tolerance in 
combination with ongoing state control such that the state can permit some religious 
expression, but that when it feels its legitimacy or stability threatened by specific 
religious groups, it does not hesitate to crack down on them (whether successfully or not) 
(cf. David Palmer 2007; Nancy Chen 2003; Madsen 1998). Still others focus on the 
psychological need for religious and ritual life after traumas like the Cultural Revolution 
or to deal with the anomie of reform-era life (cf. Yang Fenggang 2005). While some 
argue that the rapid revival of religious ritual shows that, on the ground, religious and 
ritual life never really disappeared, others emphasize that current religious and ritual life 
are more or less invented traditions that meet individual and corporate utilitarian goals 
(cf. Helen Siu 1989, Emily Chao 2000, Liu Xin 2000).  
 Consequently, to say that traditional folk death ritual and religious ritual has been 
revived in funerals in Shanghai or that there are now religious ethics that serve as 
alternative sources for subject formation in China today is hardly a ground-breaking 
statement. Instead, the intriguing part of my fieldwork findings is about why and how 




people died as socialist subjects, religious subjects, and relational subjects when they all 
still perform socialist civil funerals (memorial meetings) and when the core ritual itself 
denies any recognition of spirits, afterlife, or gift exchange? In other words, what I 
analyze in this dissertation is the way that ritual, especially death ritual, works as a site of 
subject formation and how ritual provides for pluralist constructions of subjectivity.   
 I started this inquiry by examining how the CCP carried out funeral reform in 
Shanghai after the 1949 regime change. I showed how the funeral governing institution 
changed its early task of cleaning up dead bodies to instead begin to promote funeral 
reform and therefore started a process of what I called civil governance.  Specifically, by 
nationalizing the horizontal ties and intermediate entities that handled death and dead 
bodies and that stood between individuals and the state, the CCP isolated individuals 
from their various social affiliations so they came to be tied more directly to the state.  
 After eliminating these intermediate sources of identity, the CCP generated a new 
idea of person through the promotion of memorial meetings in state funeral parlors—the 
model socialist citizen. By performing modernist bodily movements (especially by 
bowing instead of kowtowing and permitting only solemn expressions of grief and 
mourning) and socialist verbal utterance (especially through the socialist dirge, the 
memorial speech, and the thank you speech), memorial meetings made everyone 
momentarily act as if they were all model socialist citizens.  
 This articulates two important characteristics of memorial meetings as a type of 
ritualized act. The first is its emphasis on social commitment to externalized acts instead 




of denotative meanings in performing ritual. We saw these two most clearly in the way 
that memorial meetings rehabilitate “cow ghosts and snake demons” into proper persons. 
As a result, I suggest that memorial meetings construct socialist subjectivity of both the 
living and the dead. Such death rituals provide a cognitive frame to ritual participants to 
understand what is being said and acted out in memorial meetings.    
 The irony of dying socialist in memorial meetings today is that the CCP has 
prohibited Chinese people (at least Party members) from performing memorial meetings 
since shortly after the Cultural Revolution ended. Meanwhile, as Shanghai (and other) 
funeral parlors were marketized, the CCP actually wanted people to shift to having 
personalized funerals. Personalized funerals were the funeral parlors’ solution to business 
competition from private funeral brokers and to the continued demand for them to carry 
out funeral reform. None of these has worked out on the ground. The majority of 
Shanghai people prefer to commemorate their beloved with memorial meetings that 
delineate the dead as model socialist citizens instead of personalized funerals that portrait 
the dead as autonomous individuals. It is against this background that we see memorial 
meetings (and their variations) actually taking root in Shanghai.  
 Consequently, why do Shanghai people die socialist after three decades of 
economic reform? The root cause is associated with the peculiar political economic 
structures of death in China in general and in Shanghai in particular. With Opening Up, 
the CCP transformed all funeral parlors from ineffective (in monetary terms) resource 
draining institutions into financially flourishing ones. However, funeral parlors 




promote funeral reform policies concerned with promoting cremation and eliminating 
“superstitions” and “feudalism” (associated with traditional and religious funeral). The 
trick was that they were now to do so in a way that generates profits. This institutional 
awkwardness (are funeral parlors for profit or non-profits?) is further complicated by 
another set of contradictions. That is, while funeral parlors should operate based on the 
market spirit of competition, they also remain a state monopoly.  
 The above two sets of contradictions have two direct consequences. First, this 
meant the formation of divergent interests between state practitioners and higher up 
managers and officials. While the latter might care about the political tasks of funeral 
reform (largely due to political pressure from above them), the former’s primary care is 
their monthly quota and bonus. This means that while higher up managers and officials 
wanted to direct the bereaved to move in certain directions that are also profitable, state 
practitioners just wanted to sell more by providing what the bereaved wanted.  The 
second consequence was that once state funeral parlors were caught in the role of being 
lucrative, money-making state institutions as well as “Non-Profit Public Service” state 
institutions, they lost legitimacy to dominate the performance of funerals. In other words, 
once death fell from a project of moral governance to a profit making business, public 
concern over profiteering made the state lose its legitimacy to dominate subject formation 
at the end of life. Meanwhile, the state’s ongoing monopoly provides extra incentive to 
state practitioners to do business in a way that they know will work.    
 Consequently, at an analytical level, I suggest that we see Shanghai people dying 




neoliberal governance. By continuing to act as if everyone was a model socialist citizen, 
Shanghai people construct socialist subjectivity for dead bodies on the one hand, while 
also realizing that they are no longer socialist on the other (otherwise they would not 
have to act as if they were). This dual process of becoming socialist and realizing that 
they are not after all creates a meta-level realization of the capitalist reality of their daily 
life. Meanwhile, it allows ritual participants to cross from market subjectivities to a 
socialist subjectivity in a public performance of this crucial rite of passage. When both 
dead and living bodies “regain” socialist social lives, they are reminded that that there is 
more than market subjectivity and a possible source of alternatives, however fleeting. In 
other words, as the state itself promotes “market” governance, actual opposition to the 
state is less linked to a triumph of capitalism or an embrace of liberal democratic values, 
and more safely expressed by clinging to socialist rituals.  
 This said, however, Shanghai people do not just die socialist today. As my 
opening story of Chairman Mao being both socialist proletarian leader and the resident 
deity of Prosperity restaurant symbolized, contemporary death ritual is a conglomeration 
of socialism and religion within socialist civil funerals. Memorial meetings today often 
contain religious ritual and gift exchange. This means that Shanghai people 
conceptualized the dead as socialist in conjunction with religious and relational 
subjectivity. This then poses an interesting question. How do incommensurable ideas of 
death and dead bodies co-exist? I suggest that religious and relational variations of 
socialist civil funerals are possible because they turn the meeting into one with modular 




socialism (classic memorial meetings). Even though the length of these religious and 
relational prefaces and appendices might be longer than the socialist book itself, they 
were nevertheless secondary, since they accepted the centrality of the socialist memorial 
meetings.  
 This characteristic of being modular is possible because, like the original socialist 
memorial meetings, what matters is the external social commitment. By de-emphasizing 
authenticity, sincerity, and denotative meanings, ritualized acts allow pluralist 
constructions of seemingly incommensurable ideas of self at the end of life. This 
argument is more clearly articulated when we see what happens when this modular frame 
starts to breakdown through Protestant memorial meetings. Wanting to take the preface 
and appendix approach a step further, Protestants wanted to re-write the socialist book 
itself with a message of Christianity. They do so because the primary goal of Protestant 
memorial meetings: to proselytize in order to create more “authentic and sincere” 
Christians. As a result, the denotative meanings of messages and acts spoken and 
performed in Protestant versions of memorial meetings suddenly become more important 
for this variation. The fact that this type of memorial meetings creates more conflict in 
Shanghai re-affirms how pluralism is more likely to be achieved when authenticity, 
sincerity, and denotative meanings recede within the motivating actions. Consequently, at 
comparative level, we find an interesting irony here. That is, high socialism and 
Protestantism actually share a similar idea of conceptualizing the self of the dead. They 
both strive to create a singularly defined and collectively shared subjectivity (the only 




sincere and authentic Protestant Christian). Meanwhile, popular religion and Buddhism 
(and to some degree, the contemporary “socialist” government) accepted plural ideas of 
the self of the deceased.      
 Theoretically, my work proposes a methodological shift in studying subject 
formation away from either governmentality and subjectification or the psychosocial 
experience of individual subjects and toward a focus on ritual. By re-orienting our site of 
exploration to ritual, we can see subjects created at the intersections where individuals 
commit themselves to externalized, conventional, and repetitive acts and where 
governing power and other normative forces interact with each other. It is through the 
rituals created and enacted in the frictional political economic relationships between state 
funeral practitioners, private funeral agents, and the bereaved that the final definition of 
the self of the deceased is made. While this does not replace a psychosocial 
understanding of subjectivity, this shift does provide a perspective from which to 
research plural processes of subject formation, their interaction, and their potential for 
conflict across multiple individuals. Finally, my dissertation enhances our understanding 
of how various ethical codes and their respective ideas of self relate to governance and 
social change in contemporary China as it undergoes its rapid economic development and 
social transformations. By studying how people die and are commemorated, we can 
better understand how they live and what they live for. 
 Under the CCP (and to some degree the Republican government, too), funeral 
reform is “one of the most salient aspects of the modern state’s intervention in private 




the dead in the lives of the living, no matter whether the former was thought to live 
among or separate from the latter, and the importance of funerals in the maintenance of 
social ties among the living in imperial China. It is in this context that we can begin to 
understand how, by changing funeral rituals, the CCP deliberately changed how its 
people perceived themselves in relation to their own selves, to others, to their ancestors, 
and to the Party/state. Linking death ritual and subjectivity is by no means accidental. 
After all, death is perhaps one of the most critical existential crises for both the living and 
the dead.  
 
Change and the Invariance  
 On May 28, 2014, the New York Times journalist, Didi Kirsten Tatlow, published 
an article about rumors that at least six elders committed suicide in Anqing City, in Anhui 
Province after the Anqing Civil Affairs Bureau announced its determination to implement 
Funeral and Interment Reform in that small city.  Rumors suggested that the suicides 
were precipitated after the local government confiscated the coffins the elders had 
prepared.219 This article reported that the suicides were a way both to protest the changes 
and to get into their coffins and graves before the change went into effect.220 Whether or 
not these elders were indeed committing suicide to avoid being sent into a funeral parlor 
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to be cremated,221 this 2014 incident reminds us that by no means is Funeral Reform an 
historical policy limited to China's high socialist periods.222  
 By the same token, memorial meetings are by no means exclusive to high 
socialism as well. Several scholars have asked me whether contemporary Shanghai 
people continuing to “die socialist” is simply a “cultural vestige” or perhaps simply 
another proof of how funerals are “always the last thing to change” in any given society. I 
hope that by now my dissertation has shown not only that dying socialist is a 
contemporary phenomenon that really happened alongside and in correlation with the 
Opening Up, but also that death ritual changed rapidly over time. Particularly, I suggest 
that these changes were not only initiated and implemented by powers at the center—
both in terms of the original Funeral Reform efforts and again in terms of the decision to 
marketize funeral parlors during China’s entrance into its market economy—but also 
instigated and brought about in the particular ways they emerged by powers at the 
margin, by private funeral brokers. What makes marginality especially powerful is its 
fragility. Dues to funeral brokers’ structurally fragile middle position as well as their own 
feeling of being fragile, they pushed death into a moral vacuum on the one hand, and 
created a platform for religious and relational morality to re-join the socialist funeral on 
the other. The importance of this fragile middle position, along with its accompanying 
moral ambiguities and ambivalences, show how social change is neither a top-down nor 
bottom-up process. Instead, certain social fields such as death ritual (or, at another level, 
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funeral brokers themselves) work like a node where multiple, sometimes contradictory 
forces, move in and out to make change happen. I think that the fragile middle (funeral 
brokers) is the key to directing the trajectories of these forces as they intersect in the 
node. This type of description, moreover, helps to deconstruct the analytical dichotomy 
of  “the state” versus “society,” “the state” versus “the market,” or “tradition” versus 
“invention” in analyzing religious and ritual revival. Perhaps more importantly, it 
reminds us that social change and change makers under authoritarian regimes need not 
necessarily be inherently “liberal” or even “moral” even though the result may be an 
increase of diversity.     
 Though funerals might not be the first thing to change, at least in China they 
certainly have not been the last thing to change either. Memorial meetings might appear 
to be “paleosocialist,” especially considering the decline of work units since the 
introduction of economic reforms. For Shanghai people, however, this socialist civil 
funeral is what a modern urban funeral ought to look like. Their way of commemoration 
signifies their privileged status of being urban and Shanghai residents. From funeral 
professionals’ perspective, Shanghai funeral ritual and funeral parlors are actually the 
future, not the past, of Chinese death ritual and the Chinese funeral industry. One state 
practitioner told me, “it is just a matter of time before other places catch up.” 
 The continued and increasing efforts at establishing (state) funeral parlors to take 
over the handling of dead bodies all over China provides another piece of evidence to 
confirm Shanghai as an imagined linear future destination since funeral parlors here are 




Chinese national funeral industry follows Shanghai and the Shanghai funeral industry 
follows Longhua Funeral Parlor” (quanguo binzang kan shanghai, shanghai binzang kan 
longhua 全國殯葬看上海，上海殯葬看龍華). Whether or not the Shanghai model is 
really the future of the Chinese funeral industry and of Chinese death ritual is a question 
to return to in a decade or so. What matters here is that dying socialist, funeral ritual, and 
funeral parlors in Shanghai are not cultural survivals that have remained unchanged. 
Quite the opposite, death ritual is a contemporary response to the economic reforms 
wherein state institutions have had to make profits, boundaries of moralities have been 
contested, and different ideas of self flow in and out. Ritual might appear to be invariant, 
yet they change just like other aspects in daily life and in their changes, when we pay 
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Funerals and their Religious Variations in Shanghai, China,” at the 2014 Annual 
Workshop in Applied Ethics, October 3-5, at Northeastern University.  
 
2013 “Edge Ball Politics and Amoral Agents: Private Funeral Agents and Ritual 
Change in Shanghai, China,” November 20-24, at the American Anthropological 
Association Annual Meeting in Chicago. 
 
2013 “Transforming the Dead and Constructing Socialist Subjectivities: Dying Socialist 
in Shanghai Memorial Meetings,” June 13-16, at The Social Lives of Dead Bodies 





2012 “Dying Socialist in Capitalist Shanghai: Memorial Meetings, Death Ritual, and 
Perceptions of Self in Urban Chinese Funerals,” May 11-12, at the Society for 
Cultural Anthropology Spring 2012 Meeting, “Life and Death: A Conversation” 
in Providence. 
 
2009 “Motion of Modernity: Railroads as the Threshold of Nationalism in China,” at the 
Society for East Asian Anthropology Conference, July 2-5, in Taipei.  
 
2007 Co-authored (with Joseph Bosco), “Discovering Tradition and Authenticity: The 
Growth of a History and Folklore Association in a Taiwanese Township,” March 
22-25, at the Association for Asian Studies Annual Meeting in Boston.  
 
2006 “Dangerous Consumption, Intersecting Identities: Gender, Class, and Social 
Identity in Betel Nut Use in Taiwan,” November 15-19, at the American 
Anthropological Association Annual Meeting in San Jose. 
 
2006 Co-authored (with Joseph Bosco and Matthew West), “Underground Lotteries in 
China: The Occult Economy and Capitalist Culture,” November 15-19, at the 
American Anthropological Association Annual Meeting in San Jose. 
 
2006 “Betel Nut Consumption in Contemporary Taiwan: Gender, Class and Social 
Identity,” July 13, at the Society for East Asian Anthropology Conference, “East 
Asian Anthropology and Anthropology in East Asia” in Hong Kong. 
 
2006 “Betel Nut Consumption in Contemporary Taiwan: Gender, Class and Social 
Identity,” February 16-18, at the 5th East-West Center International Graduate 
Student Conference, “Sustaining a Resilient Asia-Pacific Community: Issues and 
Solutions” in Honolulu. 
 
2001 Co-authored (with Wang Jiwei et al.), “A Comparative Study of Newspaper and 
E-Newspaper Reading Habits among College Students (in Chinese),” April 28, at 
the Development and Vision of the Internet Media Conference in National 
Taiwan University, Taiwan.  
 
Invited Presentations 
2014  “Death Ritual as a Site of Subject Formation: Religious Variations on Socialist 
Funeral Ritual in Shanghai, China,” September 23, at the Fairbank Centre in 
Harvard University. 
 
2013 “Award Wining Teaching,” at the International Teaching Fellows Orientation, 





2009 “Motion of Modernity: Railroads as the Threshold of Nationalism in China,” at the 
conference Crossing Space and Making Boundaries: Anthropological Perspectives, 
July 1, at the National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan.  
 
2008 “Contradicting Modernities: Consuming Betel Nut in Taiwan,” at the conference 
Charismatic Modernity: Popular Culture in Taiwan, October 4-6, at the University 
of South Carolina.  
 
2007  “Masculine Taiwanese Men: Betel Nut Consumption in Contemporary Han 
Chinese Culture (in Chinese),” May 25, at the Institute of Austronesian Studies, 
Taitung University, Taiwan.     
 
2006  “Betel Nut Consumption in Contemporary Taiwan: Gender, Class and Social 
Identity (in Chinese),” June 14, at the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, 
Taiwan.  
 
Public and Volunteered Presentations 
2014 “Death Ritual as a Site of Subject Formation: Religious Variations on Socialist 
Funeral Ritual in Shanghai, China,” February 19, at the Anthropology 
Department in Boston University. 
 
2009 “End of Life and Self-Formation: Ritual and Death Industry in Contemporary 
China,” October 2, at the Anthropology Department in Boston University. 
 
2009 “Motion of Modernity: Railroads as the Threshold of Nationalism in China,” 
February 13-14, at the Conference on East Asia in Boston University. 
 
2006 “Being a Real Man in Taiwan: Masculinity and the Chewing of Betel Nut,” June 
29, for the Hong Kong Anthropological Society at the Hong Kong Museum of 
History.  
 
2006 “Betel Nut Consumption in Contemporary Taiwan: Gender, Class and Social 
Identity,” March 17, at the Anthropology Department in the Chinese University 
of Hong Kong. 
 
LANGUAGES 
Native Mandarin (read, spoken, written), Fluent English (read, spoken, written), 
Proficient Holo (Fujianese) (spoken), Proficient Shanghainese (spoken), Fair Cantonese 
(spoken), Basic Korean (spoken). 
